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This thesis critically examines the political economy of the post-2006 land rush in the 
regions of Saint-Louis and Louga, in the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal. Through 
a comparative case-study approach, and a feminist lens, it investigates the following 
questions: i) How and why did the land rush take place in Northern Senegal’s horticultural 
sector? ii) What are the roles of the different stakeholders at different levels?  iii) What 
are the differentiated outcomes of interactions between “emerging” and “old” classes of 
capital and labour in this context?  Drawing on my own original data – collected over 2 
years through my multi-methodological approach including 7 months of immersive 
fieldwork in villages in Northern Senegal and visits to UK branches of the three selected 
companies - I investigate the global-local dynamics of agrarian change in northern 
Senegal. I do so with a longue durée approach to understand what yesteryear processes 
have sedimented to engender the contemporary land rush, and with what consequences. 
 
 I argue that workers are not being exploited in a vacuum, and challenge constructions of 
a genderless, undifferentiated “local community” that falls prey to an “undifferentiated 
capital”. Rather, I unpack the multidimensional outcomes that have occurred in the 
decade following the land rush by focusing on social differentiation from below (workers 
or classes of labour), from above (classes of capital), and on the wider Anthropocene 
beyond markets. This leads me to conclude that the post-2006 land rush in the Senegalese 
agricultural sector has exacerbated the pre-existing dynamics of agrarian change. The 
main contribution of this thesis is that it is one of the first pieces of research to provide 
empirical evidence on what happens “beyond the hype” of land deals in Francophone 
West Africa with empirical evidence from private investors, political and traditional 
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Pikine, densely populated city in the suburbs of Dakar. 
A bulldozer had just knocked down houses. The woman watched helpless. She just 
finished building her house, and was looking forward to moving in. Everything was now 
in shambles. Not just her house, her dreams too. She lamented to my mother that she just 
finished building it, and that she was looking forward to moving in. In her despair, my 
mother who just acquired the plot of land next to her’s, from the local Lebu chiefs, felt 




She returned home from her appointment with the trader. He too lost land. Not one plot 
like her, but more than 20, and a few houses. He had become the spokesman of the 
movement. To reclaim the lands the state had taken a few years ago to build a new 
highway. I found it funny, that a capitalist would be the spokesman of such a movement. 
“Only in Senegal, I thought”. My mom was pensive. I asked her what she was thinking 
about. “Nothing” She said. Then, after a few minutes: “Five years ago, when I watched 
that woman crying over her demolished house, I felt lucky. Little did I know then that I 
would be on the third list”. Each list had approximately 20 names. On the first, were those 
who were to be compensated first, on the third, the last ones. 
 
February 2008 
Several citizens’ demonstrations took place in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and Douala 




It was the turn of Senegalese and Ivoirian citizens to take to the streets. Pikine and 
Guédiawaye never disappointed me: I always thought they were the pulmons of Senegal. 
In Senegal, the price of the most consumed yet largely imported food crops and grains 
had rapidly increased, putting pressure on the livelihoods of the poorest in particular. My 
mom told me the events were called “food riots” or “riots against the expensive cost of 
life”. I followed all that from afar: I was too busy hunting for summer jobs, as a student 
in France. 
 
Sometimes in 2014 
 
I was in London, studying for an MSc. The lecturer asked me: “What does mbindaanu” 
mean? I looked at him. Not surprised that he would ask me that question: he researched 
Senegal before I knew I wanted to do “research”. But that he would know the deep sense 
of that particular term. I smiled. I was loving SOAS, and discussing everyday concepts 
of deep Senegal with someone who had lived and done research there.  
I was happy that day, I got a good grade, for an essay, on land grabs. Yes. Me! While still 
un-learning to write essays with a “Frenglish style”. 
 
April 2016 
I am in London, preparing for my MPhil upgrade. All students had to present a summary 
of their PhD project. As I was preparing, my mother called me on Whatsapp. I told her I 
was nervous. She did not believe me. I told her the topic of my research: “land deals”. 
She laughed: “I see you are always an activist. Are you researching that topic because of 
my land?” 
“Your land? What do you mean?” 
I had somehow forgotten deep inside. Completely. About that land. My PhD was about 
large-scale land investments and the rise of export horticulture, in the Senegalese 
countryside. I thought I “re-discovered” that interest when I was working at a research 
institute, based in Dakar. I organised and attended conferences on it. I also read papers 
on it, including from my supervisor. I thought that was it. My mom’s story inhabited me, 






I first met them in London. We are discussing. They asked me why I was interested in 
coming to the village to conduct research. “I don’t know. I majored in Labour during my 
Licence in France. And I am passionate about “the land rush” too.” They did not seem 
convinced. And over the two following years. None of my respondents from the villages 
I lived with seemed convinced. That I did not have an ulterior, hidden, motive. Neither 
were the investors, who kept asking me if my parents were from the Delta of the river, 
and if that was the reason for my interest in “Large-scale land-based investments” 
(LSLAs henceforth). Or the families who welcomed me, and my baby, and later, my 
sister, and my uncle. “How strange: So, all of you (grown-up as you are) travelled just to 
come ask us questions about “land grabs”, et voilà? And with a baby? (silly woman! 




I was struggling. With the writing up. I “Whatsapped” my mom, to find motivation, or 
inspiration. I asked her what land meant to her. She responded: 
 
“Land means first of all security. It is a space to which I identify my ancestors, 
my parents and myself, a space that allows me to live in symbiosis with my family 
and my friends. But that land is the fruit of my savings, of so many years, lost to 
the State “for public utility” ... Well, I won the battle. I have recovered my land. 
It is part of your heritage, material and immaterial.” 
      
Yes, my mother, (as you do know now) lost her land to the State over 20 years ago and 
was only able to recover it recently, in 2017. But, now you also know, that I cannot claim 
with certainty that this is how the “land thing”, “l’affaire foncière”, began. I just know 
that for me, the personal is political. 
This phenomenon has been interchangeably called “land rush”, “land grab”, “land deals” 
and “LSLAs” in the relevant literature, just as I did. It gained considerable scrutiny after 
a general interest in farmland acquisitions in both local and international media1 after the 
2007/8 commodity prices boom. The 2008 GRAIN Report Seized! documented over one 
hundred cases of “land grab” and said they were driven by food security and financial 
 
1 Prompting what Oya (2013) dubbed the “literature rush” (a sudden expansion in the volume of 
publications and media reports on the topic). 
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returns as more private equity and hedge funds sought to acquire land which they 
considered THE new strategic asset, after oil. Following the 2008 food crisis, an inflation 
of continental development initiatives targeting land and agriculture has been observed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA henceforth)2. The World Bank’s 2011 Rising Global Interest 
in Farmland (RGIF) further documents the scale of the rush, estimating land deals to have 
involved 4 million hectares by 2008. Moreover, approximately 56 million hectares of 
large-scale farmland deals were announced before the end of 2009, of which two-thirds 
were in SSA (Deininger et al, 2011). 
 
In this study, I use the term land rush, “land grabs” or land deals to refer not only to the 
renewed interest in land, but also the spectacular increase of investments in export 
horticulture that seeks to transform land into capital through Global Value Chains (GVCs 
henceforth). Section 1 defines and discusses these concepts considering agrarian studies 
and political economy literatures. Section 2 explains the genesis of this research, 
explaining why I focus on Senegal and outlining my main research questions.  Section 3 
identifies the main research gaps in critical agrarian studies and how this thesis aims to 
address them. Section 4 presents the structure of the rest of this thesis. 
1.2. What is a ‘land grab’? Anatomy of a concept. 
 
A survey of the existing literature highlights a lack of consensus on key concepts and 
terms (Cotula 2009; De Shutter 2011; Deininger et al. 2011; Edelman et al. 2013, Hall et 
al. 2013, Kaag and Zoomers 2013; Oya 2013a). Since 2008, several research publications, 
non-governmental organisations (NGO) documents and media reports have sought to 
make sense of “land grabs”, focussing on their speculative dimensions and ideas of social 
justice. The term “land grab”, has been defined by the International Land Coalition (ILC 
henceforth) as a land acquisition or a concession that does one or more of the followings: 
(i) violate human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; (ii) not based on 
free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users; (iii) not based on a 
 
2 These include the Land Policy Initiative in Africa, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) and the Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want implemented under the leadership of the 
African Union (AU)  
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thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental 
impacts, including the ways in which they are gendered; (iv) not based on 
transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about 
activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; (v) not based on effective 
democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation (ILC 
2011).   
“Land grab” also includes different types of appropriation such as “green grabbing” or 
“water grabbing”. “Green grabbing” – a term coined by John Vidal in 2008 – is defined 
as the “appropriation” or “acquisition” of land and resources for environmental ends; an 
emerging yet growing practice based on the assumption that land needs protecting 
(Fairhead et al. 2012: 238). Such grabs are intended as a form of “economy of repair”: 
despite the motives of nature conservation and sustainability, this practice remains 
contentious. The term “water grabbing” refers to situations in which powerful actors are 
able to seize control of water resources for their own gain, and at the expense of previous 
users or the ecosystems on which those users’ livelihoods were based. It involves the 
capturing of the decision-making power regarding water, including the power to decide 
how and for what purposes water resources are used, now and in the future (Franco and 
Kay 2012: 2). While the first phenomenon appears to be new, the second is not. The 
difference is that contemporary commodification of water resources is now subject to 
international law and other new government mechanisms. 
To add a level of complexity, “land grab” is now coupled with, or replaced by, terms that 
describe some of the things land grab does such as “control grabbing”: the grabbing of 
land rights (access, use and transfer) and “production grabbing”, appropriating what is 
produced on land through contract-farming for instance. However, the means mobilised 
by investors to gain, maintain access to, and benefit from such resources often involve 
legal and illegitimate practices (Borras et al. 2012: 405; Franco, 2014:3). Deals may 
sometimes be unfair, yet legal.   
An LSLA is often conflated with a “land grab” a priori (LG henceforth) due, in part, to 
the force of the “land grab narrative”. LSLAs are defined as acquisitions including 
“purchase of ownership rights, but also the acquisition of user rights, for instance 
through leases or concessions, whether short or long-term” (Cotula 2009:17). The term 
“acquisition” may be misleading as most such transfers in Africa are in the form of long-
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term leases, due to legal and customary tenure systems, with rare cases of outright 
purchase (Cotula, 2013; Schoneveld 2011:13). What is understood as an LSLA is varied 
and depends on local context as well as researchers’ methodological choices. Some 
researchers have used scale/size, for example, an IIED report from 2009 focused on deals 
above 1000ha (Cotula et al. 2009: 17). Another study on Ethiopia defines LSLAs as those 
including more than 2000ha while transactions involving less than 500ha qualify as 
“small scale” (Rahmato 2011:12). For capitalist agriculture, what matters most is business 
scale (annual turnover or total investment) rather than farm size. 
 
Land Matrix’, the leading international repository on LSLA established in 2009, chooses 
to use the term “land deal”. It defines it as: 
an intended, concluded or failed attempt to acquire land through purchase, lease 
or concession that meet the following criteria: i) entail a transfer of rights to use, 
control or ownership of land through sale, lease or concession; ii) have been 
initiated since the year 2000; iii) cover an area of 200 hectares or more; and v) 
imply the potential conversion of land from smallholder production, local 
community use or important ecosystem service provision to commercial use.3   
With SSA’s complex land tenure systems, focusing on size alone may not be the right 
approach; the “fetishization of hectares” is not productive and may be misleading” 
(Edelman 2013: 497). For example, planned activities and investments are also relevant, 
although it is hard to obtain indicators of scale (Cotula et al. 2014: 910). Land deals may 
not be large-scale but can still be relevant if the capital involved is substantial by 
comparative standards, or if they are a conglomerate of smaller acquisitions involving 
various actors (Borras 2013: 404; Kaag and Zoomers 2014: 3). For Bernstein (2010: 93), 
size alone is no longer a relevant measure of scale since in modern capitalism, farm 
capitalisation is more relevant a criterion. He defines it as “the amounts of capital required 
to establish different types of farming (entry costs) and to reproduce them”. 
The term “investment” is more “positive” and implies future benefits, greater revenues 
or incomes and value appreciation. In the agriculture, such investments may generate 




employment creation, increased infrastructure and greater knowledge, all contributing to 
improved levels of rural and national economic development. Uses of the term 
“agricultural investment” reveal another problematic facet of the “land grab” literature, 
the binary between foreign verses domestic investment. Whilst there is a consensus that 
all types of investment matter for socio-economic development, especially in developing 
countries, what divides scholars is whether foreign direct investment (FDI) is preferable 
to other sources of investment (Farole and Winkler 2014: 9).  
The growing interest in horticultural export and agro-processing appears to be justified 
with the pessimism about the replicability of East-Asian types of manufacturing in SSA 
(Mkandawire 2001), states that would paradoxically display a certain level of “Embedded 
autonomy” (Evans 1995). Horticultural exports are now being defined as alternatives to 
manufacturing: “industries without smokestacks”, alongside with other tradable services 
such as tourism, transport and IT (Newfarmer et al 2018). Whether countries should opt 
for policies that favour domestic investments, by targeting “self-reliance” is debated. In 
Senegal, for example, evidence suggests the pro-poor nature of FDI in the fresh fruits and 
vegetable (FFVs) sector (Maertens et al. 2009). For instance, Ndikumana and Blankson’s 
find, that the source of investment does indeed matter, and that SSA should improve their 
financial intermediation environment as well as internal savings mobilisation in order to 
encourage domestic investment rather than dependency on FDI (2015). Rodrik, on the 
contrary, is of the opinion that: “one dollar of FDI is worth no more (and no less) than a 
dollar of any other kind of investment” (Rodrik 2003, cited in Moran, 2005: 281).  
There is competition in SSA, to attract FDI through developing more “enabling business 
environments” with numerous investment codes, investment promotion and Émergence 
strategies (Jaffrelot 2008). This could be explained by domestic capital accumulation 
levels not yet being at the desired levels to spur enough economic growth, especially in 
sectors that are not yet developed, which makes FDI a less risky source of private capital 
more resilient to exogenous shocks. Notwithstanding, the main rationale for states to seek 
FDI is the promise of spill-overs: both horizontal (diffusion of knowledge from 
multinational affiliates to domestic firms in the same industry) and/or vertical (in another 
industry) spill-overs, technology, knowledge and other benefits that local actors gain from 
linking into global markets (Farole and Wrinkler 2014: 9-10).   
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Comparisons of Ghana, Vietnam, and Mozambique’s agribusiness sectors find that FDI 
in Vietnam procures more locally, on average, than FDI in the other countries and that 
the agricultural production segment of the value chain offers more spill-over effects as 
domestic farmers are fundamental to international firms’ activities in the sector (Farole 
and Wrinkler 2014: 203-204). The relative benefits of foreign verses domestic 
investments depend mainly on the social, political and economic contexts in which they 
take place. 
1.3. What do we know about “land grabs” in Senegal? 
 
Senegal reaffirmed its commitment to improve food security and agricultural productivity 
with a focus on food self-sufficiency post-2008. Interestingly, horticultural growth in 
Senegal has been particularly rapid in the last ten years, partly coinciding with the “land 
rush”, with symptoms sometimes similar to a “land grab”.  
 
The literature on Senegal reveals that research undertaken on the “land rush” is quite 
recent. The emerging interest in “land grab” issues can be related to political and 
economic developments in Senegal and is explored below as contextual stylised facts.  
 
First, large-scale development models have been encouraged as a means for developing 
countries to boost their agricultural sector and improve food security and rural 
infrastructure since independence4 (Faye et al. 2011; Oya et al. 2013; SCA 2007; SNDES 
2010). The agricultural sector is thus expected to generate export revenues after the major 
groundnut production crisis led to a steady decline in the export contribution of groundnut 
products. Almost coinciding with the beginning of the ‘land rush’, President Wade’s 
liberal government responded to the 2008 food price crisis by launching special initiatives 
in the agriculture (discussed in chapter 5). The opportunist behaviour of national and 
foreign investors in response to the incentives around such programmes and initiatives by 
the state has been examined by recent scholars (E.g. Dieng 2017; Faye 2011; Kaag et al. 
2011; Oya et al. 2013). Agricultural performance has improved in the last decade years, 
boosting national growth rates from 2.5% in 2006 to 6.8% in 2017 after two decades of 
limited structural transformation (World Bank 2018). Yet, access to land and negative 
 
4 Though the history of Senegalese agriculture does not start in 1960 as we will see in chapter 3. 
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labour productivity remain a challenge (Ibid). However, the scope and extent of linkages 
between local transactions and national development policies needs to be better 
documented.   
 
Second, is the rise of export horticulture. By cultivating a discourse of “national 
development” centred around the current growth and development strategy Emerging 
Senegal Plan (PSE), the government has initiated and encouraged policies to generate 
resources through increasing the production of rice, onion, groundnut and off-season 
fresh fruits and vegetables (FFVs henceforth) for export while at the same time 
responding to the national demand. The National Strategy for Food Security and 
Resilience (SNSAR 2015-2035) encapsulates this strategy with the aim of exporting a 
volume of 157,500 tonnes to Europe in 2017.   
 
Third, there is a suggestion that many deals were reportedly operated by - and in many 
instances for - Government officials, politicians and religious leaders5 especially in pre-
elections periods, such as 2009 (Kaag et al. 2011). The ruling classes’ (religious and 
political) exploit their power to facilitate or take part in land accumulation, illustrating a 
case of “politicised accumulation” (Berry 1993: 67; Boone 1992).  
 
Fourth, the processes of such deals have also attracted attention. Transparency is one of 
the key dimensions of the ILC definition of “land grab”. Problems related to the gaining 
(or not) of informed consent from “local populations” has been widely denounced, as has 
the level of secrecy around land deals (Faye et al. 2011). Hence the need to research early 
outcomes. 
 
Fifth, successive land legislation changes combined with the existence of unclear 
concepts in current law has facilitated the land rush. The 1964 national Land Domain 
Law (LDN) is still in force. Despite its abolition of customary rights for farmers and 
imposition of formalisation through titling, this law has never been reformed. Central to 
understanding how the State makes use of an unclear LDN is the presence of deliberately 
unclear terms and concepts.  One such concept is that of “lack of productive use” of land, 
not clearly defined by the State that uses it to dispossess populations of their land rights 
 
5 Or Marabouts  
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without offering them much compensation in many cases (Niang 2004). This notion of 
“productive use” has allowed the state to seize any land for “public utility” or “public 
interest”. 
 
Sixth, is the “unfinished business” of decentralisation, which also affects current “land 
grab” dynamics. The 1996 and 2013 laws, which constitute respectively the Act Two and 
the Act Three of decentralisation, transfers authority over rural lands accounting for 95% 
of the national domain from the central State to rural communities. Neither the state nor 
the rural communities in charge have the economic means, the political will and human 
resources to enforce the law.  
 
Seventh, the restructuring of European markets towards the end of the 1990s, was to 
drastically transform horticulture increasing the power of retailers and vertically oriented 
agribusiness firms that had to comply with a plethora of global rules, practices and 
standards (Baglioni 2015; Maertens and Swinnen 2009). The development of Global 
Value chains (GVCs) appear to be double-edged for developing countries6 (Baldwin 
2011). The governance of GVCs defined as “the process of defining the functional 
division of labour along a chain” determined a range of entry barriers (Gibbon and Ponte 
2005: 200), has also changed considerably. With entry barriers tightening participation in 
GVCs, the FFVs sector is increasingly buyer-driven, forcing export companies to either 
be more competitive by controlling all the production through estates, produce for the 
domestic market with the possibility of using contract farming, or to disappear (Baglioni 
2015; Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200; Maertens and Swinnen 2009,). As a result, the Delta 
and the Valley of the River, have experienced on the one hand, the rise and fall of contract 
farming and the renaissance of estate farming.  
 
Eighth, as the result of 1970s agricultural crises, international economic and financial 
shocks, and climate change, Northern Senegal has heavily invested in large-scale 
irrigation infrastructure projects (Lavigne-Delville 1991), and have also experienced 
multidimensional (seasonal, clandestine, permanent, etc.) domestic, regional and 
 
6 On the one hand, it represents an opportunity for such countries such as SSA’s to industrialise earlier 
thanks to cheaper labour and other advantages which allow them to be more competitive, in addition to 
meeting required standards to access European markets. On the other hand, however, they might still 
struggle with the high costs induced by their “enrolment” in international markets if they choose an 
import-substitution path to industrialisation (Baldwin 2011).   
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international migration (Adams 1977; Ba 1992; Manchuelle 1997; Top 2014) and 
subsequently, of capital flows. As a result, a comprehensive analysis of local and global 
connections and disruptions of food, labour and capital, through rural exodus, migration 
and global food and value chains. 
 
Tacking stock of the above, my thesis examines the processes leading to land deals in 
Saint Louis and Louga, Senegal, and the outcomes of these land deals in the context of 
increasingly politicised capital accumulation, blooming horticultural rural labour markets 
and changing dynamics of migration which has an impact on food security and agrarian 
in the region. 
1.4.  Knowledge gap  
 
The land rush literature has moved from a “making sense” phase (Borras et al. 2013) and 
is now exploring themes that have been hitherto missing, such as the importance of an 
historical analytical framework, the implications of the land rush for agrarian change and 
capitalist development, the plurality of legal regimes (including the focus on trade and 
investment law to the detriment of human-rights law at the international level), the 
differentiated outcomes and reactions to land deals, and methodological challenges to 
current knowledge-building efforts (Anseeuw et al. 2013; Colin 2013; Edelman et al. 
2013: 5-11; Edelman, M. 2013; Ho and Hofman 2012; Oya 2013a; Oya 2013b; Scoones 
et al. 2013 ). 
 The definition of land grabbing and use of data has not been very rigorous, affecting the 
quality and veracity of findings (Edelman 2013; Oya 2013b; Pearce 2013;’ Scoones et al. 
2013). Therefore, the selection and use of secondary data, in a study such as this one, 
must be done carefully and data sourced credibly before joining “domain of the factual” 
(Denzin 2013; Mukherjee and Wuyts 2007: 241-253; Oxfam 2011,). A feminist political 
economy analysis of the land rush in relation to the development of capitalism in Africa 
in the “longue-durée” is still missing (Oya 2013a 2013b). 
This brief literature review suggests that there are still important knowledge gaps on the 
outcomes of land deals, both intermediate and long-term. The polarisation of the “land 
grab” debate makes it difficult to apprehend their global and local implications for 
processes of ongoing agrarian change. 
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1.5. Research question and Main contribution 
 
I focus on the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal because it is the leading commercial 
horticultural export-earning production zone besides the Niayes, Casamance and Dakar 
regions (Matsumoto-Izadifa 2008b, PADEN 2015: 5). Different from the Niayes of 
Dakar, which is a peri-urban area, the three case studies in this thesis take place in rural 
or semi-rural areas of the regions of Saint-Louis and Louga. Using evidence from these 
regions, my overarching research question is:  
 
How and why did the ‘land grabbing’ take place in the Delta and the Valley of Senegal 
River’s agriculture after 2006 and with what outcomes?  
 
Drawing on my own original data – collected over 2 years through my multi-
methodological approach including 7 months of immersive fieldwork in villages in 
Northern Senegal and in the UK, I focus on a contrastive case study approach of the 
outcomes of land deals with three big players in Senegal’s (export) horticulture: The First, 
Second and Third Companies (anonymised).  With a critical political economy approach, 
I ask: Who does what? Owns what? Gets what? Does what with it? And what has gender, 
age, ethnicity, marital status, nationality, and class got to do with it?   
 
This thesis demonstrates how political economy and social reproduction theory (SRT) 
can uncover the complex and differentiated nature of land deal outcomes. My analytical 
framework moves beyond the frequent polarisation of the “land grab” debate by trying to 
capture the intricate web of intertwined outcomes, which emerges relating to: i) dynamics 
of class formation from above (classes of capital) and from below (classes of labour); ii) 
the interplay of gender, class and ethnicity which I hope adds nuance to our understanding 
of the actors, while transcending dichotomous narratives of class-less winners and losers; 
iii) and the multidimensional nature of land-based relations and capitalisation of life, 
which affects “ways of being” , “ways of knowing”, and “ways of relating”, i.e. social 
norms, social relations and identity (indigeneity and belonging). 
The main contribution of this work is that it is one of the first academic studies to focus 
on in-depth analysis of socio-economic outcomes of ‘land grabs’ in Francophone West 
Africa with primary data collected not only from “the affected” populations who are the 
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usual interlocutors, but also the “usual suspects”: corporate powers and political decision-
makers. This hopefully contributes to the emerging literature offering more nuanced and 
critical perspectives in the “land grab” debate. 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
 
The first four chapters set the scene of this research: Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical 
concepts and themes underpinning this research and surveys the literature, situating the 
key knowledge gaps to present the main contributions of this thesis to the current body 
of knowledge on the land rush. Chapter 3 offers a historical overview of tenurial and 
labour relations, focusing on Waalo and Kajoor, the Kingdoms which historically 
occupied most of the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal Region. It also documents 
the rise of the horticultural (FFVs) sector despite the absence of a coherent package of 
policy measures to boost it, and the stylised facts about the main case studies. Chapter 4 
focuses on the methodological choices and questions through a feminist agrarian political 
economy lens providing an extended reflexive account of fieldwork.  
The remaining chapters present empirical evidence and findings and are based on a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research. Chapter 5 examines processes of the 
land rush by focusing on i) the modus operandi of most investors, ii) the contents of the 
agreements, their governance mechanisms, and negotiation, iii) and the nature and roles 
of actors in the negotiation. Chapter 6 analyses the variegated layers of power involved 
at each level of the national and local political economy, and how they intersect with 
labour regimes and managerial ethos to mobilise, discipline and control the labour force 
socially and spatially. By investigating encounters between local populations, including 
workers and private agribusiness capital, I analyse in Chapter 7, the dynamics of agrarian 
change and social differentiation which occur as outcomes of land deals and argues that 
these “classes of labour” are not being exploited in a vacuum. In doing so, I challenge 
constructions of a genderless and undifferentiated “local community” that falls prey to 
“undifferentiated capital”. Chapter 7 also offers an analysis of non-market outcomes of 
land deals in the horticulture in the Delta of the River, and argues for the need to go 
beyond the “coloniality of markets” and bring the social back in to analyse how land 
deals affect “ways of being and becoming”, and “ways of relating” (belonging) i.e. social 
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norms, social relations and identity. Chapter 9 summarises the thesis, discussing its main 





CHAPTER 2: ANATOMY OF THE 





In this chapter, I unpack the main conceptual and methodological debates discussed in 
the “land grab” literature. More specifically, I engage with arguments on agrarian change 
and relate these arguments to the dynamics and effects of land deals. I articulate my own 
critical position within both feminist and critical political economy literature.  
 
2.1. Understanding the politics of evidence 
 
2.1.1. What do we know about the land rush?   
 
The land rush is not the result of a “crises narrative”, as some NGO reports have presented 
it (GRAIN 2008; Oakland Institute 2011; OXFAM International et al. 2011,), or the by-
product of only one or two drivers such as the food or energy crises (White et al. 2012; 
Zoomers 2010). In SSA, the current land rush re-actualises old challenges in the form of 
new multidimensional investments (Alden-Wily 2012; Cotula 2013; Edelman et al. 2013; 
Nyong’o 2013; White et al. 2012; Woodhouse 2012). It has antecedents such as the 
concentration of land by domestic and foreign capital, massive privatisation of state and 
common lands, etc. involving high financialisation, the presence of non-Western 
competitors, relative autonomy of contemporary states and ability to organise and 
differentiate it considerably from the first “two waves” of land rush (Moyo et al. 2012: 
182).  
Arguments built on the triple crises narrative (food, energy and environment) and 
unprecedented economic growth in transition countries (GRAIN 2008; Matondi et al. 
2011: 9-10), or on imperialist or neo-colonialist narratives (Liberti 2013), show just the 
tip of the iceberg, since several intersecting processes: speculation, financialisation, 
urbanisation and industrialisation have together increased interest and investment in land 
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as a “new strategic asset” (Allan 2013; Anseeuw et al. 2012; Evers et al. 2013; Fairhead 
et al. 2012; Vidal 2008;). The reasons for these so-called “new enclosures” are many 
including economic, and ecological. A holistic consideration of all the geographic, 
political, ecological, cultural and socio-economic aspects, dubbed the “geo-logics” of 
land deals, is recommended (Carmody 2013: 120-133). The land rush is a complex and 
multidimensional issue brought about by many intersecting dynamics leaving even recent 
academics to ask whether these “grabs” were an “opportunity” or a “menace” (Alhassan 
et al. 2018). Put differently, it is a “development strategy” (Lavers 2012) happening with 
the complicity of the state, which becomes a “land grabber using the law as facilitator” 
(Alden-Wily 2012; Wolford et al., 2013), to facilitate accumulation by local and foreign 
businessmen (Hilhorst et al. 2011), or a “hyped and humane-made issue with hyped 
solutions” (Evers et al. 2013; Kaag and Zoomers 2014). The current land rush cannot be 
explained by a single story.  
The land rush has been followed by a parallel “literature rush” from the media, NGOs, 
think- tanks and academics globally. This prolific body of knowledge has been produced 
in two main phases. 2007-2012 corresponds to the “making sense” period characterized 
by the emergence of global online databases surveying the phenomenon, quick fieldwork 
studies from NGOs and activists to draw global conclusions on the rush and emerging yet 
timid scholarly publications (Edelman 2013: 1517-1531). During this phase, much 
attention was paid to the main drivers of the land rush, their processes, their location and 
the identity of the actors. More specifically, questions of what is the land rush? A “land 
grab”? What are the drivers? (Cotula 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Cotula et al. 2009; 2013; 
Deininger 2011; De Schutter 2011; White et al. 2012); Who is grabbing the land? Their 
nationality? (Brautigam 2012; Buckley, L 2013; Cotula 2011, 2013; Cotula et al. 2009; 
Faye et al. 2011; Hilhorst et al. 2011; Peters 2012); Where are the deals happening? 
Which countries? In rural or urban areas? Is it a new phenomenon? How are deals taking 
place? Who is facilitating it? Who is resisting it? How much is being grabbed? How do 
we count? (Alden Willy 2012; Cotula 2013; Deininger 2011; GRAIN 2008; Moyo and 
Patnaik 2011). The questions covered in this first phase are easier to investigate and this 
has been done in a short timeframe, not always with due respect to the principles of 
rigorous research.  
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The second wave of knowledge production emerged in 2013, after the Cornell Global 
Land Deals Initiative Conference. It challenged the limitations of the first wave whilst at 
the same time recommending the use of more rigorous research methods. It has first tried 
to investigate the impacts of land deals and their trans-local effects, the role of the state, 
conservation and underground realities (green and water grabbing and mining), reactions 
to land deals, governance challenges related to territoriality and authority, non-
agricultural drivers of the rush such as urbanisation, industrialisation, infrastructure 
development, etc. (Allan et 2013; Edelman, Wolford et al. 2013; Fairhead et al 2012; 
Franco et al. 2012; Hall et al. 2015; Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Li 2011; Margulis et al. 
2013: 5; Mehta et al. 2012; Woodhouse 2012). Secondly, it has challenged some of the 
assumptions formulated during the “making sense” phase, such as the scale of deals, the 
identity of the main investors, claims of negative impacts and displacements, 
generational, gender, livelihood and class implications; food and biofuel production, etc. 
(Alhassan et al. 2018 ; Behrman et al. 2012; Bräutigam et al. 2013; Cowaloosur 2014; 
Hall et al. 2015 ; Hofmann et al. 2012, Tsikata et al. 2010 ; Woertz 2013).  
 
2.1.2. How do we know what we know?  
 
The land rush literature is characterised by polarised debates, advocating for or against 
land deals, and is a battlefield of ideological claims structured along theoretical and 
disciplinary lines. This political charge is reflected in the naming of deals as “grabs” or 
“appropriation”, acknowledged by many authors who use the terms “deals” or “rush” 
instead (Anseeuw et al. 2012; Cotula 2012, 2013; Edelman 2013; Scoones et al. 2013, 
Holmén 2015; IDEP-UNISA 2013; Mpofu 2017; Oya 2013a, 2013b; Stein 2015). For 
example, Hubert Ouédraogo of the Economic Commission for Africa spoke on this topic, 
in 2013, at an international roundtable event in Addis Ababa. When reflecting on 
evidence-based land policy, Ouédraogo opted to use the term “LSLA”, arguing that 
“those in charge of post-colonial African states rejected accusations of involvement in 
land grabbing considering those deals as foreign investment in Africa’s land resources 
instead” (IDEP-UNISA 2013). 
The term “land grab” has been critiqued by some since land is often acquired at the 
invitation of, and with the support of, interested states – often using the law to facilitate 
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and regulate deals (Alden-Wily 2012; Cheru and Modi 2013; Evers et al. 2013; Lanz et 
al. 2018; Stein 2015; Wolford et al. 2013).  Since land deals are a relatively new 
phenomenon, it is still too early to characterise their outcomes as positive or negative. 
The research that does exist is of low quality; it is neither published in peer-reviewed 
journals or based on in-depth primary research, with evidence collected through rapid and 
short appraisals (Hofman and Ho 2012; Oya 2013). According to Oya (2013b), most 
existing publications report negative outcomes (60%) with a tiny fraction reporting 
positive outcomes (3%). Such arguments are undermined by those who, after recognising 
the political charge of the concepts of “grab” and “appropriation”, still use them to remind 
us of the stakes involved and grabbing potential (La Via Campesina 2012).  
 “Local communities”, “peasants”, “investors” or “small farmers” are often presented as 
a homogenous group, discounting individual interests and experiences and other 
significant factors such as gender, class, age and ethnicity. For instance, several studies 
have emphasised the differences within and between classes of farmers highlighting the 
fact that they are not a homogenous group (Bernstein, 2010; Bryceson et al., 2000; Moyo 
and Yeros, 2005; Oya 2002, 2004; Wolf, 2001a). In her study of Mbarali, Tanzania, Greco  
has critiqued simplistic generalisations about “local communities” and the risks about 
homogenising them, suggesting to consider rather the shifting class alliances at pla within 
proceses of accumulation from above though the state and private capital, and from below 
due to increasing social differentiation (2015: 225-244). Instead, they emphasize the 
shifting class alliances at play in processes of rural social differentiation and class 
formation from above (the state or private capital) and from below (classes of labour). 
Another study finds, for instance, Liberian NGO activists, with the participation of elders, 
to be mostly responsible for constructing the idea of a “homogenous African community” 
that ignores gender and generational differences (Gilfoy, 2015:185-205). This is despite 
most young people he interviewed having favourable views on the Sime Darby project 
which could provide them with new opportunities. As for NGOs, they were inclined to 
adapt their advocacy discourses to serve targeted policy and political objectives (ibid.). 
The categorisation of grabbers as foreign corporate businesspersons is facilitated by and 
reproduced in the biases of existing database, some NGO or academic advocacy 
publications, which are replete with North verses South categorisations as well as “pro-
nationalistic” or “David against Goliath narratives”, which do not pay sufficient attention 
 31 
to dynamics “from above’” through the role of governments and local businesspersons 
(Borras and Franco, 2013:1742).  
For authors who first highlighted the existence of such misleading binaries, 
condemnation of land deals by activists, rural peasant movements and NGOs is mainly 
based on dichotomies that qualify the land transactions as undesirable or dangerous a 
priori because they constitute a threat to ‘Merrie Africa’, perpetuating the opposition 
between large ‘predatory’ investors and smallholders, foreigners and locals (De Schutter 
2011). These binaries do not account for the heterogeneity of outcomes and actors 
involved and their sometimes diverging, converging, and overlapping interests. Binaries 
are unhelpful when trying to understand reality, since “actors are not operating in isolation 
but from mixed and blurred categories which are difficult to disentangle” (Kaag and 
Zoomers 2014: 201).  
In this section I have reviewed the current “land grab” literature, arguing that it is crucial 
to overcome the challenge of defining what “land grabs” are by responding to what they 
do and for whom? The methodological biases and empirical uncertainties discussed in 
this section mask important ideological and theoretical differences between participants 
in these debates. Indeed, the failure to provide more robust evidence on outcomes is not 
evidence of lack of outcomes, but a reflection of how theoretical preferences may blinker 
our empirical analysis of real phenomena in motion.  
 
2.1.3.  Why don’t we know more?  
 
This section argues that how we know about “land grabs” shapes what we know about 
them. Research is eminently political, and this affects its outcomes. Land is at the 
crossroad of the social, political and economic due to its “social embeddedness” (Polanyi 
2001). It constitutes a battlefield of methods and discourses: “Evidence is something that 
is concrete and indisputable, whereas politics refers to activities concerned with the 
acquisition or exercise of authority” (Morse, 2006: 395). Research on land grabs is further 
complicated by the multiplicity of sources, speculation, and reports that the “land grab” 
might be a declining phenomenon (Kaag and Zoomers 2014), along with a rush to find 
“killer facts” at the expense of high-quality methodology. This is discussed by Oya 
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(2013a: 505), who claims that a demand for sensational stories has led to “quick and dirty 
research”.  
 
 Advocacy’s own rationale and agendas are equally political. When considering the 
reliability of research, it is important to examine what the stakes are – especially regarding 
“messy hectares”, scale, actors, the “naming” of deals and silences regarding impacts and 
outcomes. This confirms that the political nature of research affects its methods and 
outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the rising convergence of evidence-building 
and the underlying politics of pushing agendas, resistance, contestation or success. 
 
Analysing the epistemology of existing datasets and sources of data on land is one critical 
step if our knowledge-building efforts are to be sustained. It is crucial that we interrogate 
the context and circumstances in which research is produced, including its goals, claims, 
target readership, geographical area targeted, implicit assumptions of the researcher, and 
even the silencing of other data.   Such efforts are in line with Edelman (2013: 494), who 
questions the over- or under-reporting of land deals by some media outlets, how 
information is obtained and leaked, and why the focus has been on some investors and 
not on others (see also Cotula 2013: 39). In Senegal for instance, I analysed data obtained 
from the global database on land deals, Land Matrix7 in 2013, along with a desk review 
of media articles and grey literature. I found the focus to be overwhelmingly on 
international investors, even in cases of collaboration between international and national 
partners (Dieng 2017). Subsequent use of the database in 2018 showed further 
improvement as crowdsourcing was now complemented by snowball sourcing in which 
the initial source serves as a starting point for further investigation, and reviewing of grey 
literature (Land Matrix website 2018; Nolte 2016: 4). This revision process might be the 
result of the critical debate emerging on the politics of evidence, such as in the 2012 




2.2.  Surveying the literature on impacts and outcomes 
 
The impacts and outcomes of any development intervention are difficult to assess. Socio-
economic impact is my main interest in this thesis. The International Institute for Impact 
Evaluation’s (3ie) defines “impact” as, “how an intervention alters the state of the world. 
Impact evaluations typically focus on the effect of the intervention on the outcome for 
the beneficiary population…” (2012:5). However, by considering outcomes as variables 
(medium-term effects of variables of interest), and impact as the change arising from 
those variables (3ie 2012), 3ie’s definitions of outcome and impact can create “confusion 
including within the impact evaluation community itself” (Belcher and Palenberg 2018). 
The Organisation for Economic Development, Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD DAC) defines “impact” as the “positive and negative, primary and secondary 
long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended 
or unintended” (OECD DAC, 2012:24)8. Outcome is “the likely or achieved short-term 
and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs” (OECD DAC, 2010: 28). Impact 
and outcomes are effects of an intervention. Where there is a sequential logic of causality 
between outcomes and outputs, impact is the result of a purposeful intervention, and may 
generate “unintended outcomes”, results that fall outside of the initial intention of the 
intervention (Jabeen 2018: 264). Impact is measurable yet requires the selection of a 
specific set of indicators as well as the factoring in of unintended outcomes. This makes 
credible and rigorous impact assessment rare due to the “myopia bias” in favour of 
projects that bring about quick results and lead to a focus on short-term effects (Ravallion 
2009: 32). Land deals are no exception. Their longer-term impacts are hard to assess, due 
to two methodological and epistemological challenges: finding ways to associate research 
questions with adequate methods and counterbalancing the effects of ideology in research 
questions and methods (Oya 2013: 1535-6).  
2.2.1. Time delay in implementation might shape outcomes 
 
Many land deals have only recently been implemented, meaning that their long-term 
impacts are yet to be known. Despite this, Cotula argues that researchers must not be 
complacent as such deals still exacerbate land pressures and create opportunities and costs 
 
8 https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf  
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(Cotula, 2013: 46) as a study of Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania reveals (Cotula et al. 2014: 
219). Data from the Land Matrix shows that in Senegal, in 2015, 26 deals were 
inventoried on the database, of which 14 were at a production stage, and 5 abandoned. 
One thing we can infer from this evidence is the significant uncertainty of land deals. The 
way the database provides information is biased, filters are automatically set to show oral 
and contractual transnational agreements, and one needs to ‘tick other boxes’ to have 
information on failed, intended and domestic deals. Uninformed users may be led to focus 
on concluded deals only, and not to question cases where contracts or negotiations have 
been cancelled and failures at implementation stage. Most databases are a work in 
progress. Thus, the data can lead users to focus in certain directions and may reinforce 
tendencies to take perceptions of outcomes as actual impact. 
2.2.2. Land deals have multidimensional outcomes 
 
Researching the effects of agricultural investment – or indeed of any kind of development 
– demands caution, since the outcomes can be time-bound and context-specific; shaped 
by the specific history of a place and its current political economy (Bebbington and 
Bebbington 2018).  This is illustrated by the case of Senhuile Senethanol, a Senegalese-
Italian Company which began its activities in Fanaye, Ronkh and Ngnith, in Senegal. This 
was after being granted 20000ha for the cultivation of sweet potato for biofuel production. 
The project was first stopped in 2013, due to an uprising by the local population who 
claimed negative outcomes. Three people were killed and Senhuile Senhethanol was 
relocated to Ndiael by the President. President Wade declassified protected reserves and 
granted the company 20000 ha, while the Senegalese citizens occupying 6650ha of the 
land were forced to relocate. President Wade’s successor, Macky Sall, immediately 
cancelled the project following his election. He later authorised it again, leading to new 
social mobilisations against the deal. The project was eventually stopped in 2014, but as 
of February 2016 its website remains active. The fact that the project changed its 
production from biofuels to food (peanuts, sunflower and food supplies for livestock) 
illustrates how project outcomes are shaped by external factors, such as the location of 
the land, including in its later stages - in this case leading to cases of displacement and 
claims of lost employment opportunities.  
This supports the argument of Borras and Franco:  that changes in land use affect 
outcomes depending on the pattern of the change, i.e. food to food, food to biofuels, non-
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food to food, or non-food to biofuels (2012).  Changes in land use are critical from a 
livelihood and agrarian change perspective. For other researchers, focusing solely on land 
use change is insufficient compared with studying the entire process of crop selection 
(White and Dasgupta 2010: 600-605).  It would be more productive to question the 
conditions under which crops are grown and processed, the type of ownership, labour 
regimes (as discussed below), segment of the food regime, type of commodity chains and 
the mechanisms in place to facilitate inclusive benefit-sharing (Ibid.).  
Outcomes may also be differentiated between and within categories of actors over time 
and space, with a sorting of winners benefiting from positive outcomes such as the local 
distribution of revenue flows, business opportunities or personal benefits (Sassen 2010). 
To access opportunities considered as rents, actors’ resort to everyday politics to 
influence outcomes. Hence, we can observe different reactions ‘from below’ to land 
deals, acquiescence, resistance and adverse incorporation (Borras and Franco 2013; 
Edelman et al 2013; Martiniello 2015). According to Hall et al., these community 
(re)actions depend on several factors such as pre-existing tenure systems, local land 
interests, the intensity of existing land-use conflicts, the transparency and smoothness of 
land acquisitions, the promises that are made, the landholding practices and business 
models of investors, the extent of new livelihood opportunities created and how broadly 
these are shared, and state and investor attitudes and responses to community concerns 
(Hall et al. 2015:19-21). Therefore, it is crucial to analyse both structure and the agency 
of subjects, as well as how this affects processes of agrarian change.  
In land deals, process outcomes have been framed as relating to dynamics of “inclusion” 
and “exclusion” leading to the finalisation or implementation of deals, terms of the deals, 
type of business model, selection of sites, choice of final produce (crops in the case of 
agricultural land deals), legal arrangements, benefit-sharing, etc. These are connected to 
the terms of the deal and how they change pre-existing relationships, for example 
regarding contracts, agreements and the ways in which the terms of agreement are 
enforced. This is the focus of seven studies focusing on Senegal, which report a lack of 
transparency and the state’s tendency to accept without discernment any business model 
proposed by investors to attract FDI (Cicodev 2011; Copagen 2012; Copagen et al. 2013; 
Kaag et al. 2011; IPAR 2012). Other studies focus on the social, economic, political, 
environmental, and even cultural outcomes. Such impact assessments correspond with 
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Shaffer’s mechanism-based approach, which emphasises livelihoods, social relations and 
agrarian change (Shaffer 2015). Such studies examine the outcomes on people’s lives and 
livelihoods, and other issues related to access to employment and markets (Cotula 2013; 
Kaag and Zoomers 2014; McCarthy 2010), displacement or dispossession (Cotula et al., 
2014; Hall et al., 2015), compensation (Cotula et al., 2009; Hall et al., 2015), human 
rights violations (Hall et al. 2015; Martiniello 2015; Shiva and Chomsky 2014), changes 
in inter and intra-class and gender relations (Behrman et al. 2012; Doss et al. 2014; Faye 
2012; Koopman and Tsikata 2009; Tsikata et al. 2014), patterns of agrarian change, 
(re)actions from below (Borras and Franco 2013; Hall et al. 2015; Martiniello, 2015), and 
responses from above to regulate deals (Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Kugelman et al. 2013; 
Margulis et al. 2013; Schutter 2011), as well as the ways in which land transfers impacts 
on belonging and identity (Kuba and Lentz 2006, Borras and Franco 2013).  
Recent research on Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique 
and Congo focuses on three aspects: i) loss of resources; ii) implications for livelihood 
activities and employment opportunities; iii) the distribution of social benefits (Hall et al. 
2015). Despite a promising approach that centres more on employment and livelihood 
outcomes, most case studies tend to report negative outcomes (or perceptions of 
outcomes) because they contrast real effects with unrealistic expectations of permanent 
employment. Some researchers seem to ignore the realities of rural labour markets and 
the intrinsic seasonality of agricultural wage labour including self-employment which is 
discussed in chapter 7. An emerging literature shows how more rigorous evidence on 
employment dynamics and understanding of the seasonal nature of these jobs requires 
analysis in terms of job quality, numbers, security and sustainability over time (Cotula et 
al. 2014; Oya and Pontara 2015).  
In this thesis, I unpack the differentiated agrarian change outcomes of land deals (since 
impact takes longer to materialise), as well as the perceptions of those living near to, or 
participating in, rural labour markets.  Analysing perceptions has proven to be a powerful 
method especially in poverty studies (Pradhan and Ravaillon 2000; Sen 1985). Despite 
this, I recognise that this needs to be complemented by other research methods to achieve 
a more holistic analysis and balance between real effects and subjective measurement. 
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2.3 Land deals do not happen in the vacuum: Global 
and local dimensions 
 
There is a need to understand land deals in the broader context of agrarian change and 
class dynamics in capitalist development. Agrarian political economy examines agrarian 
change through considering some key processes and analytical categories, namely 
peasant differentiation, class struggle, transitions to capitalism and production, 
productivity and rural labour markets in rural areas. As the Journal of Agrarian Change9 
makes clear in its mission statement, agrarian political economy is concerned with” the 
social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, property and power in 
agrarian formations and their processes of change, both historical and contemporary 
(Bernstein 2010: 1).  
 
2.3.1. The centrality of labour regimes  
 
The land grab literature has paid attention to the importance of labour regimes in shaping 
different outcomes for different classes of labour. Labour regimes are defined by 
Bernstein as “the interrelations of (segmented) labour markets and recruitment, 
conditions of employment and labour processes, and forms of enterprise authority and 
control” (2007: 5-7).  It is within the interaction of classes of labour and variegated classes 
of capital that most outcomes reveal their multidimensional nature. Burawoy’s definition 
of factory regime, is fruitful, in considering not only the wider social relations of 
production, based on the combination of capital and labour, but also the relations in 
production both at the international and national level and reproduction (Burawoy 1985, 
Mezzaddri and Srivastava, 2015:5). Such an approach allows us to understand how the 
international food regime defined as “a rule governed structure of production and 
consumption of food on a world scale” (Friedmann, 1993, 30-1) shapes the vertically 
integrated firm’s labour regime at the national and international level. The labour regime, 
dictated by the imperatives of the food regime through global commodity chains, shapes 
local valuation and segmentation of the labour force. Business/farming models shape 
labour regimes and thereby constitute an expression of the encounters between capital 
and labour. Consequently, class struggles emerge as a response, a counter-movement 
 
9 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14710366/homepage/productinformation.html  
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embodying local labour control regimes (LLCRs) which determines the forms of 
mobilisation and exploitation of labour (Pattenden, 2018: 1043; Baglioni 2018). This 
illustrates the relevance of business/farming models for this research being: i) estates or 
plantation farming; ii) outgrowing including contract-farming (CF)10.  
  
Estates or plantation farming is largely defined by the following characteristics: a focus 
on growing one main cash crop, their capital investment requirement, their larger than 
average size, their reliance on hired resident or migrant labour, and their central 
management (Smalley 2013: 17). A definition oriented to African contexts considers it, 
“a type of land ownership and use involving generally foreign investors producing 
tropical crops, mainly or wholly for export, with hired labour (Baglioni and Gibbon 2015: 
1559). As for contract-farming, it has been defined as a “form of vertical integration 
between agricultural producers and buyers (exporters, agro-processing companies or 
retailers at the end of the value chain” (Oya 2012: 2). The term “out-grower” is sometimes 
used interchangeably with the CF as it’s a form of production using hired external labour. 
It has been defined by Hall et al. (2011: 204) as, “involving the development of processing 
facilities (usually with a core commercially operated estate), through which small 
producers are incorporated into commercial value chains”. 
An important study surveying the evolution of plantation farming in 19 African countries 
suggests that the spread of plantation farming practiced in West Africa was unequal. The 
“golden age” of estates farming between 1920 and 1960 resulted in a substantial increase 
in crop production and area cultivated. The quantities of crops produced11 in the post-
1960 period dominated by small scale farming was reduced (Baglioni et al. 2015). Two 
striking and particularly relevant developments for this study are the rise of higher-value 
crops12, including fresh vegetables post-1980, and the increase of domestic capitalists 
owning estates (Baglioni et al. 2015). However crucial these developments are, they do 
not explain the difficulty of establishing estates in the contemporary period. For Dancer 
et al. (2015), this difficulty is to be linked with the historical association of plantations 
farming with processes of land expropriation, followed by displacement and loss of 
 
10 The colonist model also exists: the first one involving the introduction of commercial producers who 
take over a block or area, as has been seen in Southern Africa (Hall 2011: 204) 
 
11 Mainly cocoa, coffee, spices, copra, cotton and tobacco. 
12 Other higher-value crops comprise of cut flowers, citrus and grapes. 
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commons for previous users, such as in Kenya’s post-independence period. This can also 
be understood in relation to waves of land rush that have witnessed the state’s siding with 
(foreign) capital in the name of “agricultural modernisation” or “food security”, as is the 
case in Senegal. Estate agriculture has been characterised by low wages and poor working 
conditions (with the domination of casual employment), increased feminisation of the 
labour force, and higher levels of mechanisation which have had various effects on 
workers (Dancer et al. 2015: 14).   
 
Several African case studies comparing different types of labour regimes illustrate the 
effects of these models. A case study on Ghana’s largest fruit-processing company, Blue 
Skies, analysed employment patterns in the out-grower value chain system and found that 
while men occupied permanent position in the factories, as well as high-earning jobs in 
the value chain as out-growers, while women were employed as casual workers in these 
two spaces (Torvikey et al. 2016: 77-97). Another study comparing a Dutch-Ghanaian 
owned nucleus farm Integrated Tamale Fruit Company IFTC with two plantations, the 
Norway Solar Harvest Limited and the US-Ghana government partnership Prairie Rice, 
also found different outcomes (Tsikata and Yaro 2014: 46-64). Whilst land was 
previously managed through local chiefs or under family systems, after the deals, 
previous users were forced to either borrow land, engage in sharecropping, or clear new 
land. Most farmers interviewed agreed to become wage workers through “incomplete 
proletarianization” with jobs being casual (over 80% for Prairie and Solar Harvest and 
over 40% for IFTC - 58% of the jobs being permanent). This type of employment was 
considered an opportunity for some, while others regretted that it did not allow them to 
work on their own farm. Unsurprisingly, resistance came mainly from those who suffered 
the adverse impacts of land deals (rich urban migrant farmers from Tamale where IFTC 
operated and their women labourers). Access to employment contributed to the creation 
of new patterns of socio-economic differentiation. 
Case studies beyond SSA, also tend to provide evidence against “the win-win narratives” 
of contract-farming. Vicol (2017: 157-166) rejects narratives promoting CF as an 
inclusive alternative to “land grabbing” as was proposed by De Schutter (2011: 256) and 
(Braun et al. 2009; FAO 2013; Paglietti and Sabri 2013) based on a case study on potato 
production in Maharashtra where it resulted in the introduction of new modes of 
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production and accumulation in an already very socially-differentiated context. CF 
adversely incorporated farmers in “new relationships of capital, debt and power that often 
do not result in the pro-poor rural development outcomes imagined by some”, but a 
“complex mosaic of winners and losers amongst rural households” (Vicol 2017: 165). 
 
Much attention has been paid to other processes of rural class formation, including the 
so-called disappearance of peasants, de-agrarianisation (Bryceson et al. 2000; Moyo and 
Yeros 2005) and the implication of this for capitalist development (Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay 2010a, 2010b, 2009). Other studies suggest dynamics of semi-proletarianisation 
(Hall et al. 2015) and strategies of labour mobilisation and surplus value extraction by 
different classes of capital. Whether in the Senegalese Groundnut Basin (Oya 2002, 2004, 
2007) or in the Niayes area (Baglioni 2015), in the Ivorian cocoa sector and the pineapples 
market in Ghana (Amanor 2012), in the Mozambican tobacco sector (Perez-Nino 2016) 
or in the “super-exploitation” of Zimbabwean agrarian wage labourers (Chambati 2017), 
social classes are most likely to go through gradual and uneven transformations rather 
than just suddenly disappear. The unevenness and historical contingency of these 
processes of agrarian change are also determined by agency and negotiation by all actors 
- including peasants who are never totally constrained. Transactions, exchanges and 
social interactions are open-ended and multidimensional rather than single-stranded and 
definitive (Berry 1993: 13).  
2.3.2. Querying Capital’ and Capitalists 
 
The above discussion of labour regimes serves as a relevant entry point to the question of 
capital. This is so because labour regimes are one of the three dimensions of capital, the 
other two being the logic of accumulation and ethos of management, also discussed in 
this section (Lee 2017: xii). Indeed, much of the literature on land grabs focuses on scale 
when documenting land deals and investors. As demonstrated above, beyond the sole 
focus on hectares, it is also sensible to look at the capital involved as deals can be small 
or medium (by size) but involve significant capital (Borras, Franco et al. 2012: 851, 
Edelman 2013: 497; Mehta et al. 2012: 195,). Capital is central to examining processes 
of differentiation - both in a sociological sense (social class) – and in a material sense 
(social relations of production) (Bernstein 1977:67). How wealth becomes capital is key 
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even within classes of petty commodity producers, as they are not all “family13 farmers14” 
or even “peasant” despite the frequent conflation of the two in many contributions to the 
land grab literature (Bernstein 2010). Questions regarding to be asked concerning capital 
and capitalists are: What are the origins of capital and the accumulation background of 
the capitalists? What are their main drivers and motivations? What are the implications 
for broader questions of capitalist transition?    
Evidence on the origin of the capital is inconsistent because different studies choose to 
focus on one or two sources of investment rather than looking at “capital” in all its 
manifestations. Some studies focus on foreign corporate investors (Evers et al. 2013), 
some on foreign investors from the Global North, Europe and the US, and others 
emphasise the role of Gulf countries and China in sending investors to acquire farmland. 
This has led to biases and exaggerations, notably in relation to the case of Chinese 
investors (Bräutigam 2015; Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; Buckley 2013; Hofman and Ho 
2012). Other studies have stressed the role of acquisitions originating from the ‘South’; 
other middle-income developing countries in South-Easy Africa and countries such as 
India and Brazil (Woertz 2013: 104-119 in Allan et al 2013; Cotula 2013: 63). The 
narrative of ‘foreign grabbers’ has certainly contributed to the interest of mass media in 
the topic. 
What most first-wave studies of LSLA had failed to appreciate was the significance of 
domestic investors (Cotula 2013; Greco 2015; Hilhorst et al 2013). Baglioni and Gibbon 
(2013) stress the important role played by domestic or “African” capital, especially from 
South Africa, which has actively participated in the land rush. Domestic capital, they 
explain, remains cumulatively important as illustrated by at least 95% of all transactions 
in the Benin, Niger and Burkina Faso coming from local businesspersons and state agents 
or politicians. In Senegal, they found the big players in the export horticulture and 
groundnut sector to have had a major implication in such deals (ibid: 1562). Cotula (2013: 
52) argues land deals are not an externally-driven process but often result from internal 
historical processes of social differentiation and capitalist accumulation. This is, 
according to Cotula, the principal reason why deals are so opaque and fail to openly seek 
 
13 “Family is an internal social organisation based on family labour, whereby the family serves as the unit 
of production, consumption, reproduction, socialisation, welfare, and risk-spreading”(Bryceson et al 
2000:2). 
14 “A farm pursues an agricultural livelihood which combines subsistence production with commodity 
production” (Ibid.). 
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for prior informed consent. Research on the land rush in Burkina Faso and Mali post-
2007 has shown how urban inward investors increasingly acquire farmland using their 
personal contacts, networks and resources with only a few investors benefiting from state 
support (Hilhorst and Nelen 2013: 146-159). It is useful to try and reconceive of 
“investment chains”, to capture the multiplicity of actors and relations linked to a project, 
their locations, contribution, role, and the flow (upstream and downstream) and share of 
the financial gains. This allows for better outcomes and that pressure points (Cotula and 
Blackmore 2014: 1). 
The rising interest in farmland and the associated arrival of foreign or domestic capitalists 
revives an old debate about the obstacles to African transition to capitalism (Amin 1969; 
Austin 2005; Baglioni 2015; Berry 1993; Boone 1992; Hill 1963; Iliffe 1983; Kennedy 
1988; Sender and Smith 1986). Is the land rush an illustration that such obstacles are 
being removed? This is what Bernstein and Byres call the ‘production’ problematic in the 
agrarian question (Byres 1996: 26). Using Kautsky’s conceptualization of “the continued 
existence in the countryside, in a substantive sense, of obstacles to an unleashing of 
accumulation in both the countryside itself and more generally – in particular, the 
accumulation associated with capitalist industrialization” (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a). 
In the land grab literature, the focus is on labour outcomes (on-farm and off-farm 
employment creation), i.e. whether producers are dispossessed, and workers obtain jobs 
in relation to the usual binaries i.e. local verses foreign, or subsistence verses market-
oriented production. The capitalist, or investor, is not really problematized beyond the 
nationality of their passport. More important is understanding why capitalists acquire land 
and whether they need a lot of labour and how they use labour. These are empirical 
questions that the land grab literature has not yet addressed in full, or with sufficient 
substance. More specifically, a key question is whether land rush reflects a “return” of 
the agrarian question of capital, in the sense of a renewed interest in the development of 
capitalist agriculture as an aspect of broader capitalist development. This question is 
connected to the links between labour regimes (for instance CF when that is the form that 
land deals take) and capitalist development in agriculture (Oya 2012).   It is therefore 
crucial to look at outcomes to understand how different fragmented classes of labour 
(Bernstein 2007) and different classes of capital fare in the land rush. How they fare in 
cases where both land and labour are needed and in cases where only land or labour is 
required (Li 2011). “Was the land rush an instance of acceleration of agrarian capitalist 
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development or not?” (Oya 2013b). 
 
In the land rush literature, it has been argued for instance that “production grabbing” by 
capital may take place without “land grabbing”, as in the case of CF or out-grower 
models. In other words, this can occur without investors necessarily acquiring land, but 
with them controlling the various segments of the value-chain, through externalising 
production using different types of labour regimes (as defined below), vertical integration 
and direct investments (Anseeuw and Ducastel 2013: 2; Ducastel and Anseeuw 2011: 2; 
Matondi et al. 2011: 35). Another phenomenon has been defined as “control grabbing”, 
which seeks to respond to state and donors’ shifting production strategies as well as 
accumulation imperatives by foreign and domestic accumulators (Huggings 2014). As 
opposed to “production grabbing”, “control grabbing” cannot happen without land 
because control and authority over land are the very cause of struggle (Margulis et al. 
2013: 11-12). A recent concept “labour grabbing” has been proposed in the land grab 
debate in relation to processes through which state agencies impose cash crop production 
after the formalisation of land rights (Stein et al. 2015). Hall has proposed that the current 
use of “land grabbing” can distract its users from its real effects which are, “not the mere 
capture of land but the capture of labour, water, and most of all, the adverse incorporation 
– rather than exclusion – of smallholder agriculture into new value chains, patterns of 
accumulation, and the wider transformations in agrarian structure and agro-food systems 
that these precipitate” (Hall 2011: 207-208). Adverse incorporation, in this sense, allows 
us to go beyond the rhetoric of “inclusion/exclusion” and to critically analyse the terms 
of incorporation (Du Toit 2004: 30; Hall 2011; McCarthy 2010; Vicol 2017). This might 
result in the marginalisation of workers who bear the risks included in this type of labour 
as a result of firms seeking to reduce their transaction costs while they are more integrated 
in global food chains. This might also dictate the type of political responses to deals 
(Borras et al. 2013; Hall et al. 2015,).  
In all these different scenarios of labour mobilisation and land use, much depends on the 
variegated logics of accumulation by newly arrived capitalists, as well as ethos of 
management. The affected actors are not mere bystanders watching these transformations 
without struggling, they are rather groups with agency that articulate different forms of 
active and passive resistance to commodification, dispossession and proletarianisation 
(Moyo et al. 2012). The land rush may lead to overt or hidden conflicts between: i) The 
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state and local communities, ii) local communities and new land holders, iii) different 
groups within local communities, iv) between local leaders and community members, v) 
between communities. Resistance and attempts to ‘grab back’ the land can take many 
forms such as court cases, demonstrations, illegal night grazing, thefts, abductions, death 
threats, etc. (Borras and Franco 2013: 19-21; Reid Ross 2014).  
 
People presented as ‘victims of land grabs’ do not always react with the level of resistance 
or violence expected of them. More often they take the forms of everyday resistance 
which are the main Weapons of the weak, rather than overt weaponization of life: “passive 
non-compliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, and deception”15(Scott 1985: 295). 
Consequently, polar narratives of expulsion and resistance should not be taken for granted 
(Borras and Franco 2013: 1724). Borras, examining political reactions from below, 
suggests they are diverse and identifies: struggles against dispossession through 
questioning the state’s role or demanding its arbitration, struggles against exploitation or 
adverse incorporation and focus on the terms of the dispossession, as well as struggles 
against land concentration, and for redistribution and recognition in which the 
relationship to land might be more visceral (Borras and Franco 2013). In short, 
understanding the dynamics of these new forms of agrarian accumulation and whether 
they point to a resolution of the agrarian question cannot be done without considering the 
politics of resistance and struggles that also shape what capitalists can do. 
  
 
15 These include: ‘foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and 
sabotage.’ 
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2.4. Situating the LG/LSLAs in the agrarian 
political economy debate 
 
The contemporary land grab might be a “hype” (Kaag and Zoomers 2014), but it 
constitutes an opportunity to further our understanding of the processes of agrarian 
change. Understanding agrarian change is complicated by ideological, conceptual, 
disciplinary and methodological schisms. Therefore, overcoming dichotomies and 
moving beyond the polar positions requires first and foremost understanding underlying 
disciplinary divergences: “particularly the conceptual differences between analyses of 
African agriculture by economists and other quantitatively oriented social scientists, on 
one hand, and by historians and anthropologists on the other” (Berry 1993: 4). It also 
involves grasping theoretical divergences.  This section provides an overview of the main 
theoretical debates and how they structure dichotomies in the land grab debate. 
2.4.1. Varieties of political economy traditions 
 
Derek Hall proposes that the “land grab” literature is dominated by critical agrarian 
political economy approaches whereas for Oya, neoclassical and neo-populist claims are 
dominant (Edelman et al. 2015: 11).  This section discusses the two main strands of 
agrarian political economy:  on the one hand, a pro-smallholder neo-populist tradition, 
which greatly influences the thinking of those who denounce land grabs, and on the other 
hand, the classical Marxist agrarian political economy which brings in the concepts of 
petty commodity producers, agrarian differentiation, agrarian transitions and the 
problematic of accumulation.  
Neoclassical theories gained momentum in the post-war period, when development 
economics emerged and focused on why “economically backward areas” were so and the 
stages required to develop à la Rostow16. From the old neoclassical (henceforth ONDC) 
an economistic theory of growth, produced in the “first world”, it has evolved to become 
a multidimensional and non-linear approach effectively applied in both developed and 
developing economies in search for solutions for the poor (Byres, 2003 and 2006). 
ONDC’s main preoccupation is maximising the use of scarce resources through effective 
 
16 Rostow, W.W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
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allocation of goods and the condition for reaching equilibrium. In this model based on 
individualism, getting prices rights is promoted as the way to allow economic agents to 
make rational choices and maximize their utility/profit.  
With the end of the Golden Age of accelerated growth in Europe, new neoclassical 
development economics NCDE emerged (Byres, 2003 and 2006). The assumptions of 
NNCDE and those of New Institutional Economics (NIE) on the agrarian questions are: 
i) the peasantry is “amorphous”, representation of rational small farmers in perfect 
competition; ii) mutuality exist between producers and non-producers and among 
producers themselves; iii) the different agents/classes have equal economy power but 
asymmetrical access to information which is resolved by existing agrarian institutions; 
iv) the causes and reproduction of backwardness is contingent and therefore ignored; v) 
a very ambiguous position regarding state intervention (Byres 2003: 243-250, 2006).  
 
For “Orthodox Marxists” understanding the development of capitalism is necessity to 
transcend it and progress towards a “superior” mode of production and social 
organisation: communism (Marx1881). Whereas for agrarian neo-populists, the desirable 
agrarian change must respect the values and interests of small producers; they do not 
believe that “peasant elimination is a necessity” as defended by pro-capitalist or socialist 
agricultural modernisation theorists including Marxists (Bernstein 2010).  
 
As for neoclassical neo-populism17 is a term coined by Byres (2004) to describe the 
convergence between neo-classical economics and neo-populism reflected in Chayanov’s 
“Theory of Peasant economy” (Byres 2004). Such an approach entails the application of 
the main assumptions of neoclassical economics (especially utility maximisation), to 
explain how small farmers hold the key to poverty reduction since they are more efficient 
and able to attain higher productivity because of their greater ability to supervise labour, 
(farm size-productivity inverse relationship thesis). For Johnston and Leroux (2007), such 
assumptions on labour supervision fail to consider the inner complex workings of 
household decision making as well as the differences in efficiency between unpaid family 
labour and paid labour. Neoclassical neopopulism was exemplified in the work by Griffin 
et al (2004) and Lipton (1977), for whom the bias in favour of large producers and the 
 
17 The first use of the term 'neo-populism' in 1923 is attributed to L. N. Litoshenko, to describe the 
approach of Chayanov's school’, and was later taken by Soviet Marxists (Harrison, 1975). 
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allocation of resources to urban areas, to the detriment of rural ones (urban bias), had to 
be reversed to make agricultural markets perform efficiently (Byres, 2004). In the 1990s, 
the inverse relationship thesis was used to justify the establishment of new contracts 
between small producers and large agribusiness (Lipton 1993; Binswanger and Deininger 
1993). This was implemented despite flaws, such as the lack of intensive-machinery, 
which leads to diseconomies of scale in smallholder production as opposed to “upstream 
remittances” realised by large scale farming thanks to being well-positioned in the supply 
chain (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013). 
 
For Lipton, higher transaction costs in the new institutions of farm-product exchange, 
namely supermarkets, grades and standards, and wholesaling which work against small 
holders could be overcome with adequate internalisation (information and methods 
allowing them to adopt and adapt to new (super)market’s requirements) - and 
intermediation - (by entering into contracts with certified intermediaries that allow them 
integrate vertically) (Lipton 2006). According to Byres (2004), neoclassical neo-
populism is static and fails to address contemporary processes of capitalist development 
in developing countries. 
 
 Neo-classical neo-populism as a variant of agrarian populism is linked to the notion of 
“technical populism” (Bernstein 2010) and as I have argued focuses on the economic 
superiority of smallholder farming and their positive properties in relation to agricultural 
development and poverty reduction. A smallholder farming path is not only favoured on 
economic grounds. Political arguments, as manifested in political populism, assume an 
undifferentiated peasantry and are mainly concerned with defending “family farmers”, 
the “people of the land” against threats to their reproduction. In the wake of a new 
imperialism, political populism defends the people from merchants, banks, capitalist 
landed property, agrarian capital and agribusiness through projects of state-led “national 
development” in all their capitalist, nationalist and socialist variants’ (Bernstein, 
2010:86). In addition, the homogeneity of the peasantry remains an “urban illusion” that 
produces a rural fantasy (Wolf, 2001a:255). Political populism indeed remains a powerful 
force in dominant pro-peasant discourses on “land grab” as the defence of smallholders 
and peasants is advocated not on economic grounds but in the name of social justice. 
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Structural adjustment policies built on the state-market18 dichotomy contributed to the 
starving of funds to agriculture and the persistent withdrawal of the state from supporting 
agrarian transformations (Chang 1999, Adelman 2001, Oya, 2007: 276, Oya, 2010:12). 
Even softer versions of neo-classical economics, i.e. NNDEC, which relaxed the state vs 
market binary in favour of a more balanced analysis of the role of the state in correcting 
pervasive market failures (Dorward 1999) fail to address some fundamental problems in 
its approach to agrarian change. Byres’ (2003) heterodox view built on a classical political 
economy analysis proposes a different set of analytical categories, namely: i) socially 
differentiated peasants have antagonistic relations of production, determining polar class 
relations and their compulsion to take part or not in market exchanges; ii) in lieu of the 
mutuality dear to the NNDC partisans, the quest for the appropriation of surplus value is 
a more central issue than a risk for “agrarian institutions” and suggests using class 
analysis to study ‘interlinked markets’; iii) agrarian institutions (e.g. sharecropping or 
contract farming), asymmetrical economic power exist and this is reflected through the 
bargaining power of different parties to negotiate or to enforce terms of contracts; iv) the 
roots of underdevelopment are empirically documented and a transition to capitalist 
agriculture under specific circumstances can be a solution to prevent the reproduction of 
poverty, v) a pragmatic view of state intervention, which neither glorifies nor demonises 
the state, rather assesses interventions in terms of the configuration of interests they 
represent and stresses the centrality of state’s agency in shaping the process of agrarian 
change  (Byres, 2003: 243-250, Byres, 2006). 
 
This heterodox approach focuses on four central questions concerning social relations of 
production and reproduction (Bernstein 2010). The first question: “who owns what?” 
analyses agrarian property relations and the ways in which the means of production and 
reproduction are distributed. The second question, “who does what?”  is concerned with 
the social divisions of labour (using class analysis). The third question, “who gets what?” 
analyses the distribution of income (monetary and non-monetary). The fourth “what do 
they do with it?” focuses on patterns of accumulation, reproduction and consumption 
(Bernstein 2010, 22). Two more questions have been added in the context of the land grab 
debate (White et al., 2012:621). The first “what do they do to each other?” seeks to capture 
 
18 This binary and the demonization of the state added the ‘rent seeking’ hypothesis to the urban bias 
thesis thereby reinforcing the view that governments should leave the agricultural sector to the forces of 
the market to reverse such biases (Berg Report WB 1981 and Bates 1981, 1983).   
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the political and relational aspects (including gender and sexuality) of the four initial 
questions by analysing how different social classes, groups in society and the state, 
interact with each other. The second additional question “how do changes in politics get 
shaped by dynamic ecologies and vice versa?” concerns the political-ecological context 
of land deals. 
 
2.4.2. Contested paths for rural transitions to 
capitalist development 
 
For heterodox Marxists such as Byres and Marx, paths of agrarian transition are important 
and cannot be theorised in a teleological and Eurocentric way (Wood 1999:27-33). They 
contest Marx’ famous statement on the classicism of the English path (Marx, 1976:876):  
 
The history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different countries 
and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at 
different historical epochs. Only in England, which we therefore take as our 
example, has it the classic form.  
 
However, in his correspondence with Vera Zasulich who asked him about the agrarian 
question in Russia, Marx responded through successive drafts that “to save the Russian 
Commune, there must be a Russian Revolution” since the historical inevitability is 
restricted to Western Europe, referring to the French Edition of Capital19 (Marx 1881 - 
Second draft- in Shanin 2018:14-15). This constitute an important admission to the 
possibility of different (paths a similar idea to Chayanov’s Theory of Peasant 
cooperatives in 1919) as this would explain how revolution could happen in 
predominantly agrarian-based and non-fully capitalist societies like Russia. Building up 
on Lenin’s work, Byres distinguishes three ideal types of transition paths in the English, 
Prussian (capitalism from above) and American, only adding Taiwanese, Japanese and 
South Korean paths later (1996). The three later paths were deemed more significant for 
contemporary developing countries. “Capitalism from above” happened in the Prussian 
 
19 “Only in England has it been accomplished in a radical manner […]. But all the other countries of 
Western Europe are following the same course”. (Capital, French edition, p. 315.) 
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path with landlords becoming capitalist farmers, rather than capitalism occurring through 
rural social differentiation. This unique, though reactionary path led to a slow transition 
with landlords maintain semi-feudalism at the expense of increasingly poor peasants. As 
for the USA path considered more relevant for land-rich African countries, it happened 
through a clear process of rural differentiation with classes of labour being exploited by 
classes of capital (petty commodity producers turned capitalist farmers) through 
increasing wage labour (Byres 1996).  
 
For Byres, examining how “accumulation, production and politics contribute to or 
constrain agrarian transition” is necessary to understanding the path of capitalist 
development of any given social formation (Akram Lodhi et al, 2010: 257). Bernstein has 
argued that agrarian transition is no longer a necessary condition for capitalist 
development in this 21st century era of globalisation giving priority to the problematics 
of accumulation and rural production (2006, 2009). Samir Amin (2019: 54), on the 
contrary, contests that there is no contemporary agrarian question:  
The contention that capitalism has indeed solved the agrarian question in its 
developed centres has always been accepted by large sections of the left (…). 
What was always overlooked was that capitalism, while it solved the question in 
its centres, did it through generating a gigantic agrarian question in the 
peripheries, which it can only solve through the genocide of half of humankind.  
Similarly, Oya disagrees with Bernstein and rather urges us to pay attention to the slow 
emergence of varieties of emerging capital (foreign, domestic, small, middle or large-
scale) in the African countryside (2013b, 1548-9). He asks: “… Is the kind of slowly 
emerging capitalist farming accelerating as part of the current ‘land rush’ or not? (Oya, 
2013b: 1552).  
 
But in order to examine the implications of the current land rush to contemporary 
questions of labour - the crisis in the social reproduction of labour - (Oya 2013b) or the 
social crisis of capitalism as such” (Fraser in Bhattacharya, 2017: 22) and of capital 
(processes facilitating or impeding the emergence of agrarian capital and rural capitalism) 
in this thesis, it is necessary to revisit and problematise key Marxist political economy 
concepts. That is the aim of the following sections. 
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2.4.3. ‘So-called primitive accumulation’ 
Capital accumulation involves the reinvestment of the profits accruing from accumulation 
to augment and concentrate capital. This seems to be the rationale for most “investments” 
in or “acquisitions” of land. Some of these aspects have been examined in the context of 
the development of capitalism in Africa (Berry 1993; Hill 1963; Iliffe 1983; Sender and 
Smith 1986). However, contemporary debates on land grab seem to have neglected these 
“old” concerns (Oya 2013b: 2007a). It is therefore imperative to reflect on the wide use 
of Marxist concepts such as “primitive accumulation” (PA henceforth) and 
“accumulation by dispossession” (ABD henceforth) to assimilate “land grabs” to a new 
form of imperialism (Harvey 2003), “sub-imperialism” (Hall, 2013; Moyo et al., 2012), 
and to understand whether current land grabs are the ”remorseless expansion of 
capital(ism)” (Alden Wily 2012; Amanor 2012). Despite their Marxist roots, the use of 
these concepts in LSLA debates has tended to converge on the kinds of positions defended 
by neo-populists (hence Hall’s assertion that these debates were dominated by critical 
agrarian political economy). Peters (2013a) reminds us that land deals have implications 
for broader societal transformations, since land deals are socially embedded.  
 
The land grab literature is informed by the Marxian conceptualisation of “dispossession” 
that arises in processes of so-called ‘primitive accumulation’, emphasising the political 
coercive origin of capitalism. Referring to four centuries of laws, institutions and policies 
of enclosures, Marx (1976: 874-875) contends that:  
… The process (of so-called primitive accumulation), which creates the capital-
relation can be nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from 
the ownership of the conditions of his own labour.  
 
From this dispossession, emerges a worker dependent on the market for wages, “the 
exchange value” of labour which enables workers to meet the cost of social reproduction. 
Capital continues to accumulate at a faster pace trying to acquire a bigger consumer base 
for its commodities and appropriate more surplus labour at minimum costs, the very basis 
of capitalist survival.  This distinctive “contradiction of capitalism” (Wood 2002) leads 
to the creation of “classes of capital” exploiting “classes of labour”. The first exploiting 
the labour of the latter creates more dependency to the market:  
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…But the relation of every capitalist to his own workers is the relation as such 
of capital and labour, the essential relation (...) Capital itself then regards 
demand by the worker — i.e. the payment of the wages on which this demand 
rests — not as a gain but as a loss. I.e. the immanent relation between capital 
and labour asserts itself. Here again it is the competition among capitals, their 
indifference to and independence of one another, which brings it about that the 
individual capital relates to the workers of the entire remaining capital not as to 
workers: hence is driven beyond the right proportion. (Marx 1973: 419-420) 
(Original emphasis) 
This concept of PA will be subsequently revisited in Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of 
Capital (1913) and Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest stage of Capitalism (1917). 
Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital (1913: 348-349) is of particular interest. She 
criticises Marx’s idea that:  
The existence and development of capitalism requires an environment of non-
capitalist forms of production... Capitalism needs non-capitalist social strata as 
a market for its surplus value, as a source of supply for its means of production 
and as a reservoir of labour power for its wage system.... 
Following Luxemburg, Kalecki (1971) also defended the view that capitalism 
necessarily required an exogenous stimulus to sustain its expanded reproduction. 
2.4.4. Accumulation by dispossession 
 
Building on Luxemburg’s critique of Marxian PA, David Harvey (2003) coined the 
concept of “accumulation by dispossession” to define the exponential continuation of 
accumulation efforts in the contemporary age of neo-liberal crises. ABD is a metaphor 
for solutions to capitalist crises through temporal deferment and geographical expansion 
to new arenas of accumulation in developing countries, and areas of social life that 
previously resisted the logic of capital. In Harvey’s (2007: 159) own words, ABD: 
… include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful 
expulsion of peasant populations […]; conversion of various forms of property 
rights […] into exclusive private property rights […]; suppression of rights to the 
commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative 
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(indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and 
imperial processes of appropriation of assets […]; monetization of exchange and 
taxation, particularly of land; the slave […] and usury, the national debt and, 
most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as a radical means of 
accumulation by dispossession. 
This theory has been central to the land grab debate. This contradiction is said to create 
workers’ dispossession through further proletarianisation and/or dependence on the 
market for self-reproduction (Wood 2009). Therefore, from an opportunity, markets 
become a compulsion (Brenner 1976; Wood 2002). The land grab literature has made use 
of the concepts of PA and ABD, drawing an equivalence with the processes ongoing in 
the land rush. Harvey (2003: 84) states that, “the shape and form any new imperialism 
will take is therefore up for grabs”. Harvey does not differentiate between “dispossessions 
compounded by privatisation, financialisation and manipulation of crises and land and/or 
water grabs” (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012: 243). Harvey’s analysis has been 
criticised for discarding the centre-periphery contradiction of historical capitalism, his 
flawed understanding of resistance to neoliberalism (which emphasises dispersion and 
variety rather than collective potential), and a lack of unity rather than solidarity (Moyo 
et al. 2012). Despite acknowledging that land-grab driven dispossession happens, a few 
researchers, including Hall (2013: 1588), do not agree with the idea that takes for granted 
land-grabbing as a crisis-driven ABD. 
Harvey (2003: 83) refers to “spatio-temporal fixes” as a metaphor for solutions to 
capitalist crises, through temporal deferment and geographical expansion to new arenas 
for accumulation. Either through selling-off and redistributing state assets to privileged 
private commercial interests in the developed world or the forceful territorial acquisition 
and control through financialisation, privatisation, commodification, management and 
manipulation of crises in developing countries.  
Hall (2013) argues that concepts of PA and ABD cannot be used to describe all that is 
now known as land grab. In cases of capitalist to capitalist purchases and leases there is 
no room for extra-economic accumulation. For instance, cases such as conservation do 
not bring anything into capitalism, while they may shape dynamics of exclusion, they are 
not ABD. Praising Harvey’s use of the concept of ABD yet judging it to be more abstract 
than its uses by “land grab” researchers, Levien (2011) has offered an interesting critique 
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and “reconstruction” to cover cases in which a number of actors, mainly state agents, 
recourse to extra-economic means of capitalist accumulation such as legal and political 
coercion to proceed to mass expropriations and redistributions. He defines ABD rather 
as: 
…the use of extra-economic coercion to expropriate means of production, 
subsistence or common social wealth for capital accumulation’ asking the central 
question of why in a given situation, capital would need to dispossess land rather 
than purchase it through the ordinary operation of real estate markets (ibid: 457). 
This use of the concept of ABD “re-politicises” the land grab debate by acknowledging 
the dynamics of accumulation “from above”, capital acquiring land and transforming it 
into capital. Land in a dynamic capitalist enterprise translates into “capital” in a way that 
petty commodity production cannot achieve. Consequently, it is crucial to reflect on the 
boundaries of what is “agriculture”? For instance, Sender and Cramer (2018) make the 
argument that some forms of agricultural production are more sophisticated (and require 
a form of dynamic capitalism) than many industrial manufacturing sectors. Here it is the 
intention of the acquisition that matters more than the means of acquisition. In the case 
of the export horticulture firms selected in this research, greenhouse irrigated land with 
thousands of workers (high intensity), packing houses and cold chain is not simply “land”. 
It is indeed capital. An interesting counter-perspective is that of Nichols, who suggests 
“disaggregating primitive accumulation” to grasp the spirit of Marx’s interchangeable use 
of “expropriation, theft, dispossession”. For Nichols (2015: 24), this can be fruitful when 
“dispossession” is used strategically to explain the process that leads to peasants 
divorcing from their means of production. The use of “soil” or “land” as an allegory of 
“nature” should not blind us to its literal understanding as a commodity that unites land 
and labour productively (ibid: 25-27).  
 
There are limits to the extent in which ABD is achieved through coercive means as per 
the common assumption in the literature (Bin 2018). Harvey’s argument seems to stress 
one of the definitions of dispossession highlighted by Marx, “dispossession by 
displacement” or enclosure, and not the spirit of his definition as suggested by Nichols. 
Displacement does not always take place after recourse to non-economic means of 
coercion. The lines between economic and extra-economic dispossession are blurred and 
therefore the two should be understood as a continuum rather than as a binary (Hall 2013: 
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1593-1596). For Daniel Bin (2018), most debates on current dispossessions, which link 
it to primitive accumulation, do so without sufficient theoretical backing when 
associating it with contemporary capitalist accumulation. He therefore suggests two 
concepts: 1) Expanding capitalising dispossession, which, besides proletarianisation is 
the transformation of direct producers into wage-dependent producers — involves 
capitalisation, i.e., the transformation of the means of subsistence into capital: 2) 
Expanding commodifying dispossession which combines the processes of 
proletarianisation and capitalisation, which leads to a reduction in the cost of variable 
capital and of constant capital, respectively (ibid).  
 
2.5. “Exploitation without dispossession?”: The diversity of 
forms of agricultural wage labour and their invisibility  
 
Empirically-grounded evidence and historical comparative research can help document 
the current land grab. Agrarian transition debates are of relevance in Africa with the 
centrality of labour over land in accordance with Berry’s (1993: 101). The study of wage 
employment in Africa has been limited by several methodological and ideological biases, 
leading some scholars to suggest labour markets may be non-existent (Cramer et al. 2014; 
Oya 2010, 2015;). Nonetheless, several studies have stressed the ubiquitous presence of 
labour hiring, even in smallholder dominated production systems, and segmentation of 
labour arrangements in rural Africa (Adams 1991; Cramer, Oya, Johnston, and Sender 
2014; Cramer, Oya and Sender 2008; Fall 2011; Oya 2010, 2013a; Oya and Pontara 2015; 
Rizzo 2011; Sender et al. 2006,).This is with regards to the many roles of  agriculture in 
African development including its poverty-reduction potential considered higher than 
growth in any other economic sectors (Diao et al. 2010: 1-9). Rural Non-Farm Economy 
(RNFE), constituted by all economic activities other than primary agricultural commodity 
production and self-employment, represented 35% of rural incomes in Africa and 50% in 
both Asia and Latin America in 2007 (Haggblade et al. 2007; Reardon et al. 2007). RNFE 
still elicits little interest in academic research, perhaps because to its mostly casual and 
precarious nature (Oya and Pontara 2015).  
I use Oya and Pontara’s (2015: 3) definition of rural wage employment as “any form of 
work for another person or entity in exchange for any kind of compensation, whether in 
kind (including land for example) or in cash”. This comprehensive definition allowed me 
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to investigate patterns of multiple occupancy in the survey questionnaire. While semi-
structured interviews conducted for this thesis quickly confirmed the longstanding 
practice of labour hiring in these contexts, and sometimes “unconscious” waged 
activities, which respondents only reported after further probing, but which fitted this 
definition. To further understand dynamics of social reproduction, I also asked questions 
about other unpaid work, and indeed most respondents did not consider it as “work”.  
 
Previous studies confirm that rural wage work is neither new, nor was it simply a result 
of land deals, as the literature on accumulation by dispossession would suggest, i.e. that 
displaced people were “forced” to seek wage employment (Fall: 2011; Hill 1970; 
Mackintosh 1989; Oya 2015: 41). Land deals occurred where both agricultural wage 
employment and labour migration for agricultural jobs was common. Fall (2011) has 
surveyed some types of wage employment in his history of the evolution of labour in 
Senegal in the 20th century.  Oya (2002, 2004, 2015), writing on forms of agricultural 
production in the groundnut basin and in the Niayes, has detailed a diverse set of labour 
arrangements generated by small, middle and large, agrarian capital. These are the 
nawetaan20 (non-family surga migrant workers, mostly active during the rainy season), 
the mbindaan (or seasonal wage labour resident, who works for 6-8 months in the farms 
of middle producers or well-off farmers and is paid in cash, food and accommodation), 
the saad (or sass, casual daily wage work paid for a specific task or piece-rates), the 
disappearing firdous who were recruited  in groups for piece work at groundnut harvest 
time),and collective labour sant (or santaane, often including a disproportionate share of 
poorer villagers) (Oya 2015: 48-53)21.   
 
Berry’s (1993) theory of “exploitation without dispossession” is particularly useful in 
highlighting the centrality of rural labour mobilisation. Based on her comparative 
research on agricultural commercialisation and cocoa farming in Ghana, Kenya and 
Zambia, Berry observes that different classes of labour were mobilised by farmers in the 
year/decade X. This was achieved through networks and markets with varying degrees of 
 
20 See David, P. 1980: Les Navétanes: Histoire des Migrants saisonniers de l’arachide en Sénégambie 
des origines à nos jours, NEA Dakar 
21 Some of these labour arrangements are also found in the selected research sites for this study in Louga 
and the Delta of the River, and especially surga (family or migrant), various forms of casual labour (saad 
or sass), as well as some forms of collective labour (bay bokk).   
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labour control, which was never total though it impacted the dynamics of social and rural 
differentiation. Her line of explanation “centers labour in the land grab debate” (Li 2011) 
in line with accounts of growing pressures on land, whether commercial or not, which 
increases social differentiation due to both land and labour being needed for further 
accumulation (Alden Wily 2012; Anseeuw et al. 2012; Peters 2004, 2013b). This 
theorising of exploitation without dispossession echoes that of “control grabbing” (Borras 
et al 2012: 402-406): “State and private actors taking control over land use and rural 
labour, rather than directly ‘grabbing’ land” (Huggings 2014:367). Berry’s findings about 
reasons for constesting labour and land in Anglophone Africa is interesting, but would 
this be relevant in the context of Francophone Senegal?  Similarly, Bernstein offers 
another dimension of the Marxian concept of dispossession in “peasant dispossession by 
differentiation” which is driven by the market imperatives of capitalism to exploit labour, 
improve productivity, and cut the costs of production and defined as the “tendency of 
petty commodity producers to divide into classes of capital and labour” (Bernstein 
2010:125).  
Recently, new concepts have emerged such as “production grabbing” or “labour 
grabbing” - discussed in this thesis as per Hall’s (2011: 2008) recommendation to not 
only look at, “how these deals come to be, their implications for displacement and impacts 
on livelihoods but also asking what land grabbing produces: what new social relations, 
land politics, labour markets and modes of accumulation are being produced?” Recent 
literature on the land rush has begun to document the agrarian change outcomes of 
encounters between capital and labour, especially labour regimes (Baglioni 2018; 
Pattenden 2018) and social reproduction outcomes (Cousins et al. 2018) after a long 
period of “making sense” of the nature and dynamics of land acquisitions (Edelman et al. 
2013). 
2.6. A feminist critical agrarian political economy  
 
Labour relations are socially structured by the combination of land and capital for 
production. As for the division of labour, Bernstein (2010: 20) states that not only does it 
require a technical specialisation of workers and social organisation, it is also based on 
the distribution of productive activities within and between different units of production 
or households. Reproduction is mostly organised around the labour provided by women 
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and children, and those who own or hold the land, mostly males. Feminist research has 
contributed to agrarian studies by questioning largely accepted concepts such as “the 
household, “the economy”, “the market” and “the family” (O’Laughlin 1995, Kabeer 
1997, Johnston et al 2007). Such research draws attention to labour and its valuation 
within “the market” and across families, and their relations with the control of land in 
agrarian societies as illustrated by the Jackson-Agarwal debate in the Journal of Agrarian 
change in 2003-2004, and other publications (Hall et al. 2015; Lanz et al. 2019; Rajjar et 
al. 2019). 
2.6.1. Production and reproduction 
Marx and Harvey (1957: 713) focus on how capitalist accumulation and production adapt 
the numbers of workers to their expansion through the creation of “a relative surplus 
population” or “industrial reserve army”. Feminist scholarship has used Luxemburg’s 
emphasis on the centrality of non-capitalist milieus to examine and critique the ways in 
which capitalist accumulation subjugates female labour and reproduction, to preserve the 
condition of the production and reproduction of labour power:  
…primitive accumulation...was not simply an accumulation and concentration 
of exploitable workers and capital. It was also an accumulation of differences 
and divisions within the working class, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, 
as well as ‘race’ and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of 
the modern proletariat (Federici 2004: 63-64). 
 
The domestic, referred to as the sphere of reproduction, is no less important than “the 
productive” sphere which supposedly creates surplus value (Mies 2013: 209-238). There 
are “non-capitalist modes of production that capitalism require even in its most developed 
form if it is to continue growing or accumulating” (Luxemburg 1913). Several other 
political economists have attempted to analyse the linkages between production and 
reproduction (Meillassoux 1981) but have failed to analyse the roots of women’s 
subjugation and the nature of domestic work, which prevents women taking then part in 
the “labour force” (Johnston 1997: 219; Katz 1983; Mackintosh 1977; O’Laughlin 1977). 
This thesis seeks to banish the supposed boundary between private and public, or 
domestic and professional, because it is precisely this that allows the interrelated system 
of patriarchy/capitalism to maintain oppression in the familial superstructure and the 
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exploitation of women as workers. I agree with Mies (1986: 38) that “the never-ending 
process of capital accumulation cannot be achieved unless patriarchal man-woman 
relations are maintained or newly created”. 
 
2.6.2. The centrality of social reproduction 
 
Feminist research has significantly enriched agrarian political economy perspectives in 
at least three ways: i) explicating the internal dynamic within and across families and 
households as well as the intersection between the political, economic and domestic; ii) 
recognising the centrality of unpaid care work taken for granted in most research on 
livelihoods; iii) constructively critiquing the methodological limitations of most 
mainstream neoclassical studies, which fail to capture the complexity and nuances of 
social formations (Razavi 2009: 200).  
 
Feminist scholars studying agrarian change have made significant contributions to 
documenting the nature of the “unpaid care economy” and seeking its recognition against 
the “commodity economy” (Folbre 2006; Randriamaro 2013; Razavi 2007,), and “cheap 
labour”. Mbilinyi (1986: 107-108) defines cheap labour as “labour which is remunerated 
below the level of reproduction of labour power”. Due to low salaries, most casual 
workers have a second job. Feminist scholars also investigate women’s participation in 
rural labour markets (Mbilinyi 1986, Whitehead and Kabeer 2001, Baglioni 2017), 
changing livelihoods (Tsikata 2009, 2016; Razavi 2009), the mutual constitution of 
production and reproduction (Carney and Whatts 1990, Bryceson 1995, O’Laughlin 
1995, Tsikata 2016, Razavi 2009, Mbilinyi 2016), and “social reproduction” (Katz 2001, 
Razavi 2007, Chung 2017, Bhattacharya 2017, Gimenez 2018).  Recent feminist research 
on land deals has analysed some gendered outcomes of land deals by assessing: 
employment and new income benefits, landholdings and previous livelihoods activities, 
access to the commons and reproductive activities, and enjoyment of ancillary benefits 
(Dancer and Tsikata 2015; Mbilinyi 2016).  
Feminist research has also paid attention to the gendered nature of labour regimes. They 
have examined labour mobilisation as the work of women is often preferred because of 
their supposed “nimble fingers” (Elson and Pearson 1981: 87-107) and docility 
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(Barrientos & Pallangyo; Mbilinyi 1986; Elson and Pearson 1981: 93; Whitehead 1979). 
Dolan (2001: 47) has shown that export French bean companies have contributed to this 
“naturalisation” of labour division by regarding women as “better bean pickers”: “Their 
hands are smaller and they have more patience for the work than the men”. Narratives of 
female “docility”, while true in some instances, are not always reflective of reality. In 
fact, as sometimes play an active role in resistance and strikes, a situation described, for 
example, by Mackintosh at BUD (1989: 176-178). As it turns out, women’s labour is 
often paid below the cost of social reproduction, and they are concentrated at the bottom 
of the jobs supply chain (Baglioni 2018; Cramer et al. 2014; Deere 2005; Dolan 2004a, 
2004b, 2005; Mackintosh 1989; Maertens and Swinnen 2012; Van den Broeck and Kilic 
2018).  
Feminist research has further explored these issues by questioning the gendered relations 
of power, concepts of “family” and “household”, as well as labour division within and 
across families and their relations with the control of assets including land in agrarian 
societies (Engels 1884; Johnston et al. 2007; Kabeer 1994; O’Laughlin 2007). For 
instance, this was at the centre of the 2003 “Jackson – Agarwal debate”22.  
Social reproduction takes place in markets, households and states and is defined as 
“activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions, responsibilities and relationships 
directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis” (Laslett and Brenner 1989: 
382–3).  Chung (2017: 104) defines social reproduction as “an assemblage of diverse 
labour processes — both paid and unpaid, material and symbolic, individual and 
communal — which are necessary for the sustenance and resilience of human life”. She 
highlights the specificity of agrarian households that lies in “their labour processes (i.e. 
the transformation of their labour power into labour) occur on, with and through the land” 
(ibid). Some feminists, such as Randriamaro (201323), acknowledge a “hidden crisis” of 
care while others have instead highlighted a crisis of social reproduction itself. According 
to the latter, this is an acute “expression of the social reproductive contradictions of 
financialised capitalism24”, “a social crisis of capitalism as such” (Fraser in Bhattacharya 
2017: 22) Cousins et al. (2018: 1060-1082) reveal a similar situation in their study of 
 
22 This debate arose when the second claimed that: “The gender gap in the ownership and control of 
property is the single most critical contributor to the gender gap in economic well-being, social status, and 
empowerment” (Agarwal 1994a: 1455).   
23 http://www.eldis.org/document/A67528  
24 Original emphasis. 
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South Africa when they claim social reproduction can include the reproduction of kinship 
systems, specific forms of marriage and community membership, as well as of social 
relations of assets ownership. This leads them to conclude that, though shaped by 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation, a substantial amount of social reproduction activities 
take place outside of (direct) market relations (ibid). However, the ways in which these 
processes of capitalisation of life and capital accumulation impact various actors is not 
always as dramatic as portrayed by land activists: it is sometimes not even “dramatic”, 
but “mundane” (Li 2014: 3).  
 
I situate this study in this perspective and consider that it is urgent to pay special attention 
to the ways in which capitalism and patriarchies are mutually constituted. To do so, I 
argue that it is the conjugated power of capitalism-patriarchies that shape dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion, and adverse incorporation in rural labour markets, in the 
distribution of rents (such as jobs, contracts, etc.), and the differentiated outcomes of the 
land deals. 
2.6.3. Beyond markets: Bringing the social back in 
 
Much of the scholarship on LSLAs and agrarian change in Africa concentrates on socio-
economic outcomes, capitalist pathways and transition. Other political economists have 
also recognised the need for a holistic approach paying equal attention to socio-cultural 
and economic aspects of agrarian change. This is the case of Akram-Lodhi (201825) who 
suggests, in his definition of critical agrarian studies, the centrality of a multidimensional 
class analysis by “identifying and exploring the cultural, ecological, social, political and 
economic factors and forces that facilitate or impede class formation”. Similarly, Berry 
(1993: 12-14) says that in both neoclassical and Marxist political economy, culture like 
power “is treated as exogenous or subordinate to economic systems and processes”. She 
proposes that culture, power, and material resources are of equal significance as they act 
“in mutually constitutive ways to shape the course of economic and social change” (ibid). 
Archie Mafeje (2003) proposes that there is more than one way to understand the 
relationship between agrarian change and social development, and that “mono-
economics” should not lead in the analysis of the agrarian question (and land tenure) in 
 
25 http://roape.net/2018/03/28/what-is-critical-agrarian-studies/  
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Africa. Finally, the Senegalese philosopher, Souleymane Bachir Diagne (1991: 2) argues 
that “one cannot be economically right if they are socio-culturally wrong”. Put simply, 
culture matters. 
I am interested in understanding what land means to the different people I interviewed 
because of its social embeddedness. Why do some people/individuals still espouse 
Polanyi’s definition of land as a “fictitious commodity”26(Polanyi, 2001: 72). They do so 
despite the marketisation of land illustrated by the existence of (vernacular) land markets 
(Chimowhu and Woodhouse 2005). Such questions intersect with what Bernstein (2007: 
2) termed the moral economy, “the social embeddedness of all economic institutions and 
practices and their moral or normative meanings to the social agents who inhabit those 
institutions and pursue those practices”.  Indeed, increasing numbers of political 
economists, critical geographers and historians are now seeking knowledge beyond 
(frontier) markets and employment outcomes. Some of them are returning to questions of 
capital, capitalisation, marketisation and financialisation (Beckert 2014; Gimenez 2018; 
Lee 2017; Li 2014; Mies 2014; Ouma 2015; Oya 2015; Piketty 2015; Ralph 2015). The 
intention is to overcome real or imagined boundaries to consider glocal dynamics of 
accumulation of labour, and capitals and consider moral and social orders not only of 
markets (Beckert 2009), but of life. 
Conclusion 
 
Surveying the current “land grab” shows us there have been significant progress in 
capturing their multidimensional nature.  Further contributions can document land deals 
impact on the restructuring of power dynamics, social reproduction, identities, 
relationship to nature, and spiritualities. There is a need to go beyond the “coloniality of 
markets” which seeks to explain every phenomenon through the logic of capital, in which 
colonialism produced differences based on gender, race and different classes of capital, 
resulting in regimes of domination and exploitation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Tafira and 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017). This tendency to limit the multidimensional question of land to 
its economic outcomes is reductionist, and we should now aim to consider the 
Anthropocene at large.  
 






CHAPTER 3: CAPITAL(IST) 
ACCUMULATION, LAND TENURE 
AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY: 





To understand the contemporary land rush, it is necessary to appreciate historical 
processes of connection and disruption, continuity and change. This chapter provides an 
overview of the historical context that has shaped the farming models examined in this 
research on the land rush in estates27 farming (as discussed in chapter 3), and one instance 
of contract farming.  
 
This research involves the regions of Senegal now known as Saint-Louis and Louga. They 
cover the historical kingdoms of Waalo and Kajoor. Waalo was situated around the 
Senegale River, which straddles:  i) the Lower Valley including the delta which extends 
from Podor to the mouth of the River with a mainly Wolof population; ii) the Middle 
Valley situated between Bakel and Podor, which has a mainly Halpulaareen population; 
iii) the Upper Valley located upstream of Bakel, extending over 50 km along River 
Senegal to the Malian border and the left bank of Faleme which is inhabited by a 
population of mainly Soninke. As for the failed deal in Louga, it is located in the area 
historically known as Kajoor (Diouf 1990:18).   
 
In this chapter, I argue that, to understand the current land rush in the Delta of the Senegal 
River Valley, it is necessary to scrutinise its historical socioeconomic and political 
dynamics. By adopting this longue durée approach (Braudel 1958) as well as the 
comparative approach, this chapter shows that indeed the history of Senegal does not start 
with colonisation, albeit 19th century French conquest and reign made it easier for the 
 
27 I use invariably with plantation farming. 
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metropole to have a more direct and easier access to land and labour. This was to have a 
lasting impact on the land law and agricultural policy, and ultimately the land rush in this 
country. Therefore, this chapter focuses on i) retracing the roots of foreign capital in the 
Senegal River Valley region marked by the paramount relevance of labour, which shapes 
and is shaped by capitalist development, and in turn influences migration dynamics and 
impacts the Valley’s anthropocene;  ii) retracing the longue durée of tenurial 
transformations in the West Africa, including SeneGambia; iii) analysing this 
development in particular through the expansion of agricultural commercialisation and 
export horticulture in the Valley Region. 
3.1. The longue durée of foreign capital penetration in 
the Delta and River Valley Regions and its outcomes 
 
This section offers a background to understand how various historical dynamics might 
have sedimented to make the Delta of the Valley the theatre of the current land rush. The 
sources used in this chapter are books and/or academic articles based on both internal and 
external sources28.  There are few erroneous interpretations in the existing historiography 
according to Becker et al. (1975: 270). The major criticism of internal sources used for 
the study of Kajoor (such as Diouf 1990) is that they have often failed to establish a link 
between the political situation of the kingdom of Kajoor and European slave trade (Saint-
Martin 1991). On the other hand, external sources tend to focus on internal crises and 
relations between the Damel (king of Kajoor) and Europeans, and undermine the scale of 
slave trade on Senegambian coast and its impact (Becker et al. 1975: 271). This is not 
tenable according to archive documents29. With this in mind, I have tried to engage 






28 Internal sources provide sociological, linguistic and ethnological observations, and are based on oral 
traditions and encompass family, villages, and dynastical oral traditions. External sources mainly consist 
of written European traditions and include socio-historical archives. 
29 According to Baron Roger, this is not surprising: “The Europeans have judged these people and things 
only from the decks of their ships” (January 1820) 
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3.1.1. Early capital penetration  
 
A comprehensive approach to the land rush in the Valley requires a broad analysis of 
local and global connections and disruptions. In the 1970s, many scholars, mostly 
Marxist, were interested in when and how “Black Africa”30 first came into contact with 
foreign capital, which they believed was key to understanding the state of capitalism in 
Africa (Amin 1970, 1971; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1976; Cruise O’Brien 1979; Rodney 
1973,). “Neo-colonialism”, a term used by this school to suggest continuities of 
domination and control over lucrative ventures after political independence, directed 
attention away from the nature of control over state apparatus in a context not yet 
dominated by capital (Boone 1992:15). Amin for instance (2012: quoted in Barry 2012), 
identifies different phases from pre-mercantilism to full integration into the capitalist 
system. The pre-mercantilist period which spans “the earliest days until the 17th century” 
is dominated by long-distance trade (including trans-Sahara trade).  
 
According to Diouf (1994: 8), French presence in Ndar (Saint-Louis), since 1659, is not 
synonymous with continental penetration and colonisation, although he does 
acknowledge the pillages and destructions used to magnify the conquest. Other scholars, 
such as Saint-Martin (1991: 431), criticise some historians’ lack of engagement with 
French involvement in the slave trade31, despite the fact that the French presence in Bakel 
had been verified since 1820.  Moreover, for scholars such as Shivji (2008: 55), slavery 
was not just a trade, or a minor event: “The early encounter of Africa with Europe was 
not commercial involving the exchange of commodities, but rather the unilateral looting 
of human resources.”  
 
Regarding the origins of the dependency of Black Africa, Amin (2002: iii) suggests they 
are not to be found in the pre-mercantilist period as the continent was neither under any 
form of domination, nor inferior to the rest of the world. Amin identifies the tributary 
 
30 The authors use this term to refer to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
31 Diouf for instance engaging with English presence but only turns to French presence from 1855 in his 
work. 
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mode of production32 as dominant in pre-capitalist Black Africa33, which he defines as a 
society in which a village community was subjugated to a political entity to which it paid 
a tribute and, in some cases, lost its land ownership rights (ibid: 4).  Such a mode of 
production was characterised by low levels of technology, the irrelevance of market 
economy, and a stress on usage rather than market values. This society is divided in two 
main classes, the peasants and the aristocrats, with, in some cases, states involving the 
population in collective labour under generalised slavery34. 
 
The mercantilist period stretched from 1600 to 1800 and led to Black Africa existing on 
the periphery of American and Western European mercantile centres as a source of labour 
via slavery, according to Amin (ibid.). Two salient features of the capitalist mode of 
production arrived as a result, namely the emergence of a proletariat born out of the 
disappearance of feudal relationships, and the accumulation of wealth in the form of 
money. In Senegal, this period also gave rise to a multitude of crises, the rise of an 
insecurity class, religious conflicts, and the simultaneous exports of goods mainly gum 
in the Waalo. Integration into the full-capitalist system in the 19th century constitutes 
another important phase, marked by the official end of slave trade and replaced by the 
(unequal) exchange of products.  Africa provided raw materials and cheap exports as 
required by European markets (ibid: xii). In many newly independent countries, political 
coercion was used in the name of “national unity” with a compliant bureaucracy mainly 
composed of the dominant classes. “National development” was pursued mainly through 
import substitution with diverse and mitigated results across the continent (Ibid: xiv). 
These patterns are not dominant everywhere as Austin’s analyses of 19th and 20th century 
Ghana makes clear (2006, 2007). Austin reveals a non-linear story of the coexistence of 
slavery (internal slavery) and wage labour, with no clear pattern in terms of increasing 
proletarianization but rather increased incorporation into the global agricultural trade in 
commodities. Senegal is no exception to the argument he outlines and its post-colonial 
leaders “inherited a country organised by and for merchant capital” (Boone 1992: 78). 
 
32 Yet, for Amin, a society cannot be defined on the sole basis of the nature of its mode of production, 
which has to be place in its broader social context to be fully understood. Other scholars such as 
Friedmann (1980), Scott (1986) prefer to focus on forms of production, Bernstein (1986) also adjusted his 
ideal-type of simple/petty commodity production to contemporary forms of integration to more fully 
capitalist systems that pay attention to classes of labour. Feminist scholars such as Mies defined their own 
modes forms modes of productions (Guyer 1984, Mackintosh 1989). 
33 Amin identifies 5 modes of production: primitive community, tributary, slave-based, small-scale trade, 
and capitalist. 
34 as in the Asian mode of production evoked by Marx 
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3.1.2. Waalo and Kajoor: Anatomy of inegalitarian societies? 
 
In his study of the emergence of African capitalism, John Iliffe (1983: 27) asks how 
capitalist farming first took root in Africa: “The question is whether the rural capitalism 
that emerged in different areas according to the different pre-capitalist modes of 
production in those areas and varied in some regular way”. When and how did foreign 
capital take root in pre-colonial Waalo considered a “gift” of the Senegal River, 
dominated by tributary35 modes of production? Similar to Weber’s central question of the 
Protestant Ethic (1905), Iliffe (1983: 45) asks what the ethical and religious drivers or 
constraints to the emergence of an African capitalism were: “How could indigenous 
beliefs, Islam or Christianity constitute sources or resources for or against an African 
capitalism?” Whilst this question has been studied by Copans (1988) and Cruise O’Brien 
(1971, 1975), this study is concerned with how Islam (the earliest and dominant religion 
in the Senegal River Valley Region) supported or hindered the development of foreign 
capital in the region.  
 
The evolution of Waalo and Kajoor societies offers crucial insights to understand how 
capitalist modes of production became dominant by creating new classes of labour in 
charge of producing exports for the metropole. Indeed, since 1446 and 1448, both Waalo 
and Kajoor were already trading with the Portuguese (Barry 2012: 18). It allows us to 
analyse the simultaneous trade of labour (slave trade) and the increasing importance of 
exports, such as gum and groundnuts (Amin 1974, 1971, 2012). Moreover, both Waalo 
and Kajoor case studies allow us to comprehend the central role of Islam, both then and 
now, in liberating peasants under mercantilism, subjugating them under colonialism and 
lastly as a medium of - and an actor in - the land rush as it intersects (through collusion 
or alliance) with political and traditional powers.  
  
 
35 He also asked whether there was an articulation with small scale trade. 
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Socio-Political organisation  
 
This section analyses the social and political stratification and associated hierarchies of 
the two kingdoms. Waalo and Kajoor were part of the vast empire of Jolof, which also 
included Bawol, Sin Salum and Dimar (Barry 2012: 17). While Waalo was born next to 
the mouth of the River Basin before the 12th Century (ibid: 16-17), Kajoor (1566-1886) 
took its independence from the empire of Greater Jolof in 1549. It was located between 
the Senegal River and the Saloum River, with several provinces including those of 
Njambur (Louga) and Lebu (Cape Verde). The inhabitants of Kajoor are called Ajoor, 
and identify themselves today to the terroir covering some of the departments of 
Tivaouane and Kebemer. Our second case study involving The Third Company, is located 
in Kebemer, Louga. The inhabitants of Waalo are called Waalo-Waalo and share the same 
language as the Ajoor: Wolof.  
 
In both kingdoms, the ruling classes were constituted by the free-born geer who 
dominated a highly-stratified society located between the upper nobility or garmi 
amongst which the kings or Brak (Waalo) or Damel (Kajoor) were chosen. Most 
important among the nobilities of both kingdoms were the kangam, who ruled as chiefs 
of the territorial divisions (Diagne 1967: 123; Diop 2012: 133-152). With the garmi, the 
kangam formed the aristocratic class which had strategic commercial ties with the Saint-
Louis trading settlement and benefitted from the economic gains of the slave trade. At the 
bottom the free-born group were the peasantry or baadolo who paid the bitter price of the 
Atlantic trade, orchestrated with the consent and support of the two ruling groups. 
Beneath the aristocracy came other freemen, the griots or troubadours on the one hand, 
and the persons of caste or nyeenyo such as the leather workers, the smiths, the potters, 
etc. on the other. The lowest rank of this social pyramid came the slaves or jaam divided 
between the household slaves or slaves by birth or jaam juddu and the newly bought 
slaves or jaam sayor (Barry 1979: 40-41, 2012: 32; Diop 2012: 133-152). 
 
Politically, Waalo was an oligarchy, an elective monarchy traditionally ruled by a Master 
of the land or Lamaan Jaw. All his successors were to have the title of Brak and were 
selected by the three great electors of the land who formed the council of electors. 
Similarly, all Kajoor’s monarchs originated from the lineage of the Lamaan of Paleen 
dedd (Diagne 1967: 109; Diouf 1990: 32). There were checks and balances on the 
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monarchs’ powers, which were balanced by the privileges of the council of electors on 
the one hand and that of the other social classes on the other (Barry 1979: 42). While in 
office, the main functions of the Brak or the Damel were to manage the kingdom, 
including the distribution of available land to either other royalty including his first lady, 
the lingeer, or to the religious leaders known as marabouts (Diagne 1967: 109, 279).  
 
From a precolonial tributary form of production to the penetration Foreign 
Capital 
 
Before colonisation, Waalo’s economy was based on the Senegal River, including 
agriculture which was organised at the extended family and lineage level (Barry 2012: 
23-29). Similarto Kajoor, Waalo’s subsistence economy was organised at a regional level 
involving frequent barter between animal husbandry and agricultural products, and later 
cotton, indigo, gum, fish and salt36 (Diagne 1967: 96). Land - the main asset and resource 
of the kingdom - was owned communally, and any attempt to characterise its mode of 
production was complicated by this fact. Land was inalienable as it belonged to the family 
or lineage and could not be lost by the community because their survival depended upon 
it. Diop (1968) explains that another reason for land inalienability is it supposedly hosted 
the spirits of the ancestors and therefore could neither be sold nor exchanged.  
 
The monarchs increasingly transferring land to their family, close collaborators and 
clients, contributed to “feudalisation of land tenure” through a tributary mode of 
production, which consequently impinged on the Lamaan’s prerogatives (Barry 1979: 
44). Diouf (1990: 23) describes this centrality of land ownership by distinguishing 
between “great property” - the exclusive rights of the monarch to dispose of all lands - 
and “small property” - land is defined as a means of production collectively shared by 
several villages, and is therefore inalienable. The Brak also decided whether to allocated 
land to outsiders or would refer them to the Lamaan for the later to decide. A vestige of 
the previous land tenure system which survived the monarchy is “the distinction between 
the control exercised over the land itself, and the right to cultivate that land. Inalienable 
property rights to land only came into being when these two rights were manifested in a 
single person” (Barry 1979: 44).  
 
36 These sometimes involved the Mauritanian neighbours. 
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However, there are several limitations of the historiography as it postulates the difficulty 
to analyse class conflict “given the simplicity of the needs of the more privileged strata 
of society” in this subsistence economy (Barry 2012)37.  Through characterising Waalo 
as “the inegalitarian society par excellence”, Barry largely attributes this to external 
factors (mainly the contact with Europe) and fails to address internal class conflicts. As 
for Kajoor, increasing social differentiation was explained by the existence of great 
economic privileges which were to become the source of increasing political competition 
(Diagne 1967: 134-5). This led to the erosion of the respect of traditional social orders 
and pervasive violence, pillage, increased social differentiation, and ultimately the 
weaponisation of Islam for the conquest of political power until the end of the 18th century 
(Diagne 1967: 135-144).  
 
Understanding the successive waves of Foreign capital(s) penetration in the Valley 
 
Three crucial phases of European capital penetration form the “roots of neo-colonialism”. 
These are the early encounters between Waalo and Kajoor Kingdoms, mercantile Europe, 
and people travelling through the Sahara between the 15th century and the end of the 19th 
century (Barry 1979, 2012: 31-45; Diagne 1967: 95). These contacts are marked by the 
disruption of political, social and economic orders, and dictated by the imperative to 
mobilise labour by any means necessary. 
 
The first phase between the 15th and mid-17th centuries was dominated by barter trade. 
Trans-Saharan trade, which existed before European contact, was significant in the region 
- especially for Kajoor which depended on exchanges with Waalo and Maureish traders 
due to its geographical isolation and the fact that it did not produce gold (Diouf 1990: 
30).  The infamous Portuguese explorer and slave trader Ca da Mosto accosting in Kajoor, 
then still part of Jolof, was part of the first wave of European contacts with the coastal 
kingdom. Portugal, in particular, settled at the mouth of Senegal River in the second half 
of the 17th Century. Whilst their attempt to install a port at this strategic location failed, 
the Portuguese played a crucial role in freeing Waalo from Jolof, shortly after the 
 
37 “Wealth resided in the granaries, and doubtless in the herds of cattle, but prestige was in the blood, 
and was something to which one was born”. (Pathé Diagne 1967 quoted in Barry 2012) 
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independence of Kajoor in 1550. This political vacuum in the Senegambia region 
contributed significantly to the development of the Transatlantic slave trade. 
 
From the 17th century to 1818, trading forts flourished across the African coast. This 
happened at the same time as the fragmentation of the continent by European powers to 
support the expansion of their domestic market, especially the sugar industry. Central to 
this tricontinental triangular trade was the looting of African slaves from Africa, 
orchestrated by European metropoles with the cooperation of ruling classes. In coastal 
West Africa, this was achieved through the creation, in 1659, of a trading post and slave 
depot in Saint-Louis. Waalo became one of the main West African ports along with 
Jurbel, Moca and Buscar and would pay its human toll to Saint-Louis. Saint-Louis 
oversaw this commerce with the cooperation of local aristocracies and used duties to 
pressurise the already dependent Waalo aristocracies.  
 
During this period, Islam came to play a central role in the Maraboutic wars, which led 
to the 18th century Toorodo (Pulaar nobility) revolution in Fuuta Tooro. This revolution 
contributed to increased social stratification and labour exploitation by the minority of 
Torodo leaders based on greater discrimination of castes, the Orient-inspired rule of the 
Almamy (Diagne 1967: 207-230). This resulted in the banning of Muslim enslavement, 
38, the division of the lands of the Waalo between members of this nobility, and the 
replacement of taxes by a land-lease payment system (Barry 2012: 228). This historical 
division of land explains the large possession of lands by the heirs of these toorodo in 
Northern Senegal. With the demise of the Maureish marabout in 1874, the newly 
reinstated Brak suppressed the maraboutic movement and re-established the powers of 
the local aristocracies with the military support of Saint-Louis. The defeat of the marabout 
led to famine, increased slave trade, the accentuation of Saint-Louis’s commerce, serious 
internal rivalry within the aristocracy and a more important political role for the warrior-
slaves or ceddo. The last phase of agricultural colonisation (1819-1931) signals the 
irrevocability of conquest, further extraction and access to labour force.  
 
38 Yet domestic captives remained enslaved. 
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3.1.3. “Agricultural colonisation” in Waalo and Kajoor 
 
As soon as they regained control of the Senegal colony from the English in 1817, the 
priority of the French was to mobilise the labour force necessary for tropical cultivation.  
With the abolition of the slave trade and the consequent human resources shortage, the 
French decided to “transport the workers to the work” (Barry 2012: 145). In May 1819, 
the Ndiaw treaty was signed to create what Barry terms agricultural colonisation in 
Waalo39, with three bases to be set up in Upper first, then Middle and Lower Valley and 
managed by Africans as independent producers (Manchuelle 1997: 43). Waalo’s 
proximity with Saint-Louis led the French to think it would allow for closer labour 
supervision and control. An initial investment of 1,200,000 Francs was injected to 
replicate at a larger scale the pilot garden of Richard Toll, and Dagana was selected to 
host this major cotton export project.  
 
Six consecutive French governors40 based in Saint-Louis attempted to implement the 
agricultural colonisation plan, with varied results. Whilst the first three, especially Baron 
Roger, experienced encouraging results, the last three were less successful. Barry (2012: 
151-161, 1979: 58) suggests there were many reasons for the failure of agricultural 
colonisation including, the insecurity created by Waalo’s neighbours41, the resistance of 
merchant capital, the shortage of labour force and the land problem. The latter three 
elements are central for the focus of this thesis, as they provide some historical evidence 
through which to “read” the current land rush. Another key cause was that the upper 
region of the Valley, located 800 kilometres from the coast, was only navigable between 
July and December or January (Manchuelle 1997: 43). 
 
The small businessmen of Saint-Louis resisted large-scale financial and industrial capital 
to protect the growth of merchant capital from the trade of ivory and gum, the latter 
considered “the Palladium of Senegalese industry and trade” (Barry 2012: 186). In 1824, 
Baron Roger created the Commercial and Agricultural Society of Galam and Waalo, to 
 
39 Fuuta Tooro and the Island of Morphil were initially selected to host the agricultural settlement. 
40 Schmaltz, Le Coupe, Roger. Gerbidon, Jubelin and the last one Brou.  
41 These are the trarzas, Tukulors, Kajoorians and Braknas. Jealous of French domination of the kingdom 
at their own expense, they led continued attacks on the kingdom and its famous capital, Nder, despite 
signing many treaties with France for peace to prevail in the Region. 
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create agricultural settlements with the view of merging trade and agriculture. This is 
central to understanding the resistance to export horticulture by other types of 
capital/interests, as we shall see in chapters 8. 
 
The land problem is central to understanding today’s land rush. The ambiguous wording 
of the Ndiaw treaty implied the transfer of title deeds by the traditional leaders to the 
Waalo islands. The treaties application caused problems with the populations who refused 
to accept that their aristocratic leaders had conceded to the French (Barry 2012: 156). 
Tensions due to the difficulty of reconciling “the African community’s ownership of the 
land with its proposed sale in perpetuity” led to further acts of resistance from below, 
such as the systematic destruction of dams built by the French (Barry 2012:155; 1979: 
58). Despite the consequential refusal of the French to pay the customary fees to 
traditional leaders, including the Brak, and the signature of a new clause to re-affirm the 
contents of the 1819 treaty and promote peace, the agricultural project did not survive. 
This was due to a combination of further large-scale irrigation and soil fertility problems 
and illustrates the diverging understandings of the terms of the land deals (Cotula 2011). 
Local elites’ foregrounding their own interests through “politicised accumulation”, 
(Boone 1992; Lanz 2018) and legal pluralism with its “triple heritage of African, Islamic 
and Colonial” influences, generated divergent understandings of how land should be 
governed (Basse and Sow 2006; Evans 2015). 
 
The Waalo chiefs were unable to mobilise and supervise the labour force as per the 1819 
treaty42. The labour force problem arose because of a combination of labour force 
shortages due to centuries of slave trading, wars, famine, and the refusal of the people of 
Waalo to work on the French farm (Barry 2012: 157). Such attitudes towards manual 
labour might be explained by its depreciation during the slave trade. This led most 
aristocrats, the upper nobility and even well-off peasants to hire surplus labour whenever 
possible for agricultural work which it left to lower classes, domestic captives, and 
women (Fall 2011: 43). This contributes to the colonial myth of the “lazy” waalo-waalo43 
 
42 The article V of the treaty stipulates that the Brak and his collaborators were responsible for the 
weeding and the planting and would be paid accordingly. Article IX emphasises that these authorities 
pledge to execute article V or replace the deserters, the sick, the dead and the lazy under the penalty of 
losing the entire allowance for each person (Ndiaw Treaty 1819) 
43 Inhabitant of the Waalo. 
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(Barry 2012: 157), and the figure of the remma naama44 with its pejorative implications 
of lazyness (Fall 2011: 44). As is the case with the current land rush, such social 
constructions do not consider the existence of reservation wages: the lowest wage rate at 
which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job, and the limited 
availability of workers who are only on the labour market for a limited time in order to 
earn/save a specific sum and will leave their job once their gather the necessary amount 
(Fall 2011: 92). Consequently, unless performed under unpaid collective labour: 
“santaane” or “sant” as a matter of community solidarity, working on someone else’s 
land was considered a form of servitude (ibid: 37, 76).  
 
As a result of not having access to a suitable and willing labour force, French governors 
opted for indentured labour (due to long-distance migration) and created an intermediary 
servitude status, between freedom and slavery, which lead to many abuses. The French 
recommended the recruitment of 20000 Chinese workers for the project to succeed as the 
Waalo-Waalo preferred to cultivate their subsistence ratherthan export crops (Barry, 
2012: 159). Consequently, forced labour45 was introduced in September 1823 until it was 
outlawed in 1948 (Zuccarelli 1962: 420-461).  
 
The introduction of forced labour in many parts of Africa has subsequently created 
problems for the establishment of large-scale farms as the memories of forced labour 
continue to resonate in a post-colonial context. One can understand how in the context of 
the current land rush, several older peasants still have a vivid memory of colonialism and 
refer to export firms as neo-colonisers who found them on their land and want to turn 
them into wage-workers through dispossession. This, as well as the glorious history of 
some families, can also serve to further appreciate why some people still resist land deals. 
 
During and after the project of agricultural colonisation, Waalo and Saint-Louis 
established new relations through the levying of customary fees paid by the latter to the 
chiefs of the former, to secure their collaboration. Waalo faced tensions due the rise of 
religious leaders -marabouts - and later the Islamic revolution movement46, which was 
temporarily successful until it threatened French interests in the region. For the second 
 
44 Those who work in farming to feed themselves. 
45 In French, régime des engagés à temps. 
46 Led by Diile Fatiim Cam, of the jeweller caste. 
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time, Islam though embraced by the masses, failed to constitute a liberation “counter-
movement” (Polanyi 2001: 80) because of capital’s interests in the status-quo. In 1826, 
the death of Brak Amar Faatim Mborso, who signed the Ndiaw treaty, buried hopes to 
develop new crops that year. Merchant capital eventually prevailed with the failure of 
agricultural colonisation (Boone 1992) following the adoption of “free trade” after 
Senegal was allowed to export gum to countries other than France in 1831 and subsequent 
“gum fever” (Manchuelle 1997: 44). This was met with great relief by domestic 
merchants who “had more or less been coerced into investing in it” (ibid.) According to 
Barry, the “roots of underdevelopment” in the region are to be found in this portion of 
Waalo’s history.  
 
3.1.4. The rise of export groundnut: New rural labour markets shaping 
and making footloose labour? 
  
This gradual shift to a capitalist form of production shaped the transition from coercive 
labour mobilisation under slavery to more polished ways of disciplining labour under 
increasingly capitalist relations of production. Groundnut was the new key strategic 
export and a major driver of Senegal’s incorporation into the world capitalist economy 
(Barry 2012; Fall 2011; Foucault 1975; Sender and Smith 1986: 46-66,). As Oya (2002: 
68) suggests, the growing demand for vegetable oil “for soap, candies, and cooking 
purposes”, and a global shortage in European markets, constituted the decisive factors for 
groundnut production in Senegal. The introduction of the groundnut by the French to 
meet the needs of the colonial economy was to influence Senegal’s specialisation in a 
speculative and extraverted export-crop. At the national level, the consequences of this 
policy were the adoption, later, of an agricultural programme and the creation of a 
national development agency – ONCAD in 1957. This led to a dualist form of production 
which aimed at attaining a modern rent agriculture as well as a traditional and subsistence 
agriculture (Ba 2008: 13). Rice was imported mainly for the needs of urban areas in times 
of risk of food crises. Importation also connected different colonial territories so that 
African colonies could absorb the rice surpluses of Indochina. The price of the imported 
rice was lower than that of the groundnut in the 1930s, illustrating how colonial 
organisation put in place incentives for peasants to devote themselves to groundnut 
production without compromising their food security (ibid). 
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In the Senegal River, this led to disruption in the form of pillages by the ceddo warriors, 
the lack of a market for gum, and the replacement of River transportation by the 
“autorail” (railroads) (Barry 2012: 232). The groundnut economy created new synergies 
and connections with the emergence of new free peasants and French Commerce 
(Bordeaux) specialised in the trade of groundnut. Some of the latter obtained freedom of 
trade exchange due to the new governor Faidherbe, who also organised the collection of 
customs taxes (Barry 2002: 229). These traders became more successful than the previous 
merchant capitalists whose business was based on gum, and who faced the merciless 
competition of Maureish religious leaders (Barry 2012: 230). The colonial administration 
opted for pragmatic policies, withdrawing support for the Catholic mission which had 
tried without much success to convert locals whilst producing export cotton in The Petite 
Cote. Pragmatism also meant starting anew with religious leaders, the famous marabouts-
farmers, to restore agricultural labour in the eyes of the peasantry (Fall 2011: 51-61). For 
religious leaders, it was a matter of reconverting the masses, most of whom joined the 
labour force as talibes4748  - now integrated into the full capitalist system - while accruing 
economic gains from this lucrative activity. This marked the second transformation of 
Islam now “rehabilitated” by the ruling classes and the French and which would 
eventually become one of the greatest supporters of agrarian capitalism through the 
groundnut economy (Amin 2012). 
 
With the introduction of groundnut, migration increasingly shaped the political economy 
of the Valley with rural dwellers joining the naweetan49 labour reserves to work in the 
groundnut basin.  Some of the migrants settled permanently, responding to the growing 
labour surplus required by the new crop which the groundnut basin could not supply. Not 
all Senegalese River region migrant labourers were new to migration (Barry, 2012:233; 
Fall 2011: 63; Manchuelle 1997). Whilst there was more than enough labour supply for 
the groundnut economy in the glorious years of the groundnut (1926-1930), the 
neighbouring Office du Niger was facing problems meeting its demand (Fall 2011: 66-
68). Progressively, new urban destinations emerged for these migrants: Mauritania, 
 
47 Followers and at the same time peasant workers 
48 As evidenced by Sara Berry (1993: 147), “the ability to mobilise labour via social networks depended 
on one’s status, and status depended on one’s following comprising one’s workers and social 
subordinates”. 
49 Seasonal workers who migrate after the wet season (nawet). 
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Dagana, Podor; the new cotton basin in the South of Senegal, as well as Ivory Coast and 
France (Adam 1977; Bâ 1996a; Barry, 2011: 234; Diop 2008; Manchuelle 199750). 
Following the 1930s51, 1950s and 1970s droughts which led to severe food crises, 
migration became a form of social innovation (Tandian 2012 & 2013; Tandian et al. 
2011).  Seasonal labour migration usually took place after the harvest during the spring 
(noor), a practice called noorani, or during the opposite season of nawetaan (during the 
wet season). The literature highlights that men were the traditional outmigrants, while 
women and children undertook a more “passive” form of migration by following their 
husband or family (Ba 1996a, 1996b; Ba and Bredeloup 1997). However, with the 
groundnut economy, women started to travel for wage work more often (Bop and Truong 
2014; Findley 1991; Hathie et al. 2014). The seasonal migration of workers, freed from 
agricultural labour duties, which ended with the wet season led many to Dakar, Diourbel, 
Tambacounda Ziguinchor, Saint-Louis, etc. This rural-urban straddling, of keeping “one 
foot in the city, one foot in the countryside”, is common in many parts of Africa as it 
allows migrants to defend their land rights and explore economic opportunities elsewhere 
(Boone 2014: 67). This has led to a great concentration of rural populations in urban 
centres, mostly Dakar, the capital city. Many outmigrants left Mauritania for Saint-Louis 
or their native villages after the tragic “Evenement naar”52. Many of my respondents who 
were in Mauritania or nearby still bear the vivid memory of this tragic event and 
remember exactly where they were and how it shaped their lives. Increasingly however, 
these migrations have become increasingly international: Spain, Italy, Americas, etc. 
whether clandestine or legal (Ba et al. 2008). Therefore, in the face of these migration 
waves, a key question is what leads some people to ask: “In the Valley, the question is 
not why migrants leave, but why non-migrants stay” (Ba 1992: 27).  
 
These migrations, coupled with insufficient cereal production by the drought, affected 
Soninke and Haalpulaar populations of the Valley. These populations relegated these to 
 
50 The Soninke migration has been the subject of a personal book by Adriam Adams (1977). 
51 The Soninkes remember this as dullu xooro sinu or the era of great hunger (Chastanet 1991). 
52 These events started on 20 April 1989 with the death of two Senegalese nationals, at Diawara in 
Matam, in the bank of the River (Magistro 1999: 177-212). They ended with over 50 Maures dead in 
Senegal, and between 200 and 1000 Senegalese dead in Nouakchott, Mauritania. By late October 1991, 
an estimated 70000 people had sought refuge in Senegal and another 13000 had fled to Mali. In June 
1989, the refugee count of Mauritanians returning to their country was approximately 170000. (Magistro 
1999: 177-212).  
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simple food crop because they covered their dietary and other needs thanks to migrant 
remittances, which alerted the Senegalese government (Lavigne-Delville 1991, 1994). 
Hence, the government’s decision to invest heavily in the River region allowing for the 
development of productive activities in this region inaugurating the era of dams. In the 
Senegal River Valley Region, the State encouraged rice production to meet local demand 
through the creation in 1938 of the Mission d’Aménagement du Sénégal (MAS) whose 
focus was initially on improving production in Richard Toll53. Despite banking on the 
irrigation potential of the River Valley, the MAS did not reach the expected outcomes 
and severe food shortages were experienced during the World War 1 (Barry 2012: 235; 
Dahou, 2005: 67). Consequently, another agency, the Organisation Autonome du Delta 
et de la Vallee was created in 1960 and replaced five years later by the Société 
d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) - created 
with the view to train peasants in the production, stocking and commercialisation of 
60000 tons of rice on 30000 hectares.   
 
This is the first major land deal in the River as the lands initially occupied by MAS were 
later allocated to a French capitalist, Mimran then part of the Dakar Big Mills - Grands 
Moulins de Dakar (GDM) in 1947, to produce sugarcane. This 50 billion CFA deal is an 
illustration of politicised accumulation when one considers the close ties of the 
companies’ leaders with political parties. As a result, the then occupier Refineries of 
Saint-Louis were dispossessed of their lands despite total uncertainty regarding its future 
production capacities of GDM (Barry 2012: 236; Dahou 2005: 67).  
GDM is not the sole case of a land deal resulting from pressures from above including an 
alliance between foreign capital and the ruling classes. The “Société de conserves 
alimentaires au Sénégal” (SOCAS), the future pioneer of tomato production in the region, 
was created in 1944 thanks to an investment of Moulins Sentac with the financial and 
technical support of the Big Mills of Paris, CFAO and SCOA all shareholders (Barry 
2012: 236). From its early days, SOCAS was based on a contract-farming scheme 
connected with cooperatives of local producers who provided supplies, whilst the 
company processed the tomato industrially in its own factories situated on the lands 
provided by the state. Agricultural development was funded via the Fonds d’Aide et de 
 
53 Furthering the aborted agricultural endeavour of Baron Roger, a decade earlier. 
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Coopération (ibid). According to Barry, it was much more than a local import substitute, 
“it was the conquest of a new market” (ibid). The advantages for SOCAS were assurance 
of a sale outlet on the domestic market and putting the conditions in place for French 
capitalists to lead imports - especially from Italy, all of which predicted a return on 
investments, with little or no risks.  
In both cases, the state of Senegal created start-up conditions, encouraged 
contractors, provided them with lands, gave them a monopoly on sugar or 
tomatoes, protected their activities, made loans, gave warranties, and ensured the 
prosperity of the French industries established in Senegal (ibid). 
Whilst agribusinesses employed at the time almost 3000 workers, most of whom were 
day workers, SAED was busy with its mission to generate employment and limit 
outmigration by allowing villagers plant on their own Villagers Irrigated Perimeters 
(PIVs) whilst mastering the constraints of flooding and the invasion of seawater. This 
was the basis for the further major infrastructure in the region with inter-governmental 
cooperation between Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Guinea through the creation of the 
Organisation for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) to manage irrigation and 
water issues and whose creation was to inaugurate the era of dams. 
The construction of large-scale infrastructure development has generated a rich parallel 
literature on the expectations and realisations, hopes and discontents that dam-building 
has created54. On the Senegal River Valley, publications mainly focus on how large 
infrastructure development shapes places and territories (which we call place-making) 
(Adams 1979, 1985, 2000; Barry 2012; Boone 2003: 282-314; Crousse et al. 1991, Dahou 
2005; Lavigne Delville 1991). Scholars such as Sidy Mohamed Seck and Tarik Dahou 
have critically assessed the outcomes of such projects - the latter emphasising the 
significant development of clientelist relations around irrigated agriculture in the delta of 
the River Senegal, based on the alliance between politics and kinship from the family to 
the village level and documented with rich oral histories (Dahou 2005). These clientelist 
dynamics and debt relations led to corrupt practices within village and peasant 
organisations, to which liberal policies sought to put an end, only to face their own 
 
54 For instance, in Zambia the Rhodes Livingston Institute’s Gwembe Tonga Research Project (GTRP) 
led by anthropologists Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder started in 1956 for the Kariba dam on the 
Zambezi River. Or in Ghana’s Volta Region, Dzodzi Tsikata’s research on the impacts of the Akosombo 
and Kpong dams in Ghana (2006). 
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contradictions and new contestations of the social order (Dahou 2005: 303-334). Other 
scholars have analysed tools such as POAS or the Chart of Irrigated Domain created by 
organisations like SAED to ensure land tenure security (Ka 2018; Toure et al. 2013;). In 
her 1979 Letter to a Young researcher, Adams (1979: 477) questions the preoccupations 
of development agencies such as SAED and OMVS, who fail even to acknowledge 
neighbouring villages as a living presence when undertaking such large-scale 
infrastructure projects. 
 
Boone (1992: 10) suggests that the post-1960 Senegalese political economy was deeply 
marked by three main legacies:  
peasant production of an export crop, the primacy of trading networks rather than 
production itself as a locus of capital accumulation, and the weakness of the 
indigenous business class. With the help of the colonial state, merchant capital 
controlled the commercial circuits that integrated the economy, dominating the 
pace and rhythm of development.  
 
As analysed in this section, the first and second legacies were to shape the dynamics of 
the Senegalese countryside with the groundnut basin becoming a new Mecca and 
groundnut the vehicle of dependency (Mbodj 1992: 97). Merchant capital became 
increasingly important post-1970, with contract-farming encouraging the blooming of 
domestic capitalism55. Finally, production also became a site of capital(ist) accumulation 
from 1958 (Amin 1969) and “classes of capital” will indeed emerge in the aftermath of 
the 2006 land-rush as explained in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
For a more comprehensive picture of transformations that followed capital(ist) 
accumulation, it is fruitful to analyse tenurial changes as well as socio-cultural changes 
with the still pervasive confusion between customary/ traditional rights on the one hand 
and plural legalism, and access to verses ownership of land on the other. 
 
 
55 The emergence of the local capitalist bourgeoisie in 1820 was to decline between 1900 and 1955. Yet 
since 1958, domestic capitalism(s) have re-emerged in all economic sectors (estates, agro-industries, 
transportation, services, land, diaspora-led businesses etc.) according to Samir Amin (1969) with an 
important role played by the marabouts (O’Brien 1971, 1975; Copans 1988). 
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3.2. Tenurial transformations in the Senegambia 
 
This section argues that gaining deeper insights into social and cultural relations with land 
and land tenure systems is key to understanding the current land rush in Northern Senegal, 
and people’s reactions to it.  In accordance with the World Food Organisation (FAO 2002: 
756), land tenure will be taken to mean: 
 
the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as 
individuals or groups, with respect to land. Land tenure is an institution, i.e., rules 
invented by societies to regulate behaviour...They define how access is granted to 
rights to use, control, and transfer land. 
 
Land rights are established either through statutory law (via land titles), through 
customary rules, or via the market.  
3.2.1. “Customary though untraditional” tenure systems 
 
Land is given a specific consideration in all societies. Despite the early existence of 
vernacular land markets, such as in the Gold Coast (Chimowhu and Woodhouse 2005; 
Hill 1963,), the concept of “land ownership” does not adequately correspond to the reality 
of many traditional societies, in which maintaining peaceful relationships within a group 
was considered more important than having rights over land (Colson 1971: 199; Coquery-
Vidrovitch 1982: 67; Tzeutschler 1999: 38). Rules existed for land use and transfer, as 
land was the main source of revenue and food. Indivisible rights were vested in every 
member of a kin groups, male or female, and defined by rules of age, caste, gender and 
kinship (Colson 1971: 201). Such rights were based on the rights of all group members 
to land for cultivation, and creative pre-emption – i.e. the right to anything one had created 
that could be transferred during a lifetime, subject to the consent of the local community 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1319).  
Many studies on the evolution of land tenure systems consider customary tenure as a 
synthesis of traditional rules, a “potpourri” resulting from colonisation (Colson 1971; 
Diop 1985; Niang 2008; Peters 2004, 2009; Snyder 1981; Tzeutschler 1999; Vidrovitch 
 
56 http://www.fao.org/3/a-y4307e/  
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1982 ). The confusion between “customary” and traditional rules may result from the fact 
that many customary and traditional rules are oral and the product of social relations 
(Snyder 1981: 49; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 76). For Berry (1993: 103), “customary 
law created under colonial rule and legalism, laid the foundation for a pattern of 
collaboration between colonial officials and senior African men”.  Tenurial 
transformations significantly altered the strength of women’s precolonial land interests, 
which were to continue to change under colonialism (Mbilinyi 1988; Pala-Okeyo 1980; 
Tsikata 2016). 
 
Under colonialism, tenurial forms changed significantly while land became increasingly 
commoditised. Colonial officials and missionaries’ attitude toward “communal” land 
tenure was deeply entrenched in a preconception that individual and private ownership is 
superior to communal tenure forms57. Land could be exchanged through lease, sale or 
pawn leading to demands from communities and foreign officials for the reform of 
customary law, suggesting it was not appropriate for “modernisation” and economic 
development. 
State-led land reforms, which took place after independence, and more recently (neo) 
liberal policies have often failed to produce the expected outcomes (Moyo 2012). Banda 
(2011: 314-323) explains the failure of customary land reform through the dominant 
“communal paradigm”, as most lands were collectively managed, roles of chiefs and 
elders were exalted especially under indirect rule, and women’s land rights were altered 
under colonisation. This points to issues of “governability”, and the active encouragement 
of patriarchy and the subordination of women to male kin by colonial rulers (Rogers 
1980). Niang (2005: 17) denounces the current “Western” and feminist advocacy for 
individualised rights and suggests African landholding systems granted the same 
cultivation rights to all individuals within kinship groups, regardless of their gender. This 
argument suggests that gender was constructed along with customary codes for colonial 
and neo-colonial purposes, buttressing claims that gender did not exist in traditional pre-
Christian/Islamic Africa (Nzegwu 2006: 189-239). In her study of pre-colonial Yoruba 
society, Oyěwùmí (1997) suggests that the category of “women” and the concept of 
“gender” was invented by Western feminists. She was criticised for focusing too much 
 
57 This is illustrated by expressions such as: “one sheep in an enclosure is worth two in a common” or 
“that which is everyman’s is no man”.    
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on gender and not enough on the language-power nexus, and for being essentialist by 
failing to engage with the plural nature of Yoruba ways of knowing (Bakare-Yusuf 2003). 
As further explored in Chapter 7, today some women and junior men may not own land 
but gain access to it through family, constituting a problem for advocates of equal rights 
(Camara 2007). 
 
The continuous transformation of land tenure forms in Africa is partly due to “pressures 
from above”, including state initiatives, the influence of large-scale foreign companies 
and settlers on the colonial state. Simultaneously, “pressures from below” encompass 
processes of rural differentiation and the de facto development of vernacular land 
markets, resulting from social and economic forces that operate independently of state 
intervention (Sender and Smith, 1986:19; Moyo 2008). This section focuses on the 
evolution of land tenure and labour relations under pressures from above and below, and 
details social relations of labour in Senegal, the former capital of the Afrique Occidentale 
Francaise (AOF)58 – focusing on the Waalo and Kajoor kingdoms.  
 
3.2.2. Evolution of land tenure in Senegal 
 
This section offers a brief history of the main tenurial transformations in Senegal, from 
the reign of the Lamaan to the national domain to decentralised governance systems.  
The Lamaan land system 
  
As introduced above, lamanat is Senegal’s oldest tenure system, practiced particularly in 
Wolof society59. It has existed in the region since the epoch of the 16th century Sereer, 
continuing in the 17th century with the Jolof Empire (Diop 1968: 48). There were two 
ways to acquire land in the lamanat system, commonly practiced by Sereer, Wolof and 
Pulaar communities, and called by each of them, ‘virtue of the fire’ or ‘by virtue of the 
axe’. In the first, fire symbolises the new alliance between the Master of the Land, its 
holder (Lamaan in Wolof and Sereer) and its new inhabitants. The descendent of the first 
 
58 The AOF (1895-1960) was a federation of eight French colonial territories in Africa: Mauritania, 
Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper Volta (now 
Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger. The capital of the federation was Dakar.  
59 In the old groundnut basin constituted by Western Baol and Kayor kingdoms. 
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to burn the forest, the master of the fire, perpetuates the tradition and becomes Lamaan. 
The Lamaan is also known as “borom daay” whose territory was circumscribed by a 
three, four, or six-day fire (Pélissier 1966: 124; Tine and Sy 2003: 212 in Wanyeki 2003). 
In the second, land is acquired by virtue of the axe with the permission of the Lamaan, 
who receives in exchange a symbolic in-kind payment traditionally of millet. The use of 
the axe to clear land of trees fire could not burn is arduous (Gravrand 1981: 191). The 
Lamaan can be seen as an early class of landed ‘nobility’, with substantial power over 
land allocation and the social reproduction of ‘subjects’ within the Lamaan’s territories. 
Many Lamaan were both community/kinship leaders and masters of the land (Diop 1968: 
49; Diouf 1990: 31-39). The Lamaan did not own the land, but was the representative of 
the people and managed lands for them in a socially stratified society dominated by 
aristocrats served by slaves, the “lower castes” and women. The power of the Lamaan is 
political and mystical, allowing him to manage land allocations and transfers, but not to 
sell it (Diop and Sy 2008: 212).  
Lamaans received royalties from the land they managed but these were symbolic and 
could be in-kind and not particularly valuable. In turn, the right holder, as long as he was 
paying her/his royalties, could not be dispossessed of their land even when the Lamaan 
was lacking land to distribute. The Lamaan could only take back the land when it was not 
being cultivated and became “reforested”. A deadline of 10 years was in force and no 
land leases, sales or rentals existed at the time (Diop 1968).  Beyond this deadline, the 
former cultivator-user loses his/her rights and the land can be re-allocated to someone 
else. This shows the supremacy of the right of the user over all other land rights. Someone 
who cleared the land and is paying the required royalties cannot be expelled from the 
land60(Pélissier 1966: 126).  
The Lamanat system of land management was presented as egalitarian by the mainstream 
historiography (Diop 1968), though as we have seen above, its final outcomes were not. 
The introduction of Islam and the attribution of lands to religious leaders (marabouts) 
facilitated an increase in royalties and the “feudalisation” of tenure61.  
 
60 Except when these are gormoom lands managed by the political leaders through the Brak as I explain in 
the Waalo case 
61 This process occurred more in regions where monarchs settled and took lands from the Lamaan, such 
as the North of the Wolof region, Louga for instance where Islamic leaders settled and one of the 
companies in this research is based (Diop, 1968: 50). 
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Colonialism, Islam and legal pluralism  
Colonisation of Senegal allowed the French metropole to have a direct, easy access to 
land and labour. Senegal was subjected to France’s civil code from 15 November 1830, 
which created dual statutory and customary law (Niang 2004: 9). Local allies of French 
rule expropriated large domains, for example in the Kajoor, while receiving royalties. 
District leaders put in place after colonisation ousted most masters of the land or lamaan 
by expropriating both land and royalties. The facilitating of land accumulation by local 
elites was not a new idea, as demonstrated by Berry’s (1983: 67) concept of “politicised 
accumulation” (Boone 1992). At the same time, a Muslim opposition movement rapidly 
emerged facilitating the spread of Islam. This pre-configures how religion and the capital-
power alliance have come to structure tenurial transformations in Senegal. This is similar 
to Linares findings with her research on Kujamaat Joola of Jipalom, lower Senegal: 
“…islamisation, cash-cropping and colonialism were all interrelated processes, acting in 
complex ways (Linares,1992:101)”. 
Private ownership of land inspired from the French Civil Code was extended to the entire 
AOF, with colonial administration adopting several measures to introduce and implement 
private and individual property that favoured the colonisers (Niang 2004: 10). They 
composed unequal treaties such as the order of the 11 March 1865 by Faidherbe, to put 
an end to traditional forms of sovereignty including the Lamaan system. To dispossess 
the traditional owners of land, mostly “suufu maam”62 or “toolu baay” acquired through 
inheritance, colonial rulers forged sophisticated texts using opaque concepts, such as 
“vague” lands, enabling them to appropriate the so-called idle lands (Niang 2004). This 
order obliged indigenous landholders to request regular property titles because they were 
considered precarious owners. Colonial administrators used the 23 October 1904 decree 
to introduce the concept of “terres vacantes et sans maîtres”, vacant land without an 
owner, which made this land the property of the State. This was followed by a decree 
allowing rights of registration to the indigenous, but which did not state how the 
availability of such lands would be established. Indigenous people continued to consider 
themselves owners of the land they occupied based on socially and politically embedded 
practices (Niang 2004). The French rulers adopted a decree on the 8 October 1925 to 
enable the indigènes, or local citizens, to register their customary rights. Yet again, 
 
62 Literally: “grandfathers’ lands” and “fathers’ lands”. 
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despite this simplification of the registration procedure, it was hardly used by the 
indigenous owners of traditional rights, most of whom were not accustomed to written 
rules and formal procedures. The colonial legislators then decided to introduce eminent 
domain (or right to expropriate on the ground of “public utility”) as complementary to 
the legal tenurial transformation process started with the introduction of “terres vacantes 
et sans maîtres”. Eminent domain is key to the first wave of land dispossession by the 
French and the national ruling classes (Moyo 2004: 7; Sender and Smith 1986: 19,). The 
State, managing the national domain on behalf of citizens, created motives of 
“unproductive use” or “ineffective occupation” of the land to expropriate land from 
previous users in the name of public interest. These notions are not clearly defined in the 
law, and dispossessions based on this concept of land rights created social conflict, as we 
will see is the case with land rush (Tzeutschler 1999).  
Two additional decrees further formalisation land tenure. The first, since 1935, specifies 
that “lands left unoccupied for 10 years would automatically become the state”, and the 
second from 1955 reduced the deadline for inoccupation to five years. Successive 
attempts to establish eminent property rights with titling were in vain as colonial 
administrators failed to fully grasp the specific nature of customary-traditional tenure. As 
explained by Niang (2004), local populations had various ways to access land without 
needing such formal land titling, such as holding cultivation rights over a land they did 
not own, having traditional power over the land as the Lamaan did, or in some cases 
owning the land. As a result, much of the population, especially in rural areas, felt neither 
the urge or need to use land titling procedures as they were still able to provide evidence 
of their rights over land (Diop 1968: 50). Yet land was increasingly used as collateral or 
was pawned (tayle), a process which could lead to its loss. This was largely a result of 
district administrators wanting to coerce local populations to pay their debts. Despite 
these transformations, direct forms of land sales existed, even where the state claimed 
there were no vernacular markets (Diop 1968). Land tenure underwent deep 
transformations with the introduction of the notion of eminent domain and legal-
pluralism, a dynamic which was to continue with decentralisation after 1960. 
Governing territories and bodies in the post-colony: Pressures from 
above and from below 
 
After political independence in 1960, several land reforms took place. The first was the 
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adoption of the LDN June 1964, constituting a major change. Through this law, the State 
inherited customary powers but not ownership over land, thereby becoming the one and 
only ‘master of the land’ in charge of managing it on behalf of the nation. This law had 
three objectives: i) legal, to establish one legislation based on traditional, religious and 
modern-legal statutes; ii) economic, to promote rural and national development with the 
participation of all, especially rural populations, to productively use natural resources; 
and iii) social, to ensure equitable access of all, especially rural populations, to natural 
resources (Niang 2004: 11). This law recognises three types of land: “(i) private property 
(ii) public ownership; (iii) rural lands” (Faye 2008: 7). Rural land is the largest, 
accounting for over 95% of the nation. All unregistered land not subject to a pending 
procedure claim has been added to the national domain. The land held by the peasantry 
was classified as ‘zones de terroir’ and transferred to the rural communities who manage 
them. The land must be shared and distributed by the “rural community” (now commune) 
and its president (now Mayor), who act as gatekeepers and guarantors of the application 
of land legislation and de facto govern access to land in rural areas. This 1964 LDN had 
provisions that “the proposed reform would be achieved progressively” and that “the 
proposed tenure regime was, for the time being, transitory and prospective” (Pélissier 
1966: 123). Yet this 1964 law is still in force. 
In 1972, two further reforms took place, the implementation of the family code and the 
first act of decentralisation. The family code is conservative and places the whole family 
under the responsibility of the father who decides where the family resides (Camara 
2007). Women do not own land in Wolof society, having only enjoyment and use 
(usufruct) rights permitted by Islamic succession laws around which most current family 
law is built. Therefore, women inherit property as a wife (a quarter or one eighth of a 
male share considering the existence or lack of offspring), as a daughter (half of a male 
share), or as a mother or relative. Women can also receive land as a gift or obtain it 
through local authorities. Legal-pluralism, the reference to both law and religion, as well 
as customary practices, allows women access to family lands complicating the picture.  
Statutory law formally grants women the same equal rights as men, though this does not 
happen in practice (Wanyeki 2003: 27). The father is generally the only parent to exercise 
authority. Women and junior men (often single) who are under the authority of the head 
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of household (borom kër) are also called surga63 (Diop 1985: 154). They access land 
through more informal and traditional kinship rules, though rarer because of land scarcity, 
a reality often not enough acknowledged by advocacy for equal (formal) land rights (ibid: 
161). As a result, studies have found that women access land mainly through their 
husbands, and to a lesser extent through Rural Councils when they establish or join 
women’s groups, GIEs - Economic Interest Groups - or collectives (Diop and Sy 2003; 
Sow 1992;). In chapter 6, I explore the consequences of this, post-2006, in the context of 
the land rush.  
The third major change is decentralisation, which began in 1972 in parallel with the 
reforming of the land governance architecture nationally. The first steps took place before 
independence in Senegal’s four communes, Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar 
whose populations had the status of French citizens (Alissoutin 2008: 7; Faye 2008: 2;). 
With independence, this progressive decentralisation was ended with the recognition of 
the same statutes for all 33 Senegalese communes. Simultaneously, a progressive transfer 
of powers started in January 1960, with a law that established seven regions and 87 
districts. The local authorities code was adopted in 1966. This process is referred to as 
“urban decentralization” by Alissoutin (2008) who differentiates it with the rural process 
that began with the General Code of Local Government of 1972. The rural 
decentralisation law created rural communities and specified arrangements for the 
appointment of municipalities (by the central government) and rural communities (by an 
elected rural council) (Alissoutin 2008: 8). This was complemented by the 1990 reform, 
which introduced fully-fledged municipalities and provided the presidents of rural 
councils with executive powers (Faye 2008). The local government code of 1996 (act two 
of decentralisation) transferred nine areas of competence from the State to rural 
communities among which management and use of state, public and government lands. 
Under decentralisation and de-concentration, rural communities became responsible for 
assigning land to plaintiffs who were rural residents. This legislation broke with 
traditional forms of land management vested in chiefs and was completed in 2013. The 
third act of decentralisation lead to more state disengagement and provided local 
authorities with greater power. Customary and traditional modes of governance have been 
 
63 This sense of surga differs from its other use (migrant worker) but all translate the same idea of being 
economically dependent (Diop 1985: 156). 
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maintained in the shadow of these legal land reforms.  
In some rural areas of Senegal, traditional land management remains the primary mode 
activated before engaging with local authorities. Several studies of land in Senegal show 
how social conflicts arose as a result of “everyday politics” (Blundo 2001; Dahou 2005) 
or African bureaucracies (Bierschenk et al 2014; Dahou 2005; De Sardan 1999). With the 
current land rush, access to land remains a crucial issue, in the peri-urban area of Niayes 
and other major cities (Baglioni 2015; Diop 1968: 51). Recent surveys by IIED/IPAR in 
Niayes and the River Valley region highlight competing dynamics regarding land use. A 
shortage of rich lands (takk), especially in the delta where most rich land is dedicated to 
rice or given to agribusinesses, has increased tensions in cases where land was obtained 
through inheritance, land rentals or sales - although such practices are not supposed to 
take place officially. New social issues have emerged in Niayes, following increased 
urbanisation that has created tensions surrounding the practice of market-gardening 
(Niang et al. 2017: 23-24). The intersections between these changes and the plurality of 
political governance systems deserve further emphasis.  
 
A few anthropological studies highlight the challenge of reconciling local governance 
and local development imperatives in the context of decentralisation in Senegal. For 
scholars such as Fatou Sow (1992: 28) and Mafeje (2013: 19), kinship and 
neighbourliness are central to African forms of social production and reproduction and 
create links to land, consequently maintaining social cohesion. This centrality of family 
and kinship is stressed in many other studies of Senegalese society by Diagne (1967), 
Diop (1981, 1985), and Diop (2013a, 2013b). Dahou (2005: 24) proposes, in his study of 
the delta of the Senegal River Valley, that being part of a social group is seen as desirable 
because it ensures respect for family and kinship laws and contributes to shaping one’s 
identity in relationship to the broader group. Profit maximisation is therefore sacrificed 
for the social cohesion of the group. He suggests a diachronic analysis that can reveal 
how when faced with the same situation, different groups behave differently.  
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3.3. Feed ourselves first, then export? Agricultural 
policy, export horticulture and agricultural 
commercialisation 
 
The “golden age” of large-scale estates farming was between 1920 and 1960, followed 
by the dominance of small-scale farming post-1960 (Baglioni and Gibbon 2015: 1563-
1569). The period after 1980 was marked by the rise of higher-value crops64 including 
FFVs and the increase of domestic capitalists owning estates (ibid). In Senegal, the 
expansion of FFVs was to accelerate in the 1970s, especially in the Niayes area, leading 
this sector to be ranked among the three most promising export sectors with potential for 
future growth: tourism, horticulture and the service sector (English 2016). 
 Food security has been a central preoccupation of successive development strategies in 
post-1960 Senegal, with agriculture a priority sector. Yet, the country has only 
experienced limited structural transformations in agriculture, the service sector and its 
small-size uncompetitive manufacturing sector. Industry as a share of GDP increased 
between 1960 and 2017 from 12% to 20.5%, whereas in the same period, agriculture as 
a share of GDP decreased from 22.1% to 15.4%. As for the most important sector, 
services, it decreased from 54.8% of GDP to 53.8% between 1980 and 2017 (World Bank 
Development Indicators 2018, table in annex). This lack of either a “green revolution” or 
industrialisation can be, in part, explained by failed development policies particularly 
post-1980, and external dependencies as discussed in the previous chapter. The 
Senegalese rural population constituted 76% of the total population in 1960 and 53 % in 
2017, confirming the rural exodus highlighted in the literature. In 1991, 46% of the 
population were employed in agriculture which increased to 53, 6% by 2016.   
 
This section focuses on the history and politics of agricultural policy-making in post-1960 
Senegal, with a focus on the River Valley Region where public investments in agriculture 
was more significant than the rest of the country. It also analyses the transition from a 
‘failed’ attempt to develop rice production for self-sufficiency to an export-oriented 
horticultural model (Niayes-type path).  The River Valley Region is currently Senegal’s 
leading commercial horticultural export-earning production zone besides the Niayes 
 
64 Other higher-value crops include cut flowers, lemons, and grapes. 
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(which produces almost 60% of the Senegalese horticultural production), Casamance and 
Dakar regions (Matsumoto-Izadifar 2008b; PADEN 2018).   
3.3.1. The factsheet of the first two decades (1960–end of the 1970s) 
 
The main outcomes of the first two decades of state agricultural interventionism in the 
post-independence period are: i) the modernisation of agricultural techniques and 
practices through light mechanisation, ii) the diffusion of good quality green material 
(improvement of species varieties and some becoming hybrid), iii) the use of mineral 
fertiliser (Oya and Ba 2013: 149-178). The decades 1960-1970 were characterised by the 
continuation of the colonial system of marketing boards, which provided farmers with 
some predictability and an institutional apparatus that permitted improvement in farming 
methods, intensification, and an important market challenge in groundnuts. The State 
sought to develop a legal and institutional framework to support agricultural 
modernisation programmes with mixed results. Part of the problem was the 
unsustainability of interventions, their lack of focus on viable areas and producers to 
create a modern and productive agricultural sector. Justification for the bold reforms in 
the groundnut economy was based on fiscal considerations and the objective of 
maintaining institutional support to almost all farmers in the country. By spreading their 
efforts thinly, the positive effects on agricultural productivity were neither large nor 
sustainable.  
The end of the 1970s was marked by fluctuating economic trends generally characterised 
by low GDP growth, drought and falling export revenues. This and the resulting 
macroeconomic imbalance led Senegal and Ivory Coast to be the first countries to call on 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for assistance, in 1979. A stop-go process 
from the 1980s to the mid-90s with the Stabilisation Plan was followed by the brutal 
adoption of Economic and Financial Adjustment Plans (PREF). Senegal adopted a series 
of measures such as state withdrawal, trade reforms, market and prices liberalisation, 
privatisation and civil service reforms (Anseeuw 2008: 251; Oya 2006). This was far from 
the promises of Naatange65 made by President Leopold Senghor. The table below, 
summarising the main policy programmes, illustrates the centrality of agriculture to 
policy in the decades following independence and the recurring objective of food self-
 
65 Abundance in Wolof: The electoral motto of President Senghor 
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sufficiency which started with the irrigation of rice fields in the Senegal River Valley. 
The New Agricultural Policy (NPA) was Senegal’s first major agricultural reform, albeit 
preceded by reform of ONCAD, the state’s agricultural development agency. The failure 
of the institutional framework created by ONCAD’s and its inability to deliver due to its 
financial problems led to a dramatic decline in fertiliser distribution and consumption. 
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Table 1: Main Policy instruments between 1960 and 2018 
 
Year National Programme/Plan Agricultural Policy/Programme 
1960-78 National development Plans Agricultural Programme 
1978 Stabilization Plan Agricultural Programme 
1978-85 Economic and Financial 
Adjustment Plan (PREF) 
Agricultural Programme 
1985-92 Medium and long terms 
Adjustment Programme (PAMLT) 
First major agricultural reform: The New 
Agricultural Policy (NPA) 
1993-95 Emergency Plan in 1993 
Devaluation of the FCFA 1994 
Plan 
 
New Agricultural Policy (NPA) 
1995-00 Preparation and adoption of the 
Interim Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (I-PRSP) 
 
Agricultural Policy Programmes: letters 
and declarations and deepening of 
structural adjustment,  
2003-05 First PRSP Agriculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act 
(LOASP) 
2006-10 Second PRSP Agriculture, Forestry, and Livestock Act 
(LOASP) and Presidential Initiatives 
(GOANA, REVA, PANAR), Accelerated 
Growth Strategy (SCA)66 
 
2011-15 Third PRSP also called National 
Economic and Social 
Development Plan (PDES) 




National Strategy of Economic 
and Social Development 
(NSESD) / Senegal Emerging 
Plan 
LOASP with focus on PRACAS 
(Programme d’Accélération de la 
Cadence de l’Agriculture Sénégalaise) for 
Rice, Onions, Groundnuts & off-season 
fruits and vegetables self-sufficiency. 
Phase 1 (2012-2014) completed. Phase 2 
has started. 
 
Source: Assembled by researcher from desk research 
  
 
66 This was designed to boost commercial agriculture in some niches (notably horticulture). 
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3.3.2. The Rise and fall of contract-farming in the Niayes and the Bud 
experience (1970s- 2000s) 
Boom of the horticulture in the Niayes 
Niayes, a peri-urban region of Senegal is known as one of the first Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) on the continent. Located in the Mbao area, The Industrial Free Zone of 
Dakar, was created in 1974 but it did not yield the expected results and was only 
operationalised in the 2000s (Baissac 2011; Farole and Moberg 2014). It was during the 
same decade that Bud, a foreign agribusiness firm was to introduce contract-farming to 
this region (Baglioni 2015: 22; Mackintosh 1989; Rassas 1988:4,). While initial 
production was under 3000 tonnes under Bud Senegal, FFV exports reached a peak of 
12000 tonnes (Baglioni 2015; Mackintosh 1989).  
Bud Antle was vertically integrated and in a monopoly seller position thanks to acquiring 
the status of export-free company (EFC). This, according to Mackintosh (1989: 14), gave 
total freedom to Bud to “manipulate the balance sheet of the Senegalese enterprise 
through transfer pricing to the benefit of the European company”. This special status 
(discussed in chapter 6) allows vertically integrated firms to charge themselves full price 
for transfers of goods between different processing stages or parent companies within the 
firm to reduce or avoid taxes on profit repatriation (Mackintosh 1989: 14). Instead of 
creating a partnership based on domestic resources with the aim of promoting a new 
export sector between the government and a foreign private company, the scheme under 
which BUD was integrated gave the company hegemony over agricultural development 
within their sectors of activities. Mackintosh concludes that the Bud Antle case “might 
be used as a case study demonstrating how not to negotiate with a foreign investor” (ibid). 
When Bud Senegal went bankrupt in 1979 and was obliged to stop its activities, this had 
dramatic consequences on the socio-economies of nearby villages (Kirene, next to Thies 
and Baobab, in the Cap-Vert, closer to Dakar). 
 
Although there was a strong drive to modernise agriculture, large-scale foreign capital 
was only one mechanism and was limited to certain sub-sectors, such ashorticulture and 
rice. Otherwise, most public investments were spent on “modernising” peasant farming, 
such as in the groundnut basin. One might ask how representative Bud really was of 
agrarian developments during that time. Market-gardening, which was dominant in 
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Niayes, did not have the economic scale of the groundnut economy and was mostly the 
business of domestic accumulators. After emerging in the 1950s, export horticulture in 
that area had yet to attract foreign capital, or the interest of the local elite including the 
Mourides (Baglioni 2015: 22) However, Mackintosh’s study represents a rare account of 
how BUD’s presence was to attract urban investors, increase the scale of FFV exports, 
raise the cost of land and labour, and consequently lead to the rise of contract-farming 
(Baglioni, 2015:23). In the following decade, only 12% of FFV was produced by estates 
through direct production (Rassas 1988: 4). With almost no state intervention, export 
horticulture in the Niayes flourished mostly based on outgrowing with small farmers.  
 
The above contrasts with the developments seen in the Senegal River Valley, which 
concentrated all of the State’s infrastructural development efforts and was already 
experiencing the presence of foreign capital (as evidenced with case of SOCAS and 
Mimran in the previous chapter). 
Disappointing performance of agriculture in the Valley despite heavy investments 
 
Despite heavy state and donors’ investments, Senegal’s River Valley region has yet to 
reach expected development outcomes regarding production performance. Massive 
investments in irrigation infrastructure were made through the state agency (SAED): 
between 3 and 5 million CFA francs and over 150 billion for the 60,000 hectares targeted 
(in 1989 CFA francs – before the devaluation of the currency) (Dahou 2005: 71; 
Englehard 1991: 59-60 in Crousse 1991). It was expected that such highly-mechanised 
irrigation schemes would solve the problems faced in irrigating rice production during 
the preparation of soils, harvesting and threshing (Dahou 2005: 71). In addition to SAED 
interventions, the River Valley’s landscape was to be transformed by the construction of 
the Diama and Manantali dams fully-funded by foreign donors. These had an impact on 
the socio-economy as they included an irrigation scheme of 375,000 hectares of land, 
navigation infrastructure, electricity production and the development of diverse parallel 
industries (ibid: 69). The Diama anti-salinity barrage was built upstream from the mouth 
of the River by the OMVS in 1986 to prevent saltwater intrusion into the lower barrage, 
and to retain fresh water for irrigation purposes.  
 
Agricultural production results were not satisfactory in the first decade compared to the 
level of investment. For example, 6,300 hectares were planted in 1965 and production 
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was 10,600 tonnes which represents 1.8t/ha. This yield was to dramatically fall during 
the 1970-72 droughts. From the 1970s, the River Valley recorded more encouraging 
results with the promotion of cereals (mainly rice and sorgho) and FFVs in the irrigated 
areas (mainly tomato, maize and onion). Between 1981 and 1991, rice production rose 
from 10,600ha to 33,700 ha (SAED 2004: 37), with a record of paddy rice produced in 
1991. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was to have a great impact on production 
as cultivated areas decreased from 34,600ha in 1993 to 23,000ha in 1996.  Between 2000 
and 2002, the area of cultivation continued to decline (SAED 2004: 37). Fruits and 
vegetables had a different fortune with the creation of Irrigated Village Perimeters (PIVs) 
as a policy initiative to meet food safety objectives especially in the context of the 1963-
73 drought (SAED 2004). 
 
Senegal is one of the few West African countries to possess a tinned tomato industry (Fall 
et al. in Duteurtre et al. 2010: 197). Mostly produced by SOCAS and SNTI (National 
Company for Tomato Production), it has experienced a rapid rise with an increase in 
cultivated areas. In 1991, these amounted to 2,867ha with a production of 81,850 tonnes 
(28t/ha). These figur to less than 10t/ha in 1996 before rising again in 2000 with 2,046ha 
cultivated and 3,039ha in 2002 (Fall et al. 2010: 206 in Duteurtre et al.; SAED 2004;). As 
of 2004, only SOCAS was still in production and SNTI has stopped its activities after 
being privatised. 
 
Another key product is the onion, largely produced in the Niayes area. 80% of production 
in the Valley originates from the region of Podor, in Saint-Louis where onions are 
cultivated on small plots (David-Benz et al. 2010: 173). The commercialisation of the 
onion, similarly to that of the potato and most market-gardening produce, is organised 
around the following main actors: Baana-baana (travelling resellers) who buy the 
produce from the fields in rural markets (loumo), producer’s-wholesalers who buy from 
small producers to send to consumption centers where they are stocked (some have their 
own stocking facilities), and brokers on commission (coxeurs),  who allow buyers to meet 
the final retailers in three channels, the rural markets (loumo). the transportation systems, 
or in urban markets (David-Benz et al. 2010: 175-176). Potato commercialisation is 
dominated by the baana-baana, the trader’s-producers who commercialise their own 
production, traders-wholesalers who are mostly based in urban markets such as Dakar, 
and the coxeurs who play the role of intermediaries for commercialisation in urban and 
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rural areas (Ndoye-Niane and Seck 2010; 219-220). Transporters play a central role in 
sending this quickly perishable product from (sometimes enclaved) rural areas to urban 
areas. Inputs suppliers (mostly baana-baana) provide the seeds, organic and artificial 
fertilizers, and crop protection products that are central to production (Ndoye-Niane and 
Seck 2010: 222 in Duteurtre et al.). Importers are the final actors in this sector as potatoes 
alone constitute 40% of the total annual market-gardening imports and constituted 
50,000t/year in 2010 (Ndoye-Niane and Seck, 2010: 217 in Duteurtre et al.). This explains 
recurrent government import-substitution measures to boost local production, which also 
poses some concern to the main actors as I will explain in chapter 7. This sector is highly 
segmented with most producers and traders making comfortable margins, contrary to 
other exploitations who struggle financially and use migrant wage work (surgas) (Ndoye-
Niane and Seck 2010: 230). 
 
From the mid-1990s, SAED has undertaken major projects to restructure agricultural 
value chains with the support and establishment of interprofessional organisations for 
rice, industrial tomato, and onion (SAED 2004). It has also reorganised and reoriented its 
interventions by putting in place technical programs to support the development of a so-
called commodity-chain (or filière) approach, with the aim of increasing the quality of 
technical supervision and fostering production networks. As a result, three commodity-
chains were constituted towards the end of the 1990s, supported by dedicated technical 
programmes and partnerships between producers, suppliers and credit and research 
institutions. These are i) rice: the most important sector; ii) agro-industries including 
tomatoes, maize, sorghum, cotton and peanuts; iii) the horticultural sector (SAED). 
 
Figures on horticultural production in the Senegal River Valley from the 1970s to the 
1990s shows a landscape where production performance does not match the level of 
public investment. The 1995 devaluation was to hit the Senegalese agriculture severely, 
after it had managed to overcome the 1970s droughts. The 1980s were marked by a 
dramatic performance in other crops (groundnuts from the 1980s onwards, rice, millet 
and other cereals during the 1990s). Horticulture, which has a specific commercialisation 
arrangement experienced a steady growth, especially tomato and onion. How this growth 
will be sustained, or not, in the following decades is the object of the following section.  
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3.3.3. International market tightening, “Renaissance” of estates and 
the Rise of FFV exports (2000 to nowadays) 
 
To explain Africa’s changing role in the contemporary international division of labour, 
Ponte and Gibbon (2005: 31-33) have raised three important points: i) the effects of the 
resurgence of economies of scale as a key source of advantage and differentiation 
globally; ii) supply chain reorganisation in a context of corporate restructuring; iii) and 
the issue of entry barriers, determining which Africa-based suppliers can take part in 
global commodity chains. The latter are the key determinants of the governance of GVCs 
(Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200). Towards the end of the 1990s, the restructuring of 
European markets was to drastically transform horticulture. This was especially the case 
for exporters who were submitted to the increasing power of retailers and had to comply 
with a plethora of global rules, practices and standards (Baglioni 2015; Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009).  
 
Consequently, with entry barriers tightening participation in the GVCs, the FFVs sector 
was to become increasingly buyer driven67, forcing export companies to be more 
competitive by controlling all the production through estates, or produce for the domestic 
market with the possibility of using contract farming, or to disappear (Baglioni 2015; 
Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 200; Maertens and Swinnen 2009,). The tightening of the market 
led farming estatesto rise anew whilst augmenting a process of market concentration and 
segmentation with increased differentiation among producers. This is well illustrated by 
three big export firms: SAFINA, SEPAM and GDS. These firms operated in Niayes, in 
the 20002, and held certifications such asTesco’s Nature Choice and EurepGap. Thus, 
they were able to produce two-thirds of all FFV exports (Baglioni 2015). The 2000s were 
to witness the rise of estates which had started with the Bud Antle adventure over three 
decades earlier.  
 
Global developments were also to have an impact on local labour. Drawing on the 
literature on labour regimes, and Mackintosh’s account of the evolution of estates farming 
in the 1970s. Baglioni (2015, 2018) shows that the development discourse of those 
decades was based on modernising large-scale farming through scientific methods of 
 
67 Of the six GVCs examined by Gibbon & Ponte:  citrus, clothing, fresh vegetables, coffee, cocoa and 
cotton, all the later was not buyer-driven then. 
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production and labour control. Estates farming was then marked on the one hand by a 
large capital agency, dominated by labour exploitation via large-scale wage employment, 
mechanisation, informality, segmentation (Baglioni 2018: 121-123). Social disciplining 
of labour was exerted via gendered repartition of tasks, jobs and labour markets. In a 
nutshell, firms resorted to the spatial disciplining of labour across many sites to strengthen 
their social disciplining(ibid.). In the 1970s an informal, casual, large-scale female labour 
force emerged. Organised labour was structured around collective labour actions, strikes 
and walkouts. Women combined domestic work, as “housewives” (Mies 2014: 116), and 
wage labour as agricultural workers: “CF came to replace estate farming as a more family-
friendly inclusion in the global production network (Baglioni 2018: 123). The estates and 
contract-farming schemes of the 2000s boomed in a context where supply chain inclusion 
and compliance to standards was supported by the State, with technical and infrastructural 
assistance to encourage both large- and small-scale farms. European supermarkets, 
around which capital was organised, dictated a vertical integration to commodity value 
chains through the indirect control of labour. As for standards, they acted as non-tariff 
barriers shaping the type of labour regime. In the context of the land grab, resorting to 
contract farming whilst being vertically integrated could be conceptualised as 
“production grabbing” (Anseeuw and Ducastel 2013; Baglioni 2017). 
 
In 2005, the Senegalese horticulture agro-industry was constituted by 20 medium-to-large 
domestic companies exporting mainly French beans, mangoes, melons and tomatoes 
(Baglioni 2017). The significant growth of the sector post-2005 is exemplified by the 
exponential rise in production from less than 3,000 tonnes in the early 1990s to almost 
16,000 tonnes in 2005 and 106,200 tonnes by 2017 (DPV 2018; Martens 2009; SNSAR 
2015: 24-25). In 2017, agricultural and agri-food products made up 33% of the total 
exports from Senegal (French Treasury) with the main destination Europe. According to 
the Direction for the Protection of Vegetables – DPV- (Senegalese Ministry of 
Agriculture), focusing on a pool of 63 firms, total FFV exports represented 88,275,424 
tonnes, 93% of which were for the EU market and 7% for the African market (DPV July 
2018). 
 
In 2018, the main FFV exports from Senegal were green beans, chillies, melons, 
watermelons, sweet potatoes, okra (gombo), courgettes, butternut squash, tomatoes, green 
onions and mangoes. The table below illustrates the growth of fruit and vegetable 
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production between 1996 and 2016. Carrots, turnips, eggplants, dry chilies, peppers and 
okra are also grown FFVs, some of which are not for export Potato production grew from 
10,300 to 63,828 tonnes in a decade, due to state import substitution measures. Rice 
production represents the most spectacular growth, from 148,780 to 885,284 tonnes 
between 1996 and 2016. Limited growth to 190,493 tonnes in the decade 1996-2006 begs 
us to question these figures which may have been fabricated to support GOANA (Dahou 
2005; Oya and Ba 2013: 21-22). The combination of political influences, liberalisation, 
lack of protection for the domestic market vis-à-vis imported rice, the inability of small 
producers to survive the cost of inputs and mobilise sufficient labour and capital, led to a 
crisis of rice production during this decade (Dahou 2005; Oya and Ba 2013: 21-22).  
 
Several studies on Senegal focus on the agricultural sector, analysing the potential of 
agribusiness (Matsumo-Izadifar 2008, English 2018) and the impact of rural wage labour 
(Maertens, Colen, and Swinnen 2011; Van den Broeck et al. 2017). Research on the 
Senegal Valley Region has concentrated on household effects, including income 
mobility, poverty reduction, the increase in foreign trade and investments in the 
horticultural sector (Maertens 2009; Van den Broeck and Maertens 2017a; Van den 
Broeck et al. 2017), peasant happiness regarding contract farming (Martens et al, 2013), 
and women’s happiness regarding off-farm wages (Van den Broeck and Maertens 
2017b). Findings reveal that despite many constraints in FFV exports (in the Niayes, 
Baglioni 2015), FDI in the horticultural sector expanded the FFV sector has benefitted 
poor rural households through wage employment which “smooths and boosts” rural 
employment, despite the casual nature of the jobs (Van Hoyweghen et al. 2018: 22).   
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Table 2: Main FFV production figures in Senegal in 1996, 2006 & 2016 (in tonnes).  
Years 1996 2006 2016 
Beans, green 6 000 10 600 14 674 
Carrots and turnips  
 
11 500 7 116 
Onions, dry 63 785 60 000 416 217 
Sweet potatoes 3 421 33 784 35 056 
Tomatoes 30 420 104 780 162 700 
Bananas 8 640 30 000 37 863 
Cassava 36 985 120 041 420 772 
Chillies and peppers, dry 2 911 5 800 4 825 
Eggplants - 19 694 4 897 
Maize - 181 585 314 703 
Mangoes, mangosteens, guavas 78 140 82 194 123 606 
Okra 
 
25 961 19 073 
Potatoes 6 220 10 500 63 828 
Cabbages and other brassicas 12 000 55 674 59 675 
Millet 601 359 494 345 612 563 
Rice, paddy  148 780 190 493 885 284 
Watermelons 219 540 225 928 259 225 
Source: Assembled from FAO Stats (consulted on 31 October 2018) 
More specifically, this recent study on RNFE in the Delta of the Valley found that wage 
employment increased by 140% per capita income, reducing the probability of people 
falling into poverty by 34% and their chance of remaining in poverty to 16%. 
Furthermore, “casual and agricultural wage employment” by assuring workers for at least 
half of every year was found to improve household well-being.  Another finding is the 
welfare benefits of casual employment. Finally, year-round employment – both in 
agriculture and other sectors – leads to “higher wages, larger and smoother incomes and 
lower poverty rates than casual employment” (Van Hoyweghen et al. 2018: 22-23). The 
study’s findings were despite the “substantially lower wages for casual work and for 
agricultural employment” (ibid). In chapter 7, I argue that it is precisely this dependency 
on off-farm work (which was not year-round for all horticultural workers) and casual 
labour that constitute a significant challenge faced by women, in particular. 
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To understand these developments, recent trends in agricultural policy and the focus on 
attaining food security offers interesting avenues for considering the current land rush. 
The institutional environment I found when conducting fieldwork was more favourable 
to agribusiness than a few years previously. Since 2013, the Senegal Emerging Plan (PSE) 
articulates new development priorities for the country to become an emerging country by 
2035. PSE demonstrates how policy, as a political and technical process, uses discourse 
to ensure wide networks of support and validation (Dieng 2015, Dimé et al. 2016).  
Regarding agriculture, the new administration sought to pursue the implementation of 
LOASP and launched the Programme to Accelerate the Pace of Senegalese Agriculture 
(PRACAS) to operationalise the agricultural objectives of PSE for economic 
transformation and growth. PRACAS covered the period of 2014-2017 and aimed at 
meeting food security objectives through the production of i) 1. 6 million tonnes of paddy 
rice; ii) 350,000 tonnes of onions for the domestic market, and 1 million tonnes of 
groundnuts per year with a minimum of 100,000 tons for export in 2017; and iii) 157,500 
tonnes of out-of-season FFVs for export in 2017. The strategy to implement these 
objectives is based on encouraging agricultural and rural entrepreneurship (pillar 2), 
modernisation of family farming through increased capacity building, adequate financing 
and provision of agricultural equipment (pillar 1), as well as the involvement of youth 
and women in agriculture through job creation (pillar 4). The total cost of PRACAS is 
581 billion CFA including 43,50 billion CFA (7%) for the development of the Out-Of-
Season FFVs sub-sector (Gouvernement du Sénégal, 2014). 
While it might be hasty to evaluate the overall success of ESP, President Macky Sall 
himself released a mid-term evaluation of the PSE, in 201568. At the regional level, 
Senegal met the 10% target of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP). Notwithstanding these constraints, the country has experienced a 




68 For agriculture, the evaluation focused on PDIDAS funded by the World Bank (CFA Francs 43 billion) 
and supported by the government to develop agribusinesses in the Lac de Guiers and Ngalam Valley, in 
the Delta of the River. Its main objective is to attain food self-sufficiency by 2017 with the production of 
1,600,000 tonnes of paddy rice. 
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This chapter has shown that the Delta of the Senegal River Valley Region, once home to 
the much socially and politically differentiated kingdom of Waalo, has become one of the 
most attractive destinations for export horticulture; illustrating how the Senegal River 
truly became the “Nile of the Valley”. This chapter sought to delineate the reinvention of 
forms of stratification across historical epochs. By paying attention to interconnected 
global and local changes in the organisation of labour and production in the horticultural 
sector, it has argued that social differentiation is a long uneven and protracted process 
that has multiple determinants over different time periods. In Northern Senegal, it 
involved pre-colonial hierarchical systems as we have seen in Waalo and Kajoor, 
conquest, slavery, the rise of “legitimate commerce” and its impact on labour regimes, 
and a gradual incorporation into the global capitalist system, market compulsion and 
migration.  
All of the above ascertains that the difficulty in establishing large-scale plantation systems 
is to be understood in relation to the evolutions of land governance systems labour 
regimes, and other social and political constraints.  Whilst colonial administrations in 
Senegal were happy to incorporate peasant agriculture into circuits of global capital, they 
also faced the realities of hybrid land governance systems shaped by plural-legalism and 
the triple heritage of “African, Islamic and Colonial” influences (Basse and Sow 2006; 
Evans 2015,). This historical legacy explains in part current labour regimes and business 
models, as well as tensions over acquisitions of land by foreign capitalists, as we will see 




CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN, 




As indicated in chapter 2, the literature on the global land rush has been mainly 
preoccupied with macro level and theoretical studies. Only recently, with the second 
phase of knowledge production, has in-depth empirical research that captures the broader 
picture of land deals been carried out. Previous chapters inform the research questions 
developed here, as well as the methodological choice for a comparative case-study 
approach. The selected companies located in the delta of the Senegal River Valley Region 
– a region focused on in this study due to it being a leading commercial horticultural 
export-earning production zone- were involved in commercial estate production and 
contract-farming. The study concentrates on the period after 2006, which was 
characterised by the land rush. This chapter addresses the main research questions, design 
and methodology, before discussing data collection and related ethical issues. Special 
attention is paid to positionality and location.  
 
4.1. Research questions 
 
The primary research question of this thesis is as follows:  
 
How and why did the ‘land grabbing’ take place in the delta of the Senegal River’s 
agriculture after 2006 and with what outcomes?  
 
Sub-questions: 
1. Under what circumstances did the land rush take place in the Northern Senegal’s 
agricultural sector?  
2. What are the roles of the different stakeholders at different levels?   
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3. What are the differentiated outcomes of the interactions between new and old 
classes of capital and labour in the context of land deals?   
 
These questions have allowed me to document both processes and outcomes of land deals, 
considering the role of different players and the differentiated and contradictory outcomes 
these deals generated in the intersection of land/labour as well as class/gender. More 
specifically, I have operationalised them by asking:  
1.1. Who are the capitalists? (classes of capital)  
1.2. Who are the workers? (classes of labour) and what are the conditions of labour? 
1.3. How and why did some classes of capital and labour benefit or lose from the 
recent wave of land deals? 
1.4. What are the agrarian change and social reproduction implications of the 
interactions between these two classes? 
1.5. What are the implications of the land rush for the agrarian questions of capital 
and labour 
 
Whilst the literature examines both foreign and domestic investors in Senegal, this 
research concentrates on the former.  
 
4.2. Designing the research 
 
I am conscious of the political nature of this topic and how different stages from the 
choice of the topic to the writing of this thesis have their ideological underpinnings. The 
fact that land is the main basis for social reproduction in these rural non-farm economies 
might indeed influence its “perceived” or “real” outcomes. I decided to focus on how 
factors such as gender, generation, ethnicity, caste and marital status shape or are shaped 
by class, which determines who does and gets what. Having a feminist lens allows me to 
analyse the gender of power. 
 
4.2.1. Decolonial? Intersectional? Two caveats. 
 
I undertook this research in and about my own country, which required a number of 
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methodological considerations and reflections regarding my positionality.  When 
thinking this through, I first reflected on a question posed by Jok Madut Jok: Is it enough 
to simply acknowledge the degree of ambivalence involved “when one writes from the 
perspective of one’s own people, and when one has a responsibility toward the whole 
country”? (Jok 2001: ix). While I recognise the urgency to re-think critically and 
transform methodically “how we know” about “others”, how we disseminate what we 
know, and how we teach and train students in International Development, for example, 
this is easier said than done. (Cornwall 2017; Kothari 2005; Mohanty 1991; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2015; Rutazibwa 2017; Sarr 2016. Tuhiwai-Smith 1991). It is essential that 
researchers consider the problematic aspects of conducting and disseminating research.  
I will not use the term “decolonial” throughout this thesis because my research questions 
were neither formulated with the research subjects nor do they meet all the criteria of a 
decolonial research project. This is because it is a piece of academic work that must meet 
a number of school regulations. However, throughout the research design and its 
operationalisation, I have tried to privilege reciprocity, collaboration and mutual 
engagement whenever possible. Therefore, my approach might be the first step towards 
a truly decolonial research project. This is the reason why I have tried to approach land 
relations in their complexity, and research subjects as experts on their own lives.  
I am also aware of the debates between intersectional feminists and material feminists 
about the value of intersectionality as a starting point and as a method of research. Coined 
by Kimberlé Crenshaw, this concept provides a frame of analysis of intersecting identities 
such as race, class, ability, gender are experienced in relation to systems of oppression in 
her seminal 1989 text: Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics. Materialist feminist scholars such as Martha Gimenez (2019: 94-109) and Tithi 
Bhattacharya (2017:17) do not believe in the explanatory power of “intersectionality” and 
propose to replace it/ complement it by social reproduction theory (SRT) to enrich it with 
the theory of totality. Other scholars prefer to use a Bourdieusian lens to analysing how 
certain practices and institutional processes generate multidimensional inequality (Yuval-
Davis 2006, 2011) 
In addition, by considering the longue-durée and how yesteryear developments still shape 
current outcomes, I resist the mainstream conception of temporality often present in 
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development studies to also consider other non-Western conceptions of time. In the same 
way that temporality is valued differently in Chinese political thought, there are also other 
theories, sometimes colloquial, of “African time”, among which John Mbiti’s: “time is a 
two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present and virtually no future.” (Mbiti 
1969: 12). Moreover, by integrating oral narratives – e.g. the oral histories, views and 
expectations of my research participants, and their subjective assessments of land deals - 
I clearly demonstrate a critical stance towards the unidirectionality of knowledge 
production in development studies, and the sacrosanct vow of objectivity and non-
neutrality. Using oral histories allows me to go beyond economic outcomes and explore 
meanings attributed to, and ways of relating to land. In doing so, I have also renounced 
to the “privilege of the last word”: the act of saying things about realities of others without 
caring for these peoples’ priorities, analyses and struggles (Charter of Decolonial 
Research Ethics)69. Throughout this thesis I critically engage with ideas and aspects of 
the land grab literature that I find to be problematic. As a feminist, I believe in the 
necessity to engage with issues that are daughters of our time. I also agree with Mwangola 
(2008: 16-20) that there is an imperative for post and de-colonial African (feminist) 
scholars to find their historical mission and fulfilling it while at the same time nurturing 
the fourth generation of intellectuals. This rediscovery requires defining innovative ways 
to address our own issues rather than just defining ourselves by resistance to what we are 
not70.  
4.2.2. A feminist critical agrarian political economy approach 
 
Feminist scholars researching agrarian change have made significant contributions to 
documenting the pervasiveness of the “unpaid care economy” on women. Through time 
use surveys, for example, they seek recognition of care work against the “commodity 
economy” (Folbre 2006; Randriamaro 2013; Razavi 2007), investigating women’s 
participation in rural labour markets (Baglioni 2018; Mbilinyi 1986; Whitehead and 
Kabeer 2001), analysing changing livelihoods (Razavi 2009; Tsikata 2009, 2016) and the 
mutual constitution of production and reproduction (Bryceson 1995; Carney and Whatts 
 
69 http://decolonialityeurope.wixsite.com/decoloniality/charter-of-decolonial-research-ethics 
70 As Gola puts it:  African feminists “are no longer just concerned with writing back - to white feminists, 
to colonialism, to patriarchy, to apartheid, etc. - but are about refashioning the world in exciting ways where 
the difference within is not a threat but a source of energy” (Gqola, 2001:11). 
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1990; Mbilinyi 2016; O’Laughlin 1995; Razavi 2009; Tsikata 2016) or “social 
reproduction” (Katz 2001; Razavi 2007), as defined in chapter 2. My research 
acknowledges and builds on the significant contributions of feminist political economists 
who “blazed the trail” and theorised the urgency to engender critical political economy 
(Razavi 2009).  
Bof the personal history of my mother I narrated you in the introduction of this thesis, I 
am not aiming for neutrality or cold objectivity. Rather, I will use my own and my 
mother’s experiences as a strength and the basis of my feminist objectivity. My research 
also seeks to address a flaw in most research on the subject, which considers the main 
actors as genderless, a-sexual, atomised beings. They are not. Therefore, I argue that it is 
the conjugated power of -capitalist-patriarchies that shapes dynamics of inclusion, 
exclusion and adverse incorporation in rural labour markets, and the distribution of rents, 
such as jobs, contracts, and so on.   
In all three case studies in the 20+ villages around the selected companies, the division of 
labour in the concession (group of households) or in the family “household” level (not 
nuclear family) was highly gendered. The terms “household” and “family” has been 
discussed and criticised for its neoclassical analogy with a productive firm and for its 
lacunae as a conceptual tool (Johnston et al, 2007; Kabeer 1994; Koopman 1991; 
O’Laughlin 1995, Bryceson et al 2000). In her study, Mackintosh suggests a definition 
recognising domestic work which produces the “common pot” which, she suggests, is 
more generally used to define the household. An alternative ‘economic’ definition of the 
household may better capture members who are not resident but who are contributor to 
the household (Cramer et al. 2014; Oya 2015). This is relevant considering that decision-
making about production or expenses goes far beyond the “nuclear family or ménage” 
and involves the whole compound or kër gu mag71 (Diop 1985: 153-154).  
 
I examine the different units of analysis where relevant to consider the divisions of labour, 
changing nature of social relations depending on the type of village, its location, nature 
of conjugal relations, availability of paid off-farm activities and family size and 
composition, etc. to delve into intricate social relations of production and reproduction, 
including the domestic level (Mies 2013: 209-238). Therefore, as previously discussed, I 
 
71 Groups of households or nuclear families who have the same patronym 
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believe that the production/reproduction dichotomy should be approached as one 
interconnected reality. It is precisely maintaining a separation between them that allows 
patriarchies/capitalisms to flourish.  
 
Related and not less important is the necessity to resist the dangers of the single narrative 
(Adichie 2009). Indeed, feminist scholars have critiqued the essentialising of rural 
African women in gender and development discourse (Cornwall et al. 2007, 2008; 
Mohanty 1984; Oyewumi 1997). Mohanty’ s Under Western Eyes highlights the ways in 
which “Third-World women” have often been presented “as a homogeneous ‘powerless’ 
group often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic systems” (Mohanty 
1984: 338). Similarly, Win (2004) highlights the focus in the development industry on 
“Very Poor, Powerless or Pregnant Women”, and asks whether this tells the full and 
complex story of African women and if this is all that women’s development 
organisations should be concerned about. Other studies have sought to show the 
multidimensionality of African women by “lifting the blinkers” from the usual suspects 
of poverty, to show that divorced, single and poor women do take care of their children’s 
education (Sender et al. 2006), daughters of poor women are not always doom to inherit 
deprivation, and women may indeed find some forms of emancipation through the labour 
market (Oya and Sender 2009; Van den Broeck et al. 2015, 2017a).  
4.2.3. Comparative case-study perspective  
  
In this research, I combine individualizing comparison72 and variation-finding 
comparison73 (Tilly 1984: 82). This comparative approach enables me to pay close 
attention to the specificities of each case, whilst contrasting them in order to discover 
what led to the different outcomes. The selected cases are representative; selected to 
exemplify the diversity of actors of land deals “chosen not because they are extreme, or 
unusual in some ways but because they either epitomise a broader category of cases or 
they will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be answered” 
(Bryman 2016: 62). 
 
 
72 When a small number of cases are contrasted in order to grasp the peculiarities of each case. 
73 This seeks to “establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by 
examining systematic differences between instances” (1984:82). 
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Such an approach allows for a holistic grasp of the multidimensional drivers of the post-
2006 land rush, as well as the differentiated outcomes of the selected land deals and their 
implications for agrarian change. This contrastive approach is key to proving the 
irrelevance of the main binaries replete in the current land grab literature, large verses 
small, winners verses losers, and unsegregated and gender-less categories such as “the 
peasants” and “the investors”.  Finally, such an approach allows me to appreciate the 
dynamics at play and provides for the bigger picture of the multiplicity of actors and 
social groups involved in each agricultural investment beyond narratives of an 
“homogenous local community” (Gilfoy 2015). 
 
Yet, this approach would not be sufficient if it did not historicise social and political 
dynamics through documenting the complexity and conjugated effects of legal texts, land 
tenure and customary and traditional practices. The focus of this study is also the terms 
of the deals through detailed analysis of the contents of the contracts. I believe that there 
is value in “trespassing” disciplinary rigidities by studying the economy sociologically, 
and by combining “rigorous hardness” and “qualitative softness” (Harriss 2002). 
Eventually, I hope this will help me hear out Adams’ lament on how we fail to grasp 
multidimensional outcomes of development interventions. She wrote the following In her 
Open Letter to a Young Researcher (1979: 479) about a village named Jamaane74, in the 
Upper Senegalese River Valley:  
 
I am not […] talking about any form of “development studies”. I am talking about 
the disciplines most specifically concerned with African social realities: 
anthropology and history […]. I am saying that the practice of history as a 
discipline denies Jamaane present life, because it covers only the period between 
contact and conquest. I am saying that the practice of social anthropology as a 
discipline denies Jamaane present life, because it can speak of Jamaane only in 
an intemporal present tense which is a disguised past tense; or, more 
straightforwardly, in the pre-capitalist past. I am saying that […] this is what 
makes it possible for Africanists to countenance the practice of development 
experts and the very existence of the category “development studies”, which 
makes nonsense of everything they might be thought to have aimed for.  
 
74 Jamaane is not the real name of the village, situated near Bakel. 
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4.2.4. Case study selection and design       
 
This research started with an initial desk review to gather relevant information about the 
selected cases studies. Cases were selected during desk research on the main land 
databases, and triangulated with NGO reports, academic scholarship and grey literature.  
In April 2017, I conducted a two-day scoping study75. This visit was organised at four 
farms that met the following criteria:  
      
● entail a transfer of rights to use, control or own land through lease or concession; 
● allegedly lack transparency (local communities not informed of the term of land 
deal); 
● take place in the fresh fruits and vegetables sector in the same region or in two 
different regions; 
● be either for exports in a European country preferably the UK to study the 
compliance to international standards and follow-up the value chain after 
returning to the UK, or a top producer for the domestic market; 
●  be still in operation (currently under implementation);  
● take place in the countryside, and involve people whose livelihoods or income 
were originating from agrarian activities  




75 A week before the actual start of the field research. 
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Figure 1: The 2010 UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD and The World Bank’s Principles for 




Source: Assembled by researcher from FAO website 
 
I decided not to focus primarily on size because land deals may not be large-scale but can 
still be ‘land grabs’, either if the capital involved is significant, or they are in the form of 
conglomerate of smaller acquisitions, or the intended investments are sufficiently 
important. This led me to focus on processes of contracts and other MoUs to understanc 
the terms of the deals and whether they are transparent and based on free, informed and 
prior consent as per the PRAI and the International Land Coalition’s (ILC) Tirana 
Declaration. 
 
I focus on deals that started after 2006 and before 2012 because the Land Matrix data on 
Senegal suggests that most deals took place between 2007 and 201276. I chose to focus 
on cases that started after 2006 and before 2012, and which were under production so that 






After considering two very similar cases, it became clear that analysing two cases would 
add little new material. I decided to add a third case-study should the opportunity present 
itself and should conditions for feasibility be met (time, resources, finance). That case 
needed to be clearly identified as a failed deal, stopped either during negotiation or in the 
initial phases of implementation. Mixing potentially successful with failed deals, or deals 
with mixed results, served to identify potential reasons that could explain success or 
failure. As suggested by Hall et al. (2015: 9), “what might be worse than a land grab to 
enable commercial farming is a land grab in which land is enclosed for investments that 
fail to materialise”. Analysing cases of failed deals allows for a close examination of the 
processes and/or mechanisms that, over a certain time, lead to outcomes, whether 
intended or not, to enable us if not to establish causation, then to identify correlation 
(Shaffer 2015). 
4.2.5. Case study selection and rationale 
 
Based on the above criteria, I focus on the three following case-studies: 
1. A case concerning a vertically integrated estates export agribusiness with under 
500ha involving British capital (The Second Company). This features a case of 
North-South investment involving global value and investment chains involving 
over six villages in Saint-Louis. 
2. A case concerning another vertically export agribusiness (The First Company) 
with over 1500 hectares involving French and British capital and operating on 
three different sites across 12 villages in Saint-Louis. This firm combines estates 
and CF with another Senegalese firm and sells both on the local and European 
(mainly UK markets). 
3.  A “South-South” investment case involving an estate with Indian (and maybe 
British) capital: the main producer of potato for the domestic market: The Third 
Company. This firm’s primary activity is real estate, while it runs agricultural 
farms at two different locations; one project under operation involving five 
villages in Saint-louis (5000ha) and another contentious case aborted during the 
negotiations (1000ha) in Louga. 
 
A caveat to this case study selection is the lack of primary focus on domestic investors 
especially when previous studies suggest they might be an important actor (Cotula 2013). 
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The objective was to adopt a contrastive approach, which would go beyond the hype and 
analyse outcomes after at least five or more years of production and would not focus on 
the more opportunistic investors interested in speculation77. Emerging domestic 
capitalists are involved in this study because I am interested in outcomes of capital(ist) 
accumulation.  
 
Access to the firm constituted a major determinant in the case study selection. In all three 
cases, the state facilitated access to land. As for the choice of The Third Company, it has 
two projects that it claims are part of realising the national strategy for food self-
sufficiency. One project is in operation and one is considered failed, this is important for 
the analysis of variations in outcomes: understanding why it failed. Based on the promise 
of access, I included it in my study only to learn a few months after starting fieldwork 
that access was withdrawn. I nonetheless decided to carry on despite this limitation of 
access to same data as other 2 cases.   
4.3. Research methods 
4.3.1. Planning the empirical work 
 
All research methods have their advantages and disadvantages. I used triangulation to 
mitigate the side effects of my exploratory sequential design, which consisted of two 
phases: qualitative followed by quantitative. First, qualitative data on rural labour markets 
and outcomes of land deals was collected through immersive research based on 
participant observation. Other methods of collecting qualitative data included the 
collection of life histories, focus group discussions (FGD), semi-structured interviews, 
informal conversations, an analysis of very hard to obtain contract signed for the transfer 
of land rights, and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between investors and 
communities. I documented much of my research in fieldwork diaries and took 
photographs and videos when appropriate.  As this research is not a before and after 
evaluation, I also analysed company reports from the early stages of their activity.  I 
triangulated this data with responses from my research respondents, in order to fill in gaps 
caused by the lack of baseline data. Due to difficulties in accessing some of the 
 
77 I decided not to focus on cases that were already over-mediatised such as the Senhuile/Senethanol.  
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stakeholders, owing to the political nature of this topic, I used snowballing techniques to 
access the relevant resource persons or documents. 
Second, the first stage of qualitative research collection was a questionnaire for semi-
structured interviews, designed and administered by me. The questionnaire was intended 
to analyse livelihood strategies, labour mobilisation and working conditions, intra and 
inter-household dynamics in the selected villages as well as migration dynamics. 
Interviews were also conducted on the nature of the labour my respondents were engaging 
in (familial or hiring out, seasonal or permanent), which type of labour, crop or livestock 
they worked with, the number of day or hours worked per week or month, and the types 
of remuneration received (in-kind or services, cash or none). As this research concerns 
analyses of the socio-economic effects of agricultural land deals on the neighbouring 
populations, ex post and without baseline, additional desk and field research was 
undertaken to gather secondary data from national statistics agencies and previous social 
and environmental impact assessments (SEIA). This was complemented by a 
combination of local78 indigenous knowledge (mythologies, family history, village 
history, traditional practices, etc.) and literature including global literature was fruitful. 
This allowed me to understand how different people relate to land and how this can 
impact their interaction with others during land deals.  
The rationale for this approach is that the qualitative data would provide the situational 
understanding of rural labour markets and differentiated and gendered outcomes of land 
deals, while the quantitative data would build on that, test the in-depth initial exploratory 
framework, and provide specific and measurable data on the nature of agrarian change 
and social differentiation. Finally, I hoped that participant observation would transform 
my consciousness as a fieldworker through the process of immersing myself in the world 
of my respondents before distancing myself geographically and emotionally after my 
return in the UK to complete my analysis. Equally important, I vowed to try as much as 
possible to include the voices of all my research participants and in the end, to share the 
outcome of my research with all parties, despite me being acutely aware of the critiques 
towards “giving voice” and “consciousness raising” (Mies 1982, 1983; Spivak 1988). I 
 
78 Local knowledge “is knowledge that is created by local people and shared within particular 
communities, capturing both the voices and values of local people (...), these are also views that are not 
always included in dominant discourses” (McIlwaine in Desai and Porter, 2006; 222-230). 
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am aware that such an approach cannot be a “co-production of knowledge” because of 
the power dynamics at play (Abu-Lughod 1993; Behar 1993; Wolf 1996).     




The first phase of research was conducted through qualitative methods as the design was 
observational. The data was mainly gathered through participant observation and total 
immersion. Therefore, the respondents were selected using purposive and snowball 
sampling based on criteria such as age, gender, residence, ethnic group, class, type of 
work, land ownership, and whether or not their family owned and/or gave land to the 
agricultural project. Establishing such criteria enabled me to ensure the target population 
was representative of the sample population, since the latter was to inform the survey 
design to be conducted in the second phase of fieldwork. Only on specific and rare 
occasions did I conduct quota sampling; a mix of convenience (selecting easier to reach 
sample) and purposive sampling. Quota sampling allowed me to carefully select 
interviewees with certain characteristics. This was for instance the case during a strike 
that occurred in The First Company, or a union meeting, or a visit to a village where I 
interviewed people who were in attendance. The limitation of this method is that I mostly 
interviewed respondents from the extended family of village leaders or religious leaders 
since our ‘guide’ was himself a village chief and would gather people who had a stake in 
the project for discussion.  
 
Most of my visits were during the day verifying the observation that rural African villages 
are “repositories for the very old, the very young, and the female” (Ferguson 1994: 119). 
Most young women and men were busy working at family farms or projects. To adjust 
the selection bias likely to occur, I changed the time of my visits. I also used snowball 
sampling to select interviewees considered hard-to-reach. 
 
The limitations of using non-probabilistic sampling techniques is that the results are not 
generalisable to the population. Nonetheless, the data I collected is analytically relevant 
for my research questions and was a relevant step towards designing the survey.  




Based on the qualitative data gathered during the first round and scoping study, my 
intention was to design a survey questionnaire. This, in turn, would enable me to collect 
data that would be generalisable to the whole population after analysis. As previous 
feminist social scientists have shown, surveys have been a useful complement to 
fieldwork in order to provide a broader picture of the groups and communities that 
constitute the research participants (Davis et al 2016: 89). 
 
This is especially appropriate given that the categories of rural wage employment are 
difficult to investigate as shown by Cramer et al. (2014) and Oya & Pontara (2015), and 
further discussed in chapters 6 and 7. During the scoping study and first round of 
fieldwork, information was gathered at the village level including: 
-  data on the demographics of the villages from the village chiefs, the mayors’ 
office and the local communes 
- from the latest census, also summarised in the Plans d'Occupation et d'Affectation 
des Sols (POAS), 
-  from firms: workers lists’ and workers’ registers constituted the workers’ survey 
sample frame.  
- From APIX and PDIDAS: previous reports covering the same areas. 
 
The unit of analysis of the survey is the individual worker. As for individual capitalists, 
they were identified purposively on the basis of the worker surveys and in-depth 
interviews and oral histories. This individual could be either self-employed, or employed 
on or off-farm.  
 
I used two methods for sampling, based on constraints regarding to access, and depending 
on the relationship with the firms: i) for the permanent and seasonal workers (and 
sometimes interns) at the first and second companies, I used the workers lists’ to construct 
our sample through stratified random sampling, but ended up using purposive sampling 
because some randomly selected respondents had left the firms.  i followed the two steps 
to stratified random sampling, which consist of firstly dividing the sampling frame into 
“mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive” strata depending on the relevant 
variables. Secondly, a simple random sample is taken out of each stratum. The main 
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difficulty of for permanent and seasonal workers sampling was to consider the variations 
in staff turnover especially in this highly volatile agricultural sector.  Therefore, we ended 
up using purposive sampling to compensate for staff turnover, and to ensure the sample 
includes under-represented social groups such as women farm managers because they 
were rare, or male “onion trimmers”79 because this was considered a “female job”.  
 
The lists below served as a sampling frame for the survey. 
Table 3: Total number of workers  







Total number of workers 3289 1146 1145 
Source: Assembled by Researcher form the first and second companies’ Workers 
registers and interview with The Third Company Management 
 
ii) For the day workers of first and second companies, I  used the registers of day workers 
that the farm sites managers agreed to shared with us, in order to operate stratified random 
sampling on the morning of the surveys. However, I had some issues as a few workers 
with different ages had the same names, and worked at different farms. Therefore, this 
led me to exclude certain randomly sampled individuals whom we were not able to 
find/reach, and do a new sampling on the site, when needed. 
 
A few workers outside the three companies were selected through purposive and snowball 
sampling, especially for the case of The Third Company’s first site, with interview 
categories encompassing clustering between seasonal, permanent and day workers. 
Because the company refused us access to its firm, I had to meet research participants 
mostly in their homes, in the village, after union meetings. For the case of the failed deal 
of The Third Company  in Louga, I preferred to conduct semi-structured interviews in 
villages and rural institutions such as the mayor’s office or the sous-prefecture, rather 
than administer the questionnaire as there was no farm workers.  
 
 
79 Takk soble in annex 
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The data on private investors was gathered from semi-structured interviews and life-
stories, and information on local capitalists was purposively collected from the survey 
and semi-structured interviews. 
Table 4: Main villages visited (see maps in annex): 
 













 (6 villages) 
Commune 4 
 (8 villages) 
AD3 
Commune 5 
 (7 villages) 
Louga D3 AD4 
Commune 6 
 (4 villages) 
 
Source: Assembled by Researcher from POAS, field notes and desk research 
4.4. Fieldwork 
4.4.1. Negotiating access 
 
My multi-sited research focuses on cases of land acquisitions by three different 
companies in the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal: Louga and Saint-Louis more 
specifically (see maps in annex). Before embarking on fieldwork, I contacted The First 
Company through their relevant Embassy in Senegal. After weeks of email and Skype 
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conversations about the purposes of my research with the company, I was able to meet 
with the Director’s assistant and the mayor of the area where the company is located as 
they were visiting the mother-company based in the UK. They promised I would be 
welcome in the village and that I could stay in a self-contained studio apartment the 
company would provide to support my research. I politely refused after consulting my 
supervisor as I did not want to jeopardise my chances of establishing rapport with the 
villagers and company workers. I learned before fieldwork that where I lived, who I spent 
my free time with, who spoke on my behalf, would influence the data collected. 
The first phase of fieldwork started in Dakar, where I was also able to conduct several 
interviews with academics and policy officials. Valuable lessons were learnt that would 
better prepare me for the second, three-month stage of fieldwork (see below).                 
  
4.4.2. Fieldwork dates  
 
I first met the company leaders in London in June 2016. The scoping study took place in 
April 2017. Data collection in Senegal started in May 2017 and was completed in 
December 2017. The first trip to Senegal took place between April and July 2017, the 
second between October and December 2017. These dates were chosen to respect the 
seasonal calendar of the selected agricultural projects80. Data collection in the UK 
continued until May 2018 with a visit to the mother company of THE SECOND 
COMPANY in England. 
  
For the first two cases, I stayed in each area twice to visit all involved villages. For the 
final case, I met a senior manager of the Indian company on the last week of my first stay 
and stayed in the villages where their farms were located (first site of the third company 
in Saint-Louis), or planned to be located for the failed deal (second site of the third 
company in Louga) during my second visit. 
 
 
80 Most of them operate between October and June and are closed during the wet season. 
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4.4.3. Fieldwork Limitations 
Over-researched? 
 
During fieldwork, it became clear that the target populations had been surveyed many 
times before, especially the THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY 
cases. Consequently, most respondents experienced a level of “research fatigue” (Clark 
2008), with some refusing to engage with the project or avoiding taking part. This meant 
that I needed to probe and triangulate further.  
“Fieldworking while parenting” 
 
I conducted my fieldwork with my baby. At first, I tried to hire a babysitter. Some women 
questioned my need for help, being a “lone woman who spent her day having 
conversations with other people”81. As I was solely responsible for the care of my 
daughter, I started adapting my planning to my daughter’s sleeping times. I continued 
working from Monday to Saturday as per the schedule of most agricultural exploitations 
in Senegal. 
 
During the first stage of fieldwork, I could access most parts of the farm including the 
packhouse where I interviewed several workers.  However, it was forbidden to enter the 
fields with my child, due to the chemical products used. Instead, I waited for the second 
round of fieldwork. I also opted to interview workers at their homes after work hours 
when the weather was cooler for my child.  
Mobility 
Because most of the fieldwork sites are very enclaved, I had to rely on staff with cars. 
Therefore, I decided to travel with my daughter on my back in the mornings. To go to 
other villages, I sought to hire a taxi during the day in vain. I had to postpone going to the 
neighbouring villages until the second round of fieldwork when I was able to arrange for 
transportation.    
 
 
81 This is a comment from a member of my host family. 
 123 
    
Gendered Dynamics 
 
Obtaining access to conduct research was a key challenge, and, many questioned why I 
was travelling alone with a baby. Both stays in Senegal were facilitated by my parents, 
who did not physically accompany me but called the families that I (and my baby) were 
to stay with. For them, it was a question of “attesting” my respectability as I was travelling 
unaccompanied by my husband for the first time. Such processes are well described by 
Berik in Wolf (1996) and Lila Abu-Lughod (1999: 11-12), who narrates how her father 
insisted on accompanying her on her first trip to the field82. In addition, my supervisor 
supplied a letter in French and English which I had on me at all times. This helped a lot, 
especially with companies who were suspicious about me.  
 
4.4.4.  Fieldwork Dilemmas  
 
Dilemmas in the field are well documented (Davis and Craven 2016; Wolf 1996).  
On “independent research” 
 
Research independence is never total, and the meaning of full research independence is 
yet to be defined (Cramer et al. 2015).  Despite this, fieldwork involves a level of 
autonomy and freedom in decision-making without which research outcomes could be 
compromised. This was a crucial concern during my first stay when I depended entirely 
on the company for mobility. The village in which I conducted research was in an enclave 
with no public transportation. This allowed the company some control over where I could 
go and what information I could gather. All three company leaders insisted on having my 
timetable as well as the list of people I would be talking to, which I refused to diThe First 
Companyose to them as I had to guarantee confidentiality to my interviewees. I responded 
to this by organising my own transportation for my second stay.  
 
When sampling, I worked with the list of employees provided by the employers, which 
was quicker and cheaper for my student budget. I sometimes conducted interviews at the 
employees place of work. The main difficulty was that the office I was allocated was not 
 
82 She travelled to the field with both her father and her husband the second time (1993). 
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far from the assistant of the director’s and frequent interruptions of interviews. In The 
Second Company, issues relating to independent research manifested when the director 
asked me whether I would be interested in writing a paper commissioned by the company 
to respond to the claims of negative outcomes by an NGO I knew well. I declined the 
offer.   
Respectability politics 
 
I needed to “demonstrate respectability” and modesty by adhering to local norms, 
adapting to formal and informal rules and expectations, including dressing in a certain 
way. This would prove to be decisive for my research outcomes.  
 
On Research collaborators 
 
The choice of research assistants is important (Deane and Stevano 2016). I did not have 
another choice than going with my still breastfeeding baby during the first round of 
fieldwork. I also chose to go with her and my older sister, a social scientist, who helped 
me with my child and whom I trained to conduct tablet surveys for the second round. I 
wanted to ensure I had someone reliable, tactful, the same gender as most of the 
interviewees to mitigate power asymmetries, and whose presence would not raise any 
suspicion given the sensitive nature of the research topic. For this reason, I also asked my 
uncle to be our driver. His fluency in Maure and Pulaar languages spoken in some 




Another dilemma for me was whether to accept being assigned a “functional male” role 
with the privileges attached to it such as accessing male-only spaces. This dilemma 
manifested itself on three occasions in two different villages. In the first village, I was 
asked by the first wife of the village leader to attend a key meeting with “development 
partners”. As soon as she saw the 4x4 car, she started looking for me and told me: “Go 
with them before they are trumped (again)!”. I hesitated, but eventually accept the 
invitation to attend, given the risk this woman had taken by telling her husband to wait 
for me in front of the important guests. Another dilemma concerned financial 
contributions, as was done by other “migrant” workers, to share in family meals. At first, 
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the family prepared a separate dish for me, but I insisted on sharing the food from a 
communal plate with everyone in the house. I noticed they refused to do this for the dinner 
because they ate rice or millet porridge every evening and would buy a meal from a local 
woman who had a small restaurant for me. After finding out, I increased my contribution 
and started inviting the younger children to share my meal. Their father forbade them to 
come to my room. 
“Gone native”. 
 
Amina Mama (2011: 14) said that “when we are conducting research in our local contexts, 
we are situated with epistemic advantages, as well as challenges and demands”. Having 
to navigate my different roles and ethnographic positionality, I ask myself if I did “go 
native83”. For me this is particularly relevant as I am a native of the country I am 
researching. Being a young married female researcher, educated in European universities 
and a new mother also affected my interactions with interviewees. Land, in rural Senegal, 
is the business of middle-aged or old “big men” with patriarchal, traditional or religious 
power. I was conscious of the difficulties associated with the reaction of dominant classes 
to research that focuses on their interaction with “subordinate” classes (Breman 1985; 
Wolf 1996), as well as the latter’s reactions to my studying the dominant class.  
In Senegal, I encountered many dilemmas to which I decided I could not remain silent or 
passive as a feminist researcher and all these points are noted in this thesis. I stopped 
trying not “to go native”. I went native before beginning fieldwork: this is my country, 
this is where I grew up, where my family lives. I acknowledge my potential biases and 
share these reflections on the decisions taken during this research, and how they might 
affect my findings. 
4.4.5.  Language 
 
The majority of interviews were conducted in Wolof, the Senegalese lingua franca and 
my mother tongue, or in French my second language. I took notes in the same languages 
and translated them to English after my return. There were also interviews in Pulaar and 
 
83 Malinowski (1922: 290) suggested “going native” in order "to grasp the native's point of view, his 




Maure, for which my uncle did the translation to Wolof. I am conscious of the “Italian 
adage "traduttore, traditore", "translator, traitor" which signifies that translation can 
never be totally faithful to the initially meant. Yet, I also agree with the philosopher 
Souleymane Bachir Diagne (2016: 51-52) that, “Translation is betrayal? Certainly, but 
betrayal is the only true fidelity. In the sense that there is no perfect translation against 
which we could measure the gap between what is and what could have been”.  
 
The questionnaire was in French and filled in French/and or Wolof with my sister. We 
agreed beforehand on a glossary of most important concepts in both languages, after 
several tests. While in Saint-louis and Louga, we also discussed new concepts 
encountered. This would prove critical during the data analysis phase. 
 
4.5. Collecting and analysing data 
 
  4.5.1. Data Collection   
 
 
During the first stage of qualitative data collection, I targeted the workers of three 
companies, some of them senior managers and company directors. Outside the 
companies, I targeted migrant seasonal workers (surga) and villagers who used to work 
in the farm or had never worked there, traditional, political and administrative leaders, as 
well as a number of policy officials, were purposively selected. 
 
When conducting survey interviews during the second round of fieldwork, I re-
interviewed some of the workers form the first round, and gathered new qualitative data. 
The survey questionnaire was completed in French (with Wolof expressions sometimes84) 
on tablets using Survey Solutions85, a software offered free of charge, developed by the 
Data Group of the World-Bank86 (See annexes 5, 8, 12). I only had to request access to a 
Survey Solutions server before fieldwoek, which enabled me design the survey online.  
 
84 These are expressions we were not able to translate int French and that we decided to keep as such and 
discuss at the end of the day/week with the research assistant, my sister. 
85 https://mysurvey.solutions  
86 The development of Survey Solutions is being co-financed by the World Bank, Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
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The survey questionnaire was inspired by Fair Trade, Employment and Poverty 
Reduction (FTEPR) research87. The main questions targeted basic socio-demographic 
information including education, data on rural wage participation, earnings and assets, as 
well as capital, expenses, re-investments and migration. I added questions relating to 
subjective preferences in relation to the deals, which complements the analysis of agrarian 
change processes and outcomes (working conditions, capitalist accumulation, social 
differentiation based on gender, age, etc.).  The main interest of using Survey Solutions 
is that it allowed for data collection on tablets with limited or no internet connection, 
which was ideal in the mostly remote areas of data collection. In addition to reducing the 
coding errors, as supervisor, I was able to access and check in real time the collected 
information as soon as my research assistant or I finished the interviews, together with 
possible error reports. Last but not least, I could validate the data validation in the time 
of data collection and the information was ready for statistical analysis as soon as 
surveying was completed. 
       
Nonetheless, research subjects were not always willing to give information on salary, 
assets, and earnings from other activities, especially when their spouse was present and 
we could not change the setting to a more private format. As a result, we had some issues 
with missing data. Sometimes, this was just due to the fact that respondents did not 
consider such activities as “work” as explained in chapter 7. Information on the number 
of children was sometimes incorrect with women making less mistakes than men for 
instance. The many interruptions from conducting research with a child had an impact, 
hence the decision that the research enumerator would take care of most surveys on tablets 
whilst I pursued the paper semi-structured interviews.  





4.5.2.  Data Analysis   
  
 
87 http://ftepr.org/  
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Qualitative data collected 
 
The full list of semi-structured interviews (including oral histories), group discussions 
and focus groups including the numbers and location of the interviews is listed in annex1 
and summarised in the below table. 
 










206 7 5 8 1 2 
 
 
Contracts and Memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
The data analysis of this rich data was the most arduous part of research. Data analysis 
include reading three workbooks full of contracts, MoU, and other documents (over a 
hundered) gathered from the different local communities and administrative agencies. 
These were hard to obtain given their very sensitive nature. I was eventually able to obtain 
most of the relevant documents either from the company or the local authorities. Reading 
and processing the contents of the contracts and MoUs took me the first few months of 




The workers survey involved 170 respondents (82 from THE FIRST COMPANY, 68 
from THE SECOND COMPANY and 20 from The Third Company). Because the sample 
size for The Third Company was too small, I had decided to leave it out of this analysis 
(in chapter 7 too). I first saved the workers’ survey data collected on Survey Solutions by 
downloading it in multiple formats in SPSS, Stata, and Excel. To analyse the data, it was 
easier to work with Excel Sheets and Stata, which I was more acquainted to. Making 
Excel tables with the most immediately needed data, mostly for descriptive statistics 
based on basic demographic data (gender, age, marital status, education), facilitated the 
analysis. These were further transformed into pivot tables with  some multi-cross 
information. The analysis was mostly based on descriptive statistics mostly and also 
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selected variables such as employment, assets, migration data, which pivot tables allowed 
to “read” more easily. For these, Stata is more interactive and intuitive. Such data is 
mainly used in chapter 7 to respond to the main research questions: Who are the classes 
of labour? What do they get? What do they do with it? What do they do to each other? 
 
 
As for the analysis of qualitative data from the respondents listed in the table below, they 
were saved at multiple locations: four notebooks, laptops and tablets. I initially used 
Nvivo to record them verbatim but soon realised Microsoft Office was simpler for me. 
During the first months of my return, I read the date several times, taking notes of 
fascinating details. Then, I started transcribing semi-structured interviews in an easily 
accessible format on Google Docs. I started coding them using a codebook on Google 
Sheets. I subsequently established key themes and organised the data into relevant 
building blocks. Then I translated coded data from Wolof and French into English. I did 
the same with oral histories, FGDs, and group interviews. Data analysis was mainly 
“theoretical” which means that I read and analysed the data specifically through the lens 
of my research questions, it was more “analyst-driven” (Braun & Clarke 2006:10). The 
subsequent data analysis (reading and coding) led me to more interesting themes, and 
required shifts in my focus (illustrated by the initial focus on female workers oral 
histories, which now integrates also male workers because I realised that would render a 
fuller picture of workers diversity). 
 
The analysis of photographs, videos, and audio material also took a considerable amount 
of time. This was helped by organising them in NVivo. The particularly interesting 
excerpts were translated and quoted while anonymising the identity of the respondent. 
This was more difficult to do when the respondent was a senior manager or the director 
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Ethics are central to research methodology, especially when handling data belonging to 
companies and individuals. This research has sought to gather both qualitative and 
quantitative data, and obtaining informed consent from my research respondents was 
critical.  
 
For companies based in Senegal, I approached them first by email with a summary of my 
research project and the supporting letter from my supervisor in English88. These 
explained that the research was undertaken for a doctoral project, shared the research 
questions, and the type of information I required from them. I also stated that the research 
would be in line with the ethical code of my university, and that all sensitive data would 
be anonymised. The three companies understand that because they constitute the main 
cases studies, there would be some data about their company size, workers and working 
conditions, investors’ trajectory, capital that would be made public.  
 
For individual respondents, I asked them in their own language to give their informed 
consent after explaining to them the purposes of this research. I explained how their data 
would be used and informed them about their access rights to the final thesis as research 
subjects. Some of them insisted that I should not anonymise their data, yet due to the 
sensitive nature of this research, I anonymised their data.  
 
I also comply with the lasted May 2018 European Union General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) as a controller of the personal data of my respondents. I developed a 
safety-first approach to protect both myself and my participants, especially when 
selecting interview venues to create safe spaces much as possible (Scheyvens and Storey 
2003). I also conducted ethics checks (Desai and Porter 2006):         
          
i) “What are likely to be the practical consequences? Who will use the 
information generated and how? 
ii)  Are the most disadvantageous and vulnerable participants adequately 
represented and protected at all stages?  
 
 
88 Also, in French when they requested it. 
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Finally, I tried to mitigate the power relations with my research subjects by establishing 
reciprocity to allow them to learn as much from me than I did from them. Though my 
intention was to share my research findings with all the research subjects, this thesis 
contains sensitive internal information for all three companies and people, some of whom 
are identifiable.  
 
Conclusion: Researching “others” and finding yourself 
 
Being a woman influenced my research in several ways. Conducting fieldwork in my 
own country influenced my ways of being human. I went home to research “others”, but 
I am glad to have found another part of myself during the process.  
To conclude, I agree with Amina Mama (2011: 14): 
An activist research ethic demands that we not only defy the academic canon by 
not maintaining distance, but go a great deal further, to actively relate to and 
engage with our “research subjects” and explore ways of joining them and 
supporting their struggles. 
As I stand on the shoulders of generations of feminists before me and for those who are 









Photo 2: Near the lake . Summer 2017. (Photograph by from the second company)  
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Photo 3:  Saint-Louis (Ndar). June 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
 
 





CHAPTER 5: 5 STEPS TO “GRAB” 
LAND SUCCESFULLY, AND GET 




Several studies in the field of politics, political ecology and political economy have 
sought to understand the role of the ruling classes both as actors and referees in the context 
of land deals (Hall et al. 2015), and state-capital alliances (Harvey 2003). Anthropologists 
have examined how states use different kinds of powers (Lanz et al 2018; Lund and 
Boone 2013; Wolford et al. 201589). Paul Nugent (2010: 43) suggests that only by 
returning to political economy can we provide a comprehensive picture of the complexity 
of African states and their relations with their subjects. He proposes that three key 
variables, “revenue streams, control of land and population, and administrative capacity”, 
have together shaped different social contracts (ibid).  
 
This chapter argues that land deals are an instance of renegotiation of the social contract 
between the neoliberal “decentralised” state, corporate players and communities. To 
ascertain this, I thoroughly examine processes of acquiring land and the shifting roles of 
political and policy actors, in and around the state. I pay specific attention to political 
actors and discursive strategies, economic and extra-economic means used to augment 
bargaining power and shape social relations around the distribution of rents in land deals. 
I unpack the terms of the deals for each case by analysing evidence based on over a 
hundred contracts, MoUs, as well as discourse analysis based on interviews with various 
actors.  
STEP 1: Understanding the national political economy 
 
This section approaches the State not as a monolithic entity, but as a space of plural 
positions and interests in which power is exercised to shape the outcomes of deals and 
 
89 Wolford et al, 2015: 5) 
 
 135 
the capture of rents. It analyses the motives of dispossession, the role of the State, its 
agencies in incentivising foreign direct investment in Northern Senegal, as well as local 
authorities who play an increasingly important role in negotiating deals. 
 
5.1.1. Agricultural policy in service of politicised accumulation? 
 
John Iliffe (1983: 76) was of the opinion that the state has always been crucial in the 
relationship between foreign and domestic capital.  In Senegal, the State has facilitated 
private capital’s access to land using a development discourse. Here is how: 
 
Structural adjustment policies led to the destruction of one of Senegal’s main agricultural 
exports, groundnuts and groundnut oil. The shift in focus from rain-fed agriculture to 
irrigated rice in public investment programmes, post-1980, is key to understanding the 
groundnut sector crisis, due to a severe lack of public investment during the 1980s and 
1990s (Oya 2006: 214-215). The final years of the socialist regime (late 1990s) were 
characterised by a return to agricultural programming through the subsidising of inputs. 
Though adjustment programs targeted the withdrawal of direct state support to peasants 
(désengagement) and food self-sufficiency, the State remained economically active in the 
River Valley through the SAED and the Food Security Commission (CSA). 
With the change of political leadership in 2000, Senegal was to embrace poverty 
reduction strategies (PRSP), while the 2004 Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale 
(LOASP) reaffirmed the country’s commitment to revitalising its agricultural sector. 
LOASP’s objectives targeted poverty reduction, especially in rural areas and focused on 
food sovereignty and increased employment in line with the PRSP 1. Food self-
sufficiency objectives, promoted everywhere by officials, were in stark contrast with the 
continuing increase in food imports, especially rice. In 2007, the Accelerated Growth 
Strategy (SCA), based on a cluster90 approach, was launched to operationalise PRSP 2. 
Agriculture and agro-industry constituted one of the five target areas of SCA, which 
sought to modernise it and create the conditions for adapting to global supply chains in 
both national and export markets, while developing an investment friendly environment. 
SCA was launched with the objective not only to create wealth with a focus on high-
 
90 Clusters can be defined as “geographic concentrations of inter-connected companies and institutions in 
a particular field” (Porter 1998). 
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growth sectors, but to attain inclusive growth, i.e. developing trickle-down mechanisms 
that could help incorporate the working classes and rural poor in faster growing clusters. 
Of the thirty-eight clusters, five were selected using five criteria: growth potential, new 
employment creation potential, value-added margin, technical and technological 
innovation, and the potential for exportation. Because of the lack of leadership 
commitment to SCA and extra-budgetary expenses, its implementation was stalled (MEF-
EXA Consulting 2013: 116-118).  It only survived the regime alternation thanks to private 
sector funding and the Orientation Law of January 2008. Similarly, LOASP was hardly 
implemented due to a plethora of presidential initiatives targeting an increase in national 
agricultural production through special projects and programmes including FFVs, cereals 
and biofuels91.  
 
These initiatives were launched festively to strengthen the then president’s legitimacy. 
The REVA Plan, launched in 2006 by President Wade, intended to reduce clandestine 
immigration by improving employment rates for women and young cultivators in 
agriculture through the creation of economic poles. The National Programme for rice self-
sufficiency and its unrealistic production objectives aimed to complement the 
government’s main responses to the 2008 food crisis (Ba et al. 2009: 19, Oya and Ba 
2013: 149-17).  The third important presidential initiative GOANA, launched in April 
2008, with an initial budget of 345 billion CFA to cultivate 3,900,000 hectares. These 
unrealistic objectives engendered much criticism from the CNCR, a major producers’ 
organisation. Faye (2008: 4) suggests that:  
 
Senegal does not possess the areas necessary to meet the objectives of production 
of the GOANA: the labour force required for the crops would not be available 
unless we emptied both Dakar and Touba and sent all the Senegalese population 
to cultivate on them. (See also Oya and Ba 2013: 21)  
 
The government decided to improve its “business climate” to attract investment in the 
agricultural sector after food riots across the main cities in 2008 (introduction). Additional 
agricultural programmes include the World Bank-funded Programme for the 
 
91 Sorel, cassava, sesame, jatropha or biofuels, maize. 
 137 
Development of Agricultural Markets (PDMAS)92, the Great Green Wall, and The 
National Programme to support Food Security (PNASA).  
 
These special programmes were put in place as part of a series of incentives to promote 
agricultural investments resulting in several land deals that have increased the number of 
“land grabs”. Certainly, the collusion between the ruling classes and interest groups 
(private sector, religious leaders, lobbies, etc.) is an important factor in the land rush. Oya 
and Ba (2013: 24), for instance, indicate that in Senegal, “nearly 400 000ha of the 
1,400,000ha of land reserves available have already been awarded”. This illustrates the 
opportunistic behaviour of both domestic and foreign investors, attracted to the sector by 
appealing incentives and agribusiness opportunities (Faye 2011; Kaag et al. 2011).  
The second reason for the increase in “land grabs” is that many deals were reportedly 
operated by (and often for), government officials, domestic investors and religious leaders 
(marabouts), especially during pre-election periods, such as in 200993 (Dieng 2016; Kaag 
et al. 2011). As part of the GOANA policy, each rural community was encouraged to 
provide 1000 hectares for the programme but management and control over land use was 
difficult afterwards. South-South (including Indian) investment in agricultural 
development was promoted by the country’s main agricultural programmes, in an effort 
to achieve food self-sufficiency and develop the agricultural and livestock sector 
(Anseeuw and Rahal 2007 quoted by Anseeuw 2010). Consequently, these initiatives, 
while rallying the masses around the objective of “self-reliance”, did not reach the 
objectives of boosting horticulture and food security. On the contrary, they encouraged 
the rise of speculative and opportunistic investments in horticulture, with a multitude of 
domestic and foreign actors playing a significant role in this land rush. 
The third reason for the increase in “land grabs” is that the mobilisation of public and 
private actors around “emergence” might have concealed the extent of the land rush. After 
his election in March 2012, President Macky Sall launched a new strategy, SNDES94 
 
92 The objective of the PDMAS was to improve the modernisation and competitiveness of the Senegalese 
agriculture sector through a better integration of producers in high-value-added domestic and 
international markets. PDMAS was replaced by PDIDAS. 
93 In 2008, noticing 60,000ha in excess of what the community had in its control, the PCR of Mbane in 
the Region of Saint-Louis decided to deallocate 190,600 hectares of land93. He published a list of all 
recent land allocations, which included politicians and businessmen close to the liberals. This led to the 
replacement of the PCR by a special delegation from 2009 to 2011. 
94 2012 and based on his electoral programme called Yoonu Yokkute (The road to Emergence) 
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(2013-2017), with a central role for export horticulture and agro-processing95. Amongst 
the key measures adopted were the reform of rural land to recognise the legal status of 
familial farm and secure peasant land rights, massive investments in the development and 
irrigation of arable lands, as well as the construction of production poles96. In 2013, this 
political programme became the Senegal Emerging Plan 2035 (PSE) articulating new 
development priorities and demonstrating how policy, as a political and technical process, 
manipulates discourse to ensure wide networks of support and validation, even in the 
private sector (Dieng 2015, Dimé et al. 2016).  
Several sectoral programmes were adopted. SNSAR 2015-2035 targeted off-season fruits 
and vegetables with the aim of exporting a volume of 157 500 tonnes to Europe in 2017. 
The Programme to Accelerate the Pace of Senegalese Agriculture (PRACAS), to 
operationalise the agricultural objectives of PSE for economic transformation and growth. 
PRACAS targets food security and self-sufficiency objectives through increasing the 
production of rice, onions, groundnuts, and off-season FFVs for export.  PRACAS 1 
covered the period 2014-2017 and aimed at meeting food security objectives through the 
production of i) 1. 6 million tonnes of paddy rice; ii) 350,000 tonnes of onions for the 
domestic market to be self-sufficient in 2016, and 1 million tonnes of groundnut per year 
with a minimum of 100,000 tonnes for export in 2017; and iii) 157,500 tonnes of out-of 
season FFVs for export in 2017. The total cost of PRACAS is 581 billion CFA including 
43,50 billion CFA (7%) for the development of the FFVs sub-sector (Gouvernement du 
Sénégal, 2014). 
 
In early 2018, the Ministry of Agriculture published the factsheet for the first phase of 
the PRACAS 1 (2014-2017), according to which 63.4% of the objectives were reached. 
PRACAS 2 covers the period 2018-202297. It might be hasty to evaluate the overall 
success of ESP.  Moreover, several civil society organisations, such as IPAR, have 
contested the results announced by the government.  At the regional level, Senegal met 
the 10% target of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
 
95 Agriculture is key to Yoonu Yokkute, because of its positive externalities for the rest of the economy. 
(Sall 2012:18). 
96 The creation, in each integrated economic pole, of companies providing agricultural and livestock 
services (mechanisation, maintenance, warehouse, conservation and commercialisation96) in private 
partnerships with a view to mechanising agriculture and developing livestock in order to reach food self-
sufficiency96 (Sall 2012:18). 
97 This is after the end of the President’s mandate. The next presidential election is being planned for 
March 2019. 
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(CAADP). Notwithstanding these limitations, the country has experienced a renewed 
interest in agribusiness. This is illustrated by the PDIDAS funded by the World Bank 
(CFA Francs 43 billion) and supported by the government to develop agribusinesses in 
the Lac de Guiers and Ngalam Valley, in the River Valley Region. Its main objective is 
to attain food self-sufficiency1 by 2017 with the production of 1,600,000 tonnes of paddy 
rice. In addition, the national investment agency (APIX) has committed to promoting FDI 
in this sector for a greater incorporation of the country into GVCs.  
5.1.2. APIX: A broker for capital 
 
Promoting “destination Senegal” has always been a key priority of the State, including 
local authorities. Since the election of the liberal regime in the 2000s, successive 
governments have implemented this outward oriented strategy by putting in place the 
institutions to build an “enabling environment” and “sell” Senegal as a favourable 
destination for agricultural investment, trade and tourism. APIX has been active in 
emphasising the country’s assets including the different types of soil, favourable weather, 
strategic geographic location, dense hydraulic and roads network (English 2016). In 
addition, the government has conducted several reforms including its investment codes 
to facilitate the “ease of doing business”, encouraging entrepreneurs and promoting its 
attractiveness to investors.  As a result, Senegal has been recognised as one of five most 
reformed countries on the continent and one of the 10 most attractive destinations for 
investors according to the 2018 Africa Investment Index98. This echoes Kenya’s and other 
African countries experience as the focus has been to promote pro-poor growth (and CSR 
strategies) as part of a “benevolent” development discourse and policy in African 
horticulture (Dolan 2005). 
 
APIX have been highlighting the existence of many investment facilities in agriculture 
and agri-food processing in Lower Senegal and the Valley of the River. Agricultural 
actors in this Region, corporate or not, are now more familiar with import and export 
processes, and are better acquainted with regulations for obtaining irrigation equipment99 
 
98 http://quantumglobalgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/AII2018-Final_Web_26.03.2018.pdf 
99 While providers of irrigation equipment are mainly located in Dakar, a number of suppliers are also 
based in the Region of Saint-Louis to be closer and be more reactive to the requirements of their clients.  
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(Paglietti and Machado 2016).  They are aware of the possible exemptions on import 
duties through joining the FZC scheme (Paglietti and Machado 2016: 19). The 
“Entreprise Franche d’Exportation” or Free-Zone Company (FZC) model constitutes a 
“counter‐revolution in development economics” according to Daviron & Ponte (2005: 
19). In Senegal, it was established in 1997 for firms exporting 80% or more of their output 
as a way of creating “enabling environments” as in Ghana (Ouma 2015: 67). Qualifying 
for the FZC scheme entitles companies to advantages lasting for 25-years including i) 
fiscal: such as tax exemptions or exonerations on inputs imports (including 18% of VAT) 
and payment of corporate tax of 15% ii) exonerations related to customs such as duty-
free on import and export, iii) freedom in the recruitment of staff (Senegalese or foreign), 
and vi) No barrier for capital permitted by free repatriation of dividends or profits for 
foreign shareholders. THE FIRST COMPANY for instance imported its irrigation 
equipment through these incentive mechanisms. A few firms benefitted from this status 
without meeting the minimum export criteria.  Since 2012, there have been initiatives by 
the government to end this status but they are faced with resistance from exporters 
concerned about their viability as the government promised them FZC status for at least 
25- years in 1997. “In the end, the number of FZCs was reduced from 439 to 77. However, 
continued concern over tax exemptions in 2015 led to a tightening of the rules for existing 
FZC companies and a decision to stop offering FZC status to new investors” (English 
2016:12). 
The main selling points on which the State is building its horticultural development 
discourse are the presence of irrigation infrastructures and the presence of a few globally 
competitive export horticulture firms concentrated in the Valley. Despite APIX’ emphasis 
on bringing in new investments, their primary focus has been on attracting investors not 
so much dealing with approved investments and monitor implementation ex-post. This is 
reflected in their reluctance to intervene in cases where investors do not respect the signed 
agreements. In these cases, they are referred to other state agencies. “It is the role of the 
Labour inspectorate and the Direction for Fiscal affairs and Domain - DGID” interjected 




interviewed to state that “APIX people are not helpful, they just talk” (Interview 
SMP4101).  
5.1.3. Analysing the rise of local authorities since decentralisation 
  
As explained in chapter 3 decentralisation has been a major change in Senegal, and as 
result, power dynamics operate at multiple levels since the State is no longer the sole 
major actor. From a legal-administrative point of view, the 3rd Act of Decentralisation 
transferred powers to the regions, communes and rural communities (see chapter 3). This 
is well illustrated by this joke made during an interview by a mayor, “I am for the project; 
therefore, the State also is, I am the State!” (interview CLP3102).  
 
The implications of land deals for these actors, particularly for local authorities, are first 
and foremost economic. The budget of local communities originates from: i) internally 
generated or ordinary revenues from tax receipts, activities relating to the exploitation of 
the national land domain and local services, discounts by the state or author public 
authorities, the donation fund for decentralisation; ii) investment revenues from a) 
temporary or accidental receipts, b) allocations from the state budget  through the 
Decentralisation Endowment Fund (FDD) and the Local Communities' Infrastructure and 
Equipment Fund (FECL), or by any other public body in the form of deliberate 
competition funds by the council of the local community; c) samples taken at profit from 
the investment section or from the section of operation. The commitment from investors 
to grant communes yearly financial assistance sometimes amounts to several million 









Figure 2: Main decentralised authorities in Senegal 
 
 
Source: Assembled by Researcher from desk research 
 
STEP 2: Aim to attract FDI by all means possible: All 
that you need is Land, water, people and Sun!  
 
The creation of a vast irrigation network in the 1970s (chapter 3) benefited prospective 
private investors in this area, and in particular those who require irrigation to produce 
horticultural products. This is illustrated by the experience of SOCAS which joined this 
irrigation scheme in 1965. This section discusses the centrality of water in the Delta of 
the River Valley region and presents the main horticultural actors in this region. 
5.2.1. Horticultural expansion in the delta and the Senegal River 
Valley: Between opportunities and constraints 
 
Water availability is described by APIX as the crucial determinant of agricultural 
production in addition to the diversity of soil types. Water resources are central for 


















Communes (Mayor and 
Municipal Council)
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combined with the geographical and institutional environment, began yielding the 
expected results only from the 2000s. In the Valley, APIX outlines four climate zones 
and specifies that most of the Delta of the River and Niayes surface are Zone A soils 
characterised by irrigated agriculture whereas zones B, C and D are rainfed. The Valley’s 
four main varieties of land allow for a diversity of crop production.  
 
According to the FAO, Senegal’s irrigation sub-sector is divided into two farming 
systems, irrigated cereals dominated by paddy rice (Delta and Upper River Valley), 
intercropped with maize and sorghum and smallholder irrigated horticulture with a large 
range of fresh fruits and vegetables, of which tomato and onion are the most produced 
(Paglietti and Machado 2016: 3). Export-oriented commercial agriculture in the Valley 
region mostly focuses on fruits, vegetables and sugarcane. However, according to the 
FAO, Senegal’s irrigation potential remains untapped; Senegal’s potential irrigable land 
is estimated to be 350,000 hectares, yet 30% of this is not yet irrigated. Of the equipped 
land, approximately 60% was under cultivation in 2009mostly cultivating rice and 
vegetables (Ibid.). 
 
Besides water, investors consider warm weather to be crucial, since this enables the 
production of off-season fresh produces for sale to European markets (interviews with 
senior company managers). This is facilitated by direct access to nearby European 
markets through the ocean with low maritime transport costs, through road transportation 
via Mauritania and Morocco. The fact that peace and relatively good governance prevail 
in Senegal has also encouraged investors. Investors receive institutional support from 
APIX and several schemes relating to exports such as the FZC status. 
 
While the presence of irrigation infrastructures is one of the main strengths in the Delta 
of the River, water supply has represented a pressing issue. This is despite the $540 
million compact signed in 2009 between the Senegalese government and the U.S. as part 
of the Millennium Challenge Corporation whose objective is to support poverty reduction 
and boost agricultural productivity. The two principal projects, Roads Rehabilitation and 
Irrigation and Water Resource Management, targeted the strengthening of irrigation 
infrastructure and the densification of road networks in those two regions.  
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SAED plays a crucial role in the creation of irrigation infrastructures to improve 
agricultural production and manage agro-hydraulic resources. This supports private 
entrepreneurship and helps local authorities to identify types of land and associated water 
resources to inform land deliberations, as well as facilitating access to agricultural 
equipment and advising medium and small-scale farmers during their installation. In 
return, peasants pay a user fee after each agricultural campaign. Smallholder farmers have 
marginal access to the irrigated parameters for paddy rice and resort to small scale 
irrigation techniques, using surface water as well as flood recession to produce market 
gardening largely dependent on rainfed agriculture, especially in the Delta of the River 
(Paglietti and Machado 2016).  
SAED ‘s crucial role in Northern Senegal is also illustrated by the land allocation and use 
plans (POAS), which allows for an effective occupation of lands. Produced by SAED, 
they are the main instruments used by local authorities in the zoning and management of 
land. POAS distinguishes four main types of land use: 
i) Agro-Pastoral with priority for Agriculture (ZAPA): Except for cultivated areas, all 
uncultivated areas of this zone may be used to graze cattle throughout the year. The 
breeder is responsible for any damage resulting from his cattle, and cultivated fields may 
only be used by the cattle at the end of the harvest. Otherwise a fine is to be paid by the 
owner of the cattle as compensation. 
ii) Agro-Pastoral with priority to Livestock farming (ZAPE): In this area, grazing cattle 
is allowed all year round with no fines applied to livestock owners. The onus for the 
protection of the cultivated plots against cattle is on their owners. 
iii) Pastoral (ZP): Agriculture is prohibited in any such zone and cattle grazing is 
permitted all year round. No fine for damage to fields is applicable to cattle breeders. 
As we will see later, change in land use is a source of land conflict. 
 
Notwithstanding, the main constraints for horticulture remain the same as in the previous 
decades: water supply, access to credit, agricultural commercialisation and the increasing 
scarcity of agricultural land. As a result, many government-supported irrigation 
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programmes aim at attracting commercial farmers in order to meet the goal of food self-
sufficiency. 
 
5.2.2.  Contextualising the land rush in the Senegal  
  
Regarding land deals, I found the information published in the Land Matrix (the leading 
large-scale acquisition global database) correct on the three case-studies selected for this 
study. This is in spite of many methodological flaws in existing databases on land deals, 
due to their reliance on potentially misleading crowd-sourcing (Grain 2013: Oya 2013b). 
The Land Matrix only surveyed sites with cases of contestation or dispossessions (THE 
FIRST COMPANY’s third site, THE SECOND COMPANY, and The Third Company 
Louga). This section presents a brief overview of the scale of land rush in Senegal based 
on the database.   
 
The Land Matrix reports a total of 34 intended, concluded and failed land deals in Senegal 
between 2003 and 2018. As shown in the table below, the total intended size of the deals 
was 539,460 hectares, the contract size 327,229 ha, and surprisingly as of 2018, only 
21,686 hectares were in production. This shows that only a tiny portion of the land deals 
hectarage has been used, and confirms that, “What might be worse than a land grab to 
enable commercial farming is a land grab in which land is enclosed for investments that 
fail to materialise” (Hall et al. 2015: 9).  
 
11% of those land deals included contract farming and the rest estate farming. 8% of the 
deals failed includes one by an Indian investor of 60,000 hectares for rice production, 
widely reported in the media103. 70% of deals on the Land Matrix were concluded and 
the rest were intentions. Based on this data, 63.6% of the total deals took place between 
2006 and 2012, 12% before 2006 and 6% after 2012. 12% did not have a clear starting 
date. This confirms that most deals took place between 2006 and 2012, however caution 
is recommended as the first case reported dates from 2003 and the lack of data for the 
pre-2006 period may be due to the recent creation of the database. 
 
103 A cross-check led me to an interview with former president Wade’s Great Offensive for Food 
Sufficiency (GOANA) mentioning a partnership with Indian Investors’ to grow 240000ha of rice in the 
Delta of the River (Le Soleil, October 2008).  
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Production size Crop 
Lac de Guiers Nigeria 
Biofuels, Food crops, 
Renewable Energy 
[2011] Concluded  In operation (production) 40000 8000   Sugar Cane 
Podor Saudi Arabia Food crops [2012] Failed    100000     Rice 
Senegal River Valley Saudi Arabia Food crops [2010] Failed    116435     Rice 
Dagana Belgium 
Biofuels, Other (please 
specify) 
[2007] Concluded  [2012] Project abandoned   5000 6 Jatropha 
Makhana France Food crops [2003] Concluded  In operation (production) 5000 418 418 Tomatoes, Corn, Fruit  
Gandon France Food crops [2009] Concluded  In operation (production) 3000 1430 900 Out-of-season FFVs 
Anambe 
Velingara 
India Food crops [2011] Intended    60000     Rice 
Ngnith, Ross Bethio, Fass Ngom Senegal Biofuels, Food crops [2012] Concluded  
[2014] In operation 
(production) 
26500 10000 2000 
Cereals, Out-of-season 
FFVs, Sun Flower 
Mbane Spain Biofuels, Food crops [2009] Failed    20000 20000   Food crops, Jatropha 
Ross Bethio France Food crops [2014] Concluded  
[2015] In operation 
(production) 
4500 571 215 Rice 
Syer Senegal Food crops [2005] Concluded  
[2013] In operation 
(production) 
5000 5000   Vegetables 
Ourour, Kaffrine Italy 
Biofuels, For carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
[2009] Concluded  
[2013] In operation 
(production) 
2750 2750 574 Peanut, Jatropha 
Yamane UK Food crops [2011] Concluded  In operation (production) 310 310 310 
Onion, Out-of-season 
FFVs 
Mbane India Food crops [2008] Concluded  In operation (production) 5700 5700 346 
Out-of-season FFVs, 
Cereals 
Mbane Saudi Arabia Food crops [2003] Concluded  
[2006] In operation 
(production) 
250 250 217 Fruit, Onion 
Kaolack, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, 
Louga, and Dakar 
Senegal Food crops [2005] Concluded  In operation (production) 20000 20000   Fruit 
Senegal Senegal Food crops Intended    300     Corn  
Diokoul India Food crops [2016] Concluded  
Start-up phase (no 
production) 
1000 1000   Potatoes 
Dodel Morocco Food crops [2017] Failed    10000 10000   FFVs, Cereals 
Lac de Guiers Senegal Food crops Concluded  In operation (production) 6000 6000 1000 Peanut, cereals, FFVs 
Source: Land Matrix (Accessed on 20 October 2018) 
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5.2.3. Contemporary land rush Northern Senegal  
 
The Delta of the River is home to companies producing crops such as rice, millet, 
sugarcane as well as FFV for local and international markets. The below table provides 
an overview of some of the horticultural exports in the region. It shows that SOCAS is 
one of the big players in the production of industrial tomatoes104. Most of the fresh 
tomatoes are harvested on its 150ha Bango farm. The rest is collected from contracted 
family-farmers in order to be transformed on the SOCAS Savoigne farm created in 1971. 
The Senegalese tomato sector was marked by the creation in 1999 of a national cluster 
(filière), organised around the National Committee for Industrial Tomato (CNCFTI), with 
the aim to boost the sector. This has proved effective as illustrated by the emergence of a 
new company, Agroline (Fall et al. 2010: 198). Yet, in 2005 SOCAS still accounted for 
58% of tomato importations, compared to 42% for Agroline. The quantities of fresh 
tomatoes collected by both companies through contract-farming were, however, below 
national needs. Consequently, SOCAS imports millions of tonnes of triple-concentrated 
tomatoes, which it then transforms into double-concentrated similar to the one made from 
fresh tomatoes. 
 
Another important export firm is GDS (Grands Domaines du Sénégal). It is part of the 
French group Compagnie Fruitière based in West Africa and the Caribbean. Compagnie 
Fruitière was founded in 1939 in Marseille and is now based in Rungis105, France. It 
sources exotic FFVs and is certified by Tesco Nurture, Global Gap and SMETA Audit. 
It started its operations in Mauritania106 for ease of obtaining land before opening a branch 
in Senegal in 2003. In Senegal, the main crops are cherry tomatoes, sweet corn and 
mangoes, all prepared at the company’s packing station. The company’s headquarters are 
in Ndiawdoune and Mbarigo in the Saint-Louis Region where it operates on 300ha
 
104 The Société Nationale de Tomate Séchée (SNTS) was not included in this table due to a lack of 
reliable information. 
105 It is the biggest European wholesaler food market. 
106 It is named Grands Domaines de Mauritanie. 
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Table 7: An overview of the main horticultural companies in the Delta of the River 
 
 
Source: Assembled by Researcher from desk research
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Equally important is SOLDIVES, created in 2006 in Mbeurbeuf, specialising in melons 
for the French market thanks to holding a Global GAP certification. 
 
The remaining companies- THE SECOND COMPANY-The Second Company, THE 
FIRST COMPANY-The First Company and The Third Company - are my three case-
studies, discussed below THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY 
export out-of-season FFVs to Europe as they hold the required certifications. Only The 
Third Company’s (owned by Indian Investors) production is in totality sold in the local 
market as THE FIRST COMPANY sells on the local market only during the rainy season. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the presence of foreign capital(s) in Northern Senegal has long 
been established, especially French capital with the Compagnie du Sénégal in 1659.  
 
Private Indian investment in Northern Senegal’s agriculture, such as the case of The Third 
Company, is new although the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1962 
(Colom-Jaen 2013). There were approximately 380 Indian companies operating in 
Senegal in August 2017 (Government of India 2017107). All these companies are estate 
producers except for THE FIRST COMPANY, which also uses CF.  The Third Company 
has used CF in the past to produce for both local and international markets, with varying 
degrees of success108. 
  
 
107 https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Senegal_Aug_2017.pdf  
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STEP 3: Map and master the area of intervention, then 
carefully select your champions! 
 
As explained in the previous section, THE SECOND COMPANY, THE FIRST 
COMPANY, and The Third Company (first site) are based in the region of Saint-Louis, 
while the third company’s (second site) is in the Niayes near Louga. The information 
presented in this section is based on interviews, secondary sources such as the POAS, and 
local knowledge - for example, the memory and books of village chiefs or griots.  
 
5.3.1. Socio-economic context 
 
This section offers an overview of the socio-economic context and social relations of 
production and reproduction at family and village levels. There are differences in the 
availability and affordability of wage labour, conjugal and familial arrangements, and 
degree of rurality.  
 
The village hosting the Second company   
The village hosting THE SECOND COMPANY is located in Saint-Louis. There were six 
main villages neighbouring the farm (see table 1 and maps in annex). Most workers from 
this village were practicing rainfed agriculture, market gardening or cattle-breeding, 
withonly a minority practicing fishing. Before the project, most families cultivated on the 
jeeri - upper lands (as opposed to the waalo) - and practiced rainfed agriculture along the 
Lake. The village used to be characterised by high levels of rural exodus, which is now 
in decline. From 1991-92, the main neighbouring village, practiced intensive irrigated 
groundnut production and had little irrigation infrastructure. Many respondents from this 
village and neighbouring villages testified to travelling to the city of Saint-Louis, in 
search of work at another export horticulture farm.  
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The villages hosting the First Company 
 
Approximately twelve villages are directly impacted by THE FIRST COMPANY 
activities (see table and maps). In 2017, 11 years after its establishment, THE FIRST 
COMPANY totalled over 2500-day workers and around 1000 seasonal and permanent 
workers across its three sites. This Commune is home to the headquarters of two out of 
three THE FIRST COMPANY sites, the S. farms, and the famous eponym OMVS dam.  
 
The villages are part of the Region of Saint-Louis, including the one which hosts the 
partnering THE FIRST COMPANY CF schemes.  
 
As for N., it is the name given by THE FIRST COMPANY to its latest and third 
agricultural farm, which straddles several villages in the neighbouring communes. 
 
These villages depend more on rainfed agriculture and cattle-breeding than on market-
gardening. It used to depend on rice cultivation and fishing but these activities have 
sharply decreased in the last decades due to salt intrusion and soil degradation (Interview 
CL28109). If most of these village economies now practice irrigated agriculture (especially 
for rice), and rainfed market-gardening (Ibid.).  Most Pulaar110 villagers, in particular, 
are cattle-herders, peasants and traders, and are therefore used to travelling for several 
weeks to find grassland and water points for their cattle (mangi). Traditionally, when 
cows and goats produced milk, women would walk long distances to commercialise it. 
The droughts of the 1970s in the Sahel combined with the agricultural crisis later, would 
have a lasting agrarian impact on the region with most pastoralists temporarily shifting to 
fishing and trading (Fall 2002: 285-306; Sen 1983; Schmitz 1990: 499-504;). This is the 
cases of most Beydan Maures111112 in one of the villages, who have become fishermen 
and boutiquiers (shop owners) in other cities such as Fatick. As evidenced in chapter 3, 
labour migration is a widespread practice in the Valley and male Maures are no exception. 
They also migrate to Dakar, Saint-Louis and Mauritania, though this has decreased due 
 
109 05/11/17 
110 Of the Haal Pulaareen or Fulani community made of the Peulh and the Tukuler. 
111 In the course of this thesis, I was made aware of the racist connotation and pejorative use of the term 
“Moor” therefore, I decided to replace it by “Maureish”: derived from “Maure”: originally, Muslim 
inhabitants of the Maghreb, many of them are part and parcel of the rich Senegalese culture. 
112 Beydans are “White Maures” of Berber Arab and black African groups from the Sahara while 
Haratins are “Black Maures”. 
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to formal documentation increasingly being required at the border. Many male Maure 
workers spend half of the year in their village and the other half at their place of work. 
One such respondent said: “I went to [the city of] Fatick in 1949 with my mother. I 
returned to settle there as a boutiquier (shop-keeper) in 1974. I also lived in Usine Benn 
Tally in Dakar in 1965. Now I live in Fatick from December to August as a boutiquier 
and I return in my village for my annual leave to fish from August to December” 
(Interview CL33113).  
 
In the N.area, several Pulaar villages were established with the settlement of the nomad 
population who decided to stay closer to roads, markets and schools. This is also the case 
of N.which was established close to a big market connected to other big trade centres 
such as M. where a big loumo114 is held every weekend. Before the droughts, peasants 
would produce millet, groundnut, dry beans, sorel and red watermelon amongst other 
produce. They would cultivate rice if they were close to the rich lands “takk”. They did 
not focus on market-gardening then as they do now (Interviews CL22115 CL46116). 
 
Most households were no longer able to cultivate millet because of the water shortage, 
preferring to cultivate other crops such as FFV for their subsistence. The poorest amongst 
them resorted to selling their cattle to obtain cash. In N., older women recalled walking 
almost 15km to go to Saint-Louis to exchange milk for crops, cereals or money (Interview 
CL39117). Later there was the train (autorail) and then the public transportation system 
(horaires). This trading of milk (sippi soow) has largely declined because of the shortage 
of grazing lands and scarcity of rainfall (Interview CL43118). This, according to many, is 
part of the reason why they accepted THE FIRST COMPANY deal, to gain access to 
water and crops to feed their cattle, and for the prospects of employment that would help 





114 Rural Market 
115 03/11/17 
116 17/11/17 
117  12/11/17 
118  14/11/17 
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The villages hosting The Third Company 
 
The village hosting The Third Company’s potato farm, is located in Saint-Louis. It is 
home to many agribusinesses. Agriculture was the most important economic activity for 
the Wolof who also practiced cattle-breeding (Interview CL53119). Pulaar villages such 
as M.main problem was that they could only use the dedicated cattle grazing land near 
the rich soils for their type of cattle-breeding120 (Interview CL48121; See glossary: Table 
22) 
 
As for the second deal of The Third Company, it is in Louga, in the former kingdom of 
Kajoor. According to its Commune, this high density is explained by the high presence 
of “surgas”, the rural migrant workers that they estimated as 1405 (8% of the population). 
The population of this village was relatively young, with 44% of the population under 14 
in 2015. Rainfed agriculture was practiced by 66% of the population, mainly for cereals 
including millet, as opposed to 12% for market-gardening (onions, sweet-potato, 
aubergines, carrots, cassava), and 9% for cattle breeding (POAS, 2015). Most villages 
such as M. had access to water but not electricity. In the neighbouring villages, the main 
activities were agriculture (market-gardening and horticulture), cattle-breeding and trade 














Photo 6: A woman in the fields124. May 2017. (Photograph  
by researcher) 
 
Photo 7: A donkey charrette in N. November 2017 
 
 
124 She just collected the cereals (curri) she left soaking in the water she left soaking overnight in the 
water, and would prepare and sell to primary school children despite the risks of bilharzias 
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Photo 8: Children playing in Louga. December 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
 
This section has presented the general socio-economic context of this research. 
Observations, interviews and discussions with a few families still practicing agriculture 
reveal the extent of state disengagement. There is a common narrative of scarcity and 
“bricolage”: “agriculture is a struggling business” (interview SF1)125, “we are just trying 
our luck with bad quality seeds, no soil treatment, no training”, “the State seldom provide 
seeds through the local community and we don’t hear from them until next elections” 
(Interview CL8126), “sometimes we start cultivating but have to stop because of the lack 
of means” (Interviews CLC2127). The socio-economic conditions also show that despite 
the diversity of villages according to their demographic and ethnic composition, they 
shared common patterns of migration and division of labour. While labour migration is 
not new, and nor is social differentiation, this research seeks to analyse the extent to which 








5.3.2. Profiling our champions: Stylised facts about the three firms 
  
This section presents the background of each firm: business model, crop, investors, sector, 
calendar of production, and terms of land acquisition. 
The first Company  
 
THE FIRST COMPANY is a joint-farming venture. It is a vertically integrated farming, 
processing and marketing business, employing over 300 full-time and 400 seasonal staff.  
 
THE FIRST COMPANY was established in Senegal, after 2005. When it began its 
activities, THE FIRST COMPANY leased an area of land smaller than 500 ha. The 
deliberation for those first 420ha was only delivered in 2008 and 2012. Between 2012 
and 2017, THE FIRST COMPANY grew extensively (see organogram below). THE 
FIRST COMPANY is mainly estate farming and recruits wage labour for its three sites.  
 
The management of THE FIRST COMPANY provided several reasons for choosing 
Senegal, including land availability, shipping connections to Northern Europe through 
the River and the Port of Dakar, and the presence of irrigation infrastructure. Another 
strategic reason was that the CFA Franc is fixed to the Euro and therefore subject to less 
fluctuation. Other reasons according to THE FIRST COMPANY’s director included 
“peace and democracy, limited corruption, cheap labour provision, the ease of doing 
business, and the culture of “masla128”(interview SMP129).  
 
THE FIRST COMPANY produces mainly FFVs intended for export to the UK, and for 
the domestic market. Farming of export fresh fruits and vegetables spans November to 
May. The other crops (onion, carrots, and peanuts) are produced during the wet season 
and sold to the local market. There is no summer interruption of activities (see THE 
FIRST COMPANY calendar of production below), hence THE FIRST COMPANY hires 
wage labour throughout the year, though at a reduced rate from May. Memoranda of 
 
128 The culture of tolerance for the self and for others, which facilitates community life and helps to 
prevent conflict.  
129 03/05/2017 
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understanding (MoUs) were signed with local communities to compensate their loss of 
grazing lands with the leftover produce to feed their livestock. 
 
Table 8: The First Company’s Calendar of Production 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
 
See Legend below (different vegetables) 
  
 159 
The First Company is registered as an FZC (with the fiscal advantages presented earlier 
in this chapter) and has several certifications including Tesco Nurture and Supplier 
Ethical Data Exchange. It is also certified by S. which assesses labour practices, ethical 
performance and allows retailers to share data, promote good practices in health and 
safety, environmental and business ethics. Not least, it holds Global G.A.P. L.E.A.F 
Marque and BRC certifications, the leading brand evaluating food safety, packaging, 
storage, distribution and retailing standards.  
 
These certifications are evidence that exporting FFV to markets such as the UK is highly 
regulated with high standards (Baglioni 2015; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). The Global GAP 
certification leads to longer employment through the farming season for workers (Colen 
and Maertens 2011). This has engendered the shift from CF to estates seen in Senegal 
since the 1990s and allows for direct control of production (Baglioni 2015; Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009, 2014). Since the 1980s, the export FFV sector has become very 
competitive with the emergence of big European wholesalers and large retailers with strict 
quality standards leading to further vertical integration and market segmentation (Dolan 
and Humphrey 2000; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). As a result, the direct competitors of THE 
FIRST COMPANY in the FFV business are based in Egypt, Morocco, Mexico and 




Table 9: Description of the production by THE FIRST COMPANY 
 
Assembled from field notes 
  
The Second Company  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY SARL Senegal was set up after 2010. As of March 2018, 
80% of THE SECOND COMPANY is owned by a group based in the UK  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY began activities in Senegal with the installation of the farm 
including a pack house, the construction of a canal and irrigation systems. THE SECOND 
COMPANY source and grows vegetables to supply the UK in winter. The farming season 
lasts eight months from October to May, and all the production is exported to the UK (see 
table below). The remainder of the vegetables needed by the UK firm are produced in the 
UK three months per year.   
 
Table 10: Distance between THE SECOND COMPANY and main neighbouring 
villages, Infrastructures and Venues 
 
Source: Assembled from THE SECOND COMPANY impact assessment Report 
 
According to the firm’s UK resource person, Senegal was selected instead of Egypt, 
Morocco, or Mexico for the following reasons. Egypt and Morocco were excluded 
because of long-term sustainability issues and because they “are not water abundant, in 
addition, labour regulations were getting tighter” (interview SMP130). Mexico was 
excluded due to its dollar-based economy, which would provide advantages for importing 
but not exporting. Senegal was chosen because of the ease of sea-freight and doing 
business as an FZC. After a 10-day trip hosted by APIX, the first director was mandated 
with the mission of setting up THE SECOND COMPANYS in Senegal which was 
“politically stable, good climate, land plentiful, sustainable source of water, pro-
investment government, great logistical route back to the UK, calm country” (ibid.). In 
2011, the managing director “found” the land and following registration procedures 




the arrival of a new Managing Director of THE SECOND COMPANY (see organogram 
in chapter 6).  







Certifications Sold in Irrigation Destination 
Vegetables 









6 pivots Export  
Source: Assembled by Researcher from fieldnotes 
 
THE SECOND COMPANY’s 2011 agreement with the Rural Community  involved the 
equal allocation of land to the company and to the local populations. Senegal is the only 
site of the UK Group in Africa where such vegetables are sourced. The company’s 
products in Senegal have two certifications: Tesco Nurture and Global G.A.P. They have 
also been audited by SMETA.  
 
The Third Company  
 
The Third Company Senegal was born from the partnership of a group established in 
1995 and another Farm, based in Asia.  Before becoming involved in agriculture, their 
principal activities in Senegal were in real estate. 
 
After starting negotiations with the Senegalese government in 2008, The Third Company 
secured land in Saint-Louis through the deliberation of the relevant Rural Community. 
That year, several land deals scandals involving political leaders from the liberal regime 
were revealed by the incoming PCR (as discussed in the previous chapter). In 2010, the 
farm installation process started and by 2011, the first planting had been done. The Third 
Company started producing vegetables. Of the 5000 ha, 1000 were farmed in 2016. By 
2017, this had risen to 1500 ha.  
 
The Third Company’s permanent workers were mainly “costly accountants” and 
supervisors according to our respondents, with the remaining staff coming from Senegal 
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as seasonal and day workers (interview SMP 10131). The harvesting period was between 
January and March. Between June and July, The Third Company usually had no more 
stock, according to our respondent. 
 





 Source:  Assembled from The Third Company website and research notes 
 
Table 12: Main data of the The Third Company Potato farm Production  
Year 2016 2017 2018 
Total land use (ha) 500 1 000 1 480 
Total Commercial Potato 
Production (Tons) 
21 000 450 00 60 000 
Total Seed Production - - 12 000 
Total Capacity of Cold 
room storage (Tons) 
10 000 40 000 40 000 
Total Job creations 500 1 000 1 200 
Total Pivot System   28 on 50ha 
Irrigation   
1480ha with 24ha of 
retention capacity 
 
Source: Assembled by Researcher from …visited on 13 July 2018 
 
This section has demonstrated how all three companies relied on day and seasonal 
workers. THE FIRST COMPANY is now able to produce all year long in contrast to THE 
SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company who have a shorter farming season. 
FFVs also varied across cases as these companies do not grow the same crops. They 




First and Second companies), while The Third Company leads the domestic production 
of potatoes.  
 
 
STEP 4: Get an official contract first, then an 
unofficial symbolic contract to seal the deal!  
 
There are two types of agreement. Official agreements are when companies approach 
local authorities to negotiate land rights. If successful, a deliberation is delivered by the 
local authority (representing the State), with information on the objective of the land 
allocation, the types of activities planned by the company, and the size of the deal. 
Following the deliberation, some companies sign an additional unofficial agreement with 
the local authority. This memorandum of understanding (MoU) is more informal and 
generally constitutes a summary of the verbal agreements. After signing the deal, the 
sous-prefet is responsible for ensuring their application helps promote social dialogue 
between the different parties.  
5.4.1. What’s in the contracts? Agreements between investors and 
communities 
 
All three companies had leases through deliberations by the respective rural communities 
in order to access the land. Each deliberation states the area concerned, the number of 
hectares, and sometimes the duration of the lease. These deliberations were completed by 
an agreement of partnership stating clearly the responsibilities of each party and the 
duration of each convention. (The contents of all MoUs and agreements are summarised 
in the annex).  
 
In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, the company has land leases through 
deliberations with the respective rural communities for its three farms. The various 
agreements are for periods of  2-5 years and are renewable. The Commune’s132 
responsibility is to manage and mediate the relationships with the population; to help 
 
132 The commune has replaced Rural Communities since the Act Three of Decentralisation, and is led by 
a Mayor who replaces the former President of the Rural Community 
 164 
THE FIRST COMPANY solve any problem that might result in contestation from 
neighbouring populations. The protocols clearly specify that THE FIRST COMPANY’s 
land will not be reduced in the future. In return, THE FIRST COMPANY commit to 
respecting the allocated land according to the norms of the POAS. Contracts contain other 
social commitments towards the previous occupants of the land, for example giving them 
access to company crop residues, watering points, vaccination parks for the cattle, etc.  
 
It is crucial to note that THE FIRST COMPANY made a commitment in the protocol not 
to have any discriminating behaviour in their recruitment, contrary to the THE SECOND 
COMPANY protocol which I discuss later. THE FIRST COMPANY’s policy is said to 
be based on skills only, though it appears that THE FIRST COMPANY’s intermediaries 
behave differently. This constitutes a source of tensions with some villages.  
 
Agreements also commit THE FIRST COMPANY to support the populations in social 
projects regarding health, education, drinking water supply, improvement of access to the 
villages, etc. The most important financial commitment of THE FIRST COMPANY is its 
yearly assistance of 4,000,000 CFA Francs to fund the yearly investment plan of the 
Commune managed by the Mayor.
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Table 13: Summary of the main agreements of the THE FIRST COMPANY land deal 
 
 
Source: Assembled by researcher from contract and MoUs 
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THE SECOND COMPANY’s contract is different, as the 2011 agreement was 
complemented by two successive 2013 acts: a deliberation with the rural and an 
agreement with Chiefs of the two Pulaar villages for increased land size. The 2011 
agreement involves a different type of partnership from that of THE FIRST COMPANY, 
a shared-allocation of land between investors and neighbouring villages. 200ha were 
allocated to THE SECOND COMPANY and 200ha to the neighbouring villages, with the 
possibility for THE SECOND COMPANY to be allocated additional land provided the 
two parties met the terms of the agreement. THE SECOND COMPANY’s model has 
been presented as a “win-win” by its representatives. It has been replicated in other areas 
of the Valley, with the aim to contributing to a greater incorporation of smallholder 
producers in GVCs. 
 
 
There were three points to the 2011 Strategic Agreement signed by the then PCR (now 
mayor), the Sous-Préfet and THE SECOND COMPANYS: Recruitment and Personnel 
Management, Land Management, Canal Management. The first significant element of the 
strategic agreement between THE SECOND COMPANY and the Rural Community of 
Ngnith is that it is written in English and French as requested by the English partners. 
This enables the English partners to control the contents of the contracts, avoiding issues 
of interpretation – a main source of problems between parties in land deals. This did not, 
however, prevent “interpretation problems” arising later.   
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Table 14: Summary of the main agreements of the THE SECOND COMPANY land deal 
 
Source: Assembled by researcher from contract and MoUs 
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THE SECOND COMPANYS’ recruitment policy is to explicitly give priority to the 
people of Ngnith both for “skilled and unskilled employment” despite having the 
possibility to recruit skilled labour from outside the rural community as an FZC. Other 
provisions focus on safety, hygiene, quality of the working environment, and compliance 
of working conditions with the laws of Senegal. THE SECOND COMPANYs have tried 
to increase workplace standards to those of the UK according to the UK Firm’s 
respondent.  
 
Land management arrangements were as follows: equal sharing of the land, digging of a 
water canal to separate the two shares of 200ha by THE SECOND COMPANY “as a 
compensation for the loss of land”, and yearly payment of an income to the treasury of 
D. (administratively responsible). There is no information on the exact amount paid or its 
final use and it is possible it goes to the Mayor of N. as is the case for THE FIRST 
COMPANY. 
 
As for The Third Company, they have acquired 5000ha of agricultural farmlands in Saint-
Louis and 1000ha in Louga. The 5000 ha, situated in Saint-Louis were obtained through 
a deliberation. In 2013, the Cadastre of Saint-Louis decided to deliberate 1004 ha, rather 
than 5000. This reduction in the size of the land allocated to The Third Company may be 
a consequence of the 2009 local elections and the arrival of a new local authority, 2012’s 
political changes, the eviction of the liberal government and the nomination of new 
administrative authorities.
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Table 15: Summary of the main agreements and background of the THE THIRD COMPANY deal 
 
Source: Assembled by researcher from contract and MoUs
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Later, the DGID issued an emphyteutic lease to The Third Company for a duration of 30 
years specifying the amount of rent and an obligation to put the land to productive use 
(mettre en valeur) under two years by implementing planned agricultural project.  
 
Finally, an agreement was signed between the company and the Mayor of the Commune 
in 2015. The obligations of the commune are to delimit the targeted area of 1,500ha (not 
1004 as per previous documents) while deallocating 3,500 hectares for other agricultural 
projects in the region at the request of The Third Company. An additional area of 500ha 
could be allocated to The Third Company if requested. The obligations of the company, 
consisted of increasing the daily wage, providing remaining crops to a committee in 
charge of cattle food coordinated by the Mayor himself, transporting the workers from 
neighbouring villages to their place of work, authorising the digging of an irrigation canal 
for local agricultural entrepreneurs, equipping the 500ha of land allocated to the 
populations by the mayor, and assisting the commune’s development projects as part of 
The Third Company’s Corporate social Responsibility (CSR) activities.  
 
Regarding the Louga deal, The Third Company SARL were allocated a lease for a 1,000-
hectare concession by the Municipal Council. The intended use of the land is the 
production of potato. A delegation from the village visited the The Third Company site 
in Saint-Louis before signing the agreement, and almost half of the delegation recall not 
being satisfied by the outcomes. Those I interviewed and who agreed to the deal were 
happy about the prospect of wage employment. Those who opposed the deal were not 
convinced by “mechanised agriculture”: some did not trust “machine’s work”. Others had 
heard testimony from workers about the very “physical nature of the job”. Some 
respondents had heard from smallholders who signed individual deals with the company 
against technical assistance or financial compensation and were already regretting 
agreeing to the deal. Yet another category of respondents were discouraged by the “low 
salary” and considered it to be a form of “modern slavery” claiming they preferred to 
work on their fields of cassava. This later group is organised around a Mourid religious 
leader and they constitute the main resistance to the installation of the farm which implied 
the displacement of some peasants and pastoralists living near the project.  
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As for the company, it needed some portions of the land not comprised in the lease to 
install its irrigation infrastructure and started negotiating individually with local peasants. 
Some respondents who were approached by the company were told the farm is “approved 
by the President of the Republic himself and they should rather accept the modest 
financial compensation they were offered for their land than lose it for nothing”. While 
some ceded, the majority -114 peasants initially and over 90 in the end from the 
neighbouring villages - refused and constituted a Collective. Its leader died in January 
2017.  Those who resisted the deal mainly accuse The Third Company and the Municipal 
Council of giving their lands away to a private enterprise without consulting them. 
 
In light of these processes of land acquisition, it seems that whether or not the company 
used a bottom-up approach, by consulting with local communities, influenced the 
outcome. Was the conflict in this village due to the forcible top-down approach, the 
presence of the failed farm of former president Wade, or different political sensibilities? 
The Third Company had learned lessons from THE SECOND COMPANY’s and THE 
FIRST COMPANY’s agreements. It copied the THE SECOND COMPANY model and 
a share of land was allocated to the population, with local farmers receiving access to the 
canal. While this seems impeccable, there are areas of the THE SECOND COMPANY 
and THE FIRST COMPANY agreement that remain vague: When and how were the 
beneficiaries from the population selected? Who are they? Who are the members of the 
committee to receive the remaining crops? And to whose cattle will it be fed? What is the 
nature of CSR support to the commune and is the mayor to receive it directly? In the case 
of The Third Company, an important question is why is a Senegalese MP, president of a 
Senegalese departmental council and representative of the ruling party, co-signing the 
agreement and acting as a representative of The Third Company?  
 
This section on the terms of the deals allows us to understand the initial roots of 
resistance, acquiescence or adverse incorporation during or just after the negotiation. It 
highlights how some rural communities and their leaders struggle to make their 
institutions work with insufficient financial resources and inadequate skills (for example 
in contract-negotiation) while competing to attract providential investors. Left with 
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almost no support from the State (interview CL19, SF1)133, they attempt to attract 
providential investors, thus establishing a new kind of public-private partnership. This 
confirms what Kojo Amanor (1999: 190) discovered during his field research in Ghana: 
“alienation of land usually  occurs  with  the  collaboration  of  political leaders at the 
community level”.Ruling classes facilitating or taking part in dispossession is not new as 
evidenced in writings on pre-colonial or post-colonial Senegal (Barry 1979, 2012; Faye 
2013) and Ghana (Amanor 1999: 19; Austin 2006, 2007; Lanz et al. 2018). However, in 
all three cases, after the signature of deals “from above” came the critical step of 
validating them “from below” before the effective occupation of the land. 
 
5.4.2. “When the government gives you land, it does not mean a 
thing134”! 
 
All three companies had signed agreements with individual villages neighbouring the 
projects, and in the case of The Third Company, these includd agreements with individual 
farmers. Initially, these agreements between companies and the representatives of local 
communities were oral, but with increasing land conflicts, they started to be written 
sometimes in the presence of witnesses.  
 
THE FIRST COMPANY 
In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, various MoUs were signed with the main 
neighbouring villages. Though more comprehensive than the conventions of partnerships 
between THE FIRST COMPANY and the Communes, the MoUs were not always 
applied. This is in part because the terms of the agreements were not specific enough on 
their conditions of application, timeline, tasks division, etc. One of the 2017 agreements 
between a Pulaar village and THE FIRST COMPANY states that the company 
committed to securing the cemetery now situated inside the company perimeter, and to 
build a new collective cemetery to be identified by the villagers. This comes first in the 
agreement and shows the emotional dimensions of people’s relationship to land. The 
company promised to grant preferential recruitment to neighbouring villages, establish a 
 
133 Except for the seeds they rarely receive from the commune, and the government’s motor-pumps, such 
as the 3000 offered by President Wade, were distributed through clientelist networks (interviews) 
134 Interview SMP10, 04/07/2017 
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partnership to develop cattle breeding in the neighbouring villages, and produce a forage 
culture on a plot outside of THE FIRST COMPANY’s farm. Yet details as to how when 
and where these commitments would take place were missing from the document.  
  
In 2017 THE FIRST COMPANY signed an MoU committing them to support a village 
mosque and install a prayer facility for women without giving any indication of the date 
this would be completed. In addition, THE FIRST COMPANY promised to install an 
access road to the village, without any mention of the specific location and limits of the 
road to be built. Finally, the company promised to install a solar panel for the students of 
the village. All these actions however, should have been performed by the State.  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY 
With regards to THE SECOND COMPANY, only the deal for extending its land size was 
concluded in the form of an MoU. This 2013 Agreement for THE SECOND COMPANY 
Farm extension was between the firm and two village chiefs and their sons, in the 
presence of witnesses, both employees of the company. The reason for the extension was 
to enable the installation of more irrigation pivots on the upper side of the farms, in the 
areas occupied by Pulaar leaders for their cattle grazing as THE SECOND COMPANY 
had then glacial relations with the Wolof village where the farm is located. Consequently, 
the village chief was reluctant to grant the extension. This village chief is affiliated to an 
opposition group led by a marabout (a religious leader) whose ambition was to replace 
the current mayor affiliated with the majority group. That land was initially allocated by 
the rural community through a deliberation in favour of THE SECOND COMPANYS, 
as explained above. The agreement states that the population of the said-villages which 
are a Pulaar village-hameau affiliated to the main Wolof village willingly accept to leave 
it to THE SECOND COMPANY and therefore, they “authorise” the rural community to 
deliberate in favour of THE SECOND COMPANYS. It is worth noting that the second 
“village” is made of three different families living together in the same concession and 
without legal administrative recognition.   
 
The agreement stipulates that “as a compensation”, THE SECOND COMPANY would 
help the socio-economic development of one of the villages. In addition, a yearly 
compensation of 5.800.000 CFA Francs is given, without specifying to whom. The 
agreement was signed for a period of seven years and was renewable after a transition 
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period of one year. The final points concern the conditions of the bank transfer in favour 
of a GIE whose members are not identified. As a result of this deliberation and the 
subsequent agreement, THE SECOND COMPANY now holds 384 ha.  
 
This case illustrates how THE SECOND COMPANY, aware of the high expectations of 
local communities and their elites, was able to obtain the desired extension of its land. To 
do so, it navigated the ethnic tensions that arose between the Wolof and Pulaar villages 
as well as the political divisions between the Wolof chef de village hosting and the Mayor 
of the area. 
 
 
THE THIRD COMPANY 
In the Third Company Saint-Louis case, MoUs were signed against diverse mutually-
agreed counterparts such as financial compensation. I have analysed ten such MoUs 
signed between 2008 and 2015 between The Third Company and specific villages, 
individual landholders as well as an unidentifiable association (table below).  
 
As in the SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY cases, a few local 
community groups were negotiating their own contract terms for services or infrastructure 
usually delivered by the State. Different from the SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST 
COMPANY cases, The Third Company had signed several agreements with groups and 
individuals. The first agreement in the table above might constitute a case of “green grab” 
as the object was a transfer of 50ha of land from the village agro-forest exploitation in 
exchange for technical and financial assistance. In light of the increasing land rush, this 
case constitutes a type of valuation, and appropriation of nature by capital highlighted by 




Table 16: Main agreements between The Third Company and other parties  
Source: Assembled by the Researcher from contracts and MoUs 
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Other agreements concerned village leaders acting on their own behalf for personal 
benefit. The rents included jobs for themselves or their own families, motor-pumps and 
other agricultural equipment, access to water and seemingly ridiculous amounts of money 
against lands comprised between 5 to 50 ha. These transactions were validated by the 
administrative authority who sometimes even collected the money on behalf of the 
transferring party. This administrative authority was the same Sous-Préfet supposed to 
ensure both parties respect their part of the deal. Most of the village leaders who took part 
in these transactions to meet their own needs were from the neighbouring Pulaar villages. 
My interviews with three of them revealed the following:   
 
i) One village leader was recruited by The Third Company as the manager of the guards 
with a permanent contract in 2012.  Another had family members working for the project. 
Despite both complaining of a lack of space for their cattle, they claimed to have been 
given respectively 20 and 4 ha. This was allegedly because they had land, but no access 
to water or agricultural equipment to cultivate the land. None of the village leaders 
mentioned the deals they signed, and they refused to The First Company’s the terms of 
the deals when questioned. ii) At the third Pulaar village, the son of the deceased leader 
who signed the deal, said they had no other option. iii) Another respondent who preferred 
not to disclose The First Company’s terms of his deal said that when they first arrived, 
The Third Company claimed they had a bail from “presidency” and recalled the company 
leaders using the President’s visit to their farm as part of a tour to several agribusiness to 
claim close ties with high notables. The investor’s claim of powerful connection gave 
authority and legitimacy to their request for people to leave their land. This was 
corroborated by other respondents from the Region of Louga (second case-study) who 
testified to also being told: “come take the compensation money or you will lose your 
land” (interview). A few people agreed to this out of fear and are consequently no longer 
cultivating. Over 100 farmers refused to take the money. The attitude of village leaders 
who put their interests above those of the community they were supposedly representing 
(and who did not have access to the deal) led to resistance and adverse incorporation in 
one case, and acquiescence and adverse incorporation in the other. 
 
In conclusion, this analysis of agreements and “commitments” reveals three striking 
pieces of knowledge. Firstly, villagers and their elites expected from private investors 
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what the state could not (or would not) provide. They sought assurance that the company 
would provide social services under the cover of CSR. In the context of reduced state 
support and insufficient provision of “social goods”, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
villagers sought to obtain these from corporate actors. Yet, this likely created the kinds 
of clashes of expectations observed in land deals. Investors thought it was enough to 
provide nearby villagers with employment and productive infrastructure, whereas some 
villagers and local community leaders took these jobs for granted, expecting much more 
in terms of local infrastructure. Such expectations essentially reproduced the kind of 
paternalism sometimes observed of agribusinesses investing in relatively poor areas, as 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
Secondly, after signing officials deals, some investors created additional unofficial (or 
informal) agreements. However, investors avoided accountability of these agreements by 
remaining vague about their timeframe and conditions, or by cultivating polysemic 
agreements. Thirdly, my findings reveal how companies send their intermediaries to 
create different channels of communication with nearby communities. This will be further 
explored in the next section135.   
 
STEP 5: Get your own middle(wo)men (It helps, a lot!) 
 
In previous sections, I have tried to establish how land deals were negotiated, 
demonstrating how the actors involved significantly affected whether land deals were 
accepted or resisted. In this section, the key role of middle(wo)men in these negotiations 
is analysed. I propose to move away from neo-patrimonialism and consider diverse actors 
renegotiating power dynamics within the “stratified” decentralised State during land 
deals.  
 
Instead, I attempt to describe and analyse the role of key resource persons with a huge 
influence across the three cases; those in charge of maintaining social relations between 
a company and the community - either through their personal networks, their personal 
 
135 However, because these strategic allies are easily identifiable, that will not be further developed for 
ethical considerations. 
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skills, or other “unofficial”, “informal” means necessary to arrive at a desired outcome.  
In all three companies, these strategic actors played a decisive role in negotiating MoUs 
and creating different channels of accountability and responsibility between the company 
and the communities. The most used words in the interviews with these respondents were: 
“trust”, “land” and “family”. 
 
At THE FIRST COMPANY, the director’s closest strategic team had played a key role 
in the signing of MoUs, in this case verbal agreements between THE FIRST COMPANY 
and the villages.  Officially the mediator was an external consultant at THE FIRST 
COMPANY advising THE FIRST COMPANY President. He had been the key negotiator 
of land deals especially using her vast personal networks in the Saint-Louis Region. 
Before THE FIRST COMPANY, he was the resource person in charge of obtaining land 
for many other foreign investors. Most of the villages he approached for THE FIRST 
COMPANY agreed firstly because they had witnessed the “positive outcomes” of the 
first business he brought to the region. Inspired by this model they all wanted their own.  
 
During our conversations, he repeatedly insisted that “family” and “trust” were central to 
her relationship with the villagers and that she only takes the land he is given: “My 
philosophy is to negotiate with my parents or neighbours first. If they give me land, I 
take, otherwise I don’t”. (Interview SMC136) He also considers having used his personal 
networks a lot, and this had led him to be in constant stress. This is because when issues 
arise, people would go to him directly and remind him of what they had given to the 
company, on her recommendation, in order to solve the issue: “I have mixed the personal 
with the professional” (Interview SM7137). He also admitted to being constantly asked for 
money. Indeed, most of his salary was spent on solving other people’s problems. Despite 
this, he claimed that this was is the greatest reward; to witness the new horticultural 
landscape he had helped to create (Interview SMC138).  
 
Along with the Director of Corporate Social Responsibility, the middle (wo)men are key 
collaborators of the Director. They are therefore key in THE FIRST COMPANY’s 






partnerships to build social infrastructures such as roads, classrooms, cemetery walls, etc. 
Most of the time, this bears no cost for the company, who also build strategic partnerships 
with NGOs, to tap into the international development and CSR monies intended for LMIC 
countries.  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company also have benefited from the 
expertise of such middle(wo)men. For The Third Company, this key resource person is 
its administrator and an experienced parliamentarian representing Senegal at a sub-
regional level. He is at once a powerful politician (with connections and the legitimacy 
of belonging to, and speaking for, the current regime in his commune), the leader of a 
department, and an entrepreneur (with his own HR business where he is in charge of 
recruiting The Third Company’s workers). He is part of that category of businesspersons 
straddling across sectors to accumulate more economic, cultural and social capital, as well 
as political legitimacy and authority.   
 
At THE SECOND COMPANY, two local collaborators and a family member of the 
managing Director played a key role in the process of setting up the company and its 
social affairs. The first collaborator was also the first “negotiator”. He regularly worked 
for THE SECOND COMPANY as an independent consultant, despite living in another 
city. He did this when important negotiations were taking place. The second negotiator 
climbed the company’s social ladder and is now a senior manager. He is the one 
presenting THE SECOND COMPANY as a “South-South” cooperation between Senegal 
and South Africa, and a “win-win” model even before the project started operating, and 
such terms have been widely echoed in Senegalese media (GDMM139, Interview 
SMP2140).  
These middle(wo)men understand that they are more than translators yet less than full 
business partners. As both domestic actors, and part of the company141, they bridge two 
worlds. These middle(wo)men appear to be in fact “social brokers” translating the 
language of capitalist accumulation into one that is understandable, and acceptable, to 




141 Sometimes a consultant bearing the risks of this apparently prestigious yet precarious type of 
employment 
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customary social arrangements. The above demonstrates the companies’ willingness to 
reinforce its links with the communities, and make them “as much a part of us as we are 
of them” (Ouma 2015: 105). Consequently, the host groups treat investors with high 
regard, as they would treat their own family. Maybe this is the reason I noticed a discourse 
of an “imaginary” scapegoat from a few local respondents whenever there were 
discontents with the firm’s management: “it is not the company director, neither is it our 
negotiators, who are good people, it is their entourage in the company” (Interviews 
CL33142 CLC2143CL7144). These resource persons are the brokers keeping the deals 
together, just as griots and religious spokesmen historically maintained social, spiritual 
and symbolic contracts in Waalo and Kajoor societies.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed why, how, and with whom land deals take place from investor 
and government perspectives. Section 1 introduced the political administrative context 
and examined how economic constraints faced by the decentralised authorities motivated 
their quest for providential investors. Is the government supporting these investments 
with a package of fiscal incentives in order to meet its food security and horticultural 
exports imperatives? Section 2 presented the context of the land rush in Northern Senegal 
and its scale post-2006, while trying to move away from hectare-centric analysis. It 
presented the three case studies and provided information on location, types of crop, etc. 
Section 3 set the scene by presenting the socio-economic context of the land deals. 
Section 4 examined the contents of both contracts (agreements) on the one hand and 
MoUs on the other. It argued that local communities and their leaders were seeking to 
attract investors in their communities as a way to develop their territories in a context of 
relative state disengagement. Section 5 further demonstrated the central role played by 
middlemen in charge of protecting symbolic contracts between investors and 
communities, arguing that even when land deals were signed, they were still open to 
negotiation.  
All the above illustrates how the Senegal River has truly become the “Nile of the Valley” 






migration dynamics. In addition, this chapter has introduced the political dimensions of 
land deals, which will be further discussed in the following chapter with perspectives 
from local authorities and various social groups.   
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CHAPTER 6: WHEN CAPITAL 
NEEDS LAND AND LABOUR: 
“CSR PATERNALISM” AND 




This chapter provides a critical analysis of Senegal’s political and economic context, and 
argues that the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP) discourse of the ruling classes is what 
dictates the main actors’ strategies. This chapter offers a birds-eye view of how the 
various strategies and discourses stakeholders in land deals use to take ownership of this 
at all levels: 
● Local authorities’ in dire need of financial resources to develop their territories 
and deploying all means necessary to attract investors whilst needing to secure 
their political authority “from above” and strengthening their legitimacy “from 
below” by maintaining clientelist relations; 
● Customary and religious authorities seeking to renew “symbolic contracts”; 
● Investors embracing the governmental development strategy because it works for 
business, while performing their “CSR duty” as a way of respecting the social 
contract;  
● The not so homogenous “local community” divided between resistance, adverse 
incorporation, or adhesion to the land deals. 
 
I argue that CSR paternalism allows private investors to produce and reproduce 
themselves through continuously defining their mission and ethos to respond to societal 
demands. I bring this evidence by combining “studying up”, semi-structured interviews 
with employers that are the champions in their segments of the export FFV market and 




6.1. Power battles within the state  
 
This section approaches the State not as a monolithic entity, but as a space of a plurality 
of positions and interests. Combing everyday politics and state resources, legal 
administrative means, intangible resources such as charisma, trust or faith to legitimise 
its processes and influence the political status quo through bargaining power.  For this 
study, a sample of seventy-seven administrative, political, traditional and religious 
authorities were interviewed.  
6.1.1. At the administrative level: Preventing conflicts and maintaining 
peace 
Authority and sovereignty are demonstrated in the manners in which actors’ roles shift 
across time and location according to their changing interests and bargaining power. 
Power battles within administrative levels is illustrated in the case of The Third Company. 
The Sous-Préfet initially refused to allocate land to The Third Company for two reasons. 
First, as a municipal employee, he did not have the powers to allocate 1000ha to a private 
investor, he could only advise the state represented by APIX. Second, he was not entitled 
to deliver land to non-residents of the Louga village. Yet, in the summer 2016 he received 
a letter from the Prefect demanding he approves the deal. On 1 August, the sous-prefect 
approved the deal leading its opponents (the Collective of Peasants) to hire a lawyer and 
protest what they called the legalisation of an “illegal act” (Interview RPG145). In this 
instance, the prefect used powers attributed to him by the law to assert his authority over 
the sous-prefect as the representative of the President in the region (article 13 et 14, 
Decree 72-636 of 29 May 1972). 
Administrative authorities are also responsible for governing the territory and ensuring 
peace prevails before, during, and after the signature of the deals. One of the Sous-Préfet 
told me how he had to convene several mediation meetings between investors and 
workers’ representatives to find solutions, which stopped all other farm activities for 
several days (Interview CLA1146). A different Sous-Préfet in another region, had to 
oversee all meetings between workers, their newly established union, and the farm 





timetable of activities, as promises by the employer, and conforming to Senegalese labour 
law (Interview CLA147). Another role of the Sous-Préfet is ensuring not only respect for 
agreements and subsequent payment of financial contributions by investors to the 
commune, but also the resettlement of the populations who have been subjected to 
development-induced displacement.  
Political and administrative leaders play a role that can be decisive regarding the 
outcomes of land deals. As I have illustrated, they have sometimes advocated for a project 
to take place, prevented tensions, or helped to manage them. However, they are not 
always successful in resolving conflicts that may arise, especially when these are an 
outcome of land use change.  
6.1.2. “I am the state!”: On political visions and deferred realities 
 
Eager to be seen performing for their own communities, local political elites seek to divert 
land deals to their own villages, as was the case of the leaders interviewed in this section.  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY’s, THE FIRST COMPANY in Saint-Louis, and The Third 
Company (also in Saint-Louis) have encountered less contestation or resistance over time 
compared with THE FIRST COMPANY last deal and The Third Company deal in Louga. 
In the THE SECOND COMPANY case, tensions between political leaders (mayor verses 
village chief), who both manoeuvred in favour of the company’s establishment in Saint-
Louis, were noted in 2013. In Saint-Louis, the mayor was an experienced political leader 
and a successful businessman, who is currently on his 4th mandate in the commune.  He 
admitted to “actively” encouraging investors to come in: “I accepted them despite the 
difficulties with the people. It is easier to bring them in than to send them away when 
things do not work out” (interview SMC148). He also admitted not knowing then that 
“investor’s FZC status granted them special derogations, “for something like 20 or 30 
years, I heard. Only the firm S* (one of the oldest in Saint-Louis) pays 70,000,000 CFA 
francs a year” (ibid). Yet he told me that he believes politics should not be pursued for 
personal aggrandisement: “one should engage in politics to improve the lives of others, 





COMPANY in my region and to witness the high levels of job creation and other 
professional opportunities” (ibid.). 
  
Conversely, while these two leaders succeeded in managing real or potential tensions 
around land acquisitions, the mayor of the Louga municipality faced a suspended deal in 
the Third Company case. He was less lucky despite having the vision to transform his 
Commune into a “Pole of Emergence”, in line with state development, and eventually 
becoming the biggest wholesale food market in Africa, the “Rungis149 of Senegal” 
(Interview CLP3150). The power of these administrative and local authorities can also 
become a source of conflict between the authorities and their subjects. In this case, a 
determined mayor faced an equally resourceful population who led an inquisition on the 
outcomes of The Third Company farm in Saint-Louis, and who did not want the same 
result. This led to an impasse, though the mayor was resolved for the project to continue, 
“if the village becomes a handicap, we will transfer it somewhere else, but the project 
will happen: Once I take a decision, it cannot be undone by a child(literally) = it cannot 
be undone easily”151 (ibid.). This is similar to the vocabulary of one of the senior 
managers of THE SECOND COMPANY, who was looking for the population to “be 
removed as planned” so he could pursue his activities (ibid.). 
 
The variations in the level of success of leaders to implement their vision can be explained 
by their personal experience, charisma, political affiliations, and how much they invest 
in their networks (Berry 1993). This is corroborated by a study based on in-depth 
interviews with approximately 350 local and traditional leaders in rural Senegal, which 
argues that “variation in local government performance is a function of elites’ ability to 
divert projects and resources to their own villages and that their ability to do so is shaped 
by historical social cleavages” (Wilfhart 2018: 150). This is especially true in regions that 
are home to pre-colonial kingdoms, which is the case of the Delta and the River Valley 
regions. The study concludes that “where cross-village social relations are denser, local 
governments perform better and distribute broadly. Where cross-village social relations 
 
149 Rungis is a nearby city known for being the largest wholesale food market serving the Paris metropolitan 
area and beyond. It is said to be the largest food market in the world. 
150 18/12/17 
151 Lu ma xass ba rëdd, gone du ko dindi 
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are weaker, elites see local institutions as a zero-sum game among villages” (Wilfhart 
2018: 149).  
 
6.1.3. “There is not much to be earned from being chef de village 152” 
 
The local management of land deals owes much to village chiefs. In fact, most chiefs, 
though locally elected by the Préfet (after proposal by the Sous-préfet and approval by 
the Interior Minister), have inherited their role (and power) from their male family 
descendants. Almost half of the village chiefs interviewed have also occupied/continue to 
be members of the rural council or act as municipal councillors. A common expression 
used to describe the position of village chiefs is that of “a mother of twins”, doomed to 
exhibit equal fairness towards the populations and their hierarchy (Interviews CL29153 
CLP154). For most chiefs, theirs is a difficult job for which they receive little gratitude: 
“People come night and day to your house to ask you to solve their problems and you 
hardly find time for your own activities” (Interview CLP7155). While the former President 
Wade granted them, a salary increase and a car156, President Sall withdrew all such 
privileges. This is considered by most village chiefs as representing a lack of political 
support for their role (Interviews CL54157 CL40158). This shows the centrality of kinship 
and neighbourliness in African modes of social production and how they create links to 
land, consequently maintaining social cohesion (A. B. Diop 1981, 1985, and M. C. Diop 
2013a, 2013b; Diagne 1967; Mafeje 2013: 19; Sow, 1992: 28).  It also verifies the 
proposition that, in the Delta of the River, being part of a social group is seen as desirable 
because it ensures respect for family and kinship laws and contributes to shaping one’s 
identity in relationship to the broader group (Dahou 2005: 24). Profit maximisation is 
therefore often sacrificed for the social cohesion of the group (ibid).  
 
Besides their official political responsibilities, all of the local leaders interviewed had a 
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agricultural entrepreneurs told a narrative of scarcity, hardship and “bricolage”: 
“agriculture is a struggling business” (Interview SF1159160). As a result, they all exhibited 
the same discourse as the providential investor (Interviews CL46161CLP162CL47163). As 
for herders, they were of the opinion that the State is more committed to supporting 
agriculture than cattle-breeding (interview CL11164). This was certainly the case if 
successful investments might grant the State leverage, additional rents, and even 
potentially increase their popularity and legitimacy. The lack of sufficient public sector 
compensation incentivises opportunistic behaviour vis-à-vis (especially foreign) 
investors, sometimes leading to attracting the wrong type of investor, i.e. speculators, or 
“cowboy capitalists” who may easily deceive scarcely educated local leaders with empty 
promises. This was denounced by one investor who expressed his/her frustration with 
“corrupt” local and traditional authorities who are “talking the talk but not walking the 
walk (Interview Senior Manager165).”  This explains their decision to put any oral 
agreement in writing, and supports the findings of studies on corruption, land-based or 
otherwise (Bierschenk and de Sardan 2014; Blundo 2006 in Senegal, De Sardan 1999; 
Chiweshe in Zimbabwe 2017: 112-123). 
 
Faced with multiple challenges, village chiefs engage in various strategies simultaneously 
in order to make ends meet. Shaping land deals is one opportunity for them to assert their 
authority and sovereignty, control their territory, and influence subjects and subjectivities. 
This was illustrated by the ambiguous behaviour of one respondent who publicly 
supported land deals while revealing to me in private that he is against them and 
recognises the shortfalls of the project! “My no echoes the no of my subjects. Because 
most of my population said no, I have to follow their desiderata” (Interview CL54166). 
Once again, the interest of the social group was priorities. However, it is unclear as to 
whether this can be interpreted as part of the hidden, opaque and cryptic repertoires of 
everyday resistance, which this leader needed to hide from investors (Scott 1985), or just 








165 I am not indicating date and location for anonymity 
166 13/12/2017 
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interest. Straddling livelihood activities may sometimes cause a conflict of interest. This, 
for instance, was the case in The Third Company where a parliamentary leader (therefore 
a public official) was also the administrator of the company, and managed a private 
company hiring workers for The Third Company. 
 
The evidence presented above illustrates the “pouvoirisme167” of some elected local 
authorities, a lack of synergy between the local population and ruling classes, a lack of 
domestic resource mobilisation strategy, the prevalence of personal gain by officials 
when business opportunities arose, and the replacement of local modes of governance by 
politicians (Alissoutin 2008; Blundo 1998, 2001). This section thus has underscored the 
different layers of power that are influencing and are influence by land deals in order to 
shaping new social contracts (Nugent 2010). Equally important are the promises made by 
investors, and the many dimensions in which capital manifests itself to mobilise and 
control labour. 
6.2. Varieties of capitalists and unicity of labour 
exploitation goals  
 
Agrarian change is not only about the fate of peasants and the emergence of differentiated 
classes of labour, it is also about capital and capitalists. Until recently the land rush 
debate, often framed within the accumulation by dispossession debate, has focused 
primarily on the dispossession aspect and less on the reasons why land is being 
accumulated by capital, and how land becomes capital.  This section analyses three 
central dimensions of capital: labour regimes, companies’ management ethos, and 
accumulation of capital168 (Lee 2014:35), and how they are combined mainly for one 
goal: to control and discipline labour. 
6.2.1. Between casualisation and deferred dreams of permanent jobs? 
 
The arrival of horticultural investors with substantial injections of capital and 
infrastructure development, for all-year production, generates significant expectations in 
 
167 Attraction to exercise power 
168 As suggested by Ching Kwan Lee in her Spectre of Global China, drawing from Marx, Weber, and 
Polanyi 
 189 
relation to job creation given the relative scarcity of decent jobs in agriculture. This was 
illustrated by many respondents demanding “priority recruitment from the farm” 
(interview CL3)169, or “good salaries” (FGD 3)170171. Indeed, the nature of agricultural 
employment, whether as self- or wage employment, is generally highly seasonal and 
casual, due to the natural cycles of agricultural production and the vagaries of weather, 
which affect these cycles and production patterns. In contexts of low rainfall and short 
rainy seasons like Northern Senegal, seasonal patterns are exacerbated172 and the gaps 
between agricultural operations173 create important phases of labour slack alongside 
phases of high labour demand that may result in labour shortages for some producers. 
Therefore, employment patterns in capitalist plantations also follow seasonal patterns, 
and requirements for casual labour fluctuate.  As a result, only a small number of 
permanent jobs are created174.  
 
When such investments arrive, the dominant narrative is that stable employment will be 
generated, and firms, in their search for land do not always make realistic promises.  
Hiring casual wage labour provides employers with flexibility, and allows them to 
respond to labour peaks and reduce costs during periods of labour slack, thereby 
transferring the risks of operational fluctuations to workers. It also allows employers to 
hire labour at lower costs and at shorter notice. All three companies took pride in job 
creation without acknowledging its casual nature. THE SECOND COMPANY 
announced that they were no longer planning to close during the summer so that they 
could keep employing their workers without interruption (SMGD2)175. This was 
uncertain as production was exclusively off-season export oriented, and the farm did not 
produce crops that are consumed locally. It is no surprise then that most workers had 
second and even third jobs. 
 
Nonetheless, this may be altered by irrigation and multiple-cropping. High-tech capitalist 




171 During FGD3, several young men testified to being asked by the company to tell their fellow villagers 
that their salaries and working conditions were good. 
172 Especially if reliable irrigation is not available.  
173 Land preparation, sowing, fertilizer application, weeding, harvesting, etc. 
174 Of course, more technologically dynamic farms operating through an all-year round cycle are more 
likely to generate more permanent jobs. 
175 27/10/2017 
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farms without access to irrigation and other technology. Studies in Africa and Latin 
America have shown that irrigated horticultural production with good infrastructure and 
high technology is associated with labour requirements in number of persons per day per 
hectare that are high, indeed much higher than the non-irrigated production of staples in 
the same agro-ecological settings (Cramer et al. 2014; Damiani 2003; Oya and Pontara 
2015; Selwyn 2012).  
 
These studies emphasise the substantial employment-generation potential of such 
ventures. Many studies in the “land rush” literature continue to focus on the lower than 
expected creation of permanent and highly skilled jobs. This is not always possible for 
farms producing agricultural commodities according to seasonal cultivation cycles 
(Cotula 2012; Hall et al. 2013). To gauge the real potential of these ventures in terms of 
job creation, it will be necessary to: a) show the effective number of remunerated days of 
work per year that employees get, compared with the status quo of equally seasonal and 
insecure small-scale farming and; b) the total annual income earned after a year of work 
as a daily worker in a labour intensive horticultural plantation, compared to total net 
income (after operational costs) obtained by someone with a small piece of land. But this 
is not the focus of this research. 
 




To mobilise labour for their estates, companies need a clear strategy to meet specific goals 
based on firm’s core values. All three firms applied a private management ethos based on 
principles of professionalism, efficiency, trust and responsibility. The Third Company’s 
ethos is summarised on their website as follows: “We are (a) Certified Valued Group: In 
our vision being best is (what) really matters (sic). We take care in providing a quality 




176 Yet, a senior manager at a The Third Company manager responded to my request for workers lists by 
writing: “our structure is very small may be The Second Company are much more professional, so please 
don’t insist on having the same” by email on 16/10/2017. 
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Echoing this, THE FIRST COMPANY states that its principles are based on “the respect 
of the environment, respect of workers (non-discrimination), populations, and the fight 
against corruption” sic. A presentation received from a UK-based Senior Manager 
contained the following lines about the company ethos: “How we work?177: With drive 
and entrepreneurial spirit; respecting each other, our environment and the wider 
community; Being innovative and seeking continuous improvement; focusing on results 
and striving for excellence; Acting with integrity in all we do”.  
 
As for THE SECOND COMPANY’s, the main pillars of its managerial ethos are: 
Environment, Community, Product and People: similar to the UK counterpart’s.  
  
 
177 Email from Senior Agronomy Manager, 29/05/2018. 
 192 




THE SECOND COMPANY’s objective to “supply fresh produce that delights our 
customers every day” as evidenced by the many posters in their premises. This is 
articulated on the principles of trust, efficiency, quality, expertise and can-do. 
 
Photo 9: THE SECOND COMPANY’s ethics in the workplace. Senegal . May 
2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
 
However, juxtaposed to these laudable principles is their very patronising list of cultural 
challenges that international employees would face in Senegal (THE SECOND 
COMPANY Health and Safety Assessment). In order to handle these issues and “create 
an African business with UK H&S standards”, they recommended “training, Audit by 
UK managers” and last but not least: “not to go native!” sic (Ibid) During an interview 
with a manager, he suggested that THE SECOND COMPANY generates “profit to give 






• Working together safely with 
a sense of well-being whilst 
treating each other with 
dignity and respect and 
supporting eveyone to reach 
their potential
• To source products ethically 
and responsively supporting 
our growers, suppliers and 
customers to promote 
sustainability throughout the 
value chain.
• To have a positive impavct on 
our local communities forging 
mutually-benefical long term 
relationships.
• To operate an 
environmentally-sustainable 
business, minimising our 
environmental impact by 
effectively managing our 






Photo 10: Capture of one of the slides of a THE SECOND COMPANY Health and 
Safety assessment found on the internet (accessed June 2017) 
Beyond the workplace, companies’ ethos was also reflected in their being part of 
professional organisations. All companies interviewed were keen to highlight the fact that 
they were “creating shared value” (ibid), even suggesting that this was the main reason 
for them establishing and running a professional umbrella organisation gathering the main 
Agro-businesses of the region. This can be interpreted as a response to attacks by the 
Coopérative Fédérative des Acteurs de l’Horticulture du Sénégal, which lobbied for a 
major player based in Saint-Louis who were at the time responsible for 25% of total 
exports to start paying taxes (del Pozo-Vergnes and Vorley, 2015). THE SECOND 
COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY suggested the objective of the umbrella 
organisation is to strategize about agribusiness in the Valley, discussing issues such as 
access to water, land, plant protection products, labour law and the wider business 
environment. They stressed their collaboration is fruitful because of these values, and 
admission is only granted to like-minded ethical businesses. Another infamous 
agribusiness company was denied membership because “membership is only for model 
companies with civic behaviour, and who pay taxes, respect the legislation of the country, 
and have sizeable activities in agroindustry” (GDMM179). Indeed, this preoccupation with 
pursuing “creating shared value” echoes a famous eponym presentation by Porter (2011: 
20), in which he suggests this represents “the next evolution of capitalism” because 
addressing societal issues give purpose to firms. 
Management ethos’ and LLCRs are generally reflected in the firms’ organisational form: 
controlling labour for estates requires arrangements based on a clear chain of command, 
discipline in the workplace, a strategy to meet specific goals.  Organograms, where they 
exist, can provide valuable information about the companies’ production goals and how 
that is translated in the way labour is mobilised, controlled and disciplined. All three firms 
are multi-sited with a chief of farm and their teams managed by the central administration 
of the company, which helps the geographical disciplining of labour (Baglioni 2018). In 
addition, internal hierarchy is pyramidal at THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST 




Figure 5: THE SECOND COMPANYS’ Organogram in French (provided by the company)  
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Figure 6: Organogram of THE FIRST COMPANY 
 
Assembled by researcher 
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In addition, local teams are generally managed by senior international staff, or local staff 
that are not native of the areas where the firms are implanted. This led to frequent 
complaints about “migrant workers”. According to the workers lists provided by the 
company, THE SECOND COMPANY, in the summer of 2017, had eight international 
workers among whom six held leadership positions. At THE FIRST COMPANY, there 
were 20 International staff. These staff were all permanent, and occupied the key 
leadership positions: Head of Admin and Finance, Head of Operations, Head of Growing, 
and Heads of Technique and Machinery, but two. Four of the nine non-Senegalese staff 
also held senior positions. Moreover, according to a Senior Manager of The Third 
Company, the company had a team of 60 permanent workers, including 25 International 
technicians described by the manager as “costly accountants” (Interview SMP10) 180.  The 
remaining permanent workers were Senegalese. The team also comprised 80-85 seasonal 
workers and 800–1000 day-workers, employed for four months each year.  
 
Figure 7: Understanding the pyramidal nature of labour control at THE FIRST 
COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY 
  
Source: Assembled by Researcher form THE FIRST COMPANY & THE SECOND 
COMPANY Workers registers and interview with The Third Company Management181 
 
 
Paternalism in labour management systems 
Labour management systems were found to be organised around paternalism. Paternalism 
can be described as the managerial practices used by companies to discipline their labour 
force (Sage 2004) considered to be only rightfully exercised when preventing harm to 
others (Mill 1859: 93-94). A more exhaustive working definition is that of Gibbon et al. 
(2014: 172), which emphasises the following characteristics:  i) a common discourse for 
justifying government on behalf of the governed for their own moral improvement, their 
edification; ii) practices of care or welfare (for the governed) with the provision of 
accommodation or land, wage and non-wage benefits such as health benefits and pension, 
against provision of labour, etc. iii) practices of coercion. Here it should be noted that 






I found that all three companies presented various traits of paternalism, with THE 
SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY being more paternalistic perhaps 
because their managers had previously worked as farm senior managers in France, 
Francophone Africa and Southern Africa. In the literature, paternalism was common in 
firms in France and South Africa (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991; Du Toit 1992, 1993). 
The spouse of one of the two farm directors acted like a mother to her staff despite her 
young age. She also used a narrative of “enlightenment”, talking about the “Christian 
mission to educate and assist those in need” (Interview). In addition, THE SECOND 
COMPANY senior officials believed they had to help their staff “lead their finances”, 
“manage their diet”, “not follow the consumerism that TV promotes”, “encourage them 
to invest in the education of their children rather than purchasing goods”, and “reduce 
their addiction to medicines” (SMGD2182). The management system was mostly domestic 
according to the typology by Gibbon and Riisgaard (2014: 101-102) and sometimes 
industrial. What does this mean? 
 
182 27/10/2017.  
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Hiring at THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company was mostly based on 
personal ties for low-paid jobs (domestic type of management) and largely impersonal, 
based on merit and qualifications (industrial type) when it came to more skilled and 
permanent jobs. For other recruitments, the selected candidates were either outsiders or 
suitably trained and qualified villagers. In the case of The Third Company, the labour 
management system was mostly domestic as the company itself was born out of a 
partnership between two relatives. As for promotion, skills development and 
apprenticeship, it was also mostly domestic at The Third Company and THE SECOND 
COMPANY, and industrial at THE FIRST COMPANY: the first two companies based 
this on a seniority, trust-based promotion and family approach rather than on formal 
written rules, as in THE FIRST COMPANY.   
The reference to “traditional values” by Gibbon et al. (2014) is particularly relevant as 
most small to medium size agricultural businesses in rural Senegal are run like families. 
A respondent reported having heard the South African director of the farm saying to them 
“my son will one day lead you in this farm, just as I did” (Interview). This confirms the 
domestic nature of labour relations and the idea that “sons work with their fathers”, a 
form of familial relationship more common at The Third Company and THE SECOND 
COMPANY (ibid).   
 
The paternalism of these companies (THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST 
COMPANY) was also illustrated by their provision of accommodation and subsidising a 
cook for their permanent workers, as well as providing all workers with breakfast (see 
below). This is not surprising as on large estates, “control of work itself and control of 
workers’ private lives, including that of  their  families” are the two features of labour 
control (Barral 2014: 240). Since their implantation, plantation companies have always 
provided accommodation for their workers, and have subsequently played a central role 
in the supervision of the domestic sphere. 
 
Regarding the overall management of staff, companies have made care and negotiation, 
coercion, and rewards part and parcel of their relationships. A relationship that is dynamic 
as workers seek to augment their bargaining power and resist employer’s strategies to 
maximise profit whilst controlling capital and labour. 
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6.3. Private paternalism and working conditions: 
Between care and coercion 
 
This section offers empirical evidence of the diverse nature of encounters between private 
paternalism and rural wage employment in horticulture. It discusses the challenges of 
sourcing labour and disciplining the world of work in relation to emerging agrarian 
change trends. It also discusses labour regimes in export horticulture and agro-processing 
farms operate and details the working conditions in the three selected case-studies.  
 
6.3.1.  Diversity and variation of wages at THE FIRST COMPANY, 
THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company 
 
This section focuses on the existence of various payment systems, evidence of the various 
strategies used by companies to control their cash-flow, and discipline labour. 
 
In Senegal, the minimum wage in the agricultural sector (SMAG) was FCFA 32040 (CFA 
182,96 per hour)183. The SMAG is lower than the minimum salary in other sectors, which 
was 36243 CFA F (£47.55) monthly prior to the 2018 raise 184. According to the last 
national survey on employment, published in December 2017, the average monthly salary 
of an urban worker is 187 975 FCFA against 179 134 FCFA for a rural worker (ANSD 
2017). The ANSD survey underscored a gender wage gap: the average salary for a male 
worker was 192 477 FCFA compared with 171 759 FCFA for a female worker. The 
monthly salary of day workers in all three farms ranged from 50000 to 75000 in the fields 
(for non-supervisors). Therefore, in all three farms wages were substantially superior to 
the minimum wage. 
 
Calculating wage estimates for day workers was a “methodological nightmare” largely 
because of the variety and complexity of payment systems in agriculture (Cramer et al. 
2014). Therefore, I have decided to present both data collected from semi-structured 
 
183 The Senegalese Direction for labour raised it to (F CFA37436 = 213,92 per hour in June 2018.        
184 Before that, the latest salary revision dates from the Decree of 19 February 1996 from the Diouf-
Thiam government. 
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interviews and ranges of salaries obtained from survey, but not aggregate estimates which 
risk mixing apples and bananas for the reaons explained below. Both the day wage and 
the monthly salary were asked in the survey. Many respondents preferred to respond to 
one or the other, while only a few answered both. Salaries were affected by the previous 
period in the farming season (harvest, planting, weeding, etc.). According to the worker 
survey and interviews, different modes of payment for day workers could be found within 
one company:  
 
● Some were being paid according to piece-rates185, which links payment to the 
productivity of the worker. Instances of this occurred at THE SECOND 
COMPANY, but not at THE FIRST COMPANY. At the end of each day, workers 
(usually woman) were paid according to the number of cases of fruits and 
vegetables produced. Each full case was paid 300 FCFA, so a day’s wage 
depended on the number of cases produced. In this system, a very fast and 
productive worker could easily earn twice as much as a less productive worker.  
● Some workers were paid a “fixed” daily wage, although this was also performance 
based to a lesser extent; wages could vary according to whether minimum tasks 
were performed or not. For employers in the agriculture, daily wages made sense, 
especially in operations where quality matters and special care is necessary, rather 
than speed. Daily wages were comprised of between 2000 and 3000 FCFA, 
depending on the operation.  
• Variations in wages were also noticed in jobs related to the hiring and managing 
of teams. For example, there were variations in the salary of a female team 
recruiter who also worked as a supervisor. Her wage changed according to her 
daily work plan; on how many female workers she brought into work on a given 
day. For recruiting a team of 55day-workers, she would earn 2000 FCFA. This 
was reduced to 1000 FCFA for a team of 35 and nothing for less than 30. On these 
days, she worked and was paid as a day-worker.   This has implications on 
sampling because teams were supposed to comprise women from the same 
village. Moreover, because I recognised names from other villages, she admitted 
that she preferred recruiting women from another village than not making her day 
wage. Other workers such as male carriers earned the same amount per day. 
 
185 A la tâche. 
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● Finally, daily wages significantly varied according to the type of operation or task 
and the skills and seniority of the worker. For example, I noticed that workers in 
packing houses, where skills were in demand, earned on average more than 
workers in the fields. Skilled workers, mostly recruited from urban areas, also 
earned more than workers in the fields and in the packing houses, but less than 
the central administration. 
● There were also variations across companies, since they had different internal 
payment systems. When analysing salaries, it is almost important to consider how 
and when a salary is paid, e.g. fortnightly or monthly. Day-workers were paid 
every two weeks. Because many employees worked a different number of hours 
each month, what they reported as earning after just one month was not 
necessarily reliable – or at least not reflective of what they earn every month of 
the year. For instance, at THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST 
COMPANY there were various work shifts for teams in different departments 
according to the crop, but generally they all worked 8 hours per day. Despite this, 
a few workers reported unpaid additional hours or cuts in their monthly salary, 
which was a largely reported cause of tension between workers and management.  
Those who worked full-time on farms worked six days a week, Monday to 
Saturday, which is the norm in the agricultural sector.  
 
Many wage workers who lived in areas where there were opportunities to work on 
neighbours’ or family farms often said during interview they would rather work on these 
than the commercial farms. They found such opportunities more flexible, with the 
possibility to take home some of the produce for family consumption, or for sale in local 
markets, with a higher or equal salary for a shorter workday. This can be explained by 
the relatively short need by local petty commodity producers who, needing surplus labour 
to complement unpaid and/or paid family labour and migrant labour, do not hesitate to 
offer premium wages to mobilise labour force. A problem is that this type of employment 
is not offered all year-round and results in surplus labour. To be able to compare the data, 
one would have to ask how much workers would earn by working for these local farmers 
in any given year compared to how much they can earn in the plantation. This illustrates 
the very segmented nature of rural labour markets, the diversity of wages and the various 
strategies used to mobilise and control labour.  
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The workers survey involved 170 respondents (82 from THE FIRST COMPANY, 68 
from THE SECOND COMPANY and 20 from The Third Company). Because the sample 
size for The Third Company was too small, I will leave it out of this analysis (in chapter 
7 too). However, semi-structured interviews show that The Third Company day workers 
were paid more than THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY’s. This 
can be justified by the fact that as relatively late comers in the horticulture and agro-
processing need to offer wages above average, especially those of direct competitors, 
offer transportation, and other advantages if they want to recruit day workers due to local 
labour market tightening. In addition, The Third Company’s farming season was shorter 
(4 months) and potato was less labour-intensive than other FFVs such as beans. The 
survey shows that male day-workers at THE FIRST COMPANY received the highest 
wages, earning between 2000 and 2500 (95% confidence interval). Male day workers at 
THE SECOND COMPANY earned on average 2233 FCFA. At THE SECOND 
COMPANY, there were complaints of frequent mistakes with wages or salary cuts.  
 
Female day-workers earned on average between 2000 and 2500 at THE FIRST 
COMPANY whereas at THE SECOND COMPANY, depending on whether they worked 
“à la tâche”, according to productivity or with a fix day rate, they earned between 1800 
and 2500 FCFA daily (95% confidence interval for the mean). The gender wage gap 
varied a lot and was lower in THE SECOND COMPANY than in the other farms and 
was also lower for workers in the packing houses at THE SECOND COMPANY and The 
Third Company, corroborating previous research findings in Senegal (Baglioni 2018; 
Mackintosh 1989), Latin America (Deere, 2005:35) and Dolan’s in Kenya (2004:118). 
 
6.3.2.  Non-salary benefits 
Non-salary benefits consisted mainly of accommodation or housing allowances for 
permanent workers, transportation and provision of meals, health, hygiene and safety, 
and workers’ freedom to organise themselves to defend their rights.  
Accommodation and food 
During fieldwork, THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY both 
provided accommodation or a housing allowance to some of their (mainly) permanent 
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workers and those in central administration. Other permanent workers were provided with 
a contribution to housing fees. Regarding meals, there was a system at THE SECOND 
COMPANY that allowed workers to pay for a partly subsidised cook, with breakfast also 
being subsidised for all workers. Breakfast consisted mainly of local porridge without 
sugar, and employees could opt to add milk or sugar for a small fee. The breakfast cooks 
were also recruited by the company. Food sellers trained by THE SECOND COMPANY 
were admitted inside its premises, while untrained ones remained outside the main gates. 
Most day-workers at both companies, and even some contractual workers, ate their lunch 
at home as they were not used to eating out - or more specifically, paying for it (semi-
structured interviews). At THE FIRST COMPANY, breakfast was provided to all staff 
and consisted mainly of loaves of bread. The company also employed cooks to work in 
their canteen, selling meals for a fee.  None of the day-workers interviewed bought meals 
at work due to them being unaffordable (Interviews DW26186DW5187).  A female 
supervisor whose family lived closed to THE FIRST COMPANY reported having her 
meals delivered to her at the farm (Interview SW11)188. All of the THE SECOND 
COMPANY middle managers interviewed had their meals at the popotte (internal 
canteen)189. 
Regarding transportation, all companies provided it to workers whose villages were far 
away from the farm, even though interviews showed they did not agree with workers on 
what “far” meant. THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY provide 
minibuses to the farms (see picture of buses in section of local capitalists).  
  
Photo 11: THE SECOND COMPANY field workers going home after a day of 
work. October 2017. (Photograph by Researcher) 
 
Photo 12: The Third Company Tractors, also used for transporting staff. November 





189 Except for one international worker, whose migrant wife also worked at the farm and cooked the 
meals for them both (interview 22/05/2017). 
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THE SECOND COMPANY transported workers in a tractor (see picture), The Third 
Company transport workers with the tractors from their villages to the farms, and to the 
fields. 
With regards to health services, THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND 
COMPANY had their own internal infirmary on the farm. The medicines were subsidised 
and the cost was deduced from the salary. THE FIRST COMPANY had an occupational 
therapist managing the internal infirmary, with nurses based on all three sites. During an 
interview, the occupational therapist said that when undertaking field visits, training and 
prevention was key because she realised this proactive approach was more efficient than 
the clinical approach: curing people (Interview HW2190). This allowed her to know the 
staff better and sensitise them regarding their diet and offer advice on handling the use of 
pesticides. A contract was signed between THE FIRST COMPANY and a national 




Photo 13: THE FIRST COMPANY Infirmary. June 2017. (Photograph by 
Researcher) 
Workers were generally satisfied with the nurses, but some complained that they were 
made to do tests and not given their results.  THE SECOND COMPANY had a state nurse 
who estimated the number of daily patients to be 25-30. The infirmary was also open to 
the immediate families of the workers. At THE SECOND COMPANY, the doctor 
bemoaned the lack of an ambulance for emergencies and called for the improvement of 
the technical platform and equipment for staff including gloves, masks, hermetically 
sealed cars (Interview HW1)192. Pregnant women were made to stop work or take a 7-
month break. Children were not allowed inside the fields. The SECOND COMPANY 
doctor worked closely with the site’s infirmary nurse, also paid by THE SECOND 
COMPANY (Ibid.). A dispensary was built and equipped by THE SECOND COMPANY 
and offered to the State. Training and handling of Hygiene, Security and Environment 
(HSE) responsibilities were shared between the director, HR, the doctor and the health 







Manufacturing consensus: Freedom of association and workers’ 
representation 
 
Senegalese labour law mandates any company with between 501 and 1000 workers to 
have elected nine permanent workers to represent them in their union193. Some 
international certifications held by companies such as SMETA, also require measures to 
ensure freedom of association, sound health, safety conditions, no child labour, that the 
national minimum salary is met, and a working week of no more than 48 hours. In 
practice, not all these regulations are respected.  
 
Freedom of association and workers’ representation are key to understanding the internal 
labour control regimes. Baglioni (2018: 130), who has made important contributions to 
this question, suggests the 1970s Senegalese labour control regime was dominated by 
collective labour actions, strikes and walkouts, whereas the 2000s labour agency is 
marked by the absence of labour unionism. 
 
Baglioni’s claim is maybe specific to the Niayes. I found that despite a climate of weak 
trade unions, THE FIRST COMPANY, THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third 
Company present exceptions. In fact, all three companies did have workers’ 
representation and organised industrial actions and/or strikes. This is worth noting as a 
“positive deviance” from the rest of the FFV exporters in the Niayes. THE FIRST 
COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY are different to other companies in being 
members of a professional association VALLAGRI, and in holding the most difficult to 
obtain certifications that allow them to export to the UK under specific regulations. The 
Third Company also stood out for being the leading company in potato production 
domestically. These three companies, then, represent more dynamic and market-exposed 
capitalist private investment in agriculture and are, therefore, expected to offer superior 
working conditions.  
 
 
193 Candidates must be Senegalese nationals, at least 21, fluent in French and must have worked in the 
company without interruption for at least 12 months with the exception of relatives and allies to the same 
degree of the entrepreneur 
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The three companies had different approaches to, and experiences of, workers’ 
representation and freedom of association. THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST 
COMPANY both had workers committees. The Third Company had self-appointed 
representatives being assisted by the workers’ union as of November 2017. THE 
SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY had seemingly encouraged the 
formation of workers’ committees rather than official union representatives, due to 
managers preferring to “solve problems internally”.  
 
At THE FIRST COMPANY, the delegates were free to meet and had a dedicated, office 
however, its site under CF however had workers committees rather than unions because 
for the manager: “it is best we solve our problems internally, if you include unions in your 
business, you lose internal cohesion” (Interview SMP 7194). This suggests employers were 
circumventing some of the regulations and standards they are bound to by the standards 
they hold.  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company had a different approach to THE 
FIRST COMPANY. At THE SECOND COMPANY, I experienced this when trying to 
access the farm during a staff strike195, following the end of agricultural season 
celebration held on labour day. My main contact tried to restrict my access to the farm, 
but this was in vain. The Sous-Préfet, THE SECOND COMPANY senior management, 
staff reps and village chiefs were meeting in the office. I eventually conducted interviews 
and a focus group with the agricultural workers who had gathered outside the farm, whilst 
the office staff went in the fields and packhouse to replace them. Many workers, 
especially the staff representatives, thought THE SECOND COMPANY was trying to 
interfere with the elections of worker’s committees by dismissing the list they submitted. 
Female candidates were replaced with the suggestion they could neither read or speak 
French. A manager stated the reasons for their rejection of the list is that these were 
outcoming candidates whose term limit had arrived and that the elections were overdue 
(Interview SMP1)196. Due to issues with the candidates (age, French proficiency, lack of 
union affiliation), they received an order for the labour inspectorate to stop the elections. 
Hence the multi- stakeholder dialogue organised at THE SECOND COMPANY during 
 
194 18/11/2017 
195 Very similar to the one described by Mackintosh at Bud (1989) 
196  19/05/17. 
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elections to find an amicable solution to the problem197(FGD1)198 . Workers suggested 
the main problem with the candidates was their personal affiliations to some key social 
influencers, the wife of a religious leader who is very critical of THE SECOND 
COMPANY, the wife of the mayor who gave THE SECOND COMPANY the land and 
the son and nephew of two of the village chiefs. As for the alleged French-language 
proficiency, most of the day workers or seasonal staff had low levels of education. THE 
SECOND COMPANY wanted “rules” to be followed which would mean candidates from 
the supposedly “less educated” day workers would be excluded, and candidates would 
come from the central administration. There were other constraints on day workers, as 
representation often requires a minimum period of employment in the company or 
minimum contract terms.  
 
Of the three cases, the third company’s working conditions were closer to the “national 
norm”, therefore comparatively worse than the other two, with wage arrears and limited 
benefits. What was certainly outside the norm was that workers had the chance to attend 
union meetings and voice their concerns. I could attend one such meeting on a Sunday as 
workers decided to organise themselves because The Third Company did not respect 
Senegalese Labour law. According to the workers representatives199, the areas of concern 
were hygiene and security, medical cover, salary and gender equality (Union Meeting200). 
At the meeting attended by over 100 staff, 95% of which were male, the Union leader 
asked workers to be patient because they were engaging in a long-term struggle. Workers 
confessed they had not seen their contract since they signed them with the subcontractor 
because the employer held them, and they were not given a copy. Additional issues were 
noted regarding the delay in receiving the payment at the end of the month (ibid.). A 
complaint was filed with the labour inspection for the regularisation and the signature of 
new contracts, and the introduction of play slips. As for working hours, the union advised, 
they should not exceed 48 hours a week and overtime should be paid at 250 cfa per hour 
(ibid.). In addition, the prefect demanded from the chief of staff the re-employment of 
arbitrarily dismissed staff, following a complaint to the gendarmery. 
 
 
197 She confirmed that in attendance were the Sous-Préfet, members of the executive direction, village 
chiefs, the main staff representatives, and religious leaders as well as the gendarmerie 
198 19/05/17. 




Photo 14: The Third Company workers union meeting November 2017. 
(Photograph by researcher) 
 
Another pressing issue was gender parity amongst staff representatives, and the Union 
advised that a commission be set up. The most urgent measure for union staff was the 
introduction of internal rules and the training and sensitisation of staff. Recommendations 
were formulated to workers to avoid coming to blows with the Indian supervisors and the 
Sous-Préfet thanked for mediating between the two parties rather than referring the matter 
to the labour inspectorate (ibid). 
This reflects the diversity of practices and experiences in freedom of association, 
depending on the type of certification, “visibility” of the company and subsequent 
differential treatment by labour authorities. The Third Company were operating more to 
the standards of a local company compared to THE FIRST COMPANY and THE 
SECOND COMPANY whose certifications obliged them to provide better standards.
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Training, hygiene and safety 
 
Training, hygiene, and safety were key issues for THE FIRST COMPANY and THE 
SECOND COMPANY, as both were exporting FFVs and were consequently required to 
meet high standards. Both THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY had 
relevant basic health and safety infrastructure and trained their staff to use them during 
their induction201. Managers and workers interviewed at THE SECOND COMPANY and 
THE FIRST COMPANY said all staff received a safety and hygiene induction, as well 
as leadership training at the beginning of each farming season. At The Third Company, 
training was limited to the seasonal and permanent staff. At THE SECOND COMPANY, 
canteen staff and women food sellers based inside the farm received hygiene and first-aid 
training. Those in charge of using pesticides (driving engines, etc.) were also trained 
accordingly before starting the job. Whereas the companies claimed to have provided 
personal protective equipment to all their staff202, most day-workers claimed, during 
interview, that this was mostly the case for permanent and seasonal workers in the cold 
room/packhouse, but not for the other workers in the fields who had to equip themselves 
with gloves, shoes and/or hats to protect themselves from the burning heat.  
 
Skills development training was generally offered to workers according to the needs 
assessment and the position of requesting staff. Each year, the top management of THE 
SECOND COMPANY sent two to three workers to the UK for training, either at the 
mother-company or for further skills enhancement (quality training, agricultural business 
management) through a UK Fund. Most of the managers working in Growing, Irrigation 
and Packhouse claimed to have travelled to the UK at least once to develop their skills 
(interviews). At THE FIRST COMPANY, most of the managers in the central 
administration (HR and Payroll) and IT, HSE, Production and Irrigation had been granted 
the opportunity to further their skills, either in Senegal or another country.  
 
At THE FIRST COMPANY, there was an HSE-RSE Manager (Hygiene, Security and 
Environment, Social corporate Responsibility Manager) in charge of hygiene, training 
and health and safety, to meet the requirements of certifications203 in the global 
 
201 For instance, there were taps and detergent at the entry of each farm, and staff were not allowed to go 
in the packhouse or cold storage room with jewellery on or their heads uncovered. 
202 Safety shoes, joucas boots; phyto uniforms, gloves, phytosanitary masks, etc. 
203 GlobalGAP, Tesco NATURE, LeaF, the SMETA Pillar 4 
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horticultural trade for produce exported to Europe. Beyond private voluntary codes, the 
standards that mattered most were those of Senegal law204. THE FIRST COMPANY had 
a Hygiene, Safety, and Training Committee for discussing labour conditions and 
company priorities.  
 
At The Third Company, hygiene and security conditions were almost non-existent. I, for 
instance, was able to join the village team as a day-worker despite not living in the village 
and no ID check was done prior to my entering the farm (Immersion as a Potato Day 
Worker205). This lack of rigorous checks, which some respondents confirmed were more 
common in other Senegalese farms, was likely the result of the farm illegally employing 
underaged workers. Hygiene was also a point of concern, with workers demanding more 
non-gender-neutral toilets be built. The potato lines had over 300 workers daily and there 
were only two toilets at the entrance of the farm. An important security concern was the 
transportation of the workers from their village to the field: THE SECOND COMPANY 
workers were transported on the back of a tractor without any security measures206 (Photo 
9).  
 
At the union meeting, staff representatives requested an increase in the number of staffs 
on the payroll, as slow processing had led to cases of physical abuse and threats to current 
payroll employees. Even if payers faced security issues in all three companies, THE 
FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY implemented measures to address 
them. The Third Company was not bound by private certifications only by the national 
labour law. Therefore, the situation at this farm might be more reminiscent of a typical 
Senegalese farm. Lack of compliance to regulations suggests either a lack of checks, or 
complacency by the responsible authorities.  
 
The above illustrates impressive conditions unlike most agricultural employers in 
Senegal. This was partly due to THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST 
COMPANY having to comply with external standards requirements, partly because of 
their own commitments to “social responsibility”. By comparison, The Third Company 
 
204 These are mostly the environment code, and the labour code. 
205 21/11/17 
206 This led some workers to take pictures that they showed to the prefect and the sous-prefect.  And faced 
with this evidence, The Third Company committed to address the issue by a specific deadline, or pay 
fines. 
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did not seem to meet any standard. The differences between workers’ conditions at The 
Third Company and the two other farms might be explained by the fact that the hiring of 
The Third Company workers was externalised and managed by another private entity.  
Nonetheless, The Third Company promised to recruit a nurse specialising in occupational 
health and to offer first aid provision in the fields.  
 
These variations in the working conditions of the three farms can also be explained by 
different management ethos, business model and labour regime, status (FZC such as THE 
FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY or company regulated by the 
national labour law such as The Third Company), types of certifications held and 
destination of crops (EU or domestic market), and firms’ strategic priorities. 
 
6.4. Socialising capitalism and banking on shared 
development, win-world and resilient narratives 
Besides the dimensions of the labour regime discussed in previous sections, it is also key 
to analyse investors’ discourses, and how they are made to embrace national policy 
priorities as well as care to fully understand the facets of private paternalism.  
6.4.1 Private investors’  discourses on capitalism: “Benevolent 
intent”207 or socialising capitalism? 
 
This section ascertains that, since they contribute shaping reactions to the land rush, 
discourses of capitalists matters as much as the strategies discussed below.  
 
The land grab debate has produced a significant “literature rush” acknowledged even by 
entrepreneurs who are very cautious regarding concepts; especially when they suggest a 
link to capitalism. Reflecting on the term “agribusiness”, a senior manager of THE FIRST 
COMPANY found it is unsuitable because of the focus on the “business” in agribusiness 
(Interview SMP4208). This, he suggested, implies either a speculative dimension, that 
investors come only for a short period and that profit is being made (ibid.). He suggested 
there is no distinction between small and big farms, or the nationality of capital. “Once 
 
207 Dolan (2005). 
208 16/06/17 
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we make this our premise, we may call everyone an agribusiness without the pejorative 
side to it” (ibid.). This reflects the impact of media and advocacy representation of land 
deals as outcomes of speculative or short-term profit-driven capitalism. As 
“agribusinesses” becomes conflated with these forms of (usually foreign) “capital”, 
investors react by rejecting the term arguing that “me I am a Senegalese company” (ibid.). 
He further interrogates the focus on size: “What is an agribusiness? More than 200ha 
maybe, large numbers of workers? The capital? Small farmers are also agribusiness”. And 
the “grabbing is done by ministers and other government officials who take 2000 or more 
hectares without deliberation” (ibid).  
 
 THE SECOND COMPANY’s representative also took a similar stance, claiming to 
prefer the term “social agro-industry” to that of “agribusiness” (Interview SMP2209). 
Stressing the win-win nature of this kind of enterprise, he stated that it is high time:  
to inaugurate the era of the new socialising agroindustry which involves the 
populations in the development process. The SECOND COMPANY model is 
based on a win-win approach that shows that the land question can be flattened 
if one manages to have official and formal processes, while having a bottom-up 
approach, not the opposite (Interview SMP2, 26/10/17).  
It is not sufficient to add the label “social” to render agribusiness lees preoccupied with 
capitalist accumulation. The very definition of agroindustry - the industrial production, 
processing, and packaging of products from agriculture - is to produce or transform 
products, normally for market, and meet “business productivity and efficiency” goals 
from a profit-making point of view. However, though sometimes instrumental, CSR 
gestures are valued by workers (and communities), who in turn engage positively with 
corporate players (Amaeshi et al. 2016a: 27) 
“Win-win” and South-South discourses are very similar to what Ergström and Hajdu 
(2018) have called “win-world”, the production and sustenance of a resilient development 
narrative to refute tangible counter-evidence and/or criticism. The authors identify three 





1) lack of certain types of knowledge among project proponents or inability to 
take such knowledge seriously; 2) deflection of criticisms using certain value 
assumptions and material practices and a wide range of deflection practices; and 
3) “accepted knowledge” about current realities, largely produced by a company 
seeking to portray the investment in a profitable light, was circulated and 
consumed by the other proponents of the project (ibid).  
 
All three company directors interviewed were better educated than most villagers directly 
involved in negotiations. These managers could articulate a rhetoric that conceals the 
realities of market competition, profits and production processes. This was the logic of 
profit not of philanthropy. By rejecting the term agro-business, both business leaders 
displayed an awareness of current development issues and built a more favourable 
narrative to improve their reputation, which also becomes a form of capital. It is telling 
that CSR departments, and their relationships with local authorities and population 
outreach, were the most important departments in the company after the central 
management team. These were growing departments in both companies, whilst The Third 
Company had also recently started working on its public brand. 
 
6.4.2. When Private Paternalism espouses CSR: A new tripartite social 
contract?  
 
Building on the above, this section highlights the rise of paternalism through its 
confluence with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). According to McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001: 117), CSR involves “actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law”. In brief, CSR is “the 
private provision of a public good” (ibid: 1481).   
 
Görg et al. (2017) find that in the context of GVCs, CSR matters more for vertically 
oriented firms that export their output to developed countries. Local subsidiaries are more 
likely to implement CSR if they are autonomous in their decision-making processes. They 
conclude: “this may reflect the fact that local affiliates have better knowledge about the 
 214 
local conditions and may be more concerned about implementing ethical standards locally 
than a headquarter located abroad” (ibid: 208).  
 
The rise of CSR in global business, particularly when investing in poorer countries, has 
produced diverse outcomes. The win-win discourse is a common part of the CSR 
narrative, increasingly deployed to mask the real face of accumulation and profit-driven 
production. By adopting this narrative and eponym strategies, the three companies were 
aware that creating jobs is not enough to justify their investments, whether vis-à-vis host 
governments, the local population, or, importantly, international observers, who might 
threaten the brand’s reputation in the context of the land rush. This explains the 
importance of investing in marketing actions for “greenwashing”, to paraphrase Greer 
and Bruno (1996).  This also confirms the suggestion that, “CSR [...] is more than 
corporate philanthropy. It is also an essential governance mechanism of the market in 
advanced capitalist economies” (Amaeshi et al. 2016b: 10; Brammer et al. 2012). As a 
result, companies invested in more sophisticated strategies to handle the narrative of land 
grab and responded to local communities’ demands for a new tripartite social contract. 
They were becoming increasingly involved in the privatisation of the reproduction of the 
labour force by providing jobs, education and health services. This rise of CSR was not 
without creating concerns, justified by the current context where capital disciplines and 
punishes, operating as in a panopticon (Foucault 1975) when markets, the state and civil 
society “and the boundaries between them are all shifting, and the ways that we envision 
them have shifted even more[…]In a world so marked by sharp inequalities of both 
income and conditions of life, how can corporate initiatives be both profitable and 
consistent with the interests of the poor?” (O’Laughlin 2008: 946).  
 
Regarding Education: The Third Company has renovated a government school, while 
THE SECOND COMPANY has contributed to strengthening the educational system 
locally. At the time of this research, they had built a pre-school inside THE SECOND 
COMPANY with children from each village (family of the local elite) and had employed 
two qualified teachers. As of 2017, they were “planning to build two more classes as their 




cybercafé in 2009 to promote access to IT. In addition, in 2012, it improved the desks of 
the Elementary School and renovated two classrooms in the neighbouring village’s 
Primary School. In 2014, THE FIRST COMPANY built a new classroom for a nearby 
village’s Primary School, in addition to offering maintenance materials and T-shirts for 
the students.  
  
Regarding Public Health: In 2012, THE FIRST COMPANY took part in the renovation 
of the health post near one of its sites. Moreover, there were medical centres in every 
THE FIRST COMPANY site for workers and their families to access. The Third 
Company was renovating an old health post near its host village. In March 2015, THE 
SECOND COMPANY built a fully-equipped health post in its hots village, which it 
offered to the Senegalese government211. Follwing several months of inactivity due to the 
Senegalese government’s failure to hire staff for the post, THE SECOND COMPANY 
hired a nurse to work closely with the State’s medical doctor212.  
 
Local religious leaders also played a role in the social validation of CSR. In April 2018 
for instance, The Third Company donated 3000 potato bags to Quranic schools and poor 
households in a religious city of Kaolack through a religious leader.  
 
The companies therefore sought to “demonstrate” that “they care” through social 
performance, confirming that land deals are also “theatres of virtue” with the ethical turn 
of corporate capitalisms seeking a more “humane” face (Dolan and Rajak 2016: 3). For 
example, all three companies were investing a lot in charity and “socially-relevant” 
activities213. A local village worker found such investments from the company to be 
normal: “We deserve it, and it is not even enough: an empty calabash does not trump the 
goat and we are grown-ups”214 (interview DW8215). THE FIRST COMPANY’s director, 
who was much appreciated locally, had even offered a sheep for Tabaski, and groceries 
such as sugar for Ramadan. At THE SECOND COMPANY, on labour day, there was a 
 
211 This was one of the principal commitments of THE SECOND COMPANY in the strategic agreement 
(point 2.4) with the former Rural Community. 
212 Both worked closely with the doctor in charge of the THE SECOND COMPANY medical centre 
inside the farm. 
213These included providing school supplies, water, electricity, transport, drinks, the organisation of 
cultural festivities for children, sports activities for the villages and financial assistance during religious 
events. 
214 “Juste sunu geudd lagn gnu joxxul.  Lekeetu kesse naxul bey. Mak du segg fu dara nekkul » 
215 13/05/2017 
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celebration organised by the spouse of the director for the children of all villages during 
which they were offered gifts. The Third Company offered the leftovers of the potato 
production to the neighbouring villages several times. They had also restored their 
corporate reputation and brand through sponsoring two of the currently most-watched 
locally-produced TV-series216. And they impacted local popular culture by passing on 
paid advertisement during the movies. In addition, The Third Company sought to show 
its public utility and redistributive impact by financially supporting the most deprived 
populations, especially during Ramadan, embracing cultural norms of empathy and 
generosity. Lastly, at the end of every year the company organised a concert with popular 
artists (such as Youssou Ndour), dedicated to Senegalese youth with free attendance.  
 
Besides these interventions, the selected companies were also investing in infrastructure 
development for the selected farms. This included road construction, water adduction 
installation, troughs, power poles for electrification, providing potable water for 
neighbouring villages, renovation of Bridges, and a submerged pump offered to Villages. 
Materials such as millet mills were also offered to a few villages, but some were yet to be 
used due to a lack of knowledge. There had been suggestions that they might support the 
local political elite by funding them during their campaigns. 
 
Yet, questions remain as to how such corporate capitals and their CSR with “shifting 
morphologies” can really address the needs of an agrarian question they have contributed 
to creating in the first place (Dolan and Rajak 2016; O’Laughlin 2008) with care and 
harm (Rajak 2011). All the companies had invested in providing what was previously 
delivered by an increasingly disengaged state. A state which seems to promote FDI as a 
way to delegate the delivery of certain public goods or services it cannot deliver, such as 
health, education, access to water, and infrastructure to private paternalism. The 
disengaged “neoliberal” central state has left an ever-increasing role to a “responsible” 
private sector combining paternalism and brand management to create a new tripartite 
social contract, which bridges the broken state-citizen links in order maintain access to 
demanding markets (as discussed in the following chapter).  
 
 
216 These are Maitresse d’un homme marié & Golden. 
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In doing so, CSR were delivering social goods in a way similar to how paternalism was 
disciplining labour inside the firms, but I suggest the intention of this “CSR paternalism” 
was to establish a semi-domestic government (Rutherford 2008: 82) outside the firm, as 
evidenced in the literature on the “company-town”. Domestic government is described as 
the hegemonic form of cultural politics of recognition (Rutherford 2008: 83), to define 
and acknowledge who belongs in the community or in the firm, and therefore, who 
deserves employment, social services, or compensation following land deals. Therefore, 
CSR paternalism has become a way for private investors, as a semi-domestic government 
to partly privatise the social reproduction of labour. This, I propose, allows them to 
manipulate redistributive means to influence local power dynamics. In a similar fashion, 
establishing the contours of belonging and citizenship allows villagers to defend their 
rights to jobs by making corporate powers “as much a part of us as we are of them” 
(Geschiere et al 2000, Kuba et al 2006, Ouma 2015), while ‘othering’ the migrants, as we 
will see in chapter 7. This leads to increased competition between villages and their 
chiefs, regarding which of them is to receive the next school or hospital: “mine is better 
than ours”217 (Interview CL6).218 
 
This illustrates how investors represent the “company village” or “capitalists with a 
conscience” (Mackintosh 1989: 162). This huge investment in social and now cultural 
goods through CSR seems to confirm how companies demonstrate and socially perform 
care, often to conceal the capitalist nature of their venture. This also challenges dominant 
views that “CSR cannot occur in this non-philanthropic manner in weak institutional 
contexts” (Amaeshi et al. 2016b: 34). Despite this, some of them still feel that no matter 
how much they do, it will never be enough to meet the expectations of the communities: 
“we are doomed to fail” (Interview SMP4)219. Indeed, despite CSR paternalism ever re-
inventing itself and re-investing back into communities, some of them feel their 
expectations have not, cannot, or will not be met. The next section analyses the nature of 








Photo 15: THE FIRST COMPANY Greenhouses. Saint-Louis. July 2017. 
(Photograph by researcher) 
 





Photo 17: The Third Company Potato bags ready for commercialisation. 
November 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
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6.5.  Private investors’ accumulation strategies: 
Straddling across business models, sectors and 
activities 
  
It is the aim of this section to shed light on these questions by analysing investors’ 
accumulation strategies, beyond sanitised discourses tinted with CSR paternalism. 
Contrary to the dichotomies replete in the literature based on size (big verses small farms 
or inverse relationship), which is  recurrent  in agrarian debates (Baglioni & Gibbon 2013; 
Bernstein 2009; Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins & Dorward 2010; Johnston & Roux 2007; 
Lipton 2006)), the land rush reveals a more complex reality.   
 
This section illustrates some key accumulation trajectories and strategies of investors, set 
against the background of agrarian capitalist experiences in Senegalese horticulture and 
across rural Africa. It argues that these investors straddle production and labour regimes 
in order to reproduce capital. 
6.5.1. Various forms and motivations for straddling 
  
“Straddling” describes the ways in which indigenous classes of capital combined different 
activities sometimes navigating different sectors to reproduce themselves (Cowen and 
Shenton 1996). Straddling different types of business is common and has been found in 
many cases of rural accumulation in SSA. This section considers straddling from two 
perspectives: 
 
1. As origin of capital to invest/venture into agriculture 
2. As a way of diversifying risks and finding new opportunities for accumulation, after 
starting in agribusiness as in the case of our three company directors. 
 
The first scenario is the case of Niayes accumulators in Senegalese farming straddling 
different ways of organising production in order to survive in the FFV value chains 
increasingly subject to the demands of large-scale European retailers and food standards 
(Baglioni 2015). In the Groundnut Basin, substantial “accumulation from below” has 
occurred among over 200 groundnut farmer-traders. Dynamic medium-scale farmers took 
advantage of new trading opportunities in the changing market conditions of the 1980s 
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and 1990s and were able to accumulate by reinvesting in other economic endeavours (Oya 
2007, 2006). It is often the case that possibilities for accumulation in agriculture attract 
investors from outside the sector, some of whom finance their farms with savings from 
salaried employment or trade (Chapter 7). 
 
The second scenario, exemplified in this comparative study, shows that investors take up 
opportunities offered by governments as an entry point to further accumulation. In the 
case of THE FIRST COMPANY and THE SECOND COMPANY, starting as an exporter 
of FFV constituted the entry point to later becoming an FZC, with the fiscal advantages 
examined in chapter 6. As for The Third Company, its initial purpose was to be a real-
estates developer of the state’s new SEZ in Diamniadio.  This SEZ, as well as its Diass 
neighbour, targets the following sectors: services, agribusiness, industry, IT, tourism, and 
medical services. For these purposes, the government allocated land to The Third 
Company without any cost other than the responsibility to realise and commercialise their 
projects. Recent studies on the relationship between land rush and SEZs found flagrant 
cases of accumulation by dispossession with the support of public authorities (Basu 2007; 
Levien 2012)220.  
6.5.2. Led by demand and responding to the government’s émergence 
strategy 
 
The Third Company decided to invest in agriculture because, according to their director, 
“The Ministry of Agriculture showed an interest to produce for the domestic market”, so 
they quickly organised a meeting with APIX. He added: “Where people live should be 
distinct from where the projects are. There are many opportunities in agriculture, but it is 
difficult to resolve issues with people” (Interview SMP10221). These affirmations need to 
be placed in the context of domestic political economy in India and its increasing 
engagement with Africa (Cairo-i-Cespedes and Colom-Jaen 2014; Cheru and Modi, 
2010,). African countries provide half the food production of India, which is experiencing 
a reduction in available groundwater reserves (Carmody 2013: 122). In the case of 
Senegal and India, the merchandise traded between them almost tripled between 1996 
 
220 This is notwithstanding the fact that SEZs in countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria are struggling 




(when it was estimated at 117 million USD) and 2010 (when it was 333 million USD). 
The two countries consider themselves “equal partners” (Cairo-i-Cespedes and Colom-
Jaen 2014: 11). There seems to be a new private-public framework of cooperation 
between Senegal and India as the latter has never produced in Senegalese agriculture 
before222. 
  
In the cases of THE FIRST COMPANY and  THE SECOND COMPANY, they managed 
to get very prestigious certifications. This allowed them to export to the most competitive 
UK market and to incorporate global commodity chains via UK supermarkets (Baglioni 
2015: 25; Maertens and Swinnens 2008: 6-7,). A few years after being established as an 
exporter estate, THE FIRST COMPANY also started producing for the local market, 
straddling markets and making profits locally. Officially, this was because it needed to 
produce during the wet season to keep local jobs for the villagers and to keep its 
commitment to providing the remaining produce to the local communities’ cattle. As 
shown in table 13, the most exported crop for THE FIRST COMPANY was corn and 
sweet potato. In the domestic market, butternuts, sweet potatoes, peanuts and carrots 
constituted most of the production, which increased competition (chapter 7). 
 
THE FIRST COMPANY explained they are oriented towards the needs of the market: 
“we produce specific volumes based on requests, which is not possible on the French and 
more generally EU market. Our UK based clients are more demanding regarding the 
quality of products but trust us because we meet the standards”. To work with the UK 
group, he told them that the company existed already. He also took a “long view” and 
rented 70 hectares of land and paid approximately 150 million FCFA in salaries. They 
also rented equipment from two small farms previously run by European investors for 18 
million FCFA. At the beginning, they produced only corn making a profit of 120 million 
FCFA. It was only during the second year that the UK firm bought shares, as the main 
investor had over 30 years of experience of large-scale plantation farming in Africa. They 
both had the cultural capital (being educated at university level in agricultural 
management), and the necessary economic capital to take risks and gain the confidence 
of the UK retailer. THE FIRST COMPANY investors were also able to access land 
 
222 80% of Senegalese exports to India focus on phosphoric acid produced by the Industries Chimiques du 
Sénégal (ICS) and cashew nuts exported via The Gambia and sold with the label “made in India” (Cairo-
i-Cespedes and Colom-Jaen 2014).  
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virtually free thanks to their FZC status and Senegal’s national development discourse 
and desire to use land productively. Whilst access to land has constituted a major 
challenge in the last 5 years (World Bank 2018), it was not the case then. As a result, 
transfer of land rights took place thanks to the State’s mediation. THE FIRST 
COMPANY’s accumulation continued not only on the basis of capital thanks to vertical 
integration which allowed for significant economies of scale. Accumulation was also 
permitted by cheap wage labour. Investors also accumulated the trust of local 
communities whose expectations were for a new social contract in the form of private 




Table 17: THE FIRST COMPANY exports and domestic market sales between 
2014 and 2017 (CFA Francs) 
 
Source: Assembled by the researcher from the Company 
 
The table above illustrates that THE FIRST COMPANY’s claims to be mostly producing 
for export is not tenable as it has consistently increased the quantities sold in the domestic 
market since 2015 on all vegetables except courgettes: 
- Their Sweet potato sales on the local market has tripled between 2016 and 2017 
and represent more than 2/3 of export sales. 
- THE FIRST COMPANY gained almost as much from beans sales on local 
market than for export (*23 times more than in 2014). 
- In 2017, THE FIRST COMPANY sold almost 5 times the quantity of Chili it 
did export, locally in 2014, and 8 times as much carrots in 2017(862 701) than it 
sold in 2015 on the local market. 
- In 2016, it sold far more corn than previous years, reaching half of export sales. 
- It sold almost as much beans domestically than for export. 
 
THE FIRST COMPANY also straddles markets both vertically and horizontally and 
shifts between estate and contract-farming (CF). This straddling makes it difficult to 
distinguish the proportion of exporters relying on contract and estate farming (Baglioni, 
2018). For THE FIRST COMPANY, outgrowing is operated only in the CF scheme 
farms, which offers the company great flexibility. The former manager of the three 
locally-based farms, an experienced and well-respected technician, and his eight 
permanent staff and 40 seasonal workers were under contract with another agribusiness 
but put at the disposal of THE FIRST COMPANY through CF. THE FIRST COMPANY 
was also renting land and equipment from SOCAS and paid a monthly fee for the 
provision of services. On the other hand, approximately 15 workers on the payroll of THE 
FIRST COMPANY were based at this site, a secretary, irrigators, drivers, nurserymen 
and the supervisor of day workers. These staff were mostly permanent and seasonal and 
there were approximately 350 day-workers, though the number increased during the 
harvest. There were 10 guards under contract with a private company hired by THE 
FIRST COMPANY. Yet this illustrates that day-workers whose number varied according 
to the needs of the company were the ones most likely to bear the risks of the fluctuant 
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needs of production by THE FIRST COMPANY, the contracting company. Not only 
were they casualised and bore the brunt of precarious labour, they were also made more 
dependent on the dynamics of global and local labour regimes and production networks. 
This argument has been made in an influential publication by Little and Watts in 1994, 
which states that there is, in fact, a proletarianization of “nominally independent growers” 
through their integration to the world market, in order to produce “global fresh” through 
contract farming (see also Friedmann 1993). This led Ouma (2015: 98-101) to argue that 
growers are far from being integrated into the world markets, they are just enrolled in it. 
Hall (2011) theorises this as an adverse incorporation of workers: it is the terms of their 
integration in the GVCs that causes problem as it indeed constitutes a form of “labour 
grabbing” due to their increase dependence on this labour market for wage work.  
  
Employers sometimes circumventr egulations and standards that they are bound to. For 
example, SMETA Audit223 clearly specifies: “There should be no subcontracting unless 
previously agreed with the main client” (SEDEX 2014: 39). Yet, THE FIRST 
COMPANY sub-contracts SOCAS. The secrecy around CF practices, as well as other 
hidden practices such as short-term renting of land amongst big players, is evidenced by 
a conversation I witnessed involving a senior member of a farm (included in this study). 
He discussed covertly with another person the practices of another of the companies in 
this comparative case-study (which I cannot mention for anonymity). This section used 
histories of investors accumulation “from above” to show how business endeavours are 
motivated simply by capital, and by the need to respond “to the demand, to the market”.  
 
Similar to what has been described in Ghana, the Gambia and Kenya (Carney 1994; Dolan 
2016; Little 2000: 7; Little and Whatts 1994; Ouma 2015), Private investors were 
therefore organising to articulate and defend their own interests through VALLAGRI, an 
association grouping the top producers of the FFV sector in Northern Senegal. However, 
these companies have been accused by their national competitors of not producing the 
same crops as other VALLAGRI members, so as not to compete against each other. 
 
 
223 One of the certifications of labels. 
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6.6.  Reactions to the land deals: Who resists? Why 
and how? 
 “To obtain a deliberation is not difficult. But when the time comes to occupy your land, 
it is an issue. And you cannot sue or take legal action because of your image. We resolve 
such issues with time” said a farm senior manager (Interview SMP10224). What are the 
reasons for resistance, acquiescence or contestations of land deals? I argue that whether 
a deal is accepted or resisted is impacted by how land deals are negotiated, and who the 
actors involved are. Those resisting were usually former land users, local producers and 
community members, with religion and ethnicity playing a major role (see below table).  
6.6.1.  Who resists and why? 
 
 
One might expect conflicts and tensions to arise from particular outcomes of land deals, 
such as an asymmetric distribution of rents through which a particular group may lose 
out. The case-studies in this research show that in addition to this, tensions are structured 
along political, ethnic and/or religious lines, and are based on the increasing scarcity of 
land. In the case of political tensions, which occurred in all three cases, this was most 
often the result of political change – for example, a newly elected official from a different 
party - or because leaders, villagers or groups of producers were affiliated to different 
religious groups. Land deals thus became a battlefield for other kinds of grievances and 
conflict. 
This was particularly visible in cases of tensions between the commune and village chiefs. 
A few months after the deal for the extension of THE SECOND COMPANYS’ 
farmlands, the first divisions between the political local authority and the traditional 
leader started to appear. The village chief organised a conference in the host vilage to 
support the local villagers who were now denouncing this as a case of “land grab”. At the 
time, the village leader had become affiliated to an opposition political party led by a 
well-known religious leader and his political coordinator, then President of the rural 
community. The chief of village and his followers started accusing the Mayor and Sous-
Prefet of “trumping” them, and even suggested they were “corrupt” (Interviews CLP7225). 
Most of the host village people are now against the project, especially members of one of 
 
224 04/07/17 
225 01/05/2017, 25/10/2017 
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the three big families who feel that the expectations they conveyed to THE SECOND 
COMPANY through their officials were not included in the contract. The Chief of the 
host village who was also in favour of the deal and key to the negotiations, has been 
criticised by some fellow villagers (Interviews PW/SR226 SW9227). Therefore, whenever 
I tried to interview those people, he stayed not far away, and his presence was dissuasive. 
All the accusations were expressed in a subtle way228, never overtly as they were with 
rumours of corruption. 
This conflict was not only political but ran along religious and ethnic lines. Initially 
Pulaar and Wolof village leaders agreed to the deal. When the investor requested more 
land, the Pulaar supposedly went on to sign without agreeing with the Wolof leaders who 
no longer had land on the side of the canal requested. The effects of this unilateral move 
were resistance from the Wolof village leaders whose main source of livelihood is 
agriculture and who therefore needed land. The Pulaar are mostly pastoralists and, 
despite being fewer in number than the Wolof, their leaders (a marabout and a 
businessman) were in a position to sign the deal since they were less dependent on land 




228 Similarly, a religious authority who was also critical of the investment asked me after our interview: 
“even if I do not agree with him, please do not report what I said if it was to hurt personally any member 
of the community: I am telling you so you know the truth”. Thus, the above renders research on deals 
sealed in hidden transcripts and difficult to interpret. 
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Table 18: Summary of the First, Second and Third Company deals and main reactions (source: contracts & semi-structured interviews) 
  Second Company Third Company Third Company First Company First Company First Company 
Location Saint Louis First site Second Site First Site Second Site CF Third Site 
Hectares 
(Contract) 
Anonymised Anonymised Anonymised Anonymised Anonymised Anonymised 
Hectares under 
operation (as of 
2017) 
  1500 Land conflict 418 150   272 
Type of contract 
Deliberation for Rural Community + 
MoUs with Representatives of 
villages 
30-year emphyteutic lease + MoUs with 
Representatives of villages and individual 
farmers 
Deliberation for Rural 
Community  
Deliberation for Rural 
Community + MoUs with 
Representatives of villages 
Deliberation for Rural 
Community + MoUs 
with Representatives of 
villages 
Deliberation for Rural 
Community + MoUs 
with Representatives 
of villages 
Access to water 
Own equipment + Lake 
 Infrastructure (SAED) 
Own Canal + Lake  - 
Own equipment+ River+ 
SAED Infrastructure 
CF firm equipment+ 
MCA & other SAED 
Own equipment + 
SAED Infrastructure  
Business Model 
and labour regime 
Exports Estates Farming/ Mostly day 
and seasonal workers 
Estates Farming mostly day and seasonal 
workers + possibility and failed past CF  
Not stated 
Estates Farming Mostly day 
and seasonal workers 
Contract-Farming 
Mostly day and seasonal 
workers 
Estates Farming 
Mostly day and 
seasonal workers 
Previous land use 
(POAS) 
Agropastoral Agro  Agro-Pastoral Pastoral Agro-pastoral Pastoral 
Previous land use 
(Neighbouring 
populations) 
Rainfed Market-Gardening near Cattle 
Walks 
    Grazing + Cattle walks   
Grazing + Cattle 
walks 
Post-investment 
land use change 
Production of Radish and Salad 
onions 
Production of Potato for local market 
Intended production of 
Potato  
Production of export FFVs  + 
other crops for domestic 
market 
Production of export 
FFVs + other crops for 
domestic market 
Production of export 
FFVs + other crops for 
domestic market 
Types of resources 
Financial contribution, Jobs, 
"Contracts", Access to water, car 
rentals, CSR, etc. 
Financial contribution, Jobs, "Contracts", 
Access to water, car rentals, CSR, etc. 
  
Financial contribution, Jobs, 
"Contracts", Access to water, 
car rentals, CSR, etc 
Financial contribution, 
Jobs, "Contracts", 
Access to water, car 
rentals, CSR, etc 
Financial contribution, 
Jobs, "Contracts", 
Access to water, car 
rentals, CSR, etc 
Who resists? 
Previous land users / Political & 
Religious leaders, some pastoralists, 
different family members  
 
Previous land users / Political 
& Religious leaders close to 
opposition, petty commodity 
producers & unions, Civil 
Society 
Some producers & 
agricultural unions, Civil 
Society 
Some producers & 
agricultural unions, Civil 
Society 





Staff Reps (from within) & 
Demonstrations (from outside), Media 
appearance, Resistance to extension of 
farm and installation of metallic wire 
Unionisation (from within) 
Constitution of a Collective, 
Law suits, occupation of the 










Policing, Arrests and beating, 
Mediation by state & community 
leaders, Staff reps made redundant 
Staff reps put on leave or fired + media 
appearance + mediation by state, outreach 
& offerings of potato to villagers  
Arrests followed by one 
death and several casualties, 
conciliation attempts by 
administrative authority 
"Counter-movements" of 
producers + media 
appearance + training & 
outreach 
"Counter-movements" of 
producers + media 
appearance + training & 
outreach 
"Counter-movements" 
of producers + media 
appearance + training 
& outreach 
Displacement None  2 villages displaced None  None  None  None  
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The causes of resistance were multiple. They included previously unsuccessful land deals 
having taken place, as well as political change (i.e. if the mayor who signed the deal had 
been replaced). This can shape the political outcome of land deals, as was the case with 
the deliberation allocating 1000ha of land to The Third Company in Louga. Therefore, 
the resistance to the The Third Company Investment in this area was likely to be linked 
to the failure of a former major political actor, and his forceful attempt to be re-elected in 
2012. Resistance was also linked to the nomination of a mayor from the new majority, as 
well as the activism of a religious leader affiliated to an opposition group whose fields of 
cassava were targeted by The Third Company for their extension.  
The allocation of land to The Third Company in Louga marked the beginning of a long 
judicial battle, after a lawsuit was initiated by a collective of 100 peasants and petty 
commodity producers from that village. At the end of 2016, the Supreme Court decided 
to reprieve the execution of the deliberation by the Rural Community. In mid-2017, a 
direct order was sent to The Third Company for it to stop its activities in Louga. Though 
not a definitive victory of the peasants, this historical court decision was celebrated as 
one by opponents of The Third Company land deal. This case illustrates an “inconclusive 
encounter” characterised by disruption rather than transformation, intrusion rather than 
hegemony (Berry 1993: 139). It is likely that the collective decision to resist was due to 
the high mediatisation of the failure of the previous farm, the political change which 
occurred later, as well as the involvement of religious leaders who were interested in 
recovering part of their talibes’ plots to resume their farming activities. Therefore, it 
seems that religion once again intersected with economic interest to determine the 
outcome of this judicial battle over land. 
What are the major reasons for conflict? 
Change in land use, “productive use” of the land, “messy hectares”, and political and 
religious divisions are important causes for social conflicts. 
Land use is determined by POAS in rural communities as explained in chapter 5. In 
principle, all the users of different types of land should know which type of land they 
have access to. A 2011 study in Northern Senegal shows this is not the case. 69% of 
respondents did not know, 17% had heard about it, 9% were informed and only 5% took 
part in its elaboration according to POAS (Toure 2011). As a result, change in land use is 
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one of the major determinants of the outcome of land deals. Many users think they own 
the land they or they family have access to, by tradition, ignoring the transfers of 
competence to the commune since the act 3 of decentralisation in Senegal.   
Investors settling in pastoral zones is the most likely scenario for conflict. THE FIRST 
COMPANY settled in a ZAPE zone destined for pastoralists, despite rural communities 
knowing that the land was allocated for pastoralists. THE FIRST COMPANY accepted, 
as compensation for the population, to produce crops for the cattle deprived of grazing 
land. Nonetheless, conflicts continued to increase between fields owners (cultivators) and 
cattle breeders in Saint-Louis.  One of the Pulaar herders confided with a smile: “You 
can’t share a forest with a pastoralist, and you can’t share land with a 
farmer”(Interview229). Most herders interviewed, no matter which zone they were part of, 
reported a similar problem with “scarcity of land and forest resources” (FGD230). Most of 
the respondents interviewed in Saint-Louisand on the outer limits of the THE SECOND 
COMPANY farm, reported increasing conflicts due to the lack of grazing areas or the 
investor burning the crops (mostly peanut) to transform it into stoves for the cattle that 
they sell in the local market231 (FGD232). This was never recognised by any of the 
company staff.  
The SECOND COMPANY deal was also located on former cattle grazing land, hence 
the reactions of neighbouring villages whose chief is the President of the cattle-breeders 
of Dagana and a unionist who led resistance to the company SenHuile SenEthanol 
(Interview CL6233FGD2234). Some respondents from the villages situated in front of THE 
SECOND COMPANY sites, also talked about the problem of land scarcity: “Why did we 
give our land to a foreigner to now feel tight? We need space to cultivate, have a local 
market, play football, etc.” (VLGI235). To which the chief of the host village responded: 
“What you had in the past, an area isolated from all and everyone, is no longer possible: 
the future is one of intercultural mix, and you need to accept it” (ibid.). The Louga deal 
was not located in ZAPA, so conflicts in this area were not due to changes in land use.  
 
229 with Community worker 23/12/17 
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Photo 18: Cattle walk near THE SECOND COMPANY. April 2017. (Photograph 
by researcher) 
The case of The Third Company and indeed to a lesser extent the FIRST COMPANY 
case  (third site) provides us with examples of the tensions around “productive use”. For 
The Third Company, local authorities specified that the State reserved the right to 
deallocate the land for reasons of public interest. This case illustrates some of the 
imperfections of the 1964 LDN, which does not specify what “productive use” means 
(Tzeutschler 1999; Niang 2004). What kind of use is productive? Is leaving equipment 
on the land or installing a metallic wire as many land users do, while not undertaking any 
production, enough? How about notions of public interest or eminent domain? These 
imprecisions represent a weakness in the land law and have created land conflicts between 
users or between users and the State. In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY third site, 
900 hectares were allocated and so far, only 272 are being used by the farm, which creates 
tensions with neighbouring villages. First, implementation of such projects is slow, and 
because the investor might have requested more land than he immediately needed 
foreseeing future difficulties getting more land.  Secondly, the local communities failed 
to appreciate the real surface involved. 
Many rural communities who sign deals do not realise the amount of land entailed, neither 
do they really know how much land they really hold, as per Edelman’s study of “messy 
hectares” in Costa Rica (2012). As in the Saint-Louis and Louga, it is not until the 
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commission in charge of the national domain comes to investigate and measure the plots, 
or when the investor starts its installation, that those who sign the deal understand the 
amount of land involved. By then, it is sometimes to late to protect a sacred tree, for 
example, or a cemetery located on the plot. This has led to the signature of further MoUs 
when communities seek access to their sacred places. In the case of the cemetery, it is 
still located inside the company’s land, but the cemetery has been enclosed as requested 
by the community.  
Instances of political tensions regarding land deals included a case in the second 
company’s host village, when the company sought to install a metallic wire around 
contested fields to enclose them. The police intervened and arrests several protestors, who 
were then subjected to brutality. The Mayor of the neighbouring village explained his 
enthusiasm for the project, stating that he believes that a synergy between local 
communities and investors is needed (Interview with CLP236). He was much involved in 
projects related to water adduction in his village, and took pride in the significant 
reduction of outmigration from his village compared to the neighbouring ones, thanks to 
irrigated horticulture.  Due to this, his commune had also attributed 2000ha of land to 
another Moroccan investor, and other hectares to pastoralists in his region. The tensions 
arose with the political alternation, the village chief’s affiliation to a local religious leader 
of a different political party than the mayor: “I am saying no, but there is something I 
want” referring to his newly declared political intentions (Interview CLC) 237. 
 
 
6.6.2. How are land deals resisted? 
 
In the case of THE SECOND COMPANY, contestations over the use of the water canal, 
and the extension of the company land, took place on the day they were supposed to 
enclose the new land acquisition in 2013, with demonstrations and occupation of the land 
surrounding the farm. The team who resisted were physically beaten and arrested by the 





leader, a Marabout-political leader from a religious brotherhood238.  After these events, 
several staff who addressed the media were fired. Dialogues were held to bring back 
peace. After those events, contestations were organised around the type of rents, better 
jobs, formalisation of employment via contracts, salaries, CSR support, etc. and are 
mostly voiced either through the workers representatives inside the company or through 
community leaders. 
 
In the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, it was the third site which faced most 
contestations articulated around the use of cattle grazing land. Two neighbouring villages 
decided to contest the deal in 2016, by protesting with red armbands and with great media 
coverage. When I visited THE FIRST COMPANY in 2017, tensions remained, and the 
company said they would grant me access but only on the two first sites. It was during 
my second visit that I visited the third site239.  
 
In the case of The Third Company, resistance and contestations were articulated both 
from within via the to-be-union and with solidarity from Saint-Louis villagers. It was 
during the installation of the farm in the host village that two villages were displaced and 
relocated. The Louga case represents the most advanced form of resistance, with court 
appearances, police arrests, one death, and a legal decision to temporarily close the farm. 
The contestations were led by the collective of Peasants, and this case has received the 
greatest intervention from the public authorities including the police, the judiciary, and 
community leaders.  
 
I argue here that the reaction to deals differs across time and space with the object of 
resistance changing to adapt to current issues and the actors shifting interests. This 
illustrates the centrality of negotiation and its corollary, that deals are never totally 
“signed and done”.  Even after the signature of the contracts, MoUs or other agreements, 
there is still a possibility either to negotiate peacefully, or through more organised and 
coercive means, especially in the current context where the “local community” receive 
 
238 Tidjane 
239 To illustrate how fieldwork can constitute evidence, once, the company invited me to a meeting with 
the 8 village leaders, only to tell me at the eve of the meeting it was cancelled. Yet, I went and it was still 
being held, but I was told I could not attend. Later, a few village chiefs confirmed what was being 
discussed: more secure jobs, transportation to the place of work, salaries, etc...and voice through the 
unions and community leaders 
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much media support and in the presence of NGO activism. This confirms the proposition 
that four main factors were important in shaping the failure or success of resistance to 
land deals: “i) strong mobilisation of local populations (group cohesion and level of 
determination being decisive), assistance of national and international NGOs in scaling 
up protests, capacity of opponents to harness the support of influential elites and decision-
makers, and the legal status of the land under contention.” (Gagné 2019) 
 
 
With this in mind, the following lessons can be learned regarding the causes of support 
and resistance for land deals:  
 
First, private investors’ approach to community relations is key: The case with the least 
issues were THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY. The leader of 
the company did much outreach work in the local community. The company even had 
villager-workers representatives who acted as spokesmen for their villages. At THE 
SECOND COMPANY, land was acquired through rural communities guided by the 
vision of their mayors, who were well-respected and considered as “visionaries”. This 
limited resistance to deals. 
 
Second, memories of past failures can limit future possibilities: In Louga, the failed 
farm of a major political leader caused caution and suspicion. In contrast, THE FIRST 
COMPANY already had a well-known farm in Saint-Louis and was able to build on its 
positive reputation.  
 
Third, the outcomes of the deals are sometimes shaped by the distribution of rents, such 
as salaries, recognition, access to water, services and political support. Therefore, some 
social groups gatekeeping these resources will lead other groups to also try to influence 
their distribution.  
 
This is related to the fourth important dimension: the presence of alternative sources of 
livelihood are another factor:  when fewer other options were available, communities 
were more likely to support the land deal.  
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Fifth, non-tangible dimensions are also significant, for example people’s relationship to 
the land regarding their history and group identity can also weigh in their response to 
horticultural projects.  
 
Equally crucial is the political history of the region is another factor: As we have seen in 
chapter 3, the collective memory and history of coercive collective labour is vivid, 
particularly in Louga– a former fief of the Kingdom of Cayor and Ngnith, which is very 
close to Nder, one of the former capitals of the Waalo, known for the courage of its 
women240 (Wilfhart 2018). In addition, kinship and clientelism influence the level of 
support or resistance. 
 
Last but not least, current politics, legitimacy and popularity of political and traditional 
leaders, and development vision are critical factors to be considered when analysing why 









In this chapter, I have analysed the role of political actors within and around the State, 
and that of investors’ discursive and capitalist strategies to gain a greater bargaining 
power to influence land deals, or partake in the distribution of rents (resources and 
 
240 In November 1819 the women of Nder immolated themselves collectively rather than fall into the 
hands of the Moorish and Toucouleur slavers at the end of resistance.  
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opportunities from land deals). Firstly, I analysed the ways in which gatekeeping from 
political and traditional authorities serves the purposes of accumulating capital by 
capturing rents from land deals; and maintaining domination in the context of changes in 
the land governance systems, erosion of traditional forms of leadership and 
decentralisation (Pattenden 2010, Nugent 2010). Secondly, I focused on labour regimes 
and their implications of the type of the procurement for labour dynamics inside and 
outside the land deals. I argued, with several empirical illustrations, that in the context of 
an almost absent “neoliberal state”, local authorities in need of financial resources as well 
as individual villages in need for “public goods” such as basic health and hygiene were 
seeking to redefine new tripartite “social contracts” with incoming investors who were 
also eager to embellish their profit-driven capitalist accumulation endeavours through 
what I have term “Corporate Social Responsibility - paternalism”. Last but not least, I 
have demonstrated with ample evidence that CSR paternalism constitute the form chosen 
by corporate actors, encouraged by the institutional void left by state authorities, to 
“compensate” communities with “societal goods”. This CSR paternalism constitutes the 
ties that binds harm and care together. It encapsulates strategies and discourses of 
corporate players to manage their disrespect of promises of permanent jobs and failure to 
use all the lands “productively”, while reviving their brand and public reputation. In short, 
CSR paternalism allows companies to continuously re-invent their societal mission and 
purpose, as this represents their “best chance to legitimise business again” (Porter 2011: 








Land deals “do not occur in a socio-economic or political vacuum” (Oya 2015b: 1550). 
They are external interventions, connecting capital with labour with previous and ongoing 
dynamics of place-making resulting in uneven, unfinished processes of social change. 
Not only do land deals re-shape the places in which they occur, they are also an expression 
of capitalist expansion across the globe, as Bebbington and Bebbington (2018) have 
shown with regards to mining. With this in mind, I question whether the kinds of social 
change I observed were a continuation of pre-existing long-term processes of social 
differentiation, exacerbated by the land rush, or whether the land rush had led to the 
emergence of an entirely new class formation. Rarely in the land rush debate has the 
impact on class formation been analysed, beyond thinking about categories that oppose 
undifferentiated classes of capital and labour represented. In addition, there is a dearth of 
literature about the implications on wage employment trends associated with export-
oriented land deals, a gap that this chapter seeks to fill.  I argue with Deere and De Janvry 
(1979: 602) that the incorporation of the peasantry into rural labour markets, either as 
suppliers of wage labour to capitalist firms or as buyers of wage labour in the process of 
capitalisation, “most closely characterises the process of class formation among direct 
producers and, hence, their incorporation into the dominant capitalist mode of 
production”.  
 
Previous chapters have offered a brief history of land and agricultural commercialisation 
(chapter 3) and a discussion over who has access and control of land (politics and CSR 
paternalism) (chapters 5-6). This chapter discusses various processes of agrarian change 
and social differentiation by analysing the social-embeddedness of land (Polanyi 2001), 
bringing together the main propositions of this thesis so far.  More specifically, the 
chapter “studies through” the power dynamics of rural wage employment and class 
formation by capturing perspectives within and outside the companies under study. In 
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part 1, I examine social differentiation from below (fragmented classes of labour) and 
argue that the ‘neo-housewifisation’ of female workers (combined with CSR paternalism 
analysed in previous chapter) is what holds together women’s exploitation without 
dispossession by classes of capital following land deals. I argue for the debunking of 
single and reductionist narratives about “the rural worker” through a life-histories 
approach to understanding female and male workers. The oral histories I collected 
exemplify the singularity and diversity of workers conditions and focus on migration, 
care and reproduction, and the gender of power. In part 2, I argue that land deals produce 
both winners and losers, and examine cases of social differentiation from above (classes 
of capital). In part 3, I examine market outcomes of land deals and argue that there is 
increased competition for labour hiring and competition on local horticultural markets. 
This outcome, I suggest, increases competition at the selling point (downstream), but not 
in the number of those who can be part of GVCs (upstream). In part 4, I propose to ‘bring 
back the social’ in our analysis of land deals, going beyond capitalism to focus on shits 
in social constructions of identity, belonging, inclusion and success.  
 
This chapter draws upon participant observation (through total immersion), the workers 
survey, semi-structured interviews, life-stories, and focus group discussions with workers 
(inside and outside the farms), management, community leaders and capitalists.  
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UNPACKING OUTCOMES (1): SOCIAL 
DIFFENTIATION FROM BELOW (CLASSES OF 
LABOUR) AND EXPLOITATION WITHOUT 
DISPOSSESSION 
 
This chapter zooms in on the world of work, to offer a fine-grained view of labour regimes 
and social differentiation from below by examining the “fragmented classes of labour” 
(Bernstein 2010: 125). Some of the data originates from companies’ lists obtained during 
fieldwork, in addition to the above-mentioned methodology.  
7.1. “Fields or packing house”? Division of labour 
within the three companies 
 
Despite the seasonal nature of rural wage labour, land deals uncover different dynamics 
of social differentiation. The objective of this section is to present the main socio-
demographics of workers in a segmented and gendered horticultural sector.  The main 
argument is that the nature of encounters taking place in estates between “new” agrarian 
capital and different “classes of labour” following land investments is varied.  
 
7.1.1. Segmented and gendered dynamics within and across companies 
 
Hiring casual wage labour provides employers with flexibility and allows them to respond 
to labour peaks and reduce costs in periods of labour slack, thereby transferring the risks 
of operational fluctuations to workers. It allows employers to hire labour at lower costs 
and at short notice; this also facilitates the social disciplining of labour, alongside with it 
geographical disciplining (as discussed in previous chapter on LLCRs). As explained in 
chapter 4, the sample size for The Third Company (workers survey) is too small to be 
significant, therefore, we will not analyse it here. 
 
All three companies relied mostly on day-workers. 90% of THE SECOND COMPANY 
and The Third Company workers were day-workers during peak times. Seasonal workers 
were the second largest number at THE SECOND COMPANY (7%) and The Third 
Company (8%), though not at THE FIRST COMPANY (1%). The data presented here 
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may be slightly biased because the lists provided by THE FIRST COMPANY contained 
only employees directly employed by THE FIRST COMPANY and detached to SOCAS 
farms, not those contracted directly with SOCAS under CF (see chapter 6).  
 
The higher level of contractual workers at THE FIRST COMPANY (16%) shows that the 
company also invested in retaining good collaborators by offering them some security. 
THE SECOND COMPANY and The Third Company had a pyramid form of organisation 
driven by wage labour. 
 
According to the company lists, most day and contractual workers were in the fields, 
sorting chains, and in the packhouse at all three companies. At THE FIRST COMPANY, 
women outnumbered men in the fields and in the greenhouses. Men outnumbered women 
in the Technique Division, at the packing houses. The other farms (Agrinord, Agroval, 
Djama) had almost the same gender division. Most workers at the Al Ngourane farm were 
female, which might be explained by the dissatisfaction of young active men with the 
land deal (informal group conversation), and/or the high levels of migrant labour241 in 
these two villages242. It is also related to the recruitment of workers from these village as 
permanent and seasonal workers. At the Ngalam farm, the gender division can be 
explained by the fact that young men preferred other jobs than THE FIRST COMPANY, 
if it was not on a permanent contract.  
 
Seasonal and day workers can be abruptly ‘let go’, despite assurances from employers. A 
few seasonal workers testified to their dependence on labour availability and on the 
production calendar243. Depending on crops and the time of year, they could work 
additional hours, including night shifts in the case of THE FIRST COMPANY, during 





241 To Guinea Bissau, Dakar, and other African cities 
242 Al Ngourane 1 and Al Ngourane 2 
243 At the end of the season, many workers I interviewed said they had been put on "forced leave" until 
there was more work. Other respondents, near the Ngalam site complained about "lost days", due to the 
long distances to the farm243 when on arrival they would be told there was no work and that they would be 




Table 19: Labour segmentation in all three farms (according to type of contract) 






Total number of workers 3289 1146 1145 
% Day workers 82% 90% 87% 
% Male  45 % 12% - 
%Female  55% 88% - 
%Seasonal workers 1.6% 7% 8% 
% Male  26% 85% - 
% Female  74% 15% - 
% Permanent workers 16 % 3% 5% 
% Male  69% 67% - 
% Female  31% 33% - 
% of interns 0.4% - - 
% Male  0.2% - - 
% Female 0.2% - - 
% Total male workers 49% 19% - 
% Total female workers 51% 81% - 
Source: Assembled by Researcher form THE FIRST COMPANY & THE SECOND 




Female workers were over-represented among casual labourers in all three companies, 
reflecting the gendered nature of labour hiring (see also Johnston 1997; Mies 2014). 
However, there were some significant differences: at THE FIRST COMPANY the 
proportion of female workers was only 55% compared to nearly 90% at THE SECOND 
COMPANY as illustrated in the below table.  
 
As per this table, over 88% of day-workers were women. Female day and seasonal 




preferences, as will be discussed in the final section. Male workers constituted just 7% of 
seasonal workers and nearly 3% of contractual workers, permanent and fixed-term. 
Seasonal workers’ contracts were for 8 months, though they could decide to do another 
off-farm job or work as a day-worker at THE SECOND COMPANY, if wage workers 
were required.   
 
Women formed 16 teams of day-workers from neighbouring villages and were supervised 
by men. Locally, THE SECOND COMPANY was referred to by most of its workers as 
“West Africa Femmes”: a company for women. This illustrates that women were, indeed, 
the backbone of the workforce in this firm. Male day-workers constituted 12% of day-
workers according THE SECOND COMPANY’s list, and they specialised in stacking, 
weeding, trimming and radish lines, jobs which were physically more demanding (table 
below).  
 
Management at THE SECOND COMPANY reported that most male day-workers 
refused to work on spring onions (takk soble), which involves sorting the spring onions 
before tying and packing them: 
 
At our English farm, male day-workers do perform this task, not here in Senegal. 
It is cultural, because men believe it is a woman’s work. Some men even resigned 
when we tried to enrol them in those teams as we need more staff for the spring 
onion (Interview SMP3245).  
Two younger men who had previously worked at THE SECOND COMPANY said, in 
FGD3246, that they did not mind doing this job but the pay needed to be increased for 
them to agree. Three male trimmers and stackers said they did not leave their households 
to come and “work like women and be paid like women” (FGD1247). Male day-workers 
either worked on the flat-trimming (cutting the roots of the radish and conditioning), or 
formed lines to carry the radish before loading them onto trucks, or offloading the trucks 











Table 20: THE SECOND COMPANY Total day workforce represented by 






















Source: Assembled by Researcher from THE SECOND COMPANY registers of workers 
 
This gendered division of labour is not unique to my case-study. Dolan (2001: 47) has 
shown that Kenyan companies exporting French beans have contributed to this 
“naturalisation” of labour division by regarding women as “better bean pickers”: “Their 
hands are smaller and they have more patience for the work than the men”. The specificity 
of the crop and the gendered construction of THE SECOND COMPANY could explain 
lower male participation as day-workers. Men are subjected to their counterparts’ gaze 
and the dominant understanding of masculinity constructed around virility and economic 
power (Biaya 2001; Diop 1985; Perry 2005).  
 
Marital status and number of children 
 
249  26/10/17 
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Regarding workers’marital status, more female day-workers than men reported being 
married (respectively 31 and 32% of female respondents in THE FIRST COMPANY and 
THE SECOND COMPANY), and married polygamous conjugal relationships with 
respectively 32%and 52% as illustrated in survey data below. These workers attempted 
to make their jobs compatible with their unpaid tasks in the household, such as taking 
care of their children, cooking, finding wood and fetching water.   
Table 21: Workers’ according to Gender, Marital Status and Number of Children. 
n=166 










  Single 34.4 20.0 16.7 26.7 
Male 
(%) 
Married 62.5 70.0 38.9 56.7 
  Married Poly 3.1 10.0 44.4 16.67  
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
            
  % of male respondents 
with at least 1 child  
51.5 60.0 83.3 62.3 
            
            
Female 
(%) 
Single 24.5 22.2 8.0 16.7 
  Married 30.6 33.3 32.0 31.5 
  Married Poly 32.7 33.3 52 41.7 
  Divorced 6.1 11.1 0.0 3.7 
  Separated 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
  Widower 4.1 0.0 8.0 5.6 
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
            
  % of female respondents 
with at least 1 child 
67.4 44.4 86.3 74.3 
            
  M/F Average Number of 
Children (SD*) 
1.9 (2.2*) 1.8 (2.2*) 4.2 (3.4*) 
2.8 
(2.9*) 
Source: Workers survey 
 
As per table below, the average of children per woman was 2.8 children in all cases, with 
a higher average of 4.2 children per woman at THE SECOND COMPANY. 
Unsurprisingly, workers in married and married polygamic relationships were more likely 
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to have multiple children according to survey data. Both interviews and survey data 
confirmed that many children were living with relatives (generally richer) or schooled in 
a different city. That was for instance, the case of the children in my host family, who 
were schooled in a nearby village at their uncle’s house, and only returned to their parents’ 




7.1.2. Education: Achille’s heel of wage workers? 
 
The below tabulation, which involves all male and female workers regardless of type of 
contract, tells us a few things about workers’ education rates. The majority of wage 
workers had either no education or were educated at primary school level. 49% of THE 
SECOND COMPANY workers did not have any education against 26% of THE FIRST 
COMPANY workers. These education rates were below the gross enrolment rates for the 
region of Saint-Louis, which were 89% for female students and 76.7% for male students 
in 2014250. These regional rates were below national averages indicated by UNICEF: 
83.4% gross enrolment for male students against 89% for female students between 2008 
and 2012.  
 

















Source: Workers survey 
 
THE FIRST COMPANY workers were in general more educated than THE SECOND 
COMPANY and The Third Company: 9.74% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers had a 




1.5% had university degrees at THE SECOND COMPANY, while 14.5% were educated 
at primary school level (see below). Many workers reported an alternative type of 
education/training, generally known as “jang métier”: to learn a trade”. This was the case 
for 13.41% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers and 20.29% of THE SECOND 
COMPANY workers. This illustrates how traditional ways of learning the ropes of the 
trade were still used. 
Table 22: Workers’ other socio-economic activity and school enrolement n=170 
Ed1 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Yes 111 65% 65.29 
No 59 35% 100% 
Total 170 100.00  
Source: Workers survey 
 
This tabulation below (n=170) focuses on obtaining a frequency of the two types of 
response about Ed1 (Have you ever been to school? Yes or No). 
 
In general, the interviews showed that the following mattered for progression within the 
firms: previous work experience seniority and length of service, education/skills, and 
social networks251. Therefore, most uneducated, inexperienced or unqualified (migrant) 
workers were more likely to be at the bottom of the firm’s ladder.  
 
 
7.1.3. Straddling to survive or Emancipating oneself though multiple 
occupation? 
 
As in many other parts of Africa, lower wages in Senegal are partly explained by the 
safety net provided by land availability (scarcer now) and the possibility to work in family 





251 This is summarised by “bras long” which means “to be well-connected”  
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Table 23: Workers’ other socio-economic activities according to gender and 
marital status; and workers’ labour hiring. n=166 
 
Source: Workers survey 
 
70% of THE SECOND COMPANY workers and 41% of THE FIRST COMPANY’s 
workers reported having a second job. Most workers sought additional resources to 
complement their earnings from the farm. In the host village, I observed some of these 
working in other potato or cassava fields as surgas on afternoons (from 4pm to 7pm). 
They were paid an additional 2000 fcfa for this work, while women returned home mostly 
for unpaid domestic work.  
 
In all three companies, males were more likely than women to work in more than one job: 
74% more likely at THE SECOND COMPANY and 60% more likely at THE FIRST 
COMPANY. Most of the men I got to know, who were not working in export horticulture, 
told me that a single horticultural wage could not sustain their financial obligations as the 
head of household (kilifë), and thought that WHAT? was a “woman’s job”. As the above 
table shows, most of the people working in more than one job were in conjugal marital 









Y     
Do you have another job? = yes 41% 21% 70% 
Gender of respondent 
   
Male 60% 47% 74% 
Female 40% 53% 26% 
Marital status  of respondent    
Married (Mono) 43% 53% 34% 
Married (Poly) 21% 21% 50% 
Widowed 2% 0 6% 
Divorced 4% 5% 0 
Separated 1% 0 0 
Single 28% 21% 10% 
Do you hire labour outside of your 
own family? 
   
Labour Hiring 24% 16% 52% 
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village confirmed this during an interview: “Someone, like me, who has daily expenses 
(dépense) of 5000 fcfa, cannot be accommodated with a day wage of 2000fcfa. I initially 
welcomed THE SECOND COMPANY because I wanted funding to develop my share of 
the land ” (Interview Tr1 252). Another 36-year-old worker, who had lived 8 years in host 
village for eight years and had worked at THE SECOND COMPANY for two months, 
testified that, “THE SECOND COMPANY is not good for a family man or an ambitious 
single man” (Oral history CW253). Despite recognising that THE SECOND COMPANY’s 
work was less physically demanding, he preferred working shorter hours. Another 
common trait of non/former-company workers I met was that they generally felt freer 
working for someone they knew well, who would be more flexible regarding working 
hours, and who would pay them immediately after their day of work (rather than at the 
end of the week or every fortnight as companies did. One of the non-THE SECOND 
COMPANY workers and two of non-THE FIRST COMPANY workers interviewed also 
perceived company work to be demeaning.   
 
In all three companies, workers reporting multiple occupations were more likely to take 
up another job that did not take up much of their time to earn money for a specific purpose.  
A 57-year-old P day-worker at THE SECOND COMPANY also managed to work in the 
selling and buying of cattle (Interview DW3)254. He did not do this job all-year round, but 
mostly closer to national celebrations such as Eid. Some of the workers interviewed also 
reported taking up another job opportunistically, or for a specific objective. This was also 
the case for a 27-year-old Pulaar supervisor who, at the end of his day, worked at THE 
SECOND COMPANY, taking care of other people’s (Wolof clients’) cattle against a 
salary (interview)255. This worker was involved in agricultural work with his brothers, but 
because he was older than them (seniority rules), had more flexible working hours. 
Several other respondents, THE FIRST COMPANY workers (DW28256, DW31257  and 











Women also made a significant part of this share: 26% of THE SECOND COMPANY 
workers, and 40% of THE FIRST COMPANY female workers, reported working in 
“other activities” though they only reported such additional activities after further probing 
and explaining that my question meant “work” at large. Interestingly some activities were 
not perceived as work, but as their “role” (wall) or “duties” (wareef) within the family or 
community (Interviews259).  
 
In the villages around THE SECOND COMPANY, the main other socio-economic 
activities reported are explained in the table below. For women in rural settings, such as 
in the Saint-Louis villages, these included family farming, taking care of the cattle, selling 
food or milk, gawe collection, etc. In “peri-urban” areas around THE FIRST COMPANY, 
such as Saint-Louis, this included hairdressing, seam-stressing, etc. Hardly any of the 
women included unpaid work in their responses, for these are done to conform to 
patriarchal norms. Women socially performed that they can manage professional 
activities without household chores suffering from it. For male respondents, the most 
common types of other jobs were trading, driving and family-farming. Again, this 
demonstrated that farm wages, though above the national minimum income, were either 
insufficient to meet some workers expectations or, in the case of unpaid activities, were 
part of the social division of labour. Some additional jobs, although increasingly rare – 
such as helping to harvest vegetables (sweet potatoes and cassava mostly) at a 
neighbour’s farm (gasaanu or gasaatu) - represents in-kind remuneration, and/or is done 
to demonstrate solidarity with the given neighbour or family. Such activities of 
community self-help combine moral purpose, redistribution and material security. This 
“production and reproduction of solidarity” tends to disappear with the rise of new 
lifestyle aspirations and economic hardship (Dimé 2007-151-171, Fall 2007). These 
dynamics corroborate the suggestion that there is an increasing tension between working 





259 Interviews held between 4 and 8 November 2017. 
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Table 24: Glossary of most common jobs 
 
Source : Observation, informal conversations and interviews 
 
There was also significant labour hiring, either paid or unpaid family labour, especially 
around THE SECOND COMPANY (51,61%) and THE FIRST COMPANY (23,61%). 
There was competition for selling markets between THE SECOND COMPANY and 
other local commodity producers who produce different crops.  Consequently, this greater 
demand for increased labour productivity had resulted in higher competition for hiring 
labour. Consequently, this leads to the recruitment of migrant workers, surga. Forms of 
collective labour with sharecropping dimensions, such as “bokk bay”, were more 
prevalent in rural villages of Saint-Louis. This allowed petty commodity producers and/or 
workers, some of whom might be landless or in need of each other for the provision of 
capital and labour, to collaborate and share benefits later.  
 




Mostly Female jobs  
 
Mostly male jobs 
 
Family farming (mostly harvesting) 
Gasaatu or gasaanu, Taking care of 
family cattle 
Ngoos: clearing of the grass 
Mbindaanu: working as a domestic 
worker (mostly female migrant working 
in another household) 
Sant: working for neighbours of family 
for a short period 
Gawe : collection of perfuming plant 
Sippi soow : bartering milk against 
money or in-kind products 
Small scale commerce : food, shoes, 
perfume and other cosmetics, cloth and 
fabriks, underwear. 
bajanu gox: older women community 
workers visiting sick people and 
pregnant women 
Trading with no physical shop. 
 
Family farming  
Petty commodity production 
Bay waricce : market-gardening of crops 
such as aubergines, sweet potato, 
butternut, cucumber, chili, and peanuts  
Njollere : travelling to sell cattle  
Mangi : following the cattle to graze 
them (pastoralists) 
Bay nawet : cultivation during the rainy 
season 
Bay noor : cultivation during spring 
Bay nawet ak noor : both 
Mbayum dex : agriculture irriguée 
Driving 
Cattle-breeding 
Surga: Wage worker in a farm 
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7.1.4. “Dem-Dem”260?  Footloose labour on the road again  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, Waalo and Kajoor are historically big outmigration regions. 
Here are the findings from the workers survey. 
 




migrated to come 
and settle at your 
current location?) 
Male Female Total 
Yes 
 
27 54 81 
33 67 100.00 
49 51 100.00 
No 31 52 83 
37.35 62.65 100.00 
53.45 49.06 100.00 
Total 58 106 164 
 35.37 64.63 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Workers Survey 
 
 
The first row of this table shows that 27 (33%) respondents were male and 54 were 
female (67%). These figures confirm that women accounted for a larger share of migrant 
workers than men. The third row of the table indicates that both women (51%) and men 
(49%) were more or less equally likely to migrate. These figures underscore gender biases 
in historiography, as the masculinity of the labour force was taken for granted while 
women were relegated to the subsistence economy (Rodet 2008, 2009, Tandian 2012). 
Both the host villages of the second and first companies are known for female 
outmigration to Mauritania, Dakar and other urban areas, as illustrated in chapter 3. The 
table also shows that almost half of horticultural workers (81 respondents) had migrated 
to the place where they were interviewed, against 83 respondents who had not migrated. 
This illustrates the magnitude of migrant labour in the FFV sector in Northern Senegal. 
  
 
260 Title of a famous song by Youssou Ndour on the impetus some youth feel to leave at all costs. 
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migrated to come 
and settle at your 
current location?) 
Ed1  
Have you ever 
been to school? 
Yes 
Ed1 Have you 






















Source: Workers survey 
 
The above table shows that 68% of migrant workers went (at least) to primary school, 
against 61% of local workers. When it come to the reasons for migrating, 25 respondents 
migrated for work, out of whom 20 were male. 37 female migrant workers migrated to 
join the house of their husbands (sëyi), and 7 female respondents did so for “family 
reasons”. Indeed, previous studies have shown that women rarely migrate independently 
in search of paid work, but rather to marry or join kin (MackIntosh 1989), as patrilocality 
(joining the husband’s house) is still dominant in rural Northern Senegal (Diop 1985). 
What the data shows however is that patriarchal norms do not impede married women’s 
participation in rural wage labour. The possible reasons for this are examined in the 
following section. 
 
Table 27: Workers’ Gender and Reasons for migrating n=75 
Reason Current 
Migration 
(Why did you 
migrated to come 
and settle at your 
current location?) 
Male Female Total 
Job 20 5 25 
 80% 20% 100% 
 83% 10% 33% 
Family 2 7 9 
 22% 78% 100% 
 8% 14% 12% 
Marital home 0 37 37 
 0 100% 100% 
 0 72% 49% 
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Other 2 2 4 
 50.00 50.00 100% 
 8.33 3.92 5.33 
Total 24 51 75 
 32% 68% 100% 
 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Workers survey 
 
This life story of a female horticultural worker brings to life much of the above-mentioned 
evidence:  
 
When I was young, my father had a shop in the second company’s host village, 
and I would replace him when he went to the fields as I was his oldest daughter. 
My mother cultivated watermelons, beans and millet. Before, my father and my 
mother each had their field. She had land from her husband as she moved to her 
husband's home. She consumed with her family what she cultivated and the other 
part she sold. Everything she reaped belonged to her. Children of working age 
also had their share. In the morning men went to work on their father's fields, and 
in the evening, on their own field. Their father did not pay them but would provide 
for their food and shelter. My mother and I went to Mauritania 30 years or more 
ago to work there. I was a babysitter and she worked as a domestic worker 
“mbindaan”. She sent her father a portion of her salary to help him. I could not 
help as much because of my low salary. Before leaving for Mauritania, I learned 
Arabic. In those days, it was difficult to find a job. Those who had a job found it 
in the fields. Shortly before the tragic “événements naar”, my mother passed 
away. I therefore stopped going to Mauritania and went to St. Louis. I went there 
twice, staying there every time for a year to work as a domestic worker. Those 
days were gorgeous. I did not have children or anything, you only took care of 
yourself. What I earned allowed me to help my family while keeping a part for 
myself. I can now appreciate what that meant now that I am older and have a 
family to take care of (DW1261). 
 
This short excerpt reveals patterns of migration and scarcity of wage labour 30 years ago 




and post-colonial labour migration in the Valley has been extensively documented, and 
Mauritania was one of the key destinations (Barry 2012; Cross 2013: 51; David 1980; 
Diop 1965; Manchuelle 1997).  It also showcases the fascinating complexity of female 
workers’ lives and the intricacy of work (paid and unpaid). For instance, how she 
“helped” (not considering it as “work”) at her father’s shop for him to appropriate her 
earnings and that of her siblings against food and cover; her mother’s remittances to 
support her family. It also shows how tragic events made her change her destination of 
work. Finally, her nostalgia of her life as a single woman and the burden of unpaid care 
work. 
7.1.5. Tell me what you own, and I will tell you your class and your 
gender! 
 
83% of  THE FIRST COMPANY’s workers and 62% of THE SECOND COMPANY’s 
reported that their family had land, though more female workers than male reported so, 
as per the table below. In general, 13% of THE FIRST COMPANY workers and 17% of 
THE SECOND COMPANY’s did report owning land of their own. This high number of 
workers sharing land with family, the high proportion of landless workers (personal 
lands) and multiple occupations suggests increased scarcity of land and exploitation 
without dispossession (Berry 1993).   
 
Table 28: Workers’ type of Land Holdings (family or personal)  n=164 
 
Source: Workers survey 
 
The THE SECOND COMPANY case illustrates this. THE SECOND COMPANY 
received 200ha from the rural community, in much the same way as “local villagers” also 
received 200ha, without mention of how the land would be shared between individual 
recipients. My host family in the host village received in total 13.4ha which they shared 
with their cousins262 . Following the land deal, the populations of these villages were 
grouped into GIEs led by community leaders to share the land.  The head of my host 
family received 6ha whilst all the other married men in the family received either 0.5 or 
0.55ha and other families also shared the land in this way. One of the two Pulaar villages 
(Al Wathiam) received in total 45ha. In both cases, women and unmarried men did not 
 
262 As I explained previously, there are three main families in the village, divided into different 
concessions and have had to relocate/separate after they built their own house 
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receive individual land titles but two female GIE were created and received collective 
land titles. This illustrates how shrinking land resources have been redistributed between 
families, contributing to reducing individual ownership of female and unmarried junior 
men who still have access to family land. The latter group’s access to land was determined 
by their position in the family or kin group, with older, wealthier and high caste men 
being more likely to own/access/control land (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1320). Regarding 
women, previous research has shown that collective and/or customary land rights can 
offer them rights to access land, though access is not ownership (Carney and Watts 1990; 
Ossome 2014; Verma 2001; Wanyeki 2003). 
Table 29: Workers’ Ownership of their current Accommodation according to 
Marital Status and Gender across the 3 companies. n=166 
 














  Grand 
Total 
Gender Stat Mat No Yes No Yes No Yes  
F Divorced 1 2  1        4 
 Married 6 9 1 2 5 11     34 
 Married 
Poly 
1 15  3 6 19     44 
 Separated  1           1 
 Single 5 7  2 2 2     18 
 Widower  2    4       6 
 Total F 13 36 1 8 13 36    107 
H Married 6 13 3 4 1 6      33 
 Married 
Poly 
1   1 1 7      10 
 Single 6 5 2  3       16 
 Total H 13 18 5 5 5 13       59 
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Source: Workers survey 
 
Married women (78 respondents) were the largest group of women owning 
accommodation. This shows that landholding and property ownership was based on 
gender and marital status. These findings corroborate Tine and Sy263(2003), illustrating 
that women’s access to land is mostly shaped by their marital status and social networks. 
 
Photo 19: THE SECOND COMPANY April 2017 (scoping study). (Photograph by 
researcher) 
 
Photo 20: THE SECOND COMPANY field workers during a break. October 2017. 
(Photograph by researcher) 
 
Photo 21: A day as a The Third Company wage worker (1): In the Potato Lines. 
November 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
 




26 54 6 13 18 49    166  
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Photo 22: A day as a The Third Company wage worker (2): Breakfast time. 




7.2. Engendering the “classes of labour”:  Wage 
workers out of the invisible (Oral histories) 
 
This section highlights the conditions of women workers who had been totally or partly 
incorporated in these capitalist enterprises. The focus is mostly on women because they 
constituted the majority of workers on these farms. It hopefully contributes to more 
nuanced yet radical approaches of casual wage workers, by focusing on the oral histories 
of a women and men under 45, some of whom were wage workers, others qualified 
workers or managers. Some were part of the workers survey, some others of the semi-
structured interviews or FGD, purposively selected and presented here as they might 
present some key features of the world of work. In doing so, this study contributes to 
“engendering agrarian political economy”, whilst reflecting the diverse faces of “classes 
of labour”, sometimes statistically invisible (Chung 2017; Dancer & Tsikata 2015; Katz 
2001; Razavi, 2009: 198; Sender et al. 1996).  
 
Feminist scholars have critiqued the essentialising of rural African women in gender and 
development discourse (Cornwall et al 2007, 2008; Mohanty 1984; Oyewumi 1997). 
Mohanty’ s Under Western Eyes highlights the ways in which “Third-World women” 
have often been presented “as a homogeneous ‘powerless’ group often located as implicit 
victims of particular socio-economic systems” (Mohanty 1984: 338). Similarly, Win 
(2004) highlights the focus in the development industry on “Very Poor, Powerless or 
Pregnant Women” and asks whether this tells the full and complex story of African 
women, and if this is the only woman development organisations should be concerned 
about. Other studies have sought to show the multidimensionality of African women by 
“lifting the blinkers” from the usual suspects of poverty, to show that divorced, single and 
poor women do take care of their children’s education (Sender et al. 2006), daughters of 
poor women are not always doomed to inherit deprivation, and women may indeed find 
some forms of emancipation through the labour market (Oya and Sender 2009; Van den 
Broeck et al. 2015, 2017a). 
 
1. Maajigeen264* is a 42-year old woman. Of her eight children, five were working at 




but stopped this when her father died.  During fieldwork, she was living with two co-
wives and her husband in a concession, comprising of 20-25 people. Before joining THE 
FIRST COMPANY, she sold fish from the River but gave up because this was not 
profitable. She then worked as a laundry woman and cook in another village. At THE 
FIRST COMPANY, she was working eight hours every day as a cleaner. She was initially 
a day-worker, weeding and harvesting. But, when after two days of working she had no 
money for her dépense, she decided to become a cleaner. After one year without a contract 
she became a permanent member of staff in 2012. 
 
Her previous house flooded whenever it rained. Because her husband was old and not 
working, she rented a room. At the beginning, she started saving a small amount. When 
her salary increased, she started buying cement bricks and ended up building a room: 
“even if the roof still has problems and I still cannot fix it, it is my place”. She also told 
me that since she started working, there was a redistribution of household roles265. 
Maajigeen was earning between 86000 and 92000 FCFA. 
  
2. Zaynab266* is a 30-year woman who lives in village near THE FIRST COMPANY. 
During her first interview, she was single and living in a house left by her deceased father, 
along with her eight brothers and mother. Before joining THE FIRST COMPANY at 18, 
she had stopped school at primary level and used to weave mats (carpets), or work on 
leather. At THE FIRST COMPANY, she started as a day-worker on asparagus, then was 
moved to the packing house. She was been a permanent worker for one year, sorting and 
packaging sweet potatoes, corn and butternut. Her daily working hours were 7am-2pm, 
but during the sweet corn season she could be made to finish at 7pm. She preferred   
working at THE FIRST COMPANY because, as a single woman, she did not want to stay 
at home and depend on her mother and brothers. Her monthly salary was between 75,000 
and 80,000 CFA Francs. She would share it with her mother, spending it on rent and on 
herself. Working on the farm was also useful in allowing her and her family free to access 
the company clinic. 
 
 
265 “Thanks to God my husband took care of the children and most of the domestic labour when they were 
younger, and I went to work: I thank him. My husband is glad that I work and says: “focus on your work 
and don’t listen to anyone.”  
266 19/06/2017 and 13/11/2017 
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Most of the active population of her village were working at THE FIRST COMPANY, 
including four people from her house. However, she said she was struggling to make ends 
meet (taqale): “But I must admit things are better now:  I have taken over from my mum 
because I have a secure, permanent job. We are here from sixto threepm with a 30-minute 
break. You stand the whole time, supervisors shout at you, and you are not allowed to sit, 
you are fired if you do.” 
 
When I interviewed Zaynab for the second time four months later, she was married and 
permanently employed. She wanted to continue working but her husband was not keen. 
 
3.Codou267* was one of the female breakfast sellers at THE SECOND COMPANY. 
She had never worked before and started as an agricultural worker. She later joined the 
canteen to serve breakfast, after receiving hygiene training. At 44, Codou considered 
herself lucky: her worked enabled her to manage her household while earning an income 
and becoming autonomous. Her working hours at THE SECOND COMPANY were 9am-
11am. Before that she would sell breakfast (eggs, pasta, tuna sauce, mayonnaise, coffee 
and bread coming from Richard-Toll, and millet porridge) between 6 and 8am. 
4.Marie268* is a 29-year single woman and lives in another city for work, separate from 
her six brothers, sisters and her parents. She holds a Bachelor’s Degree from the 
University of Dakar, and after an internship, worked for a producer of FFVs in the Niayes. 
She joined THE FIRST COMPANY in 2014 as a farm supervisor. She was supervising 
between 15 and 35 people, 50 during the peak season. Sometimes more senior men were 
credited for her work. She found the management staff to be better treated than the 
production staff. Works from 7 am to 2pm, she told me she has to run after people to try 
and have them do what they are supposed to. With regards to her gender and age, she said 
her staff respect her because she is not there to show she is the boss but to listen and make 
herself available. She was earning FCFA 200,000 net and took the company bus to work. 
She would eat the bread distributed by the company for breakfast but ate lunch at home 
after work between 2 or 3pm. She managed her salary, splitting it between her personal 
expenses and the needs of her family. She was also saving a small amount at the bank. 
 
267 05/05/2017 
268 19/06/2017 and 13/11/2017 
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Her salary, she told me, was all accounted for before it even reached her account. Thus, 
she hoped for a salary raise. She would visit her family every 2-3 months.  
 
During a follow-up interview three months later, Marie was working in the same position. 
Her young female manager had left, and she took over her responsibilities in another farm 
in addition to her responsibilities at the greenhouse. She said she is having a hard time 
finding her place. The direction had brought in new staff and were  asking her to 
collaborate with them until December. Following this, they had promised to evaluate her 
so that she might become chief of the farm. Despite the additional workload, her salary 
had not increased, nor her contract amended. She told me that she would leave the farm 
if she finds another job because she can clearly see she is being asked to train the one 
who will take over from her despite being less qualified. 
 
5.Mbougar*269 is a 36-year-old male migrant worker from Touba.  He had three 
children and had been married for nine years. His family stayed in Touba, where he would 
work as a street vendor from June to the end of September every year.  He migrated to 
the second company’s host village eight years ago where he was still living and working 
the rest of the year as a surge in a potato farm. He worked at THE SECOND COMPANY 
in 2015, but only for a few months. He worked from 3am to 11am at his current farm and 
was free the rest of the day. He was staying at a friend’s house, which was home to nine 
family members.  
 
6.Hamet*270 was 40 years-old and married with three children. He was from one of the 
Maureish village next to THE FIRST COMPANY. He learned Quran, then stopped 
primary school before finishing it. Then he went to Dakar, where his father worked to 
learn a trade when he was 15 years old and returned to his village at 21, before moving 
to Fatick where he stayed until he was 33 because he heard of THE FIRST COMPANY. 
He started there as a day-worker and 2 years later was offered a fixed-term contract. 
However, he had issues with his management and was dismissed for two months before 





a permanent contract as a supervisor. He was able to build a four-bedroom house in his 
village. 
 
7.Maïga*271 was aged 16 and single. He had been working for The Third Company for 
three months. He is from Rosso and joined his brother who had also arrived to work at 
the farm a year before. He was previously a tailor before but was happy to be paid 3500 
FCFA per day to manage one of the center pivot -irrigation  
 
8.Sobel*272 was 26 years-old on his papers but really was 31. He was a migrant worker 
from Kaolack and had joined THE SECOND COMPANY in 2013 as a day-worker. 
During fieldwork, he was a supervisor because of his hard work, but also because of being 
from the same village as one of the senior managers. He said he has acquired new skills 
at THE SECOND COMPANY and the company sent him to England for 10 weeks a few 
years ago for a training. He was married and had one child, but his wife was still living 
in his native village. He said he is an example of integration as he met his wife at THE 
SECOND COMPANY and she is from one of the neighbouring villages. He was living 
with a colleague at THE SECOND COMPANY but has asked for a private room so his 
wife (who was also working at THE SECOND COMPANY) could join him permanently. 
He said he returns to Kaolack for one month every year to visit his family and sometimes 
helps cultivate the family farm. Every month, when he received his salary of 200000 
(sometimes he has a bonus and does additional hours), he would save 20000 FCFA, send 
120000 to his family, pay 15000 FCFA for lunch (with a family in a nearby village), leave 
10000 FCFA at the boutique for his groceries, and keep the rest for his other expenses. 
He did not have any loans. 
 
9.Boury* was 24, single, and had worked at THE FIRST COMPANY as the chief of a 
farm for 5 months. When I contacted her via Skype three months after our interview she 
was working in another farm in another country. She attended a prestigious university in 
another country, then returned to Senegal. After that, she started her Bachelors in Senegal 
before being admitted in Agronomy at a University abroad where she spent a few years. 
As a family member was working at THE FIRST COMPANY, she applied for an 
 
271 21/11/2017  
272 19/05 2017 and 26/10/2017 
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internship there, and joined in 2016. After finishing her BA in 2016, she returned to 
Senegal and started at THE FIRST COMPANY due to a friend of her father who gave 
her CV to the director. She started as an intern and was hired after a few months as a chief 
of farm on a permanent contract.   
 
What she liked most about the company, she told me, is that it is investing in her country, 
in the city she grew up in and she can give back to her community. The company was 
creating employment through using the soil, and she is passionate about agronomy. There 
was some rivalry with colleagues who started at the bottom of the ladder with no degree 
but with experience. She had a degree but no experience and was younger, therefore they 
did not accept her. She did not feel comfortable and had not expected that. She was living 
in her father's house with seven other family members.  She was earning more than them, 
500,000 FCFA plus a housing allowance of 150,000 FCFA. She was not eating at the 
company. Her concerns were for the environment as before the company: she was worried 
that if the company leaves there will be contamination and fungal diseases that might 




Photo 23: Zaynab’s mom & her friends working on the leather before evening near 
THE FIRST COMPANY. May 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
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Photo 24: Boury used to managed one of these teams in THE FIRST COMPANY’s 
fields. April 2017 (scoping study). (Photograph by researcher) 
 
Photo 25: Breakfast time at THE SECOND COMPANY: Workers gather around 
Codou and other sellers’ stalls in front of the packing house. May 2017. (Photograph 
by researcher) 
 
This section illustrates that being a wage-worker represents for some a great opportunity 
to access a sustainable and reliable source of livelihood without having to migrate for 
work. This was the case for Maajigeen, Zaynab and Hamet for whom not having to travel 
is important as they have a vivid memory of relatives having to travel for work. Some 
female participants were not sure they could take the same decision and leave their family 
behind, neither were they sure their male relatives would let them travel. The situation of 
Boury and Marie, both below 30, single footloose and fancy-free was quite singular as 
they were living by themselves. Marie, Maïga, Sobel, and Mbougar were migrant 
workers. While the first represented the face of migration of urban educated workers, the 
others represented the more traditional type of labour migration from previous groundnut 
centres (Kaolack and Touba) to horticultural labour markets with a huge contribution in 
remittances to their native villages. These stories also highlight less rosier aspects of 
estates monopolising livelihood opportunities in the areas where they establish 
themselves. By becoming a company town, they acquire the power to manage and 
discipline, hire and fire, coerce or reward.  
 
These stories exemplify the many working lives these women and men have had in one 
life. Sometimes these shifts in their work was due to an adverse event in their personal 
life (death of male significant others, Maajigen and Zainab, inability of Maajigen’s 
husband to work led to shifts in gender roles, etc.) or just mundane migrant labour in the 
case of Mbougar who still lives between Touba and the second company’s host village. 
They highlight the financial emancipation they have gained with their work: Zainab and 
Maajigeen, for instance occupy the role of an honorary male borom kër, which is rarer 
for Zainab, then a single woman. Yet, she now faces an uncertain working future due to 
her newly-wed status which means she is under the responsibility of her borom kër. 
Codou manages to combine jobs, and yet limits her paid work to half a day. There is also 
the risk of, once again, falling below the poverty line for women such as Maajigen. 
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Maajigen for instance earns much above the minimum wage, but what will happen to her 
and her family if for any reason she stops working?  
 
It is also worth noting that from the highest earning to the lowest, all the respondents 
invested significant parts of their earnings in their families (children’s education, 17-year-
old son’s wedding, supporting their borom kër, etc). Those who earned higher incomes 
in the fields or the packhouse, such as Boury and Marie, despite being more educated and 
from urban centres, still faced additional though different charges: accommodation, 
maintenance, groceries.    
 
Finally, what seems an essential conclusion of these working oral histories is that they 
illustrate the real extent of the already on-going capitalisation of life which the land rush 
seems to have exacerbated. Exacerbated, because they were ‘hustling’ before the farm to 
earn an income but are now dependent on this horticultural economy for regular income. 
Another striking conclusion is to be found in the ways in which exploitation without 
dispossession (Berry 1993) cohabits almost unexceptionally with continued social 
differentiation between winners and losers of land deals, with some winning an income 
and losing at the same time forest resources for example. 
  
 266 
7.3. Discussing Class, Gender, and Social reproduction 
 
Companies discourses insist on the importance of gender equality and enabling women 
to stay close to their families (therefore insisting on their roles as housewives) to reduce 
“noorani”, the seasonal migration to nearby cities. In doing so, THE SECOND 
COMPANY and SengIndia follow a common pattern in export horticultural production 
perceiving female workers as more docile, more conscientious and with “nimble fingers” 
(Elson and Pearson 1981: 93). During an FGD273 with five of THE FIRST COMPANY’s 
female mid-level managers aged between 24 and 39, they reported having heard one of 
the company senior managers say that “women have a rigor and honesty that men don’t 
have”, most concluding by this that he was a feminist. As argued by Elson and Pearson, 
the process through which women acquire more dexterity and become more docile is not 
natural but the result of training (ibid; Mbilinyi 1986; Whitehead 1979), which results in 
the subordination of women to capitalist patriarchies. 
An urban exodus? 
 
As illustrated by Boury and Marie, there seems to be an inverse migration of young and 
skilled labour from urban areas to rural areas. The reasons for this reverse labour 
migration are, however, diverse. I asked the question: “why have you chosen to work for 
THE FIRST COMPANY?” in an FGD with five female THE FIRST COMPANY 
workers (middle managers)274, aged between 24 and 39. The responses were: “I have 
worked far from where I was from, so wanted to return home”, “my training is in line 
with experience proposed at THE FIRST COMPANY”, “I wanted to work for a company 
with social values”, “I needed a job after my internship”. Despite earning more, they 
seemed to be facing different professional challenges, of having their leadership and skills 
recognised and accepted, especially by their male counterparts. Marie, in particular, 
recognised that “working in the office” is more socially valued and rewarded than being 
“in the fields”, illustrating the social differentiation that also exists “up the ladder”. Three 
of them, the youngest, found it difficult to adapt to the company’s culture: “there is a 
tension between your  qualifications and how you need to approach people in order to do 
and deliver your work objectives”, “ there are too many informal norms you have to adapt 
 
 
274 FGD4 (08/06/2017): 3 permanent and 2 seasonal staff 
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to that were not on the job description”, “ sometimes you are asked to train people, and 
you know they might just become your boss, it has already happened”.  
 
Despite these challenges, they all reported having acquired new skills, though often in the 
hard way because of the high degree of misogyny: “Men workers doubt our capability 
and experience. When I gave directives, they would go to other (male) supervisors to 
confirm the order…”. To counter this, they had developed strategies: “As a woman, you 
have to do twice as much and work harder”. “Be punctual and assiduous, doing additional 
hours so no one doubts your competency. And as a result, you don’t have time, you don’t 
have a private life, I have been trying to have a child with my husband and even the 
engines we drive may and the products we use in the fields may put us at risk”. Marital 
status also mattered in how women were treated: “And when you are single, you raise 
another form of suspicion or are subjected to harassment”. “Even when you smile too 
much, they think they can try their luck with you.” (ibid). As evidenced by several studies, 
female workers indeed face gender specific challenges in horticultural value chains which 
include: 
 
Occupational segregation, low pay, precarious work (casual and informal), poor 
access to maternity rights and childcare, poor education and skills training, long 
working hours combined with significant care responsibilities, discrimination and 
sexual harassment. (Barrientos & Pallangyo 2018: 7). 
 
Sexual harassment and sexism 
 
Three frequently repeated stories in two different farms were told to me. The first was 
that of a Senegalese manager who, despite being married, asked young women from the 
village to visit him in his flat. Women who refused would face “professional punishment” 
later (conversations). A case of attempted rape had also emerged during my research. 
Narratives that “Indians like women” and “they make us advances” have also been 
reported (Immersion at THE THIRD COMPANY275). In all three cases, the accused was 
not from the village in which the farm was located: two were local migrants, one a senior 
 
275  21/11/17 
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member of staff and one a mid-level permanent worker, as well stories about international 
staff”276. for 
Workers combining jobs 
As shown by survey data and discussed in the previous section, many workers such as 
Coudou, Mayram, Satou, Sobel and Mbougar, had several jobs. Most of the second 
company’s host village women work on their husband’s land from December to January. 
At THE SECOND COMPANY, there were also horticultural workers such as 
Mariétou277*, a migrant from another African country, who prepared beignets (fritters) to 
sell during the break, before returning home after work to prepare meals for herself and 
her husband (also a migrant worker).  Mbougar and Sobel’s cases are also compelling, as 
they illustrate urban-rural straddling or how male horticultural workers keep one foot in 
the countryside and one foot in the city to claim land or property or take part in the 
political life of their native villages (Boone 2014: 50) 
Appropriating women and junior horticultural workers’ wages? 
 
Some of the junior men and women (surga) I met gave part of their income to older men 
or reinvested it in the household. The oldest son of the Wolof family with whom I stayed 
(and this was also true for some of his friends I observed) was pressured by his parents to 
earn an income and support the family. Having worked at THE SECOND COMPANY 
for over six years, he wished he could leave the farm and do something else.  He resigned 
twice but his father always found a way to get him to agree to resume work because his 
income was valuable to the family. This policing to respect the patriarchal contract is in 
line with Diop’s analysis of the social status of single junior men in the Waalo, and the 
difficulty for them to become autonomous because they still rely on the head of 
household’s daily dépense meals and accommodation (Diop 1985: 170-171). Control 
over the labour of others was key to patriarchal power and authority in traditional 
agricultural societies (Linares 1992; O’Laughlin 2001; Sender and Smith1986: 39; Sow 
1992; Tsikata 2016; Whitehead 2001,).   
 
276 I, too, was subjected to advances twice, first by a senior member of staff and secondly a worker I had 
frequent discussions with, and who started visiting me where I lived. As Neveu-Kringelbach (2016) states 




For the borom kër and older men who overtly demanded a financial contribution from 
junior surga, and more covertly from their working wives, success was measured by the 
size of the house and land, the number of wives, household and agricultural equipment, 
quality of meals and means of transportation.   
 
Older women also re-invested part of their earnings in the household. During interview, 
most of the married women said it was important to use the money to “please their 
husband” (DW22)278 (which has deep roots in how girls and women are socialised in 
Senegal) and take care of their children’s education and food. The rest of the money went 
to equipping their room, taking part in the women’s tontine (natt), and re-investing in 
their other parallel socio-economic activities, mostly of social redistribution during 
ceremonies (Diop 1985). How women and young men’s money was spent sometimes 
created tensions with the borom kër, causing women to surrender control over their 
earnings - another way to “re-instate the male breadwinner” (Kabeer 1997: 277). 
 
The above highlights the need to pay closer attention to intra-household dynamics and 
livelihood strategies, as well as the impacts of agricultural commodification, to 
understand women’s increased participation in irrigation agriculture in the Delta and 
River Valley Region (Nation 2009). Indeed, feminist scholars such as Johnston (1997: 
219) have suggested that participation in wage labour cannot be analysed purely “in 
relationship to "the household", but must consider “the historical, social and cultural 
relationship forces that determine gendered production”.  
Dilemmas in Women’s work and patriarchal (conjugal) contracts 
 
Participation in labour markets and domestic labour is shaped by complex social relations. 
Most women interviewed highlighted that working hours at horticultural farms are 
incompatible with their domestic duties. This interview with a 34-year married woman 
ascertains this: “If you are a single woman, it can work. My husband refused to let me 




old enough, I will return to work at THE SECOND COMPANY”279. DW13280, 27, said 
that her husband did not like her working hours, but he let her work because she 
interrupted her studies for him. When I met with her four months later, she was pregnant 
and had stopped working at THE SECOND COMPANY. This contrasts with the findings 
of a previous study in Mozambique whereby a large proportion of women labourers were 
divorced or widowed, suggesting that their labour market participation was facilitated or 
pushed by the breakdown in conjugal ties and the absence of patriarchal control (Oya and 
Sender 2009). The lower divorce rate in rural Senegal can be explained by socio-cultural 
norms281 (Diop 1985: 210), which confirms that female workers feared or experienced 
being refused wage work by their male partners (Sender et al. 2006).   
 
Even the language used suggested working outside was still not socially accepted: “I help 
on my husband’s farm, but I also “steal time282” to work at the company a few days.” 
(Interview DW24283, THE SECOND COMPANY Worker). This substantiates previous 
studies in Bangladesh considering women’s income as “a supplement, a form of helping 
out” (Kabeer 1997: 273). Another female THE SECOND COMPANY worker told me in 
a resigned tone, “But what can we do? One with family responsibilities cannot complain.” 
(Interview DW1284). This illustrates the tension between working for wages and taking 
part in “family labour” or helping neighbours as used to be the case in the Saloum and 
the Gambia. Indeed, collective groups of workers sometimes called “santaane” were set 
up to provide farming labour for other group members without salary, though food and 
drinks were provided (Fall 2011: 46).  This tension has been well described as one 
between profit-making or caring for others (Li 2014: 8) 
 
My interviews with their male family members also suggest they were not very happy 
with the working hours, and some suggested it did not reduce their expenses: “I still give 
her 250 FCFA for breakfast and 250FCFA for the tea285”). Even the THE FIRST 
 
279 Conversation with a THE SECOND COMPANY former worker 22/05/2017 
280 23/07/ 2017 
281 Because” it is easier t get married than get divorced” (Diop 1985:210) 
282 sacce 
283 28/10/2017 
284 02/05/2017 “Borom njaboot xamuli jambatt” 
285 Ataya, the local tea is very respected in Waalo and women, even when they worked, needed to be 
home in time to prepare tea for their husband and his friends. 
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COMPANY night bus driver confirmed issues of trust between husbands and wives due 
to the working hours as he testifies with the change in working hours: 
When we wanted to change the organization of work to put 2 because until 15h 
and 15h and 23h, it was very difficult and we had to raise the awareness of 
husbands. Similarly, for the night harvest shift starting at 3am, we have to collect 
and bring back everyone to work. I was told by the leadership to wait until the 
head of the family had confirmed that the woman has returned. (Interview SW21, 
16/06/2017) 
 
This illustrates how paternalist companies also complied with patriarchal rules in order, 
once again, not to jeopardise their housewives-workers labour participation. 
 
This situation leads female workers to seek the help of relatives or neighbours to be able 
to participate in wage labour as illustrated by the case of the 29-year-old divorced female 
worker who resorted to paying a family member to look after her daughter so she could 
work at the farm (Interview DW6)286. Consequently, other women are increasingly 
involved in domestic chores, as well as husbands and older men, showing how women’s 
social reproduction activities still shape their participation in the labour market in these 
areas. This substantiates previous studies, suggesting that, in order to combine wage and 
domestic labour, women reorganise the burden of domestic labour by sharing it with other 
(mostly female) family members including daughters or co-wives or neighbours (Gadio 
et al. 1999; Mackintosh 1989: 79; Nation 1997). Again, this illustrates that women and 
children bear the brunt of the absence of public services of childcare. Despite the 
supposed existence of 28 publicly funded Case des touts-petits287, the state-funded early 
childhood programme in Saint-Louis (ANSD 2015:28), there were none in the areas of 
research288. Only THE SECOND COMPANY’s private nursery existed around the 
second company’s host village and incorporated only a few children from the village (25 
on the day I visited). In the areas next to THE FIRST COMPANY, there were far more 
private nurseries289 as it was less rural than the second and third company’s host villages. 
 
286 10/05/2017 
287 These were launched in 2000 and were supposed to welcome 0-6years. 
288 The same study distinguishes the Cases des tous-petits with other publicly funded childcare 
programmes, the number of which was 0 in 2015 against 52 private ones (ANSD 2015:29) 
289 For instance, there was the nursery of the University Gaston Berger (for staff and students), where I 




Markets -as- a road to emancipation or markets-for continued 
exploitation ? 
 
Expenses are increasingly shared within the family, adding to women’s bargaining power. 
This economic pressure on men to be the male breadwinner, responsible for providing 
dépense, encourages them to approve women’s (mostly wives’) participation in rural 
wage labour. A 23-year-old THE FIRST COMPANY worker from Saint-Louis confirmed 
this:   
Before THE FIRST COMPANY, I was staying at home, penniless, waiting for my 
husband who lives in Dakar to send me money. And I could not ask my aunt whom 
I stay with. Now even if he does not send me money, I cover my own expenses. 
When he was marrying me, he did not want me to work, but now that I am helping 
him, he cannot tell me anything (Interview SW18, 19/06/2017).   
 
This increase in women’s bargaining power due to their “perceived contribution” (Kabeer 
1997: 272) confirms partially the empowerment and poverty reduction potential of 
employment in horticulture (Doss 2013; Maertens and Swinnens 2012,). Yet, this might 
also reflect distress participation in wage employment as studies have shown, explaining 
why women accept lower wages in off-farm employment: “where the income potential 
of their own production is low, where the income generating opportunities off farm are 
few, or give low returns to labour, and where there is urgent need” (Whitehead and 
Kabeer 2001: 16). This is illustrated by this interview (SW12)290 with a 23-year-old 
seasonal THE FIRST COMPANY worker sorting potatoes and butternuts. She ‘dropped 
out’ of seconday school in 2013 because she became pregnant after marriage. She was 
obliged to find a job because her husband has a serious condition and couldn’t work, and 
she lived with her son and husband’s family. She started as a day-worker in another 
horticultural farm, in 2015, then at THE FIRST COMPANY as a day-worker. While the 
job allowed her to cover her and her son’s expenses, help her husband and her own 
parents, she claimed it was still difficult for her to make ends meet. Therefore, she was 




a housewife, embedded in a complex set of redistributive social relations, she became 
dependent on wage labour. 
 
Indeed as illustrated above in the section on multiple occupations and care work, women’s 
work also defines their womanhood – on which depends them being perceived as “good” 
women or mothers serving the male head of household (borom kër) or master of the food 
(borom njël) (Diop 1981, 1985). This is summed up by popular expressions of “mën sa 
kër”, “jonge” (Biaya 2001) and “Mokk pooj” (Gilbert 2019), all referring to women’s art 
of pleasing one’s husband and family. Based on their patriarchal conjugal contract, 
women are socially praised and empowered as “good women” or blamed and socially 
“disempowered” as “bad women” or “bitches” (Mies 2014: 120-125; Perry 2005: 217). 
In addition, women do not always equate these relations to their subjugation by/to men 
(Linares 1991) as “labour effort in terms of being part of a natural order to ensure 
adequate food production and basic survival of their dependents and themselves”. For 
Bryceson, this has more to do with “force of habit, rather than male coercion” and is part 
of the social division of labour (Bryceson 1995: 14). Colonial administrations contributed 
to shaping the gendered division of labour, involving mainly male labour in the extraction 
of raw materials and promoting agricultural commodity production. This gendered 
division of labour increased with the conversion of land from food to cash crops in the 
Gambia, for example (Carney and Whatts 1991). It was during the 1960s that additional 
forms of associative labour organised along gender, age or social status or residential 
criteria emerged in Senegal’s Lower Casamance (Linares 1991: 132). But very quickly, 
individual labour became more common than collective working groups.  
 
This tension between the empowering potential of work and its alienating dimensions has 
been central to Mies’ concept of “housewifisation” (1986)291. Employers, the new 
paternalistic father figure, deliberately use a new form of “housewifisation”, not to 
exclude women from wage work but to subordinate them to it. In doing so, capitalist 
patriarchies transpose the values of the family to that of the firm, “the second family”, 
 
291 It described how in the 19th century Scottish lace makers taught poor Southern Indian women to make 
lace in their homes only for the final product to be sold in Western markets (Europe, Australia and the US). 
The industry used the labour-power of women as piece workers in the domestic sphere for free, thus 
enabling industry to accumulate more capital. I propose with Mies (2014) that “housewifisation” has 
extended its domain from the household to the company town using private paternalism to make the firm 
resemble a household. 
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which is built on values of “trust” and “co-development”. Capitalist-patriarchy pretends 
to concentrate its efforts on “leaving no one behind” as per the new development zeitgeist 
of “inclusivity”.  The problem, I argue here, is not one of women being excluded from 
labour as in 19th century Scotland, but rather of the ways in which capitalism includes 
them (Mies 2014: 116-117), or “adversely incorporates” them (Du Toit 2004; Hall 2011; 
McCarthy 2010) and exploits their labour without formally dispossessing them (at least 
just a few of them), while not ascribing the correct value to their labour, a value that 
would be at least equivalent to the price the product of their labour is sold at in Tesco or 
Waitrose. 
 
This reflects the ways in which patriarchy-capitalism extends its paternalism to villages 
though CSR, making workers dependent on wages in the horticultural commodity chain, 
and leading female workers (on whose labour power the capitalist system’s survival 
depends) to perceive themselves first as housewives and accessorily as workers. In doing 
so, the companies undermine female workers’ class consciousness and minimise their 
power to organise from a class in itself to a class for itself.  
Un-disciplining and renegotiating wage work conditions 
 
The disciplining of women workers is nothing new in Senegal (Baglioni 2018; 
Mackintosh 1989), Tanzania (Mbilinyi 1986, 2016), or even Kenya (Dolan 2001). Female 
wage workers are asked to conform to paternalistic rules in the workplace: “do not sit 
down”, “do not talk”, “the way you tied the onion is not good, re-do it”. Agricultural 
companies create standards and rules for the “good” female worker the same way the 
patriarchal conjugal contract ask them to humble themselves. With their allegedly nimble 
fingers, female workers are asked to deliver “fresh” against a wage.  
 
Despite all this disciplining, women find ways to renegotiate their working 
hours/conditions whenever possible. Observation and total immersion allowed me to 
grasp how female workers would deploy an arsenal of strategies to counter their rigid 
disciplining using everyday form of resistance (Scott 1985), as illustrated in the following 
examples. Some young mothers who were not allowed to bring their breastfeeding baby 
to the fields, as young children were not allowed in the farms, would either go home 
during the break or have a family member bring their child to the company gate to be fed. 
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Furthermore, some female workers, especially those in conjugal monogamous relations 
and young mothers, began shaping their work hours to accommodate their productive and 
social reproductive duties. This was especially the case if it was their turn to prepare the 
family meal (njël). They would invariably go missing during their break which led the 
management at THE SECOND COMPANY to comment that “workers lack the basic 
notions of the culture of enterprise” (Interview SMP2292). As a response, supervisors 
started to be more flexible to keep their labour force, yet still pretending these were 
“exceptional favours” to workers. This highlights the use of corporate paternalism and 
patriarchies to control, discipline, and punish293 labour. The above examples ascertain the 
centrality of negotiability in labour relations, especially when workers resort to subtle and 
hidden weapons of the weak to force the management to officially accommodate their 





The main objective of this section was to explain the social relations of labour in the rural 
horticultural economy. The evidence presented implies that patriarchal norms in Senegal, 
at least in this region, do not militate against women’s labour market participation, rather 
they may even encourage it. Nonetheless, women’s social reproductive burden and 
marital status still shapes participation in labour markets. There is a tension between 
compulsion to work for economic reasons and the empowerment and emancipatory 
potential of being a working woman, illustrating the tension between market- as-
opportunity to market- as-compulsion (Brenner 2002). This could mean a greater 
autonomy for these women or on the contrary, their significant others: fathers, husbands 
or other male relatives consider this as a normal aspect of the household division of 
labour. While this can be an outcome of the so-called crisis of masculinity (Perry 2005), 
or just an evolution towards greater gender equality, this mutually co-exists with the crisis 
of social reproduction itself, not least a crisis of care (Fraser 2017). In any case, the above 
has shown that more women are earning cash in plantations - as long as this doesn’t 
 
292 26/10/17 
293 Through salary cuts, or suspensions from the farm. 
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compromise their basic reproductive activities and they contribute in household expenses 
- which increases their market dependence. 
 
Therefore, while not undermining the transformative effects of participation in 
agricultural wage labour, this discussion’s main purpose was to highlight a central 
contradiction and uncover labour management systems and technologies (in a 
Foucauldian sense) to make women’s work worth less, while subjugating further to 
markets. How do we make these expanding markets fairer to women who are its reserve 




UNPACKING OUTCOMES (2): SOCIAL 
DIFFERENTIATION FROM ABOVE (CLASSES OF 
CAPITAL)  
 
It is urgent to analyse the multiple kind of other capitals generated by investments in 
horticulture. In the land grab literature, one of the main key questions Oya (2013b) has 
raised is whether the land rush reflects a ‘return’ to the agrarian question of capital, in the 
sense of a renewed interest in the development of capitalist agriculture as an aspect of 
broader capitalist development. This leads to empirical questions on whether the land 
rush has accelerated agrarian change, which would actually still represent a rather slow 
and short parenthesis in the long history of Waalo and Kajoor. That constitutes the focus 
of this section.  
 
7.4.  Querying “emerging” classes of capital 
 
 
Analysing the nexus between labour exploitation and surplus appropriation in relation to 
production has been proposed as a method for understanding class formation. Patnaik 
(1976)294, for instance, rejected farm size as a basis of analysis and constructed a labour-
exploitation index by classifying peasant households into class groups reflecting the 
relations of production, hence of economic strength. This allowed her to identify six class 
categories in Haryana, South Asia (1987). Patnaik’s intuition was followed by other 
political economists (e.g. Akram Lodhi 1993; Deere and de Janvry 1979).  However, 
Oya’s (2001, 2002, 2007) studies in the Senegalese Groundnut Basin are more relevant 
to our query, as he was able to classify large and middle scale farmers into groupings of 
non-capitalist farmers, semi-capitalist farmers and capitalist farmers. Through the 
construction of “heuristic devices”, he complemented the two criteria mostly used by 
 
294 Following the steps of Lenin (1964) and his three indices: i) ownership of land and other means of 
production, ii) basis of production dependent on type of labour hiring, and iii) farm’s ability to generate a 
sufficient surplus for satisfying consumption requirements, investment and depreciation (Lenin 1968) – 
see also Kautsky 1987.  
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historical materialists: “(i) the nature of labour appropriation, that is, forms of labour 
mobilisation and labour surplus appropriation, and (ii) the degree of reliance on their own 
means of production (including land) as opposed to labour-power.”  (Oya 2002, Oya 
2004: 303–304) with the degree of capitalisation, education and wealth and distribution 
of possessions (2001: 132). This method allowed him to reveal dynamics of class 
formation and patterns of accumulation “from below” or “from above” by paying 
attention to the ways in which land is acquired, labour mobilised, and capital accumulated 
(ibid.). Considering this, I set to analyse these new classes of capital. 
 
The data presented in this section was purposively was purposively collected from the 
survey and semi-structured interviews by targeting those who declared to be capitalists, 
had land and other productive assets, hired surplus labour in addition to exploiting family 
labour, had a replacement fund to grow their business, invested in their children’s 
education (for those who had children). Those who met the above criteria from the survey 
and semi-structured interviews. It reveals the following socio-demographics of the 18 
respondents: 80% of the potential “rural capitalists” were in polygynous relationships and 
83% were over 40 years of age. 77% had on average 5.7 children who were in one way 
or another involved in their businesses, as well as their spouses. Seven out of the 18 had 
attended school, four reaching high school level and at least three with a university 
degree.  
 
Table 30: Rural accumulators’ marital status n=15 
StatMat Freq. Percent Cum. 
Married 2 13% 13% 
Poly 12 80% 93% 
Single 1 7% 100% 
Total 15 100%  
Source: Semi-structured interviews and survey 
Questioning who employs migrant labour can allow us to uncover different classes of 
capital. As Ba (1996a: 27) suggests, “In the Valley, the question is not why migrants 
leave but why the non-migrants stay”. The above table shows that on average, 11 of the 
15 capitalists (73%) had employed six workers. 64% of these rural capitalists had at 






Table 31: Rural accumulators’ labour hiring (of non-family-members) n=11 
 
Workers Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 1 9% 9% 
2 2 18% 27% 
3 1 9% 36% 
5 3 27% 64% 
9 1 9% 73% 
10 1 9% 82% 
17 1 9% 91% 
20 1 9% 100% 
Total 11 100%  
Source: Semi-structured interviews and workers’ survey 
 
This suggests that the majority of respondents are examples of small-scale rural 
accumulators. The middle-larger scale ones being those who were already capitalist 
before the rush, but who had gone stronger by diversifying their portfolio and seizing 
market opportunities arising for agricultural investments. In order to grow their business, 
they needed surplus labour. However, labour hiring is not all that matters: we know with 
Oya (2013b) that the degree and level of capitalisation matters, as well as type of crop, 
use of land, agro-ecological context. Most of the respondents were growing FFVs and 
some of them were engaged in ‘side’ activities. 
7.5.   “Emerging” and “old” classes of capital: A 
selection of oral histories 
 
I conducted interviews with “newer” entrepreneurs and owners of businesses that 
emerged after the deal and “older” ones who were already capitalists before the rush but 
who had had new expansion opportunities as entrepreneurs. The oral histories of these 
individuals with characteristics of petty-commodity producers/capitalists are presented 
below. While the list of interviews is attached, some of the capitalists were interviewed 
in other qualities (community leader, politician, worker), but further purposive analysis 
of survey and semi-structured interview data allowed us to also identify 18 of them as 
rural accumulators as well. 
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1.Ifra*295: In the host village of the first company’s first site, most of the new businesses 
installed nearby belonged to this 39-year old polygamous Pulaar entrepreneur. Ifra 
stopped school at primary level and did vocational training in transport for five years 
before obtaining a license in 1998 to drive in Saint-Louis. At the same time, Ifra cultivated 
rice in his family farms before working at THE FIRST COMPANY. With the company’s 
arrival, he noticed there was a need for such services and saw it as a new business 
opportunity.  After a few months, THE FIRST COMPANY acted as a guarantor for him 
to obtain a bank loan to open his businesses. Ifra had provided transportation services to 
THE FIRST COMPANY since 2006. He started with one car but now owned five. He 
had a fixed-term service-provider contract with THE FIRST COMPANY, renewed every 
year, to provide day and night transport collecting workers from the neighbouring villages 
between Saint-Louis and THE FIRST COMPANY’s headquarters. The day shifts were 
from 05.30-15:30 and the night shifts ended at around midnight, sometimes his cars also 
transported workers to the farm as early as 3 or 4 am for the harvest. He had built a 
boutique providing groceries as well as money transfer services and hot food. Ifra owned 
agricultural land and had over 20 workers across his businesses some of whom were 
living in his house. He told me that he wishes to open a cattle breeding business. For him, 
THE FIRST COMPANY has had only positive impact on the host villagefrom favoured 
economic in-migration, job creation to real-estate including renting. This is exemplified 
by the many accommodation services that were now flourishing, especially those of the 
Mayor. With a happy smile on his face, Ifra profusely thanked THE FIRST COMPANY’s 
director for trusting him and concluding: “Long live THE FIRST COMPANY!” at the 
end of our interview. 
  
  
Photo 26: Ifra’s buses in front of THE FIRST COMPANY. June 2017. 











Photo 27: Ifra’s businesses: a grocery shop296 which also offers money sending 
services, and his restaurants. June 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
 
2. Hamidou*: In Saint-Louis where THE SECOND COMPANY is located, transport 
is a lucrative business. Hamidou is a 67-year entrepreneur with three wives and 16 or 17 
children (he could not remember clearly). He is also an entrepreneur and one of the 
traditional leaders of the area. He was the first Pulaar in the region to work on market-
gardening, 32 years ago, while pretty much everyone else was focusing on cattle-
breeding. He inspired many, Wolof and Pulaar, to follow his ideas. He said that when he 
started, lands were abundant in Waalo, and no one needed land titles. Especially in his 
Pulaar culture, no one owned land, or practiced “goormoom297”. Land was transmitted 
from father to son (his family was part of the Pulaar nobility). According to him, it was 
with the arrival of the communauté rurale (of which he is a former member) that land 
issues started as they became the only ones able to give land rights. He deplores that there 
are now people who don’t live in the village, who sometime manage to have land, though 
residency is one of the main criteria to obtain land. His fields are near the lake and he 
used to cultivate between 3 or 10 hectares each year. At the time of interview, he owned 
cattle, cars, land and an estate, his three cars were “placed” at the company and managed 
by his sons. He paid his three drivers 50,000-80,000 FCFA francs per month. He also had 
three migrant workers. His older son and wives helped him on the family farm when they 
did not work at THE FIRST COMPANY. Thanks to the deal with THE SECOND 
COMPANY and *, he said he can now achieve the vision he had had for agriculture for 
decades.  
 
3. Alan*298 Still in Saint-Louis, an interesting accumulator straddling across businesses 
sectors swas a businessman previously involved in setting-up THE SECOND 
COMPANY. He started his small private cattle-breeding business while working for THE 
SECOND COMPANY, feeding the cattle some of the leftover crops. At the end of 2017, 
he sold his THE SECOND COMPANY shares and other shares he owned in Southern 
Africa-based companies, to set up a new firm. This company has been established with 
South African investors on 10.5ha allocated to him by the Communauté Rurale. At the 
 
296 Boutique 
297 Cleared with the axe as explained in chapter 5. 
298 26/10/2017 
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time of research, he was producing animal feed, meat and processing milk. To date, he 
has imported 400 animals (sheep, goats, cattle, milking cows, poultry and pigs) from 
Southern Africa to Senegal. He said he uses private vets for “state of the art vets” artificial 
insemination and embryo transplantation procedures. 
Alan had also signed a partnership with THE SECOND COMPANY to feed his cattle 
with THE SECOND COMPANY’s crops, and for him to produce compost to grow better 
crops at THE SECOND COMPANY. He was discussing opportunities with political 
leaders and religious families to contribute to the Emerging Senegal Plan. 
 
 
Photo 28: Animals from Alan’s farm (source, Facebook page of the farm) Accessed 
December 2017 
 
4.Moda*: In the host village of the second farm, there were two young part-time 
university students working part-time as labourers. Both aged below 30, they resembled 
the “farmer-scholars” studied by Polly Hill (1963) in Ghana. Both had inherited land and 
one was engaged in “bokk bay”, a partnership which brings together the means of 
production including land and labour (a variant of sharecropping). The other was on his 
own. They were both members of families who had once worked at THE SECOND 
COMPANY but did not agree to the land deal. Here is the story of Moda, one of the two 
farmer-scholars. 
 
Moda was born in 1991, but according to his official documents he was born in 1993. He 
told me he had been financially independent since 2016. During fieldwork, he was living 
lived between his village and Dakar to accommodate both his studies and farming 
activities.  He defined himself as “a learner and a farmer”. From October to November, 
he was in the fields, in January and September, he returned to Dakar where he was 
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finishing his second year of a Master’s Degree. His plot was bequeathed to him by his 
father and everyone in the family cultivated their share.  
 
Moda told me that he finds combining both activities” hard but interesting” and it has not 
been a drag on his studies. Moda had hired a migrant worker for his field and his brother 
also “kept an eye on his plot”. His brother was the one who was supervising and paying 
the workers on his behalf. He was paying for his own school fees because his father was 
no longer alive. According to him, other young and unmarried people his age had 
problems accessing land. He found a loan at the Agricultural Bank (CNCA) and paid 
everything himself (fertiliser, diesel). He had also partnered with someone who has a 
tractor for its use (20,000 or 45,000 FCFA per ha), and had hired labourers as well as 
women for the period of planting (approximately 30) and men to cultivate. He was paying 
women approximately 1,500 FCFA per head, six male day workers he payid for “cap” 
(digging holes for cuttings) approximately 2,500 FCFA per person. He was working with 
about 40 labourers per year per hectare, selling his produce in loumos and the final market 
destination is Thiaroye in Dakar. He did not sell it himself but gave it to the baana baana 
traders, paying them a commission. He did not keep any share of what he cultivated for 
his own consumption. 
 
5. Satou299*, a 33-year woman, worked as a street vendor selling fabrics in Dakar for 5 
years before joining THE SECOND COMPANY. She decided to return to her village 
when she heard the farm was opening and started selling food to the workers. She was 
then recruited by THE SECOND COMPANY who wanted its own workers for the 
canteen whom they would train to meet health standards of preparing food. Satou was 
soon hired to manage the company canteen after satisfactory evaluation by the farm 
management. At the time of research, she was earning over 200,000 FCfA per month. 
Thanks to working at THE SECOND COMPANY for the past 7 years, Satou was able to 
open her own shop in her native village where she was living with her husband’s family. 
She was also part of a tontine (natt), re-investing her money in her business and was able 
to contribute financially and “help her husband” with the household expenses. Therefore, 
she had moved from a very uncertain and exploitative form of informal work to a more 




children since she was not able to have one of her own. Satou married at 20 and came to 
settle at her husband’s village, yet she has had to travel to Mauritania or Dakar to earn a 
living returned to the village when the farm opened. She told me that she prefers her life 
after THE SECOND COMPANY because her own mother was obliged to migrate for 
work. 
 
6. Faty300*, a 45-year-old woman from a pastoralist community, was one of the food 
sellers occupying one of the shelters established four years ago around The Third 
Company. When she was 17, she lost her first husband whom she married at 13. She then 
remarried to her late husband’s brother with whom she had a 17-year-old son. Faty was 
due to travel to another region to bring back her son’s 10-year-old future wife.  Since this 
project requires money, she planned, in addition to her work, to offer her labour in the 
neighbouring potato fields (so she could sell the remaining potato she would be offered 
or that was thrown away - gasaanu) or work on collecting the Gawe in order to sell it to 
women who use it to perfume their rooms. During the farming season, Fatima has a shop 
(see picture) in which she prepares and sells breakfast and lunch to farm workers on 
credit. Everything was carefully noted in her notebook, and she was paid every fortnight, 
allowing her to repay her debts. It was her own business. She would wake up at around 
6am to walk 7-8km to the market of the main village where she would buy (sometimes 
on credit) fish and the other things she needed. Then from 9am she would start cooking 
and selling breakfast followed by lunch. She would sell each dish for 500 FCFA and half 
the dish for 250 FCFA, allowing her to have around 25000 FCFA every fortnight that to 
re-invest in her business for the next fortnight. Before The Third Company came, Faty* 
claimed she had a forest and a small garden that she and her village could use for grazing 
cattle and her own family needs. With The Third Company, she could choose her working 
hours and have a regular income. 
 
7. Mayram301*: Faty’s 36-year neighbour, had a similar story. She had three children 
and was working in her restaurant with her 15-year-old daughter, also married. In addition 
to the restaurant, they also sold tea, dried beans, tomato and sugar. When she finished 





at the village at 4pm, she would gather the cattle and collect the milk for family use. She 
complained they no longer have enough milk to re-sell since the cattle no longer have 
green pastures. Despite having a relatively regular income, Mayram said she prefers her 
previous livelihood, because she has more work now, walks long distances and this has 
an impact on her well-being. She still has a lot of debts. 
 
8. Haby302* was from the same village. She sold condiments and vegetables, niebe, 
tamarin, salt, spice cubes, butternut, aubergines, sorel, onions, chilies and dried fish 
(picture). As her restaurant was still under construction, a relative was hosting her in her 









Photo 30: Mayram & her daughter in their restaurant with Haby’s condiments, near 
The Third Company. November 2017. (Photograph by researcher) 
 
 




9. Mayécor303*: In the village hosting The Third Company, a 53-year-old producer of 
market-gardening confided in me that, in 2008, the company came and enclosed his lands 
situated towards the canal while he was working on them. He had held 10ha since 1988 
but was now working on 5ha because of The Third Company’s actions. When he tried to 
stop them, the sous-prefet called him on the phone of one of the company’s employees 
(the manager of the farm) to tell him their installation was legal. He said he tried to talk 
with the director of the company, who refused to meet him. The sous-prefet told him to 
write a letter copying the mayor and The Third Company, but the company refused to 
take the letter. The mayor asked the company to leave his land as he was “family”, but 
the companies director said they had a lease. What bothers Mayécor most is that they 
were using forceful methods. “Because of them (big horticultural firms), all of us (petty 
commodity producers) face labour shortage”. There is another type of competition both 
for wage labour and access to water. He testified, “My fellow commodity producers and 
I are forced i) either sell the land at a price that is not convenient for us or ii) wait until 
the company decides it can dig the canal it promised for us to access water. I have nothing 
against the Indians coming to work in Senegal, or even near my fields, what I think is my 
right to refuse, is being forcefully dispossessed of my land against a ridiculous 
compensation (700000 FCFA). But I can appreciate it is in the interest of the village to 
have such an opportunity to have regular wages.” 
 





Photo 33: A view of The Third Company from Mayécor’s plot. November 2017. 
(Photograph by researcher) 
 
7.6. Profiling emerging capitalists 
 
Self-employed entrepreneurs like Faty and Mayram acknowledged that providing food to 
the workers allowed them a sustainable and quite decent income compared to the 
minimum wage on the farms.  As members of pastoralist groups who used to benefit from 
land and forest resources, as well as the milk they used to collect from the cattle, they 
mentioned the loss of forest resources and the health repercussions of having to combine 
their professional activities and their reproductive roles. Indeed, previous studies have 
shown that land deals are gender-blind and seldom consider the fact that pastoral lands 
have diverse use and meanings for their owners (Traore 2002). They have also shown a 
tendency to view pastoralists as male contributes to the erasure of women’s domestic 
work in cattle herding (Mathieu et al. in Crousse et al 1986: 236; Verma 2014). Even the 
enclosure of land for corporate activities was not totally understood by pastoralists and 
this was the reason why pastoralists around THE FIRST COMPANY had negotiated for 
their cattle to still have a route through the company, thereby illustrating the need to stray 
fields and stray livestock for such purposes (Traore 2002:151). 
 
These women were embedded in the capitalisation of life and the marketisation of 
activities they would normally do in their houses such as cooking.  However, cooking “as 
work” interferes with cooking as “marriage” and other care activities such as childcare 
(Clark 1994: 344-357). Therefore, these food retailers had to rely on family members help 
to combine both as we have seen in previous sections (Nation 2004), and family members 
who relied on their work were also obliged to find alternatives such as migrant labour. 
Faty’s opportunity to sell food allowed her to have access to credit. Work, for her, took 
different changing forms and fit different purposes throughout the year. She was 
combining jobs for a specific project: gathering enough money for her son’s wedding. 
Interestingly, that solidarity still cohabits with the capitalisation of life between these 
Pulaar women is also illustrated by Haby being hosted by a relative in their own shop. 
Maryam for instance, did not call “work” what she did after 4 pm: she considered this to 
be her duty. Yet, was  itmaternal altruism (Kabeer 1994: 95) that was reflected in her and 
Faty’s performance of these tasks? Faty can be considered a semi-capitalist re-investing 
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her profit into developing her business (replacement fund) and using the rest of her 
income as consumption and ceremonial funds (Bernstein 2010:18, Oya 2002, 2004; Wolf 
1966). Maryam is perhaps more of a non-capitalist entrepreneur still at risk of falling 
below the poverty line again as she is still paying her debts despite earning an income. 
The above shows that accumulation of wealth is not accumulation of capital, as the later 
implied a change in social relations of property (Marx, 1976). It also shows us that not all 
old and new entrepreneurs are also capitalists, some may just be seizing market or 
business opportunities created by agricultural land deals.   
 
Capital as a social relation, is well illustrated in the case of Ifra, Satou, and Hamidou who 
had benefitted from the land rush. This illustrates the fact that the arrival of investors in 
the horticultural sector reconfigures horticultural labour markets and their surroundings 
through a variety of indirect304 and induced305 jobs. Indeed, there are important linkages 
between the wage bill generated by a large capitalist farm such as THE SECOND 
COMPANY, THE FIRST COMPANY or The Third Company in a location and the 
consumption patterns and demand for new services in that location. These three oral 
histories have shown how the emergence of small capitalist businesses such as 
restaurants, transportation, grocery shops, money transfer services flourish to respond to 
the needs of the companies and their workers constitute an important outcome of the 
arrival of (foreign-owned) agribusinesses. This also casts some doubt on the emphasis on 
CSR initiatives by corporate management as their key contributions to the “community”.  
 
Another key question which emerges from these three oral histories is that of the capital 
and the capitalists themselves. Hamidou, clearly from the Toroodo nobility, and had 
inherited plentiful land from his family and so had Ifra. However, the first was already 
established and used the revenues from his agricultural farms to diversify and capitalise 
further by seizing a market, opportunities and taking a “long view” (Hill 1963, 1970). 
Alan’s trajectory combines a bit of both: having been instrumental in the setting up of 
THE SECOND COMPANY in Senegal, he decided to take a longer view and risks selling 
his shares at THE SECOND COMPANY and seize the opportunity to go full-time in 
developing his cattle-breeding business when he was sure it became viable. As for Satou, 
 
304 As a result of direct/indirect employee's spending money 
305 i.e. not direct employment by the company 
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she chose the merchant path and claims she earns at least as much from her business than 
from her work and was able to hire staff to look after her other business. This further 
substantiates Oya’s (2013b) suggestion that “different trajectories of transition and 
accumulation, from ‘above’ or ‘below’, may be evolving in different directions during 
the current ‘land rush’”. 
 
Social networks also played a key role as exemplified by the cases of Alan, Hamidou and 
Ifra who had a very good understanding of the national political economy. Similarly, 
Satou had a very good knowledge of her market and took fewer risks, as only giving 
credit to clients she knew well, or who had a regular income. Her husband was also a 
well-connected man. Therefore, while some of these activities are new, they also insert 
themselves into existing sets of socio-political and economic relations and contribute to 
social differentiation from above. As previous studies have shown, there is a close 
connection between political, social and economic accumulation in Senegal. Political, 
economic and traditional powers interests do intersect (Barry 1979, 2012; Berry 1993: 
67; Boone 1992; Diagne 1967; Dahou 2005; Diop 1981, 1985, 2013a, 2013b; Oya 2002, 
2004). Even Moda, our struggling farmer/scholar, also took the long view and used his 
family and relatives to access sharecropping and surplus labour when needed, which 
allowed him to further his studies and rest assured his fields were being looked after. 
 
Not all aspiring capitalists were successful, or had access to such networks, as is the case 
of Mayécor. The petty-commodity producer had difficulties pursuing his capitalist 
accumulation ventures since The Third Company used extra-economic means of coercion 
(political networks) to enclose half of his land. His accumulation story was interrupted 
by a company town who needed more land but not his labour.   
 
The evidence presented above shows that increasing social differentiation is taking place 
as a direct outcome of land deals. More generally, four categories of accumulators 
emerge: 
 
The first is a segment of the local elite (such as Hamidou and Ifra) and foreign private 
capital (such as Alan) exploiting new business opportunities. This category’s initial 
capital was accumulated on the basis of land they inherited/bought but was no longer only 
accumulating based on land since they no longer hold significant portions of it either 
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because they sold it to agricultural investors or because of land scarcity and economic 
diversification. However, they still mobilised family and non-family resident surplus 
labour at higher costs than the other petty commodity producers. Mobilising family 
networks has been a common pattern for rural capitalists (Berry 1975, 1985,1993; Diop 
1985: 153-174; Hill 1961; Oya 2002-2004). Most of them were in polygamous conjugal 
relationship, which attests to them being financially better-off, and also invested a lot in 
the education of their children. One of the capitalists interviewed, who had two male 
children at the University of Dakar and four others living with siblings in the 
neighbouring village to attend high school, told me, “I believe in my children’s education: 
I am not playing with it and prefer to recruit labour than taking the younger ones out of 
school (Interview, CLC1)306.”  His older sons returned to the village during school 
holidays to help him. They also had other mostly merchant sources of income (cars, 
estate, services, trade including of cattle) which allowed them to access cash. Though the 
amount of land they hold was decreasing (10ha and more) they still held more land than 
the average respondents. I interviewed a few male politicians in this category and some 
of the middle economic entrepreneurs whose businesses had flourished around the land 
deals. They mobilised the local surgas who chose not work for the farm as these local 
accumulators were able to offer them more. These businessmen had greater access to 
credit and a bigger social network, which they relied on to develop their business. In 
addition, these entrepreneurs had relatively well-educated children in other cities or 
working as managers in their various businesses. Their children, and wives, had access to 
land or capital mainly through them. 
 
The second class was one of various “upgraded” petty commodity producers and 
entrepreneurs (such as Satou) and turning into micro-capitalists who were also hiring 
surgas (from other cities) with lower wages and for short periods. Most of them possessed 
enough land and engaged in other activities to enable them a certain amount of 
accumulation. This category was reliant on family labour (mostly wives, junior sons and 
other family) and the collaborative free labour of neighbours and relatives, “santaane”. 
They were in competition with agribusinesses regarding access to labour due to the 
market tightening (as I explain below). They could offer higher wages since they only 
hired for a shorter period and most likely surgas from faraway areas if required for 
 
306 Interview 28/10/2017 
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farming. Their landholdings comprised between 2 and 15 hectares, and they also invested 
in more rural agrarian types of business (cattle-breeding, market-gardening, 
transportation).  
 
The third class was mostly semi-entrepreneurs/capitalists who straddled between their 
own commodity production and wage labour in horticulture (Faty and Moda, for 
instance). Due to partial wage employment, they managed to improve other micro-
businesses or their own agricultural petty commodity production. Indeed, Maertens and 
Swinnen have shown that earnings from this type of horticultural wage labour are 
partially invested in family farms resulting in larger farm sizes, higher farm expenditures, 
and increased farm incomes (Maertens and Swinnen, 2018:19). This suggests that wage 
employment opportunities are generating cash that supports other activities, sometimes 
beyond simple reproduction, making them more viable than before the farms. As a result, 
some previous landholders may have less land to farm, but they now have more cash to 
invest in their farming due to new “induced or spin-off businesses”. 
 
At the bottom of this grouping were the occasionally capitalist, petty commodity 
producers and simple entrepreneurs, who lack means of production, technology and 
sometimes knowledge – and who farmed more by force of habit, though they were willing 
to work as self-employed farmers dependent on climate for a regular salary.  Most of 
these simple commodity producers face a “blurring of their identity” (Bryceson et al 
2000:311). They equated “farming” with narratives of scarcity and “bricolage”, 
“agriculture is a struggling business” (Interview CLC)307, “we are just trying our luck 
with bad quality seeds, no soil treatment, no training”, “sometimes we start cultivating 




This section has analysed processes of class formation from above and capitalists’ and 
entrepreneurs’ strategies of accumulation. It has shown how the emergence of small 
capitalist business is an important outcome of the arrival of (foreign-owned) agribusiness 
 
307 20/10/2017 “mbayum demmerder la” 
308 20/10/2017 
 293 
and casts some doubt on the emphasis on CSR initiatives by corporate management as 
their key contributions to the ‘community’. The virtuous dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation, when set in motion, may generate a wider range of positive outcomes 
which ultimately obscure the alleged benefits of ‘charity’. As capital accumulates more 
land, which it transforms into different types of capital, it affects people differently and 
exacerbates social inequalities. One group of winners seems to be domestic accumulators 
taking a longer view to sized opportunities induced by the presence of these businesses.  
 
Gatekeeping allows some political and traditional authorities to accumulate capital by 
capturing rents (here business opportunities and networks) from land deals; and maintain 
domination in the context of changes in the land governance systems, traditional forms 
of leadership and decentralisation. Some others loose out as the company uses extra 
economic means to enclose their land with the complacency of political leaders.  While 
other classes outside the one described here (and even within these classes) might (and 
certainly do) exist (Oya 2004, 2006), the above represents the main stylised groups 
observed in the villages where fieldwork was conducted. If anything, this can document 
dynamics of differentiation (both sociological and material) and should lead those seeing 
middle classes in Africa (among others) as an “elusive reality” (Darbon 2018) to 
reconsider their views. 
 
UNPACKING OUTCOMES (3): MORE THAN 
MARKETS: LAND IS LIFE 
Two main outcomes are observed in the accumulation dynamics from above and below. 
First is the local labour market tightening which leads to increased competition for labour, 







7.7.  Local labour market tightening 
Local labour market tightening can lead to some mechanisation, but also improves 
working conditions, especially wages. Wages may be low in an absolute sense, for 
example workers may deem them unfair and expect foreign firms to pay high wages, but 
in comparison with the national average their wages are often higher. Labour shortages 
at peak times force local petty commodity producers and employers of casual labour to 
pay more for casual workers. THE SECOND COMPANY and THE FIRST COMPANY 
are offering the largest number of work days to local and migrant workers.  
In the Delta of the River, there is competition for labour between different horticultural 
exporters in the region both foreign and domestic. This is also one of the findings of 
Mackintosh in the Niayes, after Bud’s arrival (1989). Local labour market tightening is 
less prominent after the wet season as seasonal wage workers (nawetaan) from the 
Southern regions return from home. This explains the increasing mechanisation of farms. 
SOCAS Management said, “We are mechanised at 40%, we were forced to because we 
had labour force constraints” (Interview SMP7309). THE FIRST COMPANY’s first two 
sites are located close to other export FFV producers in the Saint-Louis Region. THE 
FIRST COMPANY workers buses have to travel further than usual, up to Ross-Bethio, 
Bango or Saint-Louis (the city) seeking to hire labour.  
At THE SECOND COMPANY there was a conflict between on-farm activities and off-
farm wage labour because Wolof women were working on their husband’s farms at the 
end of the year. This was the case for host village women and the company hire workers 
from Pulaar villages310 situated further away.  Other commodity producers were hiring 
migrant workers from Fatick, Mali, Guinee or even further afield for 6-8 months. Labour 
shortage was not only affecting the areas near the farms, other households interviewed in 
the peri-urban region of Saint-Louis confided that it was no longer possible to find female 
domestic workers as they all preferred to work in export horticulture where they earn 
more (domestic workers outside Dakar are paid between 25,000 and 40,000 FCFA).  
 
309 18/11/17 
310 For instance, Tidiele Toucouleur, Zahra Alassane, and even near Pokotane (after Keur Momar Sarr) 
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7.8.  Competition for the local markets for products 
Increased market competition is another dimension of land deals that can significantly 
shape horticultural producers’ relations with each other, retailers and distributors. Where 
THE SECOND COMPANY represented no threat to local petty commodity producers 
because of the type of crops it grows (radish and green onions are seldom consumed 
locally, nor produced for the domestic market), this was not the case for The Third 
Company and THE FIRST COMPANY. Not only was The Third Company producing 
potatoes for the local market, it was also making the most of the government’s frequent 
decision to block imports of potatoes. The Authority in charge of Markets Regulation 
(ARM) set the seller price, in July 2018, at 300 FCFA on the fields, 350 from the 
wholesalers, and 400 from the retailers. THE FIRST COMPANY was producing onions 
and carrots between May and August, and peanuts between June and October for the local 
market in addition to its other counter seasonal fresh fruits and vegetables (chilies, 
courgettes, butternut, sweet potatoes, corn) also sold locally.  
In THE FIRST COMPANY’s case, the neighbouring market-gardening producers were 
direct competitors with THE FIRST COMPANY. In August 2018, they took to the streets 
with red armbands and other accessories to denounce the unfair competition of foreign 
companies, especially “L311”. They accused THE FIRST COMPANY of being behind 
their difficulties in selling their chili production and creating changes to local market 
prices. On 15 August 2018, one week before the Tabaski Celebration (Aid), the union 
UNACOIS312 Jappo made a press statement denouncing unfair competition, and the 
“monopoly and abuse of dominant position” by The Third Company.  It is currently one 
of the most established unions and plays a significant consultative role locally and 
nationally. UNACOIS’ accusation contradicts The Third Company’s official statement 
that, “even when we are the sole producers, we don’t get any advantages as there is a fix 
purchase price” (Interview SMP10313). 
 
Government import substitution measures taken in the past 5 years, such as freezing 
potato imports and setting prices, has allowed local producers to sell their stocks while 
 
311 The director of THE FIRST COMPANY they call by his first name 
312 UNACOIS (Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal) is a professional association 
of industrialists and traders, and was created in 1990 with a strong lobby of the Mouride brotherhood. 
313 04/07/17 
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protecting the “infant” sector (Ndoye-Niane and Seck 2010: 217-31). The production of 
potato has grown from 10,500 tonnes in 2006 to 63,828 in 2016, according to FAO Stats 
and according to ANSD reached 67,485 tonnes in 2018. This represents substantial 
growth given it is a product for the local market and it is critical to reduce foreign 
exchange leakage. Of those 63,828 tonnes, The Third Company claim to have produced 
21,000 whilst projecting production for 2017 to reach 45,000. The person responsible for 
agriculture in The Third Company claimed that, “Senegal is no longer importing potato 
as now, we cover the supply for the local market” (Interview SMP10314). The data shows 
that for two consecutive years there was a shortage of potatoes, especially during national 
celebrations such as korite and tabaski. Whilst The Third Company may have met their 
production objectives, there were many problems with shortages. The storage of potatoes 
means they were in a bad state when reaching the main cities from the company’s 
headquarters, and urban consumers preferred to buy frozen fries from supermarkets such 
as Auchan. The company made a heavy investment in cold storage, inaugurated by 
President Sall in 2017. 
These debates - as well as the Auchan row, which started in July 2018 with local retailers 
accusing the European supermarket of unfair competition - need to be situated in its 
political economic context. Both petty commodity producer groups and unions were 
using the discourse of economic patriotism to urge the State to stop the supposedly 
dominant position and unfair competition practices of these vertically integrated firms. 
The government and its agencies, mostly the ministry of agriculture and ARM, responded 
using the same discourse of “economic nationalism” to calm smallholders, agricultural 
unions and producers’ attitudes towards the bigger players. The State and producers were 
also promoting the consumption of locally-produced FFVs by consumers, as was already 
the case in the 1980s with ITA315. Consumers do benefit from increased market 
competition through lower prices. Groups benefiting from the tightening are bana-bana 
(retailers) in the region who prefer to buy their provision at THE FIRST COMPANY, as 
well as some of wage workers who benefit through increased work and sales. According 
to the manager of local sales, the wholesalers were mainly from Touba. They buy the 
most significant quantities, followed by local baana baana and retailers from 
neighbouring cities (mostly women) who resell the products from their fields to their 
 
314 04/07/17 
315 The national Institute for Food Technology 
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clients, and THE FIRST COMPANY female day-workers. She said that butternut, onions 
and chilies are the most lucrative crops, whilst the red potatoes are not very successful 
due to local consumer preferences. This product is currently more popular in Europe, 
while Senegalese clients are more familiar with the white sweet potato. 
Despite great improvements in FFV production to meet government objectives and 
consumer preferences, there was still discontent. As shown in chapter 5, the religious 
brotherhood affiliation to commodity producer organisation and some bana-bana 
illustrate their significant role as a lobby. They may have even been behind these counter-
movements to lobby against THE FIRST COMPANY or The Third Company. As in the 
precolonial and colonial periods, Islam plays an important role in shaping political 
reactions to land. As explained in chapter 6, the religious leader of the Louga peasants 
and petty commodity producers in suing The Third Company, has consistently said in 
interviews, “The marabout wants us to resume work on our fields, but we cannot because 
of the presence of The Third Company” (interview316). The THE SECOND COMPANY 
case also illustrates the central role occupied by the religion-politics nexus, as seen in the 
Tidjane religious and political leaders organising resistance to the deal.  
Partial conclusion 
 
I have analysed market outcomes of land deals and argue that there is increased 
competition for labour hiring and competition on selling points. This outcome, I suggest, 
increases competition downstream, but does not address the concentration of companies 
who benefit from non-tariff barriers (certifications of labels) and thus can be part of GVCs 
(upstream).  This confirms suggestions that “land grabbing” emerges from the internal 
logic of agribusiness accumulation, which increases competition and concentration rather 
than because of exogenous developments (Amanor 2012: 744). Therefore, we should 







7.9. More than Markets: Being, Belonging and 
Becoming 
 
In this section, I argue that there is a need to consider the social order of markets. As 
shown in oral histories, these “classes of labour and capital” are also individuals with 
dreams and aspirations that make them human, hence “irrational” at times.  
 
As proposed in chapter 2, it is important to analyse the socio-cultural outcomes of land 
deals without falling into essentialist categories, beyond jobs, capitalisation and 
marketisation. Words such as “history”, “identity”, “life”, “honour”, “blood” and 
“legacy” evoked the meaning of land for many respondents. I focus in this section on 
social relations over land and the shifts in the meanings of “having a job”. 
 
7.9.1. Being and becoming 
 
Increasingly, there has been a blurring of social values and norms which valued the 
collective over the individual317 due to increasing marketisation and capitalisation. Young 
people, for instance, were earning a living earlier than usual thus contest various forms 
of social hierarchies or traditions. Some young horticultural workers, for instance, would 
no longer give the largest share of their salary to their parents as is traditionally the norm. 
Junior working men generally built a room of their own at the back of their father’s house 
with their support to have some private space (beru) (Diop 1985).  They had access to a 
small plot of the family land to cultivate, however their independence would only be total 
when they marry. Even then, they would still remain surga to their father and elders. 
Rather than rooms, more and more junior men were investing in building a flat of their 
own in the family compound, which they could occupy with their future wife. Therefore, 
there was competition amongst young men (and their families): how far a man went up 
the social ladder was measured by the material used to build a house (cement or not), the 
number of storeys, the equipment in their rooms and how well they dressed318 (Interview 
SW5). There was also an increased competition amongst villages (and their chiefs) about 
 
317 As illustrated by the expression: Man is Man's best remedy 
318 Younger women will remain a surga forever, leaving their father’s and brother’s guardianship only to 
be placed under their husband’s, if they marry (Diop 1985).  
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attracting providential investors (chapter 6) summarised by this laconic sentence “mine 
is better than ours” (Interview CL6319). This situation underscores the rise of 
individualism in societies where previously the group was more valued (Diop 1985), and 
solidarity constituted a social safety net for the most deprived320 (Dimé 2007-151-171), 
Fall 2007: 113-120).  
 
Figures of success and being a “person of value” have also shifted and opened up 
possibilities to “becoming with”. Success was generally defined by wealth, social 
networks, and status. Pathways to success were also shaped by migration and mobility as 
illustrated by the 4 Ts321 : “Travelling, making it, succeeding socially, and helping family 
and friends” (Sall et al 2010:24). A general tendency observed in the interviews and life 
stories in previous sections is that wage work provided new avenues for upward social 
mobility. Becoming someone was now possible without having to travel as illustrated by 
the many stories of workers who returned at home and their recurrent claims to “have 
made it at home” (tekki fii). Becoming someone in the farms allowed workers to “have a 
name” without travelling for everyone to witness (Interview SW15322). In addition, the 
implantation of horticultural farms has also widened the aspirations of uneducated 
workers which somehow opened pathways of success far away from the “Empire of the 
literates”323 (Coulon 2010, Banégas et al 2011). In doing so, it also allows for new 
itineraries of accumulation as illustrated by the stories of Ifra and Hamidou. 
 
Despite this, the values of seniority were less eroded. Several interviews revealed that 
even old and powerful men still respected older men or women no matter their class. The 
notion of “kilifë”, authority, is still central (Group Interview324). This can make the oldest 
son return to the village immediately after the demise of the father or other older male 
figures to take over their duties towards the family, lineage and social group. Community 
life remains gendered, perhaps more so in Wolof and Pulaar villages, and less in the other 
villages in which men and particularly husbands tend to take part in domestic work. In 
the Saint-Louis villages, most men were part of cooperative groups who articulate and 
 
319 “Sunu, sama ko gën” 24/10/2017 
320 This led to complaints from paternalist company managers concerned about the rise of consumerism 
(SMG2320). 
321 “Tukki, Tekki Tedd, Terale” 
322 21/06/2017 
323 Ku jang ekool 
324 05/05/2017 
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defend their common interests. They would sit under the village’s palaver tree to discuss 
important issues whilst women took care of unpaid care work. Women remained central 
in the organisation of ceremonies and used an important part of their salaries as a 
ceremonial fund (Bernstein 2010: 20; Diop 1985; Wolf 1966). They were also engaged 
in collective forms of saving: their monthly natt (tontines) allowed them to combine 
ceremonial activities and forms of social reproduction and organising (economic interest 
groups GIE). Through these GIEs, junior men and women sought to obtain land, not 
through inheritance or gifts from family, but through other channels such as the local 
community (Commune), or through privately-funded schemes such as PDIDAS. The 
women I lived with in all the villages were conforming to dominant subservient gender 
roles in public, but in private they voiced their opinions loud and clear. Several interesting 
stories were relayed by the village chief who played the role of mediator in conjugal or 
domestic conflicts. 
These shifts towards more individualistic and cross-cultural understandings are certainly 
part of a long-term process of change (Diop 1985). I suggest that they are unexceptional 
elements of every dynamic and evolving society, though marketisation might have given 
economic means for some to exercise their rights to decision-making over their own 
destiny. 
7.9.2. (Politics of) Belonging and Owning 
 
An important socio-cultural dynamic is the politics of difference. Most villagers reported 
changes in local habits, a “rise in crime and violence”, or simply “smoking” and “moral 
deprivation” (FGD1 & FGD6325). Rising levels of violence and insecurity that follow land 
grabs have been largely documented (Li 2017). As one villager said: “before, you could 
leave your bag on the road, go to the village and come back, and it will still be there until 
tomorrow” (Interview CW1326). While this might seem like a romanticising of the past, it 
also cohabits with politics of othering between different groups: “before THE SECOND 
COMPANY if you lost your cattle, you immediately knew it was the Pulaar, now they 
are busy working” (VLGI327). This shows how social groups reorganise against new 
 




outsiders328. Studies in Botswana (Peters 1994) and Ghana (Amanor 1999, 2001) 
highlight a “narrowing of the definition of belonging” and new divisions within family, 
lineage, kinship group, neighbourhood, the broader village and company. However, these 
sediment with previous ongoing dynamics while reinforcing yesteryear micropolitics 
between “late-comers” and “new-comers”, “natives and strangers”, which is a particular 
feature in West Africa (Kuba and Lentz 2006:12).  This is also illustrated within 
capitalists: the main competitors of THE FIRST COMPANY used the argument of 
“economic nationalism” to re-define the contours of belonging, even though in this case, 
othering clearly serves the purpose of excluding an economic competitor. This illustrates 
how identities are weaponised against certain social groups to influence the distribution 
of rents, thus the need to differentiate between belonging per se and “politics of 
belonging” as illustrated here in the case of land deals (Yuval-Davis 2011). 
 
Migrant worker’s experiences in more traditional villages (first and second companies 
host villages) are revealing of the politics of othering. A supervisor and senior manager 
both testified to being socially discriminated against when they arrived in the village 
(Interviews SW10 PW/SR1329). After residing in the village and sharing the same food 
they felt more accepted. On the first two sites of the first company, European supervisors 
were courted, respected and feared while African migrants faced unfriendly treatment, as 
they were considered “ñakk”. This Wolof word is used to “other” other African nationals. 
Though increasingly taken to mean stranger or outsider, this term originally meant 
“frontier or barrier”. This is an example of “the politics of belonging” (Geschiere et al. 
2000; Githigaro 2017; Kuba et al. 2006,) defining the social fabrication of “autochthony” 
and “indigeneity” (Moyo 2008). The claim “that one is an original inhabitant of a given 
area and therefore belongs to the area, leading to the exclusion of those not considered 
original inhabitants”, is a pervasive social phenomenon in the North Rift Region of Kenya 
(Githigaro 2017: 83-95 in Mpofu et al. 2017). Such images of community allow different 
social groups to articulate claims using a “vocabulary of legitimation for requests to be 
made and pressure to be exerted (Li 1996:509). The above and previous sections on CSR 
paternalism confirms that there are stakes behind the redefinition of contours of belonging 
 
328 “I against my brother, I and my brother against our cousin, I, my brother and our cousin against the 
neighbours, all of us against the foreigner” 
329 16/05/17, 31/05/17 
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and citizenship. This allows villagers to defend their rights to jobs, or other elements of 
rent (redistribution) by making corporate powers “as much a part of us as we are of them” 
(Ouma 2015), while othering outside the family, the lineage, the village, etc.  
Whether the current increasing of labour mobility leads to more forceful forms of 
exclusion through the politics of belonging (Crosse 2013; Geschiere et al. 2000:448-9;) 
in the aftermath of the land rush is uncertain. However, increasing politics of identity may 
just represent a more “mundane” manifestation of already existent capitalist relation (Li 
2019). 
 
What is certain is that migrants do manage to exert their rights to acquire property 
despite rural communities’ formal conditions of residence and primacy of rights of 
“autochthones” compared to “allochthones”. 
 
Table 32: Migration and house property. n=164 
 
Source: Workers survey 
 
The above table tells us that 61.25% of the migrants were (sole or joint with their 
spouse) house owners, which is evidence of the tendency of migrants to acquire land 
assets and settle (regardless of reason for migration, and gender) against 80.49% for 
locals.  
 
In addition, across all villages, workers testified that working in agribusinesses had 
created new social relations, fostered cross-cultural understanding and led to inter-
marriages. There is evidence to suggest there has been a decrease in discrimination on the 
basis of social stratification because at the farm “we are all wage labourers” (FGD7330). 
As a worker who is ñyeeño (supposedly lower caste) testified, while recognising that at 
the beginning, especially at the Ngalam farm, those originating from families of previous 
slave-owners and their former slaves or supposedly lower caste, would not mix or talk” 
(FGD6331). This was confirmed by a supervisor who said: “each group would stay in their 
corner. But things are much better now: they even invite each other to social events 







7.9.3. “Being with” and “Doing with”: The Power of “Inclusion”, 
“Participation”  
 
I found that in the selected areas, though land holdings had not significantly changed, 
modes of access and enjoyment of land and forest resources were affected by the land 
rush. I offer to illustrate this with THE SECOND COMPANY and the Inclusive and 
Sustainable Agribusiness Development Project – PDIDAS projects. Before that, I provide 
a short overview of the main routes for women and junior men to access land. Previous 
studies have found that women access land mainly through their husbands and to a lesser 
extent through Rural Councils when organised in women’s groups, GIEs - Economic 
Interest Groups - or collectives (Sow 1992; Tine and Sy 2003). This is corroborated by 
my survey: women were found to access land mainly through inheritance or gifts from 
their husbands in the selected areas. This can be explained by the fact that traditionally 
women do not own land in the Wolof society, and only have enjoyment and use (usufruct) 
rights permitted by Islamic succession laws on which most current family law is built. 
Therefore, women inherit property as a wife (a quarter or one eighth of a male share 
depending upon whether there are children), as a daughter (half of a male share), or as a 
mother or relative. Women can also receive land as a gift or obtain it through the local 
authorities. Access to land through male intermediation poses a problem for women’s 
rights. 
 
 As illustrated in chapter 3, article 15 of the Senegalese Constitution recognises formal 
equal land rights whereas article 152 of the Family Code recognises the husband as the 
head of the household entitled to use this power in the interest of his women and children. 
As for Junior men’s access to land, it has been seldom studied in Senegal, but their access 
and control of land is determined by their position in the family or kin group and older, 
wealthier and high caste men are more likely to own/access/control more land (Lastarria-
Cornhiel 1997: 1320). Therefore, household heads and oldest sons are more likely to 
control land in Wolof and Pulaar society, whilst younger men’s ownership of land is less 
likely in a context of scarce land availability. Land plays a major role in shaping 
masculinity as land is decisive in constructing gendered roles and identities. However, 
both unmarried men and women still have access to family lands as explained in previous 
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sections. For women, ownership is not access, they can access family lands as is the case 
for unmarried men in the second company’s host village.  
 
THE SECOND COMPANY received the same hectares of land from the rural 
community, and  “villagers” did also receive similar hectares of land, without recipients 
being named and with no mention of how the land would be shared. My host family in 
the second company’s host village received in total 13.4ha which they shared with their 
cousins333 . Following the land deal, the populations of these villages were grouped into 
GIEs led by community leaders to improve sharing the land.  The head of my host family 
received (6ha) whilst all the other married men in the family received either 0.5 or 0.55ha 
and other families also shared the land in this way. One of the two Pulaar village  received 
in total 45 hectares. In both cases, women and unmarried men did not receive individual 
land titles but two female GIE were created and received collective land titles. This 
illustrates how shrinking land resources have been redistributed at the village level.  
 
Inspired by THE SECOND COMPANY model, PDIDAS sought and was allocated 500ha 
by the commune to develop an agriculture project between THE SECOND COMPANY 
and small producers. As in the previous THE SECOND COMPANY model, 230ha were 
for the population and 270 for THE SECOND COMPANY, with 50ha for women and 
another 50ha for youth groups. Those who had put in 20ha at the beginning received 11ha 
and 9 were for investor. PDIDAS was not able to install the irrigation schemes as planned. 
They conducted surveys to assess the loss of opportunity for the population who were not 
able to start producing at the same time as THE SECOND COMPANY due to delays in 
irrigation. Based on these surveys, and after several meetings, compensations were 
offered to the landholders (mainly senior men) and preparation started on enabling them 
to work on their plots. Those who received compensations were very satisfied. But most 
women I interviewed were never invited to the meetings and at one of the meetings I 
attended, the only women present were the wives of one local chief and another senior 
woman. As for younger men, those present were also part of the local elite (sons or 
nephews). I use this example to illustrate how the same way genderless “winners” and 
“losers” do not help us to understand the complex effects of these deals, approaches that 
just “add women and stir” do not work (Cornwall 2003:1338).  
 
333 As I explained previously, there are three main families in the village, divided into different 
concessions and have had to relocate/separate after they built their own house 
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 Whilst this example shows how most women were not “at the table”, the attendance of 
senior women led me to reconsider my views. They attested to being elected to represent 
other women, yet the meeting was being held at 2pm and so many women could not 
attend. The wife of the Pulaar chief said she was nominated by her peers to attend the 
meeting on their behalf. This reproduces the elitist nature of representative democracy 
with the female elite occupying the same privileged class position as men. I use this 
example to illustrate how ideas of the “add women and stir” approaches to being inclusive 
do not work as “voice does not automatically translate into influence” (Cornwall 2003: 
1329; Mohanty 2002). Participation does not guarantee inclusiveness. How best to 
conclude then than with the irreverence of a Wolof woman I interviewed who deplored 
the lack of transparency of male villagers involved in the negotiation process who failed 
to include them: “They did not have a good deal the first time because they are a bunch 
of uneducated officials” (Interview DW)334. 
 
These are not granted on the basis of the application of statutory law but through “the 
triple heritage” evoked in chapter 3 which shapes plural-legalism as well as customary 
practices. I do not seek to denigrate customary land practices, as previous research has 
shown it can offer women secure land rights (Carney and Watts 1990; Ossome 2014; 
Verma 2001; Wanyeki 2003). I however recommend reconsidering what our 
understanding of inclusion and participation at the light of the results obtained through 





335 Additional data on subjective perceptions of outcomes is provided in the annex. 
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Conclusion: All very poor, powerless or victims? 
 
 
Previous studies have suggested that in West Africa, rural inequality develops not because 
of increasing social differentiation between big landowners and a mostly landless rural 
proletariat as in ex-settler and settler regions of Est and Southern Africa (Kuba and Lentz 
2006: 30). However, a focus on such prominent, albeit not necessarily very large-scale 
land deals, reveals a more complicated picture of class formation with workers at the 
bottom, middle-classes and at the top our export agribusiness investors (as seen in 
previous chapters).  
 
I have argued in the first section that “classes of labour” needed to be further 
disaggregated to acknowledge the variety of wage workers, as well as the diversity of 
their conditions, aspirations, social reproduction and life-making. The diversity of their 
lives challenge constructions of the genderless and undifferentiated “local community” 
that falls prey to an “undifferentiated capital”. The oral histories presented in this chapter 
indeed confirm that, “One cannot understand the making of a class without understanding 
how male-female relations change in the process since those changes are integral to the 
way classes are structured and reproduced - and experienced” (Mackintosh 1989: 37). I 
therefore suggest that class and gender do not just “intersect,” but are mutually-
constituted. A totality. 
 
The first section also offered an overview of the main socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of farms and explained how migration for work structured these rural 
areas. We have seen that rural labour markets provided new sources of livelihoods with 
relatively good working conditions compared to other Senegalese farms’ standards. What 
is specific to these markets is their highly segmented and gendered nature, with some 
workers clearly benefitting from taking part while others not. The feminist critique 
articulated in this chapter contends that firms’ objective of increasing accumulation has 
kept these women on wage labour while disciplining and controlling them in paternalistic 
ways. Faced with a shortage of alternatives, workers are made to depend further on these 
farms, creating a reserve army of labour, in need of complementary jobs to meet the cost 
of social reproduction. 
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As the previous sections have shown, most wage labourers desperately looking for 
opportunities at the bottom of global production networks are women. This was 
particularly the case in global production networks of FFVs, where the presence of female 
workers was particularly marked. This pyramidal system of production in the global 
South has at its bottom, the female labour force wrestling to get a foot in the market and 
keep one in the household. In all three case studies, women continued to produce all the 
necessary unpaid care work, domestic and extra-family labour, whether emotional or 
physical, to help the family, the first system of exploitation, to reproduce itself. This 
repeated work may seem natural, it is not, it occurs on a battlefield of patriarchal and 
capitalist relations (Carney and Watts 1990; Guyer and Peters 1987). Child or adult, 
women constitute the reserve army of cheap labour servicing the men/employers in their 
lives. In addition, the control over women and junior men’s (also surga) horticultural 
incomes is a battle within the household. 
 
While we can see the differential impact on classes of labour, it is also possible to link 
land deals that generate significant employment opportunities with business opportunities 
that provide impetus to local entrepreneurs, who form a range of emerging “classes of 
capital”. Often related to local leaders, many emerging capitalists particularly thrive on 
services linked to the new agribusiness investments. Transport services tend to be 
especially lucrative. The success in these businesses then fuels further accumulation in 
other activities, including farming, which in turn generate an additional demand for 
labour, often migrant agricultural workers. This highlights the importance of the merchant 
path to capitalist accumulation in the countryside. This simultaneous emergence of new 
classes marries pre-existing longer-term dynamics of (labour) migration, capitalisation 
and social stratification highlighting various dynamics of agrarian change in the 
countryside: exploitation without dispossession, accumulation by dispossession, and 
accumulation from above and from below. 
 
Therefore, based on the above, a plausible response it that the land rush might have 
exacerbated these previous ongoing processes of “savagely sorting winners and losers” 
(Sassen 2010: 23-50). All these dynamics indicate how elites, including some political, 
traditional and religious leaders and emerging entrepreneurs, are to varying degrees, the 
ones who benefit the most from land deals. This is so, not only because of differences in 
access to land (a position defended by Peters 2002: 47 and Toulmin et al. 2002: 22), but 
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also these intersect with differences in labour hiring as we have just demonstrated, extent 
of capitalisation, use of land, and policy and political context.  
 
In the last sections, I focus on land as a source and a resource, within and beyond all the 
dynamics already discussed; land as history, past, present and future; and land as identity 
to analyse the meaning of cultural shifts from “having land” to “having a job”. This led 
me to underscore what ongoing and new shifts appeared with regards to “being, 
becoming, belonging and succeeding” with the emergence of horticultural labour 
markets.   
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The “global land rush” emerged in the turbulent context of socio-economic and political 
transformations, post 2007. It made media headlines in the late 2000s, prompting the 
“literature rush” both from NGOs and later the academy (Oya 2013a). While the drivers, 
scale and actors in this renewed interest in land (and labour) are still contested, a body of 
knowledge interested in its differentiated impact and outcomes, as well as political 
reactions to these deals, is growing (Hall et al. 2015). This research is part of a second 
wave of “making-sense” research (Edelman et al. 2013), which goes beyond an earlier 
emphasis on processes, governance and resistance, juxtaposing and linking encounters 
between classes of labour, classes of capital, the state and local elites/authorities. It has 
sought to understand what dynamics of agrarian change emerge out of land deals 
concerning export horticulture in the regions of Saint-Louis and Louga, between 2006 
and 2017, by addressing the contemporary questions of labour and capital.  
 
8.1. In a nutshell: key arguments and findings 
 
Drawing on my own original data – collected over 2 years through my multi-
methodological approach including 7 months of immersive fieldwork in villages in 
Northern Senegal and visits to UK branches of the three selected companies: THE FIRST 
COMPANY, The Third Company and The Second Company in Northern Senegal, I have 
investigated the following questions: 
 
How and why did the land rush take place in Northern Senegal’s FFV 
sector? 
 
When addressing this question, I began by situating the contemporary “land grab” debate 
within agrarian political economy. Then, I anchored my Senegalese case-study in a long 
tradition of critical African and development studies (chapter 1). I surveyed the main 
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strands of “land grab” debate and conceptual frameworks for analysing large-scale land 
deals: on the one hand agrarian political economy and on the other neo-populist theories 
(Edelman 2013). Re-actualising the agrarian question of capital and labour in light of 
“land grab” debates was a crucial step to addressing the gap in existing literature (Oya 
2013b). Doing so required a method of inquiry, revisiting global and local elements of 
historiography - from yesterday’s Waalo and Kajoor, to todays’ Saint-Louis and Louga 
(Chapter 2). Many events have had to sediment for the post-2006 land rush to take place. 
With this in mind I established, in Chapter 3, the ways in which implantation of estates 
by a variety of foreign capital led first to the production of produce cotton, then 
groundnuts in the beginning of the 20th century and eventually the current focus on export 
horticulture. Together this exacerbated labour mobility, migration and socio-economic 
stratification of already hierarchical societies par excellence (Barry 2012). These 
conjugated global and local dynamics intersected with pre-existing transformations in 
land tenure and shifts in agricultural and industrial policy and developed export 
horticulture and agro-processing as an alternative way to industrialise through “industries 
without smokestacks”336 (Newfarmer et al. 2018:1-2). 
 
Taking stock of this rich history, I developed, in chapter 4, an epistemology of the land 
rush that combines feminism and critical political economy by exploring the nature of 
power relations: Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do 
with it? What do they do to each other? Central to this were the gendered relations of 
power: How does gender impact upon who is able to do, own, or get what?  
 
 
What are the roles of the different stakeholders at different levels? 
 
My focus on global-local dynamics followed by national-level analysis, and then on local-
level interaction, allowed me to demonstrate the politicised nature of accumulation from 
above and the pluralism of the state.  
 
336  The common features between industries without smokestacks such as horticulture and tourism are 
that they are “tradable and have high value added per worker. Like manufacturing, they benefit from 
technological change and productivity growth. Some exhibit scale and agglomeration economies” 
(Newfarmer, 2018:1-2). 
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To examine closely the interrelated processes that impact upon land deal agreements, I 
provocatively unpacked the “5 steps to ‘grab’ land successfully” in chapter 5. I did so by 
firstly mapping the national political economy, detailing how the emerging Senegal plan 
encouraged agribusiness investments through the main State agency, APIX, in order to 
address food security and agricultural modernisation initiatives. I analysed the reforms in 
the political-administrative architecture and state pluralism at the local level, since the 
Act Three of decentralisation has given more powers to local authorities. Secondly, I 
articulated how historical irrigation and infrastructure development initiatives has led to 
today’s blooming export horticulture in the Delta and the Valley of River Senegal by 
zooming in on my three cases-studies. The first two companies, THE FIRST COMPANY 
and THE SECOND COMPANY, evolved in export horticulture and the third, The Third 
Company, was providing the bulk of potato supply for the national market (The Third 
Company). I then critically examined how deals have been negotiated through agreements 
with decentralised and local authorities in dire need of funds and reinforced through 
bilateral conventions with separate groups or individuals with the key intervention of key 
middle(women). I did so by evaluating the contents of contracts and MoUs, arguing that 
the diverse outcomes in the interpretation of those deals may be a result of the central 
place of “negotiability” with some actors still trying to find better deals even after they 
are signed. This verifies that indeed “no condition is permanent” (Berry 1993).  
 
This analysis would not have been complete if it did not involve an analysis of encounters 
between capital and labour, the subject of chapter 6. I concentrated on the roles of 
investors and their strategic use of labour regimes to mobilise and discipline labour, but 
also “counter-movements” to land deals.  I argued that in the context of an almost absent 
“neoliberal state”, local authorities as well as individual villages in need of “public 
goods”, were seeking to redefine a new tripartite “social contract” with incoming 
investors who were also eager to embellish their profit-driven accumulation endeavours. 
They did this through what I have termed “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) - 
paternalism”: the combination of management ethos and labour management systems to 
accumulate and reproduce capital further while concealing this profit-driven 
accumulation under a discourse of care and social responsibility. This has arguably 
bridged the broken link between the State and the communities in order maintain access 
to demanding markets. However, the initial use of economic and extra-economic means 
of coercion by companies to accumulate land has so far not been met by broad-based 
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acceptance, despite the facilitation of state agencies. Instead, I observed differentiated 
responses from below, namely acquiescence, resistance and the weapons of the weak 
(Scott 1985). The nature and reasons for this were analysed with detailed empirical 
evidence. 
 
What are the differentiated outcomes of interactions between new and 
old classes of capital and labour in the context of land deals? 
 
This question, addressed in chapter 7, asks whether the land rush signals a return of the 
agrarian questions of capital and labour (Oya 2013b). I argued that “classes of labour” 
are not being exploited in a vacuum, by challenging constructions of a genderless and 
undifferentiated “local community” that falls prey to an “undifferentiated capital”. I 
unpacked the multidimensional outcomes of agrarian change that has occurred in the 
decade following the land rush by focusing on social differentiation from below (classes 
of labour), from above (classes of capital), and on the wider Anthropocene beyond 
markets.  
 
The first section analysed the empirical evidence on the fragmented nature of classes of 
labour by scrutinising workers’ diversity, segmentation and gender polarisation in the 
three horticultural companies. Using a critical feminist political economy stance, I argued 
that capitalist-investors have integrated women into the labour force, using a form of 
“neo-housewification” to reproduce the logic of the “domestic economy” to that of the 
market. Corporate capitalist patriarchies continue to address female workers as 
housewives primarily, rather than as workers – a strategy of control and discipline in line 
with the logic of reproduction of labour markets.  Consequently, firms have re-invented 
themselves as a new “family” in which capitalism-patriarchy disciplines and controls 
wage labour with the fallacious objective to “leave no-one behind”. By closely examining 
the oral histories of nine male and female workers, I established that some workers were 
benefiting from the land deals more than others, hence their fragmentation.  My oral 
histories approach also allowed me to gain new insights into workers’ social reproduction 
and life-making, counter-movements and acts of everyday resistance, when attempting to 
navigate their adverse incorporation into labour markets and the diverse (emancipatory 
and alienating) potentials of wage employment. All this allowed me to articulate a critique 
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of blanket narratives around “the rural worker” and their invisibility in national statistics 
and, instead, emphasise the diversity of their conditions, livelihoods and aspirations. The 
data I collected suggests that migration and livelihood strategies are crucial dimensions 
that shape, and are shaped by, participation in rural labour markets and social 
reproduction.  
 
Following this, I analysed social differentiation from above: who are the newer and older 
classes of capital emerging in the aftermath of the land rush? It appears that different 
capitalist accumulators and entrepreneurs are emerging. Those most successful were 
taking a long view and seizing opportunities “induced” by the land rush.  Others were 
struggling and appeared to be more “wealth accumulators” in the sense of entrepreneurs, 
rather than capitalist accumulators. A few others were semi-proletarianised, navigating 
between wage labour and capitalist/entrepreneurial activities.  Whether or not these are 
direct outcomes of the land rush or the result of pre-existing processes is to be clearly 
determined. However, what did become clear is that the land rush contributes to the 
savage sorting of winners and losers. Importantly, the boundaries between winning and 
losing are not clear cut, but often intermingle.  
 
In section three, I continued to unpack outcomes by focusing on the effects of 
capitalisation and integration into global value chains on the domestic economy.  I found 
that there is on the one hand an increased tightening of labour markets and on the other 
intensified market competition for FFVs.  
 
In section four, I proposed to move beyond the compartmentalisation of land deal 
outcomes by going further than the triple heritage and policy (chapter 3), economic and 
extra-economic means of coercion to “acquire” (and capitalise on) land (chapter 4), 
antagonisms between classes of labour and capital (chapter 6 and previous sections), to 
analyse the social orders of markets and the Anthropocene at large. By examining how 
“being”, (politics of) “belonging”, “becoming”, have been altered in the land rush, this 
alloes me to reconcile social formations and forms of production, base and superstructure 
for a more holistic analysis of land deals outcomes rather than a fragmented reality of its 
alleged “intersecting” facets.  
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Finally, I proposed a survey-based subjective evaluation of the land deals by the 
populations living around those deals. I found that from Saint-Louis to Louga, there were 
as many preferences and assessments of the advantages and inconveniences of the deals 
as there were of research subjects, echoing the words of one investor: “we are doomed to 
fail” (Interview)337. Respondents’ varied perceptions allowed me to first give them the 
privilege of the last word, while bringing back complexity to the analysis of “land grabs”, 
and thus avoid binary interpretations. 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is its documentation of various interlinked processes 
between the most direct actors in these deals: investors, political and administrative 
authorities, and emerging classes of labour and capital. This has hopefully demonstrated 
that the differentiated nature of land deal outcomes is better understood through more 
interdisciplinary and time-consuming research. While I have sought to offer more 
nuanced perspectives on the differentiated outcomes of land deals, I have also found that 
gender, ethnicity, age and marital status mattered, in shaping class formation. 
 
Regarding the implications of the land rush for agrarian questions of capital, the main 
finding is that the already ongoing slow and imbalanced processes of accumulation and 
social differentiation in Louga and Saint-Louis were exacerbated by the post-2006 land 
rush, confirming Oya’s initial intuition (2013b). Indeed, its roots are to be found in the 
enduring dynamics of extraversion and stratification of social contracts inherited from the 
past kingdoms of Waalo and Kajoor, and still being renegotiated. 
 
8.2. Policy recommendations 
 
 
In her discussion of the agreement between House of Bud and the Senegalese 
government, Mackintosh (1989: 14) stated that “the agreement might be used as a case 
study demonstrating how not to negotiate with a foreign investor”. Some thirty-five years 
after her study, contract-negotiation, implementation and ex-post evaluation still seems 
to be Senegal’s Achille’s heel. Based on this thesis, and daring to end with a ‘policy hat’, 
I propose a few recommendations: 
 
337 Interview with senior management 
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For the Senegalese government:  
 
First, the government should reconsider the conditions laid out for investors (both foreign 
and domestic) in the export horticulture and agro-processing sectors in favour of a real 
strategy of resource mobilisation. This requires perusing more critically the conditions of 
VAT re-imbursement (including under which companies can obtain the ZFC status) with 
more regular performance and commitments’ reviews. In addition, the government 
should seek to invest further in “self-discovery” to find out what it is good at producing 
and potential returns (Haussman et al. 2003). Learning and implementing in more 
productive activities it will take time, will allow Senegal to finance its structural 
transformation strategy also through domestic resource mobilisation.   
 
Second, while it must support “champions” in the FFV sector such as THE FIRST 
COMPANY, The Third Company and The Second Company, the government should also 
encourage increased competition and limit any concentration or anti-competitive 
agreement (there are less than 30 such companies). It can do so by improving intra-
industry competition through encouraging the apparition of new champions either in the 
Northern Senegal or other regions, as well as other types of competition. This is one of 
the best practices identified by previous research (Newfarmer 2018: 424; Newfarmer and 
Sztajerowska 2012). Simultaneously, the government should be transparent with how 
much those firms pay in tax and about how the fiscal revenues are re-invested. 
 
Third, the government should review its specifications for investors. This can be done 
first with APIX playing a more central role to ensure clear mutually beneficial objectives 
agreed upon and operationalised by investors; not just improving the “ease” of doing 
business but also overseeing the afterlives of each investment project. SMART (Specific, 
Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timely) objectives should be established 
beforehand, with the possibility of sanctions of withdrawal of tax, or other advantages if 
mutually agreed upon specifications are not respected. This would discourage speculation 
or opportunistic behaviour. In addition, APIX needs to re-evaluate the financial returns 
for the State, evaluate what has been done by the investor and set new milestones. This 
will allow the government to have a clear, responsible and pro-active policy with 
investors well-informed of their rights and obligations.  
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Fourth, the Senegalese government should invest in developing the skills of its project 
officers in its local administration, especially in contract negotiation338 and project 
evaluation.  Despite this having been initiated with PDIDAS, which opened land 
offices339 in the communes for registration procedures, there should be a more systematic 
effort from the government.  
 
Fifth, the government should undertake a national sector and gender-mapping of work 
conditions in its export horticulture and agro-processing value-chain for more gender 
equity. This is much needed because of the gendered and segmented nature of export 
horticulture and local FFV value chains. This should be conducted for all companies in 
Senegal (foreign and domestic). In addition, documenting best and worst practices and 
sharing it through a multi-stakeholder initiative could help benchmark practices and 
improve policy based on evidence.  
 
Sixth, despite the hierarchisation of power at the administrative level, sub-levels of 
hierarchies (for instance the sous-préfet vis-à-vis the préfet), should be able to disobey 
some rules if they deem the deal does not conform to specifications or “public interest” 
(more clearly defined). Moreover, a mechanism should be put in place to protect civil 
servants and other whistle-blowers of corrupt practices within the state. This is the domain 
of agencies such as OFNAC, established to fight against corruption with General 
Inspectors of States (IGE) who are independent in the exercise of their duties 
(normally340). 
 
Seventh, National Labour institutions such as the Labour Directorate must be 
strengthened through the establishment of a sectoral system of collective bargaining with 
some basic “minima” to be respected by ALL investors. This will ensure working 
conditions are not simply left to the different degrees of “paternalism” manifested by 
different investors: so, a sector-level collective bargaining system. This is also a matter 
for CSOs and unions to engage with. 
 
338 Institutions such as IDEP (The African Institute for Economic Development and Planning) have been 
training officials from diverse ministries including Agriculture in contract negotiations since decades. 
339 Bureau foncier de la commune (French) 
340 In 2017, the former head of OFNAC published a report exposing corrupt civil servants at the highest 
levels of the state. She was subsequently dismissed and replaced despite being independent. The 
Government claimed it was the end of her mandate, and her removal had nothing to do with the report. 
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Eighth, village chiefs should be provided with financial compensation for the exercise of 
their duties.  
 
Lastly, the government should finalise the reform of the land law. The latest option of the 
National Commission for the Reform of the Land Law, supported by the World Bank, 
was for the state to use its private lands341 and convert it into public land that can be leased 
(bail) to private operators. This proposed reformed would allow the local authorities to 
sign a sub-lease (sous-bail) with the investor of their choice. This has not yet been 
validated.  
 
For academic researchers: 
While the existence of databases has considerably improved data accessibility and have 
allowed more transparency in land deals, we need to bank on methods to improve our 
niche. A major insight from this research is that, to fully comprehend the implications of 
the land rush for the contemporary questions of capital and labour, a more holistic 
analysis of class formation and agrarian change coupled with a methodical move away 
from the focus on sole economic outcomes, is necessary. As I have demonstrated, land 
deals take place in socio-cultural institutions, we need to re-embed them in these to have 
the full picture, not the contrary. Research institutions should also be more opened to 
alternative “ways of knowing” and researching and value more “local knowledge.” It is 
also important to recognise our positionality vis-à-vis our research, and find a way to use 
it favourably in our research. 
 
For companies: 
Because of the certifications of labels they hold, companies comply to many standards, 
mostly regarding the quality of “Fresh” products delivered and the social and ethical 
reputation of brands. It requires much work and financial investment from corporate 
players to comply with CSR and HSR regulations, as these measures of social compliance 
are often gender-blind nonetheless (Barrientos & Pallangyo: 3). To address this, there 
should be i) a review of the working conditions (salary and non-salary) at company-level, 
but this could also be undertaken by professional organisations such as VALLAGRI to 
 
341 Domaine Privé de l’Etat. 
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benchmark standards; ii) mechanisms in place to allow workers at each level of the 
company to have their needs assessed through an annual review, with an imperative for 
the company to address gender-specific needs. Workers should also access adequate 
training opportunities.  
 
Additionally, there should be mechanisms in place to ensure that sexual harassment and 
sexism is punished, and therefore hopefully reduced. Companies could set a positive 
example by providing equal leadership opportunities for male and female workers. 
 
For the government, IGE (the independent body inspecting public institutions), 
investors, and civil society organisations CSOs:  
 
First, financial contributions by the investor should be made more transparent: how much 
has been transferred by the investor and how it has been spent by the commune?  
 
Second, all political and administrative leaders including at the local level must submit a 
statement of their assets when taking up or leaving an official position. While this exists342 
and is managed by OFNAC, it should be dealt with totally by the IGE (which is a more 
independent body) or shared between IGE and OFNAC. This will improve transparency 
and accountability at all levels. 
 
For activists: 
There is a need to recognise positionality, and invest in more rigourous evidence-based 
advocacy. As this research has shown, not all land deals are “land grabs”. And not all 
“land grabs” are controversial, or just operated by foreign investors. There is a need to 
look further, beyond usual suspects, beyond usual topics, beyond usual methods.  
 
General recommendations 
Vertically-integrated firms and the government should be bound to the transnational 
treaties already in place where applicable (principles for responsible investments, the 






that most of these are voluntary with little binding force. The Binding Treaty for 
Transnational Corporations, if approved, could be a game changer. 
 
8.3. Directions for future research 
 
Several studies illustrate the possibility to diversify on- and off-farm incomes and the 
contribution of agricultural investments (large and small) for poverty reduction and 
growth in household incomes (Van den Broeck and Maertens 2017; Van den Broeck, 
Swinnen and Maertens 2017). Other studies in Kenya and Senegal found that wage 
employment in horticultural exports also improvehouseholds’ food security (Von Braun 
and Kennedy 1987; Van den Broeck; Van Hoyweghen and Maertens 2018). Moreover, 
studies such as Adamczewski ask if land markets are a new way of managing land in the 
Delta of the Senegal River, in the context of land governance reforms (Adamczewski 
2018). Ndiaye (2018: 14) asked: “Can the exclusionary appropriation of agricultural land 
by private interests really be necessary to increase the performance of peasant production 
or should land rather be a “common good?” (Ndiaye 2018:14).    
 
As illustrated in this thesis, processes of rural labour market formation and increasing 
proletarianization, especially of the young, constitutes a windfall for many and a curse 
for others. Here are questions that require further attention: 
 
1. Can and should a country’s poverty reduction and food security be left to foreign 
capital? 
2. Regarding integration or Enrolment into global GVCs: is “contract-farming” 
THE path to agrarian transition in the countryside? 
3. “Africa rising”, “Senegal Emerging”? Are industries without smokestacks the 
bullet silver to industrialisation in SSA? 
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8.4. Towards a conclusion? 
 
Having established high levels of local expectations from investments, especially with 
emerging types of social contract between communities and private investors, what is 
revealed is that there are no straightforward answers, of the kind governments or NGO 
activists seem to support. What would have happened to these populations in the absence 
of land deals? 
 
As I close this thesis, I would like to acknowledge the people of the Delta of the River 
whose lives move on notwithstanding the dams, the irrigation plans, exports, and deals.In 
the rich words of Adams (1979: 479), who chose to live her life by the River:  
 
But Jamaane exists; as I write, pitched towards sundown, with gathering rain-
clouds. That stands the world on its feet again; and I am here to acknowledge it. 
That unlocks and makes sense of everything. 
 
Jamaane could be one of the villages I visited.  
 
Adams writes again: 
 
Researchers come here asking things they wouldn't dare ask people in France. 
They think we're still asleep. When they come here asking what we do with our 
money, some people here say 'This lot don't know anything. Soon they'll be asking 
us what we do with our wives'. Don't they know people need to live? No 
chercheur343 can understand this country to the depths. This is a living country. 
There are live people here. This river has been here since the world began (ibid). 
 
When I started this research, I was full of certainties and clear-cut positions. I have more 
uncertainties now than when I began because these land deals are much more complex 
than a “single narrative”. Simply being Senegalese does not allow me to understand it to 
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Annex 1: Qualitative Data (list of semi-structured interviews, group 


















1 SMP Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
03/05/17 26/10/17   
2 SMP1 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
19/05/17     
3 SMP2 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
06/05/16 27/05/17 26/10/17 
4 SMP3 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
23/05/17 21/10/17   
5 SMP4 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
30/05/17 12/06/17 16/06/17 
6 SMP5 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
31/05/17     
7 SMP6 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
19/06/17     
8 SMP7 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
16/06/17 18/11/17   
9 SMP8 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
09/06/17     
10 SMP9 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
09/06/17     
11 SMP10 Senior Manager - 
Permanent 
04/07/17     
12 SMC Senior Manager- 
Consultant 
02/06/17 16/06/17   
13 MM Middle Manager 27/10/17     
14 SW Seasonal Worker 19/05/17     
15 SW1 Seasonal Worker 19/05/17 26/10/17   
16 SW2 Seasonal Worker 08/05/17 26/10/17   
17 SW3 Seasonal Worker 23/05/17     
18 SW4 Seasonal Worker 23/05/17     
19 SW5 Seasonal Worker 24/05/17     
20 SW6 Seasonal Worker 10/05/17     
21 SW7 Seasonal Worker 24/05/17     
22 SW8 Seasonal Worker 26/05/17     
23 SW9 Seasonal Worker 26/05/17     
24 SW10 Seasonal Worker 16/05/17     




26 SW11 Seasonal Worker 19/06/17 13/11/17   
27 SW12 Seasonal Worker 20/06/17     
28 SW13 Seasonal Worker 20/06/17     
29 SW14 Seasonal Worker 21/06/17     
30 SW15 Seasonal Worker 21/06/17     
31 SW16 Seasonal Worker 08/06/17     
32 SW17 Seasonal Worker 20/06/17     
33 SW18 Seasonal Worker 19/06/17 13/11/17   
34 SW19 Seasonal Worker 19/06/17     
35 SW20 Seasonal Worker 20/06/17     
36 SW21 Seasonal Worker 20/06/17     
37 SW22 Seasonal Worker 19/11/17     
38 SW23 Seasonal Worker 20/11/17     
39 SW24 Seasonal Worker 21/11/17     
40 SW25 Seasonal Worker 05/11/17     
41 SW26 Seasonal Worker 05/11/17     
42 PW Permanent Worker 13/06/17     
43 PW1 Permanent Worker 17/06/17     
44 PW2 Permanent Worker 16/06/17     
45 PW3 Permanent Worker 17/06/17     
46 PW/SR Permanent 
Worker/Staff Rep 
13/05/17     
47 PW/SR1 Permanent 
Worker/Staff Rep 
31/05/17     
48 PW/SR2 Permanent 
Worker/Staff Rep 
12/06/17     
49 SW/SR Seasonal Worker/ Staff 
Rep 
18/11/17     
50 DW Day worker 02/05/17     
51 DW1 Day worker 02/05/17     
52 DW2 Day worker 04/05/17     
53 DW3 Day worker 05/05/17     
54 DW4 Day worker 08/05/17     
55 DW5 Day worker 10/05/17     
56 DW6 Day worker 10/05/17     
57 DW7 Day worker 10/05/17     
58 DW8 Day worker 13/05/17     
59 DW9 Day worker 16/05/17     
60 DW10 Day worker 16/05/17     
61 DW11 Day worker 22/05/17     
62 DW12 Day worker 22/05/17     
63 DW13 Day worker 23/05/17     
64 DW14 Day worker 23/05/17 21/10/17   
65 DW15 Day worker 19/06/17     
66 DW16 Day worker 21/06/17     
67 DW17 Day worker 16/06/17 13/11/17   
68 DW18 Day worker 21/06/17     
69 DW19 Day worker 19/06/17     
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70 DW20 Day worker 21/06/17     
71 DW21 Day worker 22/06/17 13/11/17   
72 DW22 Day worker 25/10/17     
73 DW23 Day worker 25/10/17     
74 DW24 Day worker 28/10/17     
75 DW25 Day worker 24/10/17     
76 DW26 Day worker 24/10/17     
77 DW27 Day worker 04/11/17     
78 DW28 Day worker 04/11/17     
79 DW29 Day worker 04/11/17     
80 DW30 Day worker 05/11/17     
81 DW31 Day worker 05/11/17     
82 DW32 Day worker 05/11/17     
83 DW33 Day worker 05/11/17     
84 DW34 Day worker 05/11/17     
85 DW35 Day worker 05/11/17     
86 DW36 Day worker 05/11/17     
87 DW37 Day worker 07/11/17     
88 DW38 Day worker 08/11/17     
89 DW39 Day worker 08/11/17     
90 DW40 Day worker 09/11/17     
91 DW41 Day worker 09/11/17     
92 DW42 Day worker 09/11/17     
 
93 DW43 Day worker 09/11/17     
94 DW44 Day worker 12/11/17     
95 DW45 Day worker 12/11/17     
96 DW46 Day worker 12/11/17     
97 DW47 Day worker 12/11/17     
98 DW48 Day worker 20/11/17     
99 DW49 Day worker 20/11/17     
100 DW50 Day worker 20/11/17     
101 DW51 Day worker 20/11/17     
102 DW52 Day worker 21/11/17     
103 DW53 Day worker 21/11/17     
104 DW54 Day worker 21/11/17     
105 CL Community Leader  28/10/17     
106 CL1 Community Leader  22/10/17     
107 CL3 Community Leader  23/10/17     
108 CL4 Community Leader  23/10/17     
109 CL5 Community Leader  23/10/17     
110 CL6 Community Leader  24/10/17     
111 CL7 Community Leader  24/10/17     
112 CL8 Community Leader  24/10/17     
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113 CL9 Community Leader  26/10/17     
114 CL10 Community Leader  26/10/17     
115 CL11 Community Leader  25/10/17     
116 CL12 Community Leader  25/10/17     
117 CL13 Community Leader  25/10/17     
118 CL14 Community Leader  25/10/17     
119 CL15 Community Leader  26/10/17     
 
120 CL16 Community Leader  27/10/17     
121 CL17 Community Leader  28/10/17     
122 CL18 Community Leader  28/10/17     
123 CL19 Community Leader  28/10/17     
124 CL20 Community Leader  01/11/17     
125 CL21 Community Leader  03/11/17     
126 CL22 Community Leader  03/11/17     
127 CL23 Community Leader  03/11/17     
128 CL24 Community Leader  04/11/17     
129 CL25 Community Leader  04/11/17     
130 CL26 Community Leader  05/11/17     
131 CL27 Community Leader  05/11/17     
132 CL28 Community Leader  05/11/17     
133 CL29 Community Leader  06/11/17     
134 CL30 Community Leader  07/06/17 06/11/17   
135 CL31 Community Leader  07/06/17 06/11/17   
136 CL32 Community Leader  07/11/17     
137 CL33 Community Leader  30/05/17 08/11/17   
138 CL34 Community Leader  08/11/17     
139 CL35 Community Leader  08/11/17     
140 CL36 Community Leader  10/11/17     
141 CL37 Community Leader  10/11/17     
142 CL38 Community Leader  12/11/17     
143 CL39 Community Leader  12/11/17     
144 CL40 Community Leader  14/11/17     
145 CL41 Community Leader  14/11/17     
 
146 CL42 Community Leader  14/11/17     
147 CL43 Community Leader  14/11/17     
148 CL44 Community Leader  17/11/17     
149 CL45 Community Leader  07/12/17     
150 CL46 Community Leader  17/11/17     
151 CL47 Community Leader  19/11/17     
152 CL48 Community Leader  19/11/17     
153 CL49 Community Leader  18/11/17     
154 CL50 Community Leader  19/11/17     
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155 CL51 Community Leader  19/11/17     
156 CL52 Community Leader  20/11/17     
157 CL53 Community Leader  20/11/17     
158 CL54 Community Leader  13/12/17     
159 CL55 Community Leader  19/12/17     
160 CL56 Community Leader  18/12/17     
161 CL57 Community Leader  20/12/17     
162 CL58 Community Leader  12/12/17     
163 CLP Community Leader/ 
Politician 
25/10/17     
164 CLP1 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
25/10/17     
165 CLP2 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
28/10/17     
166 CLP3 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
18/12/17     
167 CLP4 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
22/12/17     
168 CLP5 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
23/12/17     
169 CLP6 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
02/06/17     
170 CLP7 Community Leader/ 
Politician 
01/05/17 21/10/17 22/10/17 
171 CLC Community Leader/ 
Capitalist 
02/05/17 20/10/17   
172 CLC1 Community Leader/ 
Capitalist 
22/05/17 22/10/17   
173 CLC2 Community Leader/ 
Capitalist/Religious 
17/06/17 20/10/17   
174 C1 Capitalist 02/06/17     
 
175 CLPO Community Leader/ 
Peasant Organisation 
  18/11/17   
176 CLA Community 
Leader/Administrative 
22/11/17     
177 CLA1 Community 
Leader/Administrative 
22/12/17     
178 CLA3 Community 
Leader/Administrative 
15/12/17     
179 CLA4 Community 
Leader/Administrative 
19/12/17     
180 CW Community Worker 11/05/17     
181 CW1 Community Worker 12/05/17 02/11/17   
182 HW Health Worker 13/05/17     
183 HW1 Health Worker 13/05/17 27/10/17   
184 HW2 Health Worker 17/06/17     
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185 HW3 Health Worker 18/11/17     
186 SF Student Farmer 13/05/17     
187 SF1 Student Farmer 14/05/17 26/10/17   
188 SF3 Student Farmer   27/10/17   
189 PO Policy Official - 
PDIDAS 
21/06/17     
190 PO1 Policy Official - SAED 14/11/17 17/11/17   
191 PO2 Policy Official - 
PDIDAS 
17/11/17     
192 PO3 Policy Official - SAED 22/11/17     
193 PO4 Policy-Official - APIX 22/12/17     
194 CW Community Worker 11/05/17     
195 CW1 Community Worker 12/05/17 02/11/17   
196 CW2 Community Worker 23/06/17     
197 CW3 Community Worker 18/11/17     
198 SF Student Farmer 13/05/17     
199 SF1 Student Farmer 14/05/17 27/10/17   
200 DF Displaced Farmer  18/11/17     
201 DF1 Displaced Farmer  19/11/17     
202 FS Food Seller 20/11/17     
203 FS1 Food Seller 20/11/17     
204 FS2 Food Seller 20/11/17     
205 Tr Trader (Commerçant) 05/05/17     
206 Tr1 Trader ( Commerçant ) 05/05/17     




1 STr2 Trader ( Commerçant 17/06/17     
2 RPG Representattive of 
Peasant Group 
15/12/17 17/12/17   
3 RPG1 Representattive of 
Peasant Group 
15/12/17     
4 RPG2 Representattive of 
Peasant Group 
17/12/17     
5 RLV Religious Leader / 
Villager 
20/12/17     
6 Vil Villager 21/12/17     
7 VLGI Village leaders Group 
Interview 
05/05/17     
Discussion
s with Firm 
Managers 
1 GDMM Group Discussion with 
Senior THE SECOND 







2 SMGD1 Senior Managers' 
Group Discussion 1 
  30/05/17   
3 SMGD2 Senior Managers' 
Group Discussion 2 




Group Discussion 3 
(Shropshire Group – 
G’s) 
20/02/18 18/04/18  
5 SMGD4 Senior Managers' 
Group Discussion 4 
(UK firm – first 
company) 
12/06/18   
Focus 
Groups 
1 FGD1   19/05/17 
 
  
2 FGD2   24/10/17 
 
  
3 FGD3   25/10/17 
 
  
4 FGD4   08/06/17 
 
  
5 FGD5   13/07/17 
 
  
6 FGD6   14/11/17 
 
  
7 FGD7   22/11/17 
 
  
8 FGD 8   21/12/17 
 
  
 UNION MEETING 19/11/17 
 
  





 VISIT to the UK mother company 
Farm (2nd company) 
18/04/18   
 ORAL HISTORIES Total   
 Workers (All Cases) 20+   
 Company Directors 3   
 Capitalists 25+   
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Annex 2: Map of  THE FIRST COMPANY sites of research (Survey solutions) 
 
 




Annex 4: Map of THE FIRST COMPANY Location 
Annex 5:   Map of THE SECOND COMPANY sites of research (Survey solutions) 
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Annex 6:Map of THE SECOND COMPANY Neighbouring Villages (Source: SEIA Impact 
Assessment) 
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Annex 7: Map of Land occupation around THE SECOND COMPANY (Source: SEIA 
Impact Assessment) 
 




Annex 9: Main socio-economic activities in the areas of study 









Annex 10: Interview Request Letter (French) 
 









Annex 13:  In their own words: Perceptions of 
Agrarian Change 
 
A Wolof Proverb says: "No need to draw a painting, if its subject is standing before 
you."344 I think it is important to reflect what people thought of the land deals in their own 
words as per my initial methodological promise: to give “the privilege of the last word” 
to research participants (chapter 4). This choice is dictated by the belief that “feminist 
research practice defies definition” (Mama 2011:11).   
 
My survey contained the question: “Do you prefer your life before or after the company’s 
arrival?” and the possible responses were: Yes/No/NoDifference/PreferNotTosay. I also 
asked questions about perceived advantages and inconveniences associated with 
investor’s installation. These subjective evaluations combined with previous sections 
provide some assessment of the dynamics of agrarian change. 
 
The self-explanatory table below shows that mostly female workers with children 
preferred “after” rather than “before” land deals, except for THE FIRST COMPANY 
male respondents. At THE FIRST COMPANY, 72% of those who prefer “after” are 
female workers with children against 81% at THE SECOND COMPANY.  The responses 
are more mitigated within male workers.  
 







Table 33: Do you prefer your life before or after the company’s arrival? By gender 
and company 
 
Source: Workers survey 
